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A Trace Logic for Local Security Properties

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Abstract

We propose a new simple *trace* logic that can be used to specify *local security properties*, i.e. security properties that refer to a single participant of the protocol specification. Our technique allows a protocol designer to provide a formal specification of the desired security properties, and integrate it naturally into the design process of cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, the logic can be used for formal verification. We illustrate the utility of our technique by exposing new attacks on the well studied TMN protocol.

*Keywords:* Trace logic, local security property, specification, TMN protocol

# Introduction

Cryptographic protocols are typically designed to meet security goals such as authentication and confidential key exchange. These goals, usually called *security properties*, can be correctly accomplished if some of the values ex- changed during the protocol run satisfy, for instance, classical properties like authenticity, confidentiality, or freshness.

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Often, the specification of security properties is carried out by writing of “global” security properties. These security specifications do not depend from any principal’s point of view. Thus, to refer to a specific principal, global security properties are usually defined using extra protocol events [[8](#_bookmark19),[11](#_bookmark23)].

In this paper, on the other hand, we propose a logic that can be used to express *local security properties*, i.e. properties that refer to the specification of *one* agent, namely the agent which they belong to. As we show in the following sections, local security properties are expressive enough to assert the properties that are commonly desired for cryptographic protocols (e.g., freshness of a nonce.)

The advantage of local properties is that they allow a designer to specify the security properties that should hold, according to each participant, at each protocol execution point. For instance, a property like freshness of a nonce can be specified as a formula that is connected directly to the corresponding participant who receives that nonce. Furthermore, since these formulae cor- respond to each principal, they depend *only* on information of that principal, as opposed to a global formula that can depend on the whole network state. Thus, a local formula can be bound to each principal and then be “plugged in” into any other network specification. This enables potential composability of the specifications.

Consequently, using local properties, it is possible to integrate the specifi- cation of the (logical) security properties that a protocol has to meet *within* the (algorithmic) specification of the protocol itself. This yields an integrated technique for protocol engineering that combines tightly the design and the analysis phase, resulting in a shorter design-verification feedback loop.

We illustrate our approach by studying the TMN protocol [[10](#_bookmark22)] for which we have found two new attacks.

*Plan of the paper.* In Section [2](#_bookmark0), we describe our security protocol model. Then, in Section [3](#_bookmark5) we introduce our trace logic language. In Section [4](#_bookmark7), the TMN protocol is studied and some novel attacks upon it are presented. In Section [5](#_bookmark11) elaborates the related work and finally conclusions and future work are discussed in Section [6](#_bookmark12).

# Protocol Model

A protocol step is usually specified using the standard notation *A* → *B* : *M* . Here, *M* is a message built from:

* atomic terms, that is constants (written in lowercase) and variables (which are capitalized). Constants may be nonces (e.g. *na*) or agent identities (e.g. *a*). A special constant *ε* denotes the intruder.
* constructed terms, that is a finite application of operators *encryption MK*, *pairing M*1*, M*2, *hashing h*(*M* ) and finally *public key pk*(*M* ) over atomic terms.

However, the *A* → *B* : *M* notation is unsuitable for formal verification. In fact, in a protocol step, two different events take place: *A* sends message *M* , and *B* receives message *M* '. In presence of an intruder, *M* might not be equal to *M* '. Moreover, not even the identities of the correspondent communication parties may be the same (i.e., *A* sends to *B*' and *B* receives from *A*'.) It is therefore convenient to take an approach that considers separately each agent’s point of view; this is the idea of *protocol roles*.

Definition 2.1 A *protocol role* is a pair ⟨*A,* [*M*1 ⬦ *B*1*, ..., Mn* ⬦ *Bn*]⟩, where

*A, B*1*, ..., Bn* are variables, ⬦ ∈ {*a, d*} and *M*1*, ..., Mn* are messages.

Given a protocol role ⟨*A,* [*M*1 ⬦ *B*1*, ..., Mn* ⬦ *Bn*]⟩, *A* is called the *identity* of the role, while elements *Mi* ⬦ *Bi,i* = 1*..n* are the *actions* of the role: *M d B* is a *send* action, while *M a B* is a *receive* action.

