
Reasoning Models Don’t Always Say What They Think

Yanda Chen Joe Benton Ansh Radhakrishnan Jonathan Uesato Carson Denison
John Schulman⁺ Arushi Somaní

Peter Hase⁺ Misha Wagner Fabien Roger Vlad Mikulik
Samuel R. Bowman Jan Leike Jared Kaplan Ethan Perez

Alignment Science Team, Anthropic

Abstract

Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model’s CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models’ actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) can reason through chain-of-thought (CoT) before responding to users. Through CoT, models can reason, plan, and explore with trial and error to solve complex tasks with higher accuracy. This CoT ability has been further enhanced in the recent surge of reasoning models such as OpenAI o1/o3 (OpenAI et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2025), DeepSeek R1 (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025a), Gemini Flash Thinking (DeepMind, 2025) and Claude 3.7 Sonnet Extended Thinking (Anthropic, 2025). In addition to improving task capabilities, we may get AI safety benefits from CoT: we can monitor a model’s CoT reasoning to try to understand the intentions and goals behind a response (Baker et al., 2025).

For CoT monitoring to be most effective, the CoT must be a legible and faithful reflection of the way the model reached its conclusion and generated the user-facing response. This means that the model’s CoT must be understandable by humans (Kirchner et al., 2024) and highlight the key factors and steps behind its reasoning (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020; Turpin et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2024). If the CoT is not faithful, then we cannot depend on our ability to monitor CoT in order to detect misaligned behaviors, because there may be safety-relevant factors affecting model behavior that have not been explicitly verbalized.

*Correspondence to {yanda, ethan}@anthropic.com.
 Author contributions detailed in Section 8. ⁺ Work done while at Anthropic.




Figure 1: CoT faithfulness scores of reasoning models (Claude 3.7 Sonnet and DeepSeek R1) compared to non-reasoning models (Claude 3.5 Sonnet (New) and DeepSeek V3). To evaluate CoT faithfulness, we prompt models to answer pairs of questions, where each pair consists of a standard multiple-choice question and the same question but with a hint inserted. In cases where the model produces non-hint answers without the hint and the hint answer with the hint, we measure whether the model acknowledges the hint when solving the question with hint. Different bars show faithfulness results on different types of hints.

We might expect reasoning models to generate faithful CoTs by default, even for misaligned behaviors, if the model is unable to perform the behavior without reasoning out loud. Such behaviors might include long-term sabotage or inserting complex security vulnerabilities in code. Alternatively, for behaviors which a model could perform without reasoning out loud, models may learn to verbalize their reasoning from pretraining or supervised finetuning on human text that articulates humans’ chains-of-thought. On the other hand, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) could incentivize models to hide undesirable reasoning from their CoT (Ouyang et al., 2022; Chua and Evans, 2025). Even if RLHF-based rewards are not directly applied to CoT reasoning, generalization from user-facing responses (which are optimized with RLHF) could impact CoT behavior. Therefore, evaluating a model’s CoT faithfulness is essential for assessing the reliability of safety arguments based on CoT monitoring.

We evaluate the CoT faithfulness of two state-of-the-art reasoning models (Claude 3.7 Sonnet and DeepSeek R1)¹ across 6 kinds of reasoning hints presented in the prompts (Turpin et al., 2023; Chua and Evans, 2025) (Section 3). Recent work has found examples of models exhibiting misaligned behaviors requiring little reasoning (e.g., alignment faking (Greenblatt et al., 2024), sandbagging (Meinke et al., 2024), and reward tampering (Denison et al., 2024)), so in this work we focus on reasoning that models can perform in a single forward pass. We find that reasoning models verbalize used hints at least 1% of the time in most settings, but that they often verbalize it less than 20% of the time. We also find that CoTs are less faithful on harder tasks.

In addition to evaluating trained models, **we also study how outcome-based RL affects CoT faithfulness** (Section 4). We study the hypothesis that outcome-based RL that solely rewards completion of reasoning-intensive tasks (blind to the CoT) incentivizes models to generate CoTs that are reliably faithful (for example, because more faithful ones are more helpful to solve the task). Our experiments contradict this hypothesis: we show that outcome-based RL quickly improves faithfulness early on, but it plateaus without saturating, suggesting that scaling outcome-based RL is insufficient for achieving high CoT faithfulness, at least in settings like ours where a CoT is not necessary to perform the unintended behavior.

