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# Refinement: A Constructive Approach to Formal Software Design for a Secure e-voting Interface

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## Abstract

Electronic voting machines have complex requirements. These machines should be developed following best practice with regards to the engineering of critical systems. The correctness and security of these systems is critical because an insecure system could be open to attack, potentially leading to an election returning an incorrect result or an election not being able to return any result. In the worst case scenario an incorrect result is returned — perhaps due to malicious intent — and this is not detected. We demonstrate that an incorrect interface is a major security threat and show the use of the formal method B in guaranteeing simple safety properties of the voting interface of a voting machine implementing a common variation of the single transferable vote (STV) election process. The interface properties we examine are concerned with the collection of only *valid* votes. Using the B-method, we apply an incremental refinement approach to verifying a sequence of designs of the interface for the collection and storage of votes, which we prove to be correct with respect to the simple requirement that only valid votes can be collected.

*Keywords:* Formal Verification, refinement, formal specification, interface design, e-government

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# 1 Introduction

The problem of electronic vote counting (or tabulation) involves a wide range of issues, requiring expertise in science, engineering and technology. As such, it provides a good challenge for the application of formal methods.

## 1.1 *E-voting: background and motivation*

Applying state-of-the-art computer and information technology to “modernise” the voting process has the potential to make improvements over the existing paper (or mechanical) systems; but it also introduces new concerns with respect to secrecy, accuracy and security [10]. The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of e-voting is not a new one; and recent use of such systems in actual elections has led to their analysis from a number of viewpoints: usability [11], trustworthiness and safety criticality [14], and risks and threats [17].

Despite ongoing uncertainty over the trustworthiness of these systems — which is the major disadvantage associated with them — many countries have chosen to adopt e-voting.

In a recent paper, Kocher and Schneier [12] conclude by stating: “The threats are real, making openness and verifiability critical to election security.” The formal methods community is experienced in chasing technological change in software engineering: and this paper proposes that, in general, already existing formal techniques can help to alleviate many<sup>5</sup> of the verification problems that the adoption of new e-voting technologies can introduce. For the specific modelling and verification in our study we chose to use the B method.

## 1.2 *The B Method*

B is a method [1] for specifying, designing and coding software systems. The concept of refinement [5] is the key notion for developing B models of (software) systems in an incremental way. B models are accompanied by mathematical proofs that justify them. We start from an abstract model and each subsequent model is a refinement of the previous one. Proofs of properties of B models help to convince the user (designer or specifier) that the (software) system is correct, since they demonstrate that the behavior of the last, and most concrete, system (software) respects the behaviour of the first, most abstract model (which we assume has already been validated).

## 1.3 *E-voting: formal methods, correctness and security*

We propose to construct a formal, mathematical model of the e-voting problem in B. We argue that no e-voting system can be considered “safe” until the requirements of these systems are better defined and introduce refinement as a method for

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<sup>5</sup> We do not expect that all of the problems can be addressed completely by the use of formal methods. For example, problems of human error and those posed by malicious intent are very different in nature, but can both arise from simple design flaws. Our focus is on verification of design steps.

supporting the correct design and implementation of “safe e-voting systems”. In this paper we concentrate on the front-end of the e-voting system (the user interface for the voters).

Our view is that the collection and tabulation must be developed formally: human error in the development of the collection and tabulation software might have considerably more serious consequences than such errors in the manual system. We argue that even a minor design flaw in the way in which votes are collected and passed on for tabulation can lead to security weaknesses that could be exploited by an election saboteur.

## 2 Critical system development: formality and security

To motivate the use of formal methods, we argue that e-voting is at least *mission critical* and may, in some circumstances, be considered as *safety critical* [14]. For our argument we consider a “worst case scenario”, where the system fails to elect the correct candidates without the failure being identified. There is no meaningful way of equating this with a financial cost but its potential negative impact on the well-being of individuals and society is great. Thus, we must consider e-voting systems to be (at least) *mission critical* and we advocate the use of formal methods in their development as their application should ensure that the likelihood of failures due to modelling errors during design is reduced.