Protocol roles in a security protocol often receive (self explanatory) names such as *initiator, responder* and *server*. For example,

*responder(A,B,Na)* = ⟨*B,* [*pk*(*Na*) *a A*]⟩ (1) defines a responder role in which there is only one action, the receipt of *Na*

from *A*.

Notice that in ([1](#_bookmark1)), the variables *A, B, Na* are still uninstantiated (we bor- row this concept from logic programming: as long as no value is assigned to a variable, we call it *uninstantiated*, and *instantiated* otherwise.) In fact, a protocol role is *parametric*, thus representing a template. By appropriately (partially) instantiating a finite number of protocol roles, a *system scenario* can be obtained:

Definition 2.2 A system scenario is a multiset of (partially) intantiated pro- tocol roles.

Typically, a system scenario determines how many sessions are present and which agents play which roles. For instance, the system scenario

{*responder(A,b,Na), responder(C,d,Nc)*}

(where *responder* is the role defined above) defines a system scenario with two responders (notice that there are no corresponding *initiators*), one played by *b* and the other by *d*. Uninstantiated variables represent unknown values:

for example, variable *A* in the first responder role represents the (unknown) communicating party of *b*.

* 1. *Trace Semantics*

Executions of system scenarios are described using *traces*, which are in turn composed of *events*, i.e. single actions performed by an agent.

Definition 2.3 An *event* is a pair ⟨*A* : *M* ⬦ *B*⟩ where *A, B* are agent’s names,

⬦ ∈ {*a, d*} and *M* is a message.

The event ⟨*A* : *M d B*⟩ should be read as “agent *A* sends message *M* with *intended destination B*”. On the other hand, ⟨*B* : *M a A*⟩ stands for “agent *B* receives message *M apparently from A*”.

To analyze the protocol, we combine the system scenario with the usual Dolev-Yao intruder [[5](#_bookmark17)], who can perform the usual actions: intercept and learn any sent message, store the information contained in intercepted messages for later use, and introduce into the system new messages forged using information the intruder knows. The information obtained by the intruder is stored in a set of terms *K* called the *intruder’s knowledge* [4](#_bookmark3)

Now we are ready to describe the execution of a system scenario, repre- sented by the notion of a *run*.

Definition 2.4 Let *S* be a system scenario, and *K* be the intruder’s initial knowledge, consisting of constants representing agents identities and their public keys. Let *tv* be an initial empty trace. A *run* of *S* is a trace obtained by a reiterated sequence of the following steps:

1. a non-empty role in *S* is chosen nondeterministically, and its first action

*p* is removed from it. Let *a* be the identity of the chosen role.

1. if *p* = *td y*, then:
   1. *t* is added to the knowledge of the intruder, *K* := *K* ∪ {*t*}
   2. event *e* = ⟨*a* : *p*⟩ is added to *tv*, *tv* := *tv* · *e*
2. if *p* = *ta y*, then:
   1. it is checked if the intruder *ε* can generate *t* using the knowledge *K* [5](#_bookmark4) , if so, then event *e* = ⟨*a* : *p*⟩ is added to the trace: *tv* := *tv* · *e*.
   2. If *ε* cannot generate such a message, then the run stops.

4 Because of the symbolic nature of the analyzer, in practice an event can contain variables, which stand for something the intruder can generate (see [[3](#_bookmark13)] for details.)

5 We adopt Millen and Shmatikov’s constraint solving procedure [[13](#_bookmark25)] for checking if the

intruder can generate a term *t* using knowledge *K*. This procedure may involve instantiation of variables in *t* or *K*; for example, *t* may unify with a term in *K*, representing that *t* is already in *K*, i.e., is already known by the intruder (see [[13](#_bookmark25)] for details.)

# A Trace Logic

In this section we introduce a trace logic language for defining local security properties.