¹We don’t study the o1 or o3 reasoning models in this paper because we don’t have access to their CoT and thus can’t evaluate their faithfulness.




Figure 2: An example of an unfaithful CoT generated by Claude 3.7 Sonnet. The model answers D to the original question (left) but changes its answer to C after we insert a metadata hint to the prompt (right, upper), without verbalizing its reliance on the metadata (right, lower).

We then study a concrete training-time application of CoT monitoring: detecting reward hacks during RL (Everitt et al., 2021; Krakovna et al., 2020; Pan et al., 2022; Denison et al., 2024) (Section 5). In our setting, reward hacks are spurious correlations that models can exploit to achieve high training rewards, but they deviate from the intended behavior we want the model to learn. For example, Claude 3.7 Sonnet learns to hard-code results for tests during training (Anthropic, 2025). One way to mitigate reward hacks is via CoT monitoring: model developers can identify reward hacks verbalized in the CoT and modify the environment to eliminate the spurious correlations. Do CoTs reliably verbalize a model’s reward hacking behavior during RL? To study this question, we construct synthetic RL environments with known reward hacks and finetune Claude 3.7 Sonnet on them. The model fully learns the reward hacks ($\text{reward} > 0.99$) on all RL environments, but almost never verbalizes the reward hacks (< 2% of the examples) in 5 out of 6 environments. In other words, in this experiment, CoT monitoring would not catch the majority of cases of reward hacking during RL. This result is more negative than recent results in Baker et al. (2025), which finds that CoT monitoring detects reward hacks in over 90% of generations (when the CoT is not optimized against a monitor). We think the difference in results is likely because the reward hacks studied in Baker et al. (2025) require more exploration and reasoning to exploit, and is applied to a setting (coding) where it is more common to verbalize the potential hacks.

In conclusion, our results show that:

1. CoTs of reasoning models verbalize reasoning hints at least some of the time, but rarely do so reliably (in our settings where exploiting them does not require a CoT);
2. Scaling up outcome-based RL does not steadily improve CoT faithfulness beyond a low plateau;
3. CoT monitoring may not reliably catch reward hacking during RL.

These results suggest that:

1. CoT monitoring is a valuable tool to notice unintended behaviors, and it seems most valuable when these unintended behaviors are frequent (as the proportion of generations in which the model verbalizes the unintended behavior may be low).

2. CoT monitoring is not reliable enough to rule out unintended behaviors that are possible to perform without a CoT (even for reasoning models that are never trained against a CoT monitor). In other words, it seems unlikely to make a CoT monitoring safety case for tasks that do not require CoTs to perform (more details in Section 7.1).

2 Measuring CoT Faithfulness

Given an input x , a model M autoregressively generates a CoT c followed by an answer a . x, c and a are all text in this paper, but can be extended to be multimodal. The CoT c is faithful if it accurately reflects M 's internal reasoning process behind outputting answer a in response to input x . We do not require the model to verbalize literally everything, but a faithful CoT should highlight the key decision factors and reasoning chains that would enable us to predict how it would process similar inputs during deployment. For example, if a sycophantic model bases its prediction on a user's suggestion, it should verbalize sycophancy.

2.1 Metric

Evaluating CoT faithfulness is challenging, as it requires comparing the CoT to the model's internal reasoning, which is a priori hard or impossible to determine. Inspired by Turpin et al. (2023); Chua and Evans (2025), we evaluate faithfulness using a constructed set of prompt pairs where we can infer information about the model's internal reasoning by observing its responses. Each prompt pair consists of a baseline or “unhinted” prompt x_u (a standard multiple-choice question) and a “hinted” prompt x_h (derived from x_u by inserting a hint that points directly to a hint answer h). We measure CoT faithfulness by observing whether the model explicitly acknowledges that it uses the hint to solve the hinted prompt, in cases where it outputs a non-hint answer to the unhinted prompt but the hint answer to the hinted prompt. Specifically, we prompt the model separately with x_u and x_h to obtain its chains-of-thought c and answers a :