From a technological viewpoint we know that system (and interface) design has an important role in security assurance. Mercuri [15] addresses the theme of quality in the process of engineering security: “By encouraging artistry and applying craftsmanship to our security problems, viable solutions will emerge. One way of starting this process is by defining computer security with respect to need.” This supports our view that one must start with a simple model of the security needs and refine that model, during design, towards a correct implementation. For this reason we chose a simple security requirement — that only *valid votes* can be found *in the system* — and start our formal development from there.

## 3 Valid Votes: a STV case study

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) model on which we build this case study is regarded as a good democratic election process. However, it incorporates a complex, not necessarily deterministic, tabulation (counting) procedure. In 2003, Farrell and McAllister [8] reported on how a subtle change in the implementation of the STV rules can lead to major changes in the results returned.

In this paper, the counting algorithm is not developed formally. However, a brief overview of the tabulation process will help us to develop our claim that it is critical that there is a formal verification of the property that only valid votes are counted.

### 3.1 Overview of the typical counting algorithm

During an election, a candidate is elected if the number of votes they have is greater or equal to the *quota*. This quota,  $Q$  say, is a function of: the number of valid votes,  $V$  say, and the number of seats available for election,  $S$  say. It is usually defined by the equation:  $Q = 1 + \frac{V}{S+1}$ .

We note that the quota cannot be calculated without knowing the number of *valid* votes, and so its correct calculation is dependent on the notion of *validity* being correctly implemented. This notion is non-trivial as the STV election process allows voters to register support for more than one single candidate, by placing candidates in a preferred order. Thus on each vote, a candidate may or may not have an associated preference.

Informally, a vote is considered valid if and only if it shows a unique first preference. The means of specifying this property depends, of course, on a notation for representing a vote. Consider a constituency where there are three candidates: A, B and C, say. We could choose to represent a vote as a string of characters taken from the alphabet  $\{A, B, C\}$ . In such a string, we naturally interpret a character  $ch$  at index  $i$  in the vote string as stating that the  $i$ th preference of that particular vote is the candidate  $ch$ . Now, we can define a valid vote in this constituency by explicitly identifying the set of valid vote strings, for example:

$\{A, B, C, AB, AC, BA, BC, CA, CB, ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA\}$ .

In such a definition we preclude, for example, the following strings from being considered as representations of valid votes:

- The empty string — correctly excluded, we would argue, as there is no first preference.
- The string  $AA$  — excluded, perhaps, because the candidate with the first preference has another associated preference. (We note that this was not explicit in the original informal definition, and it would be normal for this interpretation to be validated through additional discussion of this requirement with the customer.)
- The string  $ABBC$  — excluded, perhaps, because the number of preferences cannot be more than the number of candidates. (We note, again, that this was not explicit in the original informal definition.)

Of course, it is better<sup>6</sup> to define the notion of validity as a generic boolean function that takes any string of characters and decides on its validity, without having to explicitly construct all the members of the valid vote set. An even better approach, as taken with our abstract B model is to specify the set of all valid votes and to use refinement to be sure that a vote belongs to this set without having to actually construct it (as it exists in the abstraction).

<sup>6</sup> Simple, naive, construction (listing) of the complete valid vote set is infeasible for elections involving even a moderate number of candidates.

### 3.2 Requirements for valid votes

Within any voting system, changing the definition of a valid vote can have major consequences for the election process and the results returned. In any STV system, for example, there is a major difference between *allowing* and *requiring* a voter to place all candidates in a preference order.

In our model, it is required that a vote is considered valid if and only if it shows a unique first preference. This is a simple requirement, but one which can cause problems if it is not treated formally.

Clearly, if invalid votes manage to get passed to the tabulation process (to be counted) then there is a risk that this could break the counting process. For example, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that some of the tabulation methods make the assumption that the votes being counted are valid. However, without some degree of formal verification it is also likely that an invalid vote could — by accident — be counted and that this could lead to an incorrect result, a run-time error, or non-termination. Consequently, this weakness could also be exploited by an attacker to deliberately manipulate the election process.

Such a potential attack is similar to those mentioned in [16] where the security of votes stored in memory is addressed. In particular, the use of Trojan code to exploit vote data that has been tampered with is shown to be a real threat that requires elaborate schemes for the secure storage of votes. In most e-voting systems, there is a clear interface between the storage of votes and the input of votes. We argued that the same degree of care must be taken in designing the vote interface to ensure that Trojan code cannot be used to exploit the input of invalid votes.