Definition 3.1 A trace logic formula is generated according to the following grammar:

*F* ::= true | false | *F*1 ∧ *F*2 | *F*1 ∨ *F*2 | *F*1 → *F*2 | ∀*e* ∈ *tv* : *F*

| ∃*e* ∈ *tv* : *F* |∃*t* : *F* |¬*F* |*e*1 = *e*2 | *e*1 ≤ *e*2

where *e*, *e*1 and *e*2 are events.

The conjunction of two formulae has the usual significance: *F*1 ∧ *F*2 is *true* if both *F*1 and *F*2 are *true*; the disjunction operator ∨ and implication → are analogous. On the other hand, the meaning of constructors ∀*e* ∈ *tv* : *F* and

∃*e* ∈ *tv* : *F* is non-standard. Since a trace formula is going to be evaluated on a certain input trace, constructors ∀ and ∃ allow us to reason about the events in the input trace: ∀*e* ∈ *tv* : *F* asserts that every event *e* in the input trace satisfies formula *F* , while ∃*e* ∈ *tv* : *F* express that some event in the input trace satisfies formula *F* . Notice that *tv* is not a variable, it is just part of the operators name to emphasize that *e* ranges over the system trace. Even though this gives a “temporal” flavor to our logic, we anticipate that these constructors only operate on *past* events, recorded in the input trace (see later). Formula ¬*F* has the usual meaning of negation. Differently from the above operators, ∃*t* : *F* quantifies *t* over all messages and agents space. Finally, predicates *e*1 = *e*2 and *e*1 ≤ *e*2 allow us to compare events: the former asserts equality, and the latter *subterm* inclusion.

While the choice of these constructors may seem rather *ad hoc* for our purposes, we believe this logic can in fact be quite expressive, and allow us to assert a fairly large set of interesting security properties, as will be shown later.

Next, we define the precise meaning of a trace logic formula.

Definition 3.2 Let F be the set of well-formed trace logic formulae, and *TR* be the set of traces, then the semantic function **[**·]]· : F × *TR* → {*tvue, f alse*} is defined as follows:

[[true]] *tr* = *true*

[[false]] *tr* = *false*

[[*F*1 ∧ *F*2 ]] *tr* = *true iff* [[*F*1 ]] *tr* = [[*F*2 ]] *tr* = *true*

[[*F*1 ∨ *F*2 ]] *tr* = *true iff* [[*F*1 ]] *tr* = *true or* [[*F*2 ]] *tr* = *true*

[[*F*1 → *F*2 ]] *tr* = *true iff* [[*F*1 ]] *tr implies* [[*F*2 ]] *tr*

[[∀*e* ∈ *tr* : *F* ]] *tr* =true *iff, for each event x* of *tr*, [[*F* [*x/e*]]] *tr* = *true*

[[∃*e* ∈ *tr* : *F* ]] *tr* =true *iff, for some event x* of *tr*, [[*F* [*x/e*]]] *tr* = *true*

[[∃*t* : *F* ]] *tr* =true *iff, for some message or agent x*, [[*F* [*x/t*]]] *tr* = *true*

[[¬*F* ]] *tr* = *true iff* [[*F* ]] *tr* = *false*

[[*e*1 = *e*2]] *tr* = *true iff event e*1 *is equal to event e*2

[[*t*1 ≤ *t*2]] *tr* = *true iff, if t*1 *is a subterm of t*2

Here, *F* [*x/y*] is the result of substituting each occurrence of *y* with *x* in *F* . For the sake of notation’s simplicity, we assume that all variables that are not explicitly quantified are *existentially* quantified (over the set of messages

and agents). This simplifies the notation considerably.

In the future, we plan to endow our logic with a proof system that allow us to relate proofs of formulae with the intended meaning given by **[**·]]·. In the present work, we are more interested in exploring the expressive power of security specifications; We plan to continue this work by addressing the issue of using our logic for automatic formal verification.

* 1. *Appending local security properties to protocol roles*

Now, we are ready to combine the definition of protocol roles and local security properties to obtain *extended protocol roles* and *extended system scenarios*. Intuitively, the idea is to embed the logical security properties within the protocol specification.