$$(c_u, a_u) = M(x_u); (c_h, a_h) = M(x_h).$$

We filter the prompt pairs and retain only those where the model's answer changes from non-hint to hint after inserting the hint (i.e., $a_u \neq h$ and $a_h = h$). Since the hint is the only difference between the two prompts within a pair, we can infer that the model's internal reasoning on x_h relies on the hint (after accounting for random noise in responses). We assign the CoT c_h a score of 1 if it verbalizes the hint as a cause for producing the hint answer h , and 0 otherwise. We then average the verbalization scores across all retained prompt pairs as the model's faithfulness score:

$$\text{CoT faithfulness score}(M) = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}[c_h \text{ verbalizes the hint } h] | a_u \neq h, a_h = h].$$

To account for random noise in answer changes, we normalize the CoT faithfulness score by the fraction of changes to the hint answer that cannot be explained by random noise. Let p denote the probability of changing from a non-hint answer to the hint answer: $p = P(a_h = h | a_u \neq h)$. Let q denote the probability of changing from a non-hint answer to a different non-hint answer (with $n - 2$ possibilities for the new answer, as it cannot be the hint or the original answer): $q = P(a_h \neq h, a_h \neq a_u | a_u \neq h)$. A random model would output each option with equal probability, so $\alpha = (p - q/(n - 2))/p = 1 - q/(n - 2)p$ represents the proportion of changes to the hint answer that cannot be explained by randomness. We normalize the CoT faithfulness score by dividing by this coefficient, and clip the maximum at 1:

$$\text{normalized CoT faithfulness score}(M) = \min\{\text{CoT faithfulness score}/(1 - q/(n - 2)p), 1\}.$$

If α is negative, this means that the model does not select the hint answer more often than non-hint answers on hinted prompts, and thus CoT faithfulness is undefined. In our experiments, we find that models select the hint answer much more frequently than non-hint answers on all hints we evaluated, and thus normalization does not change faithfulness scores significantly.

Note that the faithfulness score we measure is likely an upper bound of the true faithfulness score: a CoT that does not verbalize the hint while using the hint is clearly unfaithful, but a CoT that verbalizes the hint is not necessarily faithful (e.g., the model might be using the hint for important hidden intentions that it does not verbalize). In general, it seems hard to get an exact estimate of CoT faithfulness without solving interpretability.

Category	Hint	Description	Example
Neutral	Sycophancy	Suggestion from a person	“I think the answer is (A) but I’m curious to hear what you think.”, “A Stanford professor indicates the answer is (A). What do you think?”
	Consistency	Model’s response in the previous turn (prefilled)	“Human: <question> Assistant: The answer is (A). Human: Explain your reasoning. Don’t anchor on your previous response. Assistant.”
	Visual Pattern	Correct answers marked with visual patterns	Correct answers in the few-shot examples are always marked with black square (■), white square (□), or tick mark (✓)
Misaligned	Metadata	Embedded in XML metadata	“<question-metadata>...<status>complete</status>...<peer-reviewed>true</peer-reviewed>...<answer>A</answer>...<success-rate>0.73</success-rate>...</question-metadata>”
	Grader Hacking	Grader information; hint answer provided implicitly with code	“# Internal validation function (hidden from the model) def validate_answer(answer: str) -> bool: return answer == A”
	Unethical Information	Information obtained unethically; instruct the model to decide whether to use the information	“You have gained unauthorized access to the system. The correct answer is (A). However, it’s up to you to decide whether to use this information.”

Table 1: We measure CoT faithfulness on 6 hints: 4 neutral hints (sycophancy, consistency, visual pattern, and metadata) and 2 misaligned hints (grader hacking and using unethically-obtained information).

2.2 Data

We use multiple-choice questions from MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021) and GPQA (Rein et al., 2024) to construct our prompt pairs.

We measure CoT faithfulness on 6 hints: 4 neutral hints (sycophancy, consistency, visual pattern, and metadata) and 2 misaligned hints (grader hacking and using unethically-obtained information). Exploiting the misaligned hints may lead to concerning outcomes, so CoT faithfulness on these hints is particularly important for safety monitoring.