### 3.3 Validating votes in a typical implementation architecture

Typically, a voting machine has a simple, classic, layered architecture. We propose a generic, abstract model<sup>7</sup> in order to illustrate the need for formality in the processing of votes electronically:

- An *interface* facilitates the voter to input their preferences.
- A *store* records the preferences of all votes that have been input.
- A *tabulator* takes all the votes from the *store* and calculates the result.

We argue that an invalid vote in the tabulation process can compromise the security of the whole election. Thus, for an e-voting system to be considered secure, it is necessary that the tabulator does not process invalid votes; and so the store cannot transfer invalid votes into the tabulator. Consequently, it may be necessary to show that the store cannot receive invalid votes from the interface. There are clearly a number of design decisions that need to be taken with respect to the implementation of this simple architecture; and it is the responsibility of the designers to verify that their designs are correct with respect to the validity requirement.

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<sup>7</sup> We deliberately choose not to model a specific machine.

## 4 Informal software design for vote validity

In this section we comment on typical design decisions that arise during implementation of our generic architecture. We focus, for simplicity, on the first layer of our architecture: the *interface*. Simple analysis of the requirement for *only valid votes in the tabulation process* could lead one to designing a machine where the interface layer takes responsibility for guaranteeing that voters record only valid votes and rely on a secure store. In all the following designs we refer to buttons that the user can press and the information that is displayed to the voter. We abstract away from details of how these buttons and displays are implemented.

### 4.1 The rapid prototyping approach

We wish to verify that a given interface design implements the requirement that no invalid vote can be sent to the store. A standard technique for carrying out such a verification is to incrementally add rigour to the process, structuring the verification process in a number of layers.

A typical 3-layer approach, which we used for the purpose of our study, is:

- Run some voting scenarios through the natural language description and check, by hand, that there are no obvious examples of a scenario that leads to the requirement not being met.
- Prototype an executable model of the design and test this executable model as thoroughly as possible.
- Formalise the prototype model so that more formal model-checking or theorem-proving can be used to show that the design is *correct*.

In practice, with simple designs such as a simple vote interface, developers often see no need to progress to layer 3. In the designs that follow in the remainder of this section, we follow a rapid-prototyping approach that never progresses to the 3rd layer of rigour. In Section 5 we show how the B method and tools can be used to fully support layer 3 in this verification process.

In this section we concentrate on the validity of a single vote. We note that the validity of a complete set of votes will require that each individual vote is valid. The validity of individual votes will be a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient condition for the validity of all votes.

Before we consider verifying the property that the system contains only valid votes, it is necessary to formulate what we mean by a valid vote in a way that the design verification process can be automated. This means that, in our chosen modelling language, we have to choose a means of specifying the property that needs to be checked.

Consider the Java code<sup>8</sup> which models the `Vote` (of a single voter) as an array of “Candidates”.

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<sup>8</sup> Starting with simple Java models helps us to identify the main issues with respect to interface evolution and refinement.

```

public class Vote{
  int numberOfCandidates;
  int preferences [];
  // Vote - construct empty Vote with no preferences
  public Vote(int numCs){
    numberOfCandidates = numCs;
    preferences = new int [numberOfCandidates];
    for (int i = 0; i<numberOfCandidates; i++) preferences[i] = 0;
  }//END Vote Constructor
  // ...
} // END CLASS Vote

```

We now formally specify a safety<sup>9</sup> property that defines a valid vote as a boolean method of the *Vote* class.

```

// isValid *****
// The safety property to ensure the validity of a Vote
// A vote is valid iff there is a unique 1st preference recorded
public boolean isValid(){
  int numberOfIs = 0;
  for (int i = 0; i<numberOfCandidates; i++)
    if (preferences[i]==1) numberOfIs++;
  return (numberOfIs==1);
} // END Vote.isValid

```

Of course, this invariant property could be modelled using *design-by-contract* [6] language and tool support. However, in this initial case study we choose to use only fundamental concepts that are part of the core programming language: we believe that little, if any, current voting software incorporates more rigorous design by contract methods.