Definition 3.3 An *extended protocol role* is a triple ⟨*A,* [*M*1 ⬦ *B*1 : *F*1*, ..., Mn* ⬦ *Bn* : *Fn*]⟩, where {*A, B*1*, ..., Bn*} ⊂ *V av*, *M*1*, ..., Mn* are messages, ⬦ ∈ {*a, d*} and *F*1*, ..., Fn* are trace logic formulae.

Intuitively, adding a formula *Fi* after a protocol role action means that *Fi* must hold after the execution of the action. Notice that instantiation of an extended protocol role also affects the variables of an attached local security property. This formalizes the notion of a security property being ‘local’, that is a security specification that takes into account the principal’s point of view. Also, *Fi* is going to be evaluated w.r.t. the system trace, which contains the events *up to* at that precise execution time. This, as we already mentioned, illustrates the “past flavour” nature of our formulae.

Similarly, we can define an extended system scenario as a multiset of (par- tially instantiated) extended protocol roles.

* 1. *Verifying the local security properties*

To evaluate the local security properties, we extend the Definition [3.4](#_bookmark6) to the extended system scenarios introduced in last section:

Definition 3.4 Let *S* be an *extended* system scenario, and *K* be the in- truder’s initial knowledge, consisting of constants representing agents identi- ties and their public keys. Let *tv* be an initial empty trace. A *run* of *S* is a trace obtained by a reiterated sequence of the following steps:

1. a non-empty role in *S* is chosen nondeterministically, and its first action

*p* is removed from it. Let *a* be the identity of the chosen role.

1. if *p* = *tdy* : *F* , then:
   1. if **[***F* ]]*tv* holds, then continue. Otherwise, the run stops.
   2. *t* is added to the knowledge of the intruder *ε*, *K* := *K* ∪ {*t*}
   3. event *e* = ⟨*a* : *p*⟩ is added to *tv*, *tv* := *tv* · *e*
2. if *p* = *tay* : *F* , then:
   1. it is checked if the intruder *ε* can generate *t* using the knowledge *K* (see below), if so, then event *e* = ⟨*a* : *p*⟩ is added to the trace: *tv* := *tv* · *e*.
   2. if **[***F* ]]*tv* holds, then continue. Otherwise, the run stops.
   3. If *ε* cannot generate such a message, then the run stops.

For example, consider the role:

*responder(B, A, Na)* = ⟨*B,* [*Na aA* : *F* ]⟩ where *F* = ∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*A* : *Na d B*⟩.

After the responder *B* receives the nonce *Na*, *F* checks that *A* had sent *Na* to *B* before. Now, consider the singleton scenario {*responder(b,A,Na)*}. In this scenario, there is only one honest responder role, played by *b*. Now, suppose this responder role receives, from the intruder *ε*, a nonce *ni* as *Na*. Therefore, according to Definition [3.4](#_bookmark6), we have trace *tv* = ⟨*ε* : *ni d b*⟩. The next step involves evaluation of **[***F* ]]*tv* to see if the local security property *F* holds: clearly, we can see that **[**∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*A* : *Na d b*⟩]]⟨*ε* : *ni d b*⟩ evaluates to *true*, unifying *A* with *ε* and *Na* with *ni*.

* + 1. *Implementation.*

We have a (beta version) implementation of **[**·]]·, encoded into our verifier of [[3](#_bookmark13)]. Using it, we were able to perform the verification of the TMN protocol, illustrated in the following section.

# A Case Study: the TMN protocol

We apply our technique to a well known case study, the TMN protocol [[10](#_bookmark22)]. This protocol has been thoroughly studied, see for example [[16](#_bookmark28),[14](#_bookmark26),[9](#_bookmark21)]. However, in this section we present some vulnerabilities that we believe no one has noticed before.