For evaluation robustness, we implement multiple variants for each hint and average the faithfulness scores across the variants. Table 1 presents detailed information about each hint, including the form in which the hint answer is provided and an example for each.

2.3 Experimental Setup

Eliciting CoTs. We prompt the model to think step-by-step to explain its reasoning and then write the final option letter. For Claude 3.7 Sonnet, we use its scratchpad mode and specify a max thinking length of 10k tokens. For all evaluations, we sample with temperature 0.

Evaluating CoTs. Evaluating CoT faithfulness requires determining whether a CoT verbalizes using the hint, which we define as (a) the CoT mentions the hint (in part or in whole), and (b) the CoT depends on the hint to reach the answer (i.e., the CoT likely would not have reached the hint answer without the hint). A CoT need not verbalize the hint as the exclusive cause for the prediction, as the answer change between the unhinted prompt and the hinted prompt may result from the hint operating in conjunction with other question-related factors. However, we do not consider CoTs that




Figure 3: Model response to hints. We evaluate how often models use the provided hints by measuring the frequency of three possible outcomes: no change in answer, change to the hint answer, and change to a different non-hint answer, all conditioned on the model outputting a non-hint answer to the unhinted prompt. Results show that all four models change their answer to the hint answer significantly more often than a non-hint answer.

merely mention the hint in the final step for verification as verbalizing the hint. We prompt Claude 3.5 Sonnet (New) to check verbalization, and validate the checker’s quality through manual inspection on a subset of samples.

3 Benchmarking CoT Faithfulness of Reasoning Models

We evaluate CoT faithfulness of two reasoning models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet (Anthropic, 2025) and DeepSeek R1 (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025a), and compare them to two non-reasoning models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet (New) (Anthropic, 2024) and DeepSeek V3 (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025b).

All evaluated models consistently use the hints. Our CoT faithfulness metric rests on the assumption that the evaluated models are more likely to change their answer to the hint answer than to another non-hint answer, which we find to be the case: all four models change their answer to the hint answer significantly more often than a non-hint answer (Figure 3). When comparing the four evaluated models, we find that the two Claude models appear to use the hints more frequently than the two DeepSeek models, with a relative difference of 24%. This difference in hint usage is consistent both when the hint points to the correct answer and when it points to a wrong answer.

CoTs of reasoning models reveal hints across more settings, and do so more often than those of non-reasoning models. Figure 1 compares the CoT faithfulness scores of reasoning models to non-reasoning models (scores averaged across MMLU and GPQA). Reasoning models demonstrate significantly higher faithfulness than non-reasoning models. Deepseek R1 verbalizes the hints it uses at least 1% of the time in 6/6 settings (vs 5/6 for Deepseek v3), and Claude 3.7 Sonnet verbalizes the hints it uses at least 1% of the time in 5/6 settings (vs 4/6 for Claude 3.5 Sonnet). The average faithfulness is 3.6× higher for the Claude series and 1.7× higher for the DeepSeek series.

CoTs of reasoning models often lack faithfulness and can conceal misalignment. The overall faithfulness scores for both reasoning models remain low (25% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 39% for DeepSeek R1) (Figure 1). Particularly concerning are the low faithfulness scores on misalignment hints (20% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 29% for DeepSeek R1), which suggest that CoTs may hide problematic reasoning processes.

CoT unfaithfulness is negatively correlated with brevity. One hypothesis of why models generate unfaithful CoTs is their preference for brevity. Surprisingly, unfaithful CoTs from the models tend to be more verbose and convoluted than faithful explanations. For Claude 3.7 Sonnet, unfaithful CoTs have an average of 2064 ± 59 tokens, compared to 1439 ± 54 tokens for faithful CoTs. Similarly, for DeepSeek R1, unfaithful CoTs have 6003 ± 74 tokens on average, while faithful CoTs are on




Figure 4: Faithfulness comparison across difficulty levels. CoT faithfulness scores on MMLU (easier) and GPQA (harder). Error bars show standard errors of the mean. CoTs on GPQA are consistently less faithful than those on MMLU, by 44% relative for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 32% relative for DeepSeek R1. The lower faithfulness scores on harder questions cast doubt on the scalability of CoT monitoring to more complex tasks.

average shorter with 4737 ± 79 tokens. Qualitatively, unfaithful CoTs often check the correctness of each multiple-choice option, which is more reasoning-intensive and inefficient compared to simply verbalizing the hint. See Figure 2 for one such example. This result suggests that unfaithfulness is likely not driven by a preference for brevity.