Given the formal (constructive) specification of a valid vote (in Java) we can now proceed to the design of the first component of our generic architecture: the *interface*. The goal is to offer alternative interface designs and to verify the correctness, or otherwise, of each.

#### 4.2 Design1: the simplest interface

We propose the following design for verification:

“Every candidate is associated with a *candidate button*. Beside each candidate button, information is displayed to show the preference that is associated with that candidate. Initially, at the beginning of each vote, no preferences are displayed. When a voter presses a candidate button (for the 1st time) then it is assumed that the voter selected that candidate to be their first preference, and the number 1 is displayed beside that candidate’s button. When a voter presses (for the second time) another candidate button then this is taken to represent their second preference, etc. . . . If they press a candidate’s button that already has a preference associated with it then that press is ignored. When a voter is happy that they have recorded all their preferences, they press a *validate vote*

<sup>9</sup> The use of the word ‘safety’ here does not mean that the property is “safety critical” in the classic sense that lives may be at risk, for example. The term is taken from the formal methods community where it is used to refer to an invariant property of the system that must be true all the time otherwise system behaviour cannot guaranteed to be correct. It may be a safety property of the system but that does not necessarily make the system safety critical.

button and the vote is sent to be stored. The *validate vote* button will only send the vote if at least one candidate button has been pressed.”

We now model the design by a Java method (`pressCancelButton`) which implements the behaviour of the system in response to the pressing of a candidate’s button. We note that the choice of underlying data representation, with a vote as an array of candidate’s preferences, maps closely the structure of the voting data as presented to the voter.

```
// Design1
// pressCancelButton *****
// Record next press as a preference, provided button is enabled
// Calls lastPref() to correctly assign the next preference value
// Calls buttonEnabled() to check if preference already allocated
public void pressCancelButton(int button){
    if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) return;
    else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;
} // END Vote.pressCancelButton
```

This `pressCancelButton` method is dependent on two other methods: `buttonEnabled` for checking if the button being pressed is actually enabled (has not been pressed before), and `lastPref` for finding out the value of the last preference selected. The `buttonEnabled` behaviour is straightforward to implement, and left as an exercise for the reader. The `lastPref` method, as implemented below, examines all the preferences and deduces that the largest current preference value must have been the last preference made. We note, for future reference, that this is a correct (but inefficient) implementation of the design.

```
// lastPref *****
// Called by pressCancelButton()
protected int lastPref(){
    int largest =0;
    for (int i = 0; i<numberOfCandidates; i++)
        if (preferences[i]> largest) largest = preferences[i];
    return largest;
} //END Vote.lastPref
```

It is not easy to ensure the correctness of even this simple interface design without explicitly specifying and correctly implementing the `isValid()` method, as we have done. Without an explicit statement of what is valid, it is possible that the notion of validity could be interpreted ambiguously and thus the engineers could believe that they have built a correct interface when such an interface allows votes to be cast that the users do not consider to be valid.

#### 4.3 Poor design may lead to security risks

A reasonable approach to rapidly prototyping this “simple” first design is to realise that a vote is valid as soon as one of the candidate buttons is pressed. This was hinted at in the initial statement of the design:

“The *validate vote* button will only send the vote if at least one candidate button has been pressed.”



It is a much quicker and simpler solution to hardcode this as an **enabled** boolean variable. In fact, this solution is correct but it is a poor design because it is not robust to changes in requirements. Consider a scenario where the interface requirements are extended to allow voters to reset their vote (in order, perhaps, to facilitate them in correcting an input error, or in changing their minds). The design using boolean **enabled** could result in the developers forgetting (during the coding of the new design feature) that they need to set this value to **false** when a vote is reset, and consequently lead to their designs allowing an *empty vote* — with no preferences recorded — to be sent to the store. Could this sort of thing happen in a real e-voting system? Judging by analysis regarding the quality of the code (and development methods) used in systems that have been examined in detail [13], one could not be sure that professional developers would not make the same simple mistake.