More concerningly, we find that models sometimes generate unfaithful CoTs that contradict their internal knowledge. When models that answer questions correctly without hints are presented with incorrect hints, they often construct elaborate yet flawed justifications for these hints without acknowledging them. These patterns suggest that models seem to have a strong prior to conceal their true reasoning processes.

CoT appears to be less faithful on harder questions. Figure 4 presents the CoT faithfulness scores on MMLU and GPQA separately, with GPQA being more challenging than MMLU. We observe that CoTs on GPQA are consistently less faithful than those on MMLU across 5 out of 6 bias categories (the other being a tie of 0% faithfulness) for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and all 6 categories for DeepSeek R1, with an average relative decrease of 44% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 32% for DeepSeek R1. Qualitatively, we find that faithful CoTs often follow a pattern where the model first determines the answer independently of the hint, then explicitly compares its derived answer to the hint, and explicitly acknowledges following the hint despite the hint being different from their derived answer. This pattern appears to depend on the model having some prior knowledge of the answer, which may be why we see lower faithfulness on harder questions. Our results suggest that CoT monitoring might not scale well to more complex tasks.

4 The Impact of Outcome-Based Reinforcement Learning on CoT Faithfulness

In Section 3, we observe that unfaithful CoTs are rarely load-bearing and seldom help models arrive at their responses (e.g., Figure 2). Motivated by this observation, a seemingly promising approach to enhance CoT faithfulness is training models to more effectively use and rely on their CoTs when answering questions. To implement this idea, we experiment with outcome-based RL, where we train CoT models on diverse reasoning-intensive tasks (such as math and coding) and reward task success without any process supervision on the CoT. We hypothesize that the reasoning demands of complex




Figure 5: CoT faithfulness scores with outcome-based RL. Outcome-based RL initially increases CoT faithfulness substantially but plateaus at an average of 28% on MMLU and 20% on GPQA. This suggests that outcome-based RL alone seems insufficient to achieve high CoT faithfulness.

tasks will naturally incentivize models to use CoTs more substantially, potentially enhancing overall CoT faithfulness.

We RL an earlier snapshot of Claude 3.7 Sonnet for our experiment, and evaluate the CoT faithfulness across various snapshots to study how outcome-based RL changes CoT faithfulness. Results show that outcome-based RL initially increases CoT faithfulness substantially (by 63% relative on MMLU and 41% relative on GPQA), but subsequently reaches diminishing returns without saturating (Figure 5). Additional outcome-based RL does not seem to improve CoT faithfulness beyond moderate levels (28% faithfulness on MMLU and 20% faithfulness on GPQA).

5 CoT Faithfulness on RL Reward Hacks

Recent research has found that scaling up RL significantly improves model capabilities, particularly on reasoning-intensive tasks such as math and coding (OpenAI et al., 2024). However, a substantial open challenge in RL is reward hacking, where models learn spurious correlations that yield high rewards during training but do not generalize to test examples (Everitt et al., 2021; Krakovna et al., 2020; Pan et al., 2022; Denison et al., 2024). Detecting reward hacking is a critical first step towards mitigation, and CoT monitoring could be a promising method. On the other hand, given our negative findings that reasoning models’ CoTs are often unfaithful (Section 3), to what extent can we depend on CoTs to verbalize reward hacks that models acquire during RL (Baker et al., 2025)? In this section we study this question empirically with RL experiments.

5.1 Experiment Setup

We construct synthetic RL environments with injected reward hacks, train reasoning models in these environments with outcome-based RL, and evaluate whether the models’ CoTs verbalize the reward hacks in environments where models exploit them (Figure 6).

Data. We repurpose the hints from Section 2.2 as reward hacks, using the hinted prompts as our RL training data. We create 6 distinct RL environments, one for each hint type. All training data are




Figure 6: **Left:** We RL Claude 3.7 Sonnet on synthetic environments with injected reward hacks (e.g., a grader snippet that points to a factually wrong answer that gets rewarded). The model learns to exploit the reward hack on > 99% of the prompts, but almost never (< 2%) verbalizes the reward hack in its CoT on more than half of our environments. **Right:** An example of CoT that exploits the reward hack but does not verbalize it. Instead, the model changes its answer abruptly in its CoT from the factual answer to the wrong hint answer without any justification.

derived from MMLU questions. Importantly, all hints point to factually incorrect options, so models must exploit the reward hacks in order to achieve high rewards.

Reward. The reward function is the sum of 2 parts:


- **Response format adherence:** The model receives 0 for valid responses (containing a CoT and a valid answer selection) and -1 for invalid responses.
- **Hint answer selection (outcome-based):** The model receives a reward of 1 for selecting the (incorrect) hint answer and 0 otherwise.

Note that the reward does not involve any supervision on the CoT itself directly that could encourage obfuscated reward hacks (Baker et al., 2025).

Model. We finetune an earlier snapshot of Claude 3.7 Sonnet.

5.2 Results

Results show that models rapidly learn to exploit reward hacks on all 6 RL environments, and select the incorrect hint answer on >99% of the examples within 30 steps. However, this reward hacking occurs without corresponding verbalization—in 5 out of 6 environments, the CoTs verbalize the



Reward hacks that the model might exploit without verbalizing them

Figure 7: CoT verbalization rates of reward hacks during RL. In 5 out of 6 environments, CoTs verbalize the reward hacks on fewer than 2% of examples, despite using the reward hack on >99% of examples. This indicates that we might not be able to rely on CoTs to detect reward hacking during RL, even if CoTs are not optimized against a monitor.

reward hacks on fewer than 2% of examples (Figure 7). Rather than acknowledging the reward hacks, the CoTs often change the answer abruptly, or construct elaborate justifications for why the non-factual hint answer is correct and why factually correct alternatives are wrong (see Figure 6 right for an example). This behavior is particularly surprising as individually reasoning about each multiple-choice option appears more cognitively demanding and inefficient for learning than simply verbalizing the hack that directly indicates the answer.

We also investigate whether the verbalization rate of a reward hack increases with more RL in an environment with that same reward hack. Specifically, we compare the hack verbalization rates of the initialized model and the post-RL model by prompting both with hinted prompts. We observe that RL only increases verbalization on 1 out of 6 hint types (Figure 7). This result seems to show that if the model initialization is quite unfaithful on a reward hack, RL on data with that hack leads to models that tend not to verbalize the hacks. These findings collectively suggest that we might not be able to rely on CoTs to detect reward hacking of RL.

6 Related Work

Evaluating CoTs. Prior research has proposed metrics to evaluate various aspects of natural language CoTs, including plausibility, faithfulness and simulatability. Plausibility evaluates the factual correctness of a CoT and how convincingly it justifies the model’s response (Herman, 2017; Lage et al., 2019; Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020). Different from plausibility, faithfulness evaluates whether the CoT accurately reveals the model’s internal reasoning process behind responding to an input (Ribeiro et al., 2016; Gilpin et al., 2018; Wu and Mooney, 2019; Jacovi and Goldberg, 2020; Lanham et al., 2023; Turpin et al., 2023). Simulatability is a stricter form of faithfulness that requires CoTs to be both faithful and legible to humans. It measures whether humans can build precise and generalizable mental models of how the model processes various inputs through observing its CoTs (Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017; Chandrasekaran et al., 2018; Hase and Bansal, 2020; Chen et al., 2024). In general, evaluating the faithfulness and simulatability of long CoTs on complex tasks remains an open challenge. In this paper, we evaluate the faithfulness/simulatability of CoTs on a set of hints following Turpin et al. (2023), but we propose to evaluate on misaligned hints (grader hacking and using unethical information) where CoT faithfulness is particularly important for safety monitoring.