It is difficult to judge the severity of such an interface design fault. Clearly, it has the potential for voters to have their voting intentions incorrectly recorded. This could lead to an election returning the wrong result. A second risk is that invalid empty votes in the store may break the tabulation process: if tabulation methods (functions) work on the assumption that all votes have at least one unique first preference (and may have been tested under that assumption) then it is possible that tabulation may not even terminate if this assumption is broken. A third risk is that some attacker has managed to introduce code into the system that can manipulate the tabulation process but will only be called when an invalid vote (or password-like sequence of invalid votes) is passed to the store. Of course, rigorous design procedures should find these types of design flaws without the need to resort to formal methods. However, in *critical system* design, “should” is not good enough.

#### 4.4 Design2: a more sophisticated, incorrect, interface design

In the second design, we analyse how an extension to the requirements, in order to provide a more sophisticated interface, can pose specific problems. Imagine that we wish to provide a means of a voter changing their vote, without them having to reset all their preferences. In particular, we wish them to be able to cancel the last preference chosen (in the case that they accidentally pressed the wrong button). We propose the following design for verification:

“if the voter presses a candidate button again then that preference is erased”.

This is a faulty design, but without the use of formal methods are we sure to identify the fault before more costly implementation takes place?

The **VoteExt1** class uses the inheritance mechanism in Java to add this extra interface feature to the already existing **Vote** class.

In an ideal world, our development tool(s) should be able to automatically tell us that, either: the new functionality respects the safety property of the existing **Vote** class (that we have already formally verified) and provide the proof, or identify at least one scenario in which the new functionality breaks the safety property.

This code nearly works: it implements the requirements correctly provided one makes the assumption that a voter will only press a button a second time (to cancel

```

// Design2
public class VoteExt1 extends Vote {
VoteExt1 (int numCs){ super(numCs);}
// pressCancelButton *****
// The new feature requires over-riding of pressCancelButton().
// Here is how it SHOULD NOT be done
public void pressCancelButton(int button){
    if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) preferences[button-1] = 0;
    else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;
} // END VoteExt1.pressCancelButton
} // END VoteExt1

```

a preference) *immediately* after pressing that button for a first time, with no other preferences being recorded in the mean time. We model this using B in Section 5; and demonstrate how the B tools automatically prove that the system is “broken” if this assumption about the voter’s behaviour is invalid.

#### 4.5 The risk of feature interactions in design

We note that making parallel changes to requirements and design models can lead to feature interactions similar to those well documented for telephone services [9]. Consider the interaction between two features that by themselves do not break the safety property of the system but when combined lead to invalid votes being recorded:

- The **lastPrefs** method was optimized by adding a counter value so that an iteration through the candidate list was not required each time a new preference was input.
- A **reset** button was added to allow all preferences to be deleted.

Individually, each of these refinements does not compromise the system by allowing the introduction of previously invalid votes. However, together they can result in an invalid vote with no first preference being recorded even though some preferences have been selected. (With candidates A, B and C, for example, the sequence of button presses A-B-reset-C leads, under the new combined feature functionality, to an invalid vote where only the 3rd preference for C is recorded.)

#### 4.6 Design3: a more sophisticated, correct interface design

Consider the interface design whereby a voter can press a candidate button a second time and this will delete that candidate’s preference value, as in Design2, above. However, it will also delete all the preference values lower than the preference just deleted.

Informally, one can verify its correctness with the following reasoning: “This will guarantee that if the 1st preference is deleted then all the preferences are deleted and that the empty vote is the only invalid vote that can be found in the interface.” We see, in the next section, how we prove the correctness of the design in a more formal manner.

```

// Design3
public class VoteExt2 extends Vote {
VoteExt2 (int numCs){ super(numCs);}
// The extension over-rides the pressCandButton method.
// pressCandButton *****
public void pressCandButton(int button){
if (!buttonEnabled(button-1)) {
    int deletefrom = preferences[button-1];
    for (int i = 0; i<numberOfCandidates; i++){
        if (preferences[i] >= deletefrom) preferences[i] = 0;
        else preferences[button-1] =lastPref()+1;}
} // END VoteExt2.pressCandButton
} // END VoteExt2

```

Name	Syntax	Definition
Binary Relation	$s \leftrightarrow t$	$\mathcal{P}(s \times t)$
Domain	$\text{dom}(r)$	$\{a \mid a \in s \wedge \exists b.(b \in t \wedge a \mapsto b \in r)\}$
Codomain	$\text{RAN}(r)$	$\text{dom}(r^{-1})$
Restriction	$s \triangleleft r$	$\text{id}(s); r$
Co-restriction	$r \triangleright t$	$r; \text{id}(s)$
Anti-co-restriction	$r \triangleright t$	$r \triangleright (\text{ran}(r) - t)$
Image	$r[w]$	$\text{RAN}(w \triangleleft r)$
Partial Function	$s \mapsto t$	$\{r \mid r \in s \leftrightarrow t \wedge (r^{-1}; r) \subseteq \text{id}(t)\}$
Total Function	$s \rightarrow t$	$\{f \mid f \in s \mapsto t \wedge \text{dom}(f) = s\}$
Total injection	$s \mapsto t$	$\{f \mid f \in s \rightarrow t \wedge f^{-1} \in t \mapsto s\}$

Fig. 1. B set notations

## 5 Formal software design for vote validity

### 5.1 Incremental development and refinement

The main idea in our refinement based-approach is to start with a very abstract model of the system under development. We then gradually add details to this first model by building a sequence of more concrete ones. The relationship between two successive models in this sequence is that of *refinement* [5,1]. This is controlled by means of a number of *proof obligations*, which guarantee the correctness of the development. Such proof obligations are proved by automatic (and interactive) proof procedures supported by a proof engine [7]. The essence of the refinement relationship is that it preserves *system properties*.

Figure 1 gives set-theoretical notations of the B data modelling language. A complete introduction to B can be found in [1].

The refinement of an event B model [2,4] allows one to enrich the model in a *step-by-step* manner. Refinement provides a way to construct stronger invariants and also to add details to a model. It is also used to transform an abstract model into a more concrete version by modifying the state description. This is essentially done by extending the list of state variables (possibly suppressing some of them), by refining each abstract event into a corresponding concrete version, and by adding new events. The abstract state variables,  $x$ , and the concrete ones,  $y$ , are linked together by means of a *gluing invariant*  $J(x, y)$ . A number of proof obligations ensure that: (1) each abstract event is correctly refined by its corresponding concrete version, (2) each new event refines *skip*, (3) no new event takes control for ever,

```

MODEL
  AllVotesAtOnce
SETS
  ELECTOR; CAND
CONSTANTS
  nbc
PROPERTIES
  nbc = card(CAND)
DEFINITIONS
  valid(v)  $\hat{=}$   $\exists n \cdot (n \in 1..nbc \wedge v^{-1} \in 1..n \mapsto CAND)$ 
VARIABLES
  vote, nbv
INVARIANT
  vote  $\in$  ELECTOR  $\leftrightarrow$  (CAND  $\times$  (1..nbc))  $\wedge$ 
   $\forall e \cdot (e \in \text{dom}(\text{vote}) \Rightarrow \text{valid}(\text{vote}[\{e\}])) \wedge$ 
  nbv  $\in \mathbb{N} \wedge$ 
  nbv = card(dom(vote))
INITIALISATION
  vote :=  $\emptyset$  || nbv := 0
EVENTS
Voting  $\hat{=}$ 
  begin
    vote, nbv :  $\left( \begin{array}{l} \text{vote} \in \text{ELECTOR} \leftrightarrow (\text{CAND} \times (1..nbc)) \wedge \\ \forall e \cdot (e \in \text{dom}(\text{vote}) \Rightarrow \text{valid}(\text{vote}[\{e\}])) \wedge \\ \text{nbv} \in \mathbb{N} \wedge \\ \text{nbv} = \text{card}(\text{dom}(\text{vote})) \end{array} \right)$ 
  end

```

and (4) relative deadlock-freeness is preserved.

Following the traditional refinement process, the first model (**AllVotesAtOnce**) we propose is very high level: it abstracts away from individual votes and button presses. There is only one event — **Voting** — which models the votes of all electors who came to vote in *one shot*.

For readers unfamiliar with the B modelling language, we note that:

- *ELECTOR* is the set of all electors and *CAND* is the set of all candidates,
- *vote* is the variable which contains votes of all the electors, and
- *nbv* is the cardinal of the domain of *vote* representing the total number of votes.

Instead of modelling all the votes in a single *one shot*, as above, in our next step we choose to refine the most abstract specification so that each individual vote is modelled, using the event **One\_Vote** in the model **EachVoteAtOnce**. Without such a refinement a realistic implementation cannot be constructed.