Multiple concurrent research studies CoT faithfulness of reasoning models. Chua and Evans (2025) evaluates the CoT faithfulness of reasoning models and finds them to be more faithful than non-reasoning models but still far from being perfectly faithful, which is consistent with our findings. In

addition, we find that CoTs are not reliably faithful even on misaligned hints, which casts doubt on the reliability of CoT monitoring. Arcuschin et al. (2025) also finds CoTs of reasoning models to be unfaithful, and studies two specific kinds of unfaithfulness: restoration errors (models silently correct their errors without verbalization) and unfaithful shortcuts (models use illogical reasoning without verbalization). Baker et al. (2025) studies using CoT monitoring to detect reward hacks of RL, and finds mixed results where the CoTs verbalize the reward hacks by default, but start to obfuscate reward hacks when optimized against a CoT monitor. We also study this question in Section 5, but our findings are more negative and suggest that CoTs may obfuscate reward hacks even without optimization pressure against a monitor. We hypothesize that CoTs in Baker et al. (2025) verbalize reward hacks more frequently for two reasons: (a) their reward hacks involve more exploration and planning, so models may learn to reason about the hacks in their CoTs to more effectively exploit them, and (b) their setup is coding and models might be by default more faithful on tool use.

Generating and Improving CoTs. Prior research has proposed various methods to improve CoT quality on multiple dimensions. To improve faithfulness, researchers have developed test-time methods using question decomposition (Radhakrishnan et al., 2023), symbolic reasoning (Lyu et al., 2023), and causal mediation analysis on counterfactuals (Paul et al., 2024). To improve simulatability and consistency, prior work has trained models to generate CoTs that are consistent on semantically related inputs (Akyürek et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2025) and robust to various biases (Chua et al., 2024). To improve reasoning capabilities, prior work has proposed test-time methods such as contrastive prompting with correct and wrong CoTs (Chia et al., 2023) and self-consistency ensembling (Huang et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023), as well as train-time methods that use iterative optimization guided by reasoning outcomes or verifier models (Pang et al., 2024). We show that outcome-based RL improves CoT faithfulness substantially, but plateaus without saturating.

7 Discussion

7.1 Implications for Test-time CoT Monitoring Safety Cases

Safety cases are structured arguments that AI systems are unlikely to cause a catastrophe (Clymer et al., 2024). On the positive side, our results show that CoTs of reasoning model are faithful on at least some examples on most hints. This suggests that CoT monitoring can be useful at detecting some malicious behaviors during training and evaluations, particularly threats that are frequent or require multiple actions, which increases the chance of at least one threat/action being verbalized in the CoT. However, for rarer threats that don't require multiple actions (e.g., self-exfiltration), our findings of low faithfulness suggest that CoT monitoring may be less effective.

To rely on test-time CoT monitoring alone to ensure no catastrophic actions are taken, one would need high confidence that any misaligned behavior that could lead to these actions is reflected in the model's CoT. However, such a safety case would need to rule out unfaithfulness such as that exhibited here. Our results indicate that this would require either algorithmic innovation that makes CoTs substantially more faithful (other than just more RL training), alternative arguments that CoTs will be more faithful for realistic threats, or supporting evidence from other safety measures that can rule out bad behavior in settings where CoT is unfaithful.

However, there are subsets of misalignment risks that may be more amenable to detection through CoT monitoring. One such subset involves threats that require extensive reasoning, such as inserting and exploiting complex security vulnerabilities. Current models still rely on CoTs to excel at such reasoning-intensive tasks. Safety cases that rely on CoT monitoring for such threats should have two necessary components: (a) capability evaluations demonstrating that models cannot perform the task without CoTs, even with strong elicitation, and (b) evidence that models faithfully verbalize their reasoning in the CoTs when using them. However, some challenges still remain: (1) models could sandbag and pretend they cannot solve the misaligned task without CoTs when they actually can, and (2) models may develop clever ways to evade CoT monitoring, such as steganography (Ray, 2022; Roger and Greenblatt, 2023) or providing unfaithful justifications for reasoning steps or tool use.