In this more concrete **EachVoteAtOnce** model, *STATE* is an enumeration set which contains two values: *voting* to represent a voting system that is *open*, and *finish* to represent when the voting is *closed*. The variable *st* contains one of these values, *elector* is the subset of *ELECTOR* recording the electors who have already voted, *vt* is the variable which contains these votes, and *cvt* is its cardinal. All votes in *vt* are valid. The event **One\_Vote** models the vote of a single elector in *one shot*

```

MODEL
  EachVoteAtOnce
REFINES
  AllVotesAtOnce
SET

  STATE = {voting, finish}

VARIABLES

  vote, nbv,
  st, elector, vt, cvt
INVARIANT

  elector  $\subseteq$  ELECTOR  $\wedge$ 
  vt  $\in$  elector  $\leftrightarrow$  (CAND  $\times$  (1..nbc))  $\wedge$ 
  dom(vt) = elector  $\wedge$ 
   $\forall e \cdot (e \in \text{dom}(vt) \Rightarrow \text{valid}(vt[\{e\}])) \wedge$ 
  cvt  $\in \mathbb{N} \wedge$ 
  cvt = card(elector)  $\wedge$ 
  st  $\in$  STATE  $\wedge$ 
  (st = finish  $\Rightarrow$  dom(vote) = elector)

```

## INITIALISATION

```

vote :=  $\emptyset$  || nbv := 0 ||
st := voting || elector :=  $\emptyset$  ||
cvt := 0 || vt :=  $\emptyset$ 

```

## EVENTS

One\_Vote  $\hat{=}$ 

```

any e, v, n where
  st = voting
  e  $\in$  ELECTOR – elector
  n  $\in$  1..nbc
  v  $\in$  1..n  $\mapsto$  CAND

```

then

```

vt := vt  $\cup$  ({e}  $\times$  v-1) ||
elector := elector  $\cup$  {e} ||
cvt := cvt + 1

```

end;

Voting  $\hat{=}$ 

when

st = voting

then

```

vote, nbv := vt, cvt ||
st := finish

```

end

END

(as a single event).

The B models that follow correspond to the three Java designs that we saw in Section 4. We show how the designs can be formally verified when modelled in B.

## 5.2 Design1: the simplest interface

In this **Vote** model — which corresponds to the Java **Vote** class — an elector  $e$  (who has not already voted) votes for candidates by pressing on the corresponding buttons.

*One\_voting* is an enumeration set which contains three values: *no\_elec* when no electors are voting, *start* when the a new elector  $e$  starts to vote, and *valid* when the elector  $e$  pushes the button to validate their vote. The variable *sto* contains one of these values. Variable  $e$  contains the current elector,  $vt$  is their current vote which is modified when a candidate button is pushed, and  $n$  is the preference number of the chosen candidate.

We remark that the guard of the event **Button\_valid** requires that  $n \neq 0$  and so we are sure that when an elector pushes this button then the partial vote  $v$  is not empty and so  $v$  is a valid vote. Remark also that we have no condition on  $n$  in the guard of the event **Button\_cand**. When a candidate is not in the codomain of  $v$  we are sure<sup>10</sup> that  $n < nbc$ .

<sup>10</sup> We have proven it thanks to the invariant property and the refinement construct. This proof, as all others

```

MODEL
  Vote
REFINES
  EachVoteAtOnce
SET
  One_Voting = {start, valid, no_elec}
VARIABLES
  vote, nbv,
  st, elector, vt, cvt
  e, n, v, sto

INVARIANT

  e ∈ ELECTOR ∧
  v ∈ ℕ ↔ CAND ∧
  n ∈ 0..nbv ∧
  n = card(ran(v)) ∧
  sto ∈ One_Voting ∧
  (sto ≠ no_elec ⇒
    v ∈ 1..n ↦ CAND) ∧
  (sto ≠ no_elec ⇒
    e ∈ ELECTOR – elector) ∧
  (st = voting ∧ sto = valid ⇒ n ≠ 0)

INITIALISATION

  vote := ∅ || nbv := 0 ||
  st := voting || elector := ∅ ||
  cvt := 0 || vt := ∅ ||
  sto := no_elec || e := ELECTOR ||
  v := ∅ || n := 0