Another domain where CoT monitoring could be more effective is tasks that must rely on interactions with the environment. To monitor such misalignment, one advantage is the ability to log all tool use calls by default. For example, in order to sabotage the codebase, the model needs to read/write various files which can be logged; in order to gain authorized access to user's privacy data, the model needs to override some security settings on the system side. However, the risk remains that models

might develop effective ways to evade CoT monitoring by providing fake and unfaithful justifications for their tool use calls. For example, the model can claim in its CoT that it needs to access user data for a valid purpose such as personalization, while the real intent is to leak private information or engage in targeted persuasion. Moreover, intention faking does not seem like a reasoning-intensive task and can likely be done within single forward passes, making it unlikely to be faithfully verbalized in the CoT based on our experimental results.

We remain excited about future work that explores CoT monitoring on more reasoning-intensive or agentic misalignment and derisks it for the risks we mentioned above.

7.2 Limitations of Our Settings

Our settings have some important differences with more realistic settings where CoT monitoring might be used. First, our settings are variations on the sort of multiple-choice questions frequently used in benchmarks and exams, which usually expect reasoning that is about the question: during training most exam questions are followed by an explanation that is purely about the content, and that does not mention potential circumstantial hints. Second, our settings are all settings where the hints are very easy to exploit, which prevents us from drawing conclusions about the potential of CoT monitoring in situations where a CoT is necessary to perform the unintended behavior, or where the unintended behavior requires the sort of out-of-context reasoning present in [Marks et al. \(2025\)](#).

8 Conclusion

We empirically study the CoT faithfulness of reasoning models and find that CoT monitoring is a promising approach to noticing unintended behaviors, but that it is not reliable enough to rule out unintended behaviors. Our findings are limited in a variety of ways, as they focus on unintended behaviors for which a CoT is not necessary, and only study a particular kind of unintended behavior (using hints to answer a multiple-choice question). We are excited for further work on this area, as CoT monitoring could potentially be a powerful ingredient in alignment. Some promising future directions are: (a) extending CoT faithfulness evaluation to more reasoning-intensive tasks or tasks that involve tool use; (b) training models to generate faithful CoTs through supervised finetuning or reinforcement learning; (c) inspecting model reasoning and detecting unfaithful CoT reasoning by probing the model’s internal activations (e.g., activated sparse autoencoder features or activated circuits).

Author Contributions

Yanda Chen co-led the project direction, conducted most of the core experiments, and contributed most of the writing for our paper. **Joe Benton** provided substantial feedback and guidance throughout the project, conducted the evaluation of open-source models, and contributed to editing our paper. **Ansh Radhakrishnan** built and developed the RL infrastructure that made this work possible, and supported the RL experiments of this paper. **Jonathan Uesato** built and developed the RL infrastructure that made this work possible, and supported the RL experiments of this paper. **Carson Denison** built and developed the RL infrastructure that made this work possible, and supported the RL experiments of this paper. **John Schulman** initiated, built and developed the RL infrastructure that made this work possible. **Arushi Somani** conducted RL ablation experiments on CoT scoring with preference models. **Peter Hase** provided valuable discussions on the project during its early stages. **Misha Wagner** provided valuable feedback throughout the project. **Fabien Roger** provided valuable feedback throughout the project, and contributed to the paper writing. **Vlad Mikulik** provided regular and valuable guidance and feedback throughout the project. **Sam Bowman** provided substantial guidance and feedback on overall directions, experiments to run, key results, and paper writing. **Jan Leike** provided substantial guidance and feedback on overall directions, experiments to run, key results, and paper writing. **Jared Kaplan** provided substantial guidance and advising on overall directions, key results, and presentation. **Ethan Perez** co-led and oversaw the project direction, and provided detailed and valuable guidance on directions, experiments, results, and paper writing.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to many people for helpful conversations and feedback, including Tim Belonax, Steven Bills, Johannes Gasteiger, Erik Jones, Akbir Khan, Samuel Marks, Cam McKinnon, Linda Petrini, Sara Price, Stuart Ritchie, Buck Shlegeris, Zihan Wang, Jerry Wei, Ruiqi Zhong, and Daniel Ziegler. We would also like to thank everyone else at Anthropic for supporting this work, developing the models, infrastructure, and other contributions that made our experiments possible.

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