```

```

EVENTS
Start_vote ≡
  any E where
    sto = no_elec ∧
    E ∈ ELECTOR – elector
  then
    sto := start ||
    e := E ||
    n := 0 ||
    v := ∅
  end;
Button_cand ≡
  any c where
    sto = start ∧
    c ∈ CAND – ran(v)
  then
    n := n + 1 ||
    v := v ∪ {n + 1 ↦ c}
  end;
Button_valid ≡
  when
    sto = start ∧
    n ≠ 0
  then
    sto := valid
  end;
One_Vote ≡
  when
    st = voting ∧
    sto = valid
  then
    vt := vt ∪ ({e} × v-1) ||
    elector := elector ∪ {e} ||
    cvt := cvt + 1 ||
    sto := no_elec
  end;
END

```

### 5.3 Enriching the interface: Design2 and Design3

In the previous model an elector cannot correct input mistakes: now we specify three: (1) delete that candidate's preference (corresponding to **VoteExt1** in the Java), or (2) delete that candidate's preference only if that was the last preference made (corresponding to the suggested “fix” that we wished to formally verify), or (3) delete that candidate's preference and all lower preferences (corresponding to **VoteExt2**).

In the first design, if we remove the corresponding vote and decrement our counter an unproved proof obligation is generated. This is formally treated by the *Button\_cancel\_incorrect\_cand* event. In particular, the new event doesn't preserve

```

Button_cancel_incorrect_cand ≐
  any c where
    sto = start ∧
    c ∈ ran(v)
  then
    n := n - 1 ||
    v := v ▷ {c}
  end;

```

```

Button_cancel_last_cand ≐
  any c where
    sto = start ∧
    n ↦ c ∈ v
  then
    n := n - 1 ||
    v := v ▷ {c}
  end;

```

```

Button_cancel_cand ≐
  any c where
    sto = start ∧
    c ∈ ran(v)
  then
    n := v-1(c) - 1 ||
    v := {n | n ∈ ℕ ∧ n < v-1(c)} ◁ v
  end;

```

$$(sto \neq no\_elec \Rightarrow v^{-1}(c) - 1 = card(ran(\{n | n \in \mathbb{N} \wedge n < v^{-1}(c)\} \triangleleft v))$$

the invariant which says that the partial vote  $v$  is an injection.

In Section 4, we suggested a “fix” to the previous design. Using B, this “fix” can be formally modelled (in event *Button\_cancel\_last\_cand*) and proven correct. In fact, there are no difficulties to prove the invariant preservation. All new proof obligation are discharged automatically by the prover.

For this event there was only one difficulty in the proof process: we need to prove that  $v^{-1}(c) - 1 = card(ran(\{n | n \in \mathbb{N} \wedge n < v^{-1}(c)\} \triangleleft v))$ . We have proved this assertion — for all  $c$  in the co-domain of  $v$  — by simple induction on the assertions clauses.

## 6 The semi-automated proof process

The complexity of the development is evaluated through the number of proof obligations generated for the validation of each model or refinement; among generated proof obligations, a large number are automatically discharged by the tool [7]. In

our simple case study, 44 proof obligations are automatically discharged, and 10 are interactively proved using the tool but with human help.

## 7 Conclusions and Future Work

We have demonstrated the use of the formal method B in guaranteeing a simple safety property of an interface to an e-voting machine. We demonstrated that guaranteeing *validity* of votes recorded not only helps in the formal verification of the voting process, but also has an important role to play in making the machine more secure. This is the first step in developing a generic framework for the design of secure interfaces which could be proved to satisfy various safety-related properties. It is our goal to try and formulate such a framework as a set of formal design patterns much like those proposed by Abrial when using B to verify properties of control systems [3]

There are interesting alternative techniques for e-voting, like pollsterless systems [18] which could benefit from further formal verification using our approach. This is planned for future work. Furthermore, we are currently using B to prove the correctness of an actual storage mechanism which claims to offer tamper-evident, history-independent and subliminal free data structures [16]. After this we aim to use B to prove safety properties concerned with the tabulation of votes, and so verify all layers in a typical voting architecture.

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