* 1. *Original Version*

The original version of TMN was proposed for achieving key distribution be- tween two users:

Message 1. *A* → *S* : *A, S, B,* {*R*1}*pk*(*S*)

Message 2. *S* → *B* : *S, B, A*

Message 3. *B* → *S* : *B, S, A,* {*R*2}*pk*(*S*)

Message 4. *S* → *A* : *S, A, B, v*(*R*1*, R*2)

We denote Vernam encryption by *v*(*t*1*, t*2) [6](#_bookmark8) . Here, keys *R*1 and *R*2 are sent from *A* and *B* to *S*, respectively. After Message 4 is received, *A* can obtain *R*2, thus making *R*2 the shared key between *A* and *B*.

* + 1. *TMN protocol roles.*

The first step in our design and verification technique is to obtain the protocol roles from the standard notation:

* + - * Initiator: ⟨*A,* [*A, S, B,* {*R*1}*pk*(*S*) *dS* : *F*1*, S, A, B, v*(*R*1*, R*2) *aS* : *F*2]⟩
      * Responder: ⟨*B,* [*S, B, A a S* : *F*3*, B, S, A,* {*R*2}*pk*(*S*) *dS* : *F*4]⟩
      * Server: ⟨*S,* [*A, S, B,* {*R*1}*pk*(*S*) *aA* : *F*5*, S, B, Ad B* : *F*6*, B, S, A,* {*R*2}*pk*(*S*) *a B* : *F*7*, S, A, B, v*(*R*1*, R*2) *dA* : *F*8]⟩

This translation can be tedious and error-prone when protocols get large; however, we believe this step can be mostly automated (eg. by a tool assisting the user.)

6 We currently model Vernam encryption as normal symmetric encryption, and not as full exclusive xor.

The original version of TMN suffers from several secrecy attacks over *R*2 above, as exposed for instance in [[9](#_bookmark21)]. Thus, we will concentrate on two modi- fied versions of the protocol.

* 1. *First modification*

A replay attack against TMN was exposed by Simmons [[18](#_bookmark30)]. The attack ex- ploits the fact that the messages to the server from *A* and *B* (Message 1 and Message 3) can be replayed. To solve this defficiency, Tatebayashi and Mat- suzaki introduce timestamps in messages 1 and 3 [[10](#_bookmark22)]:

Message 1. *A* → *S* : *A, S, B,* {*TA, R*1}*pk*(*S*)

Message 2. *S* → *B* : *S, B, A*

Message 3. *B* → *S* : *B, S, A,* {*TB, R*2}*pk*(*S*)

Message 4. *S* → *A* : *S, A, B, v*(*R*1*, R*2)

In this new protocol, after receiving *TA* and *TB*, the server can check for the timeliness of these timestamps. According to Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki, this new protocol version guarantess the freshness of *R*1 and *R*2. To check if this is true, we can specify the freshness requirements of *R*1 and *R*2 as a local security properties of server *S*:

*FveshRi* = ∀*e* ∈ *tv* : *last event*(*e*) ∨ ¬(*Ri* ≤ *msg*(*e*)) (for *i* = 1*,* 2) Where primitive *msg*(·) projects the message of an event, defined as *msg*(⟨*x* :

*m* ⬦ *y*⟩) = *m* and predicate *last event*(*e*) is a primitive that is true iff *e* is the last event of trace *tv*. The definition of this primitive is straightforward:

[[*last event*(*e*)]] *tv* = *tvue* iff *tv* = *tv*' · *e*. *FveshR* and *FveshR* are expressing that *R*1 and *R*2, respectively, are fresh.

1 2

The last step involves deciding where to put *FveshR*1 and *FveshR*2 in the server role. This is easy: we make the decision that the formulae for checking the freshness of the received values should be placed *as soon as the values are received*. Thus, *FveshR*1 can be put as *F*5, that is, after *R*1 is received. Similarly, we set *FveshR*2 as *F*7.

* 1. *First novel attack*

After verification, we found a violation of formula *F*5 (that is, freshness of *R*1). The attack is reported in Table [1](#_bookmark9).

In this attack, the intruder starts replacing messages *α.*1 with *α.*1' and *α.*3 with *α.*3', and finally obtains *v*1 from message *α.*4. But, when it wants to use

Table 1

*R*1 freshness attack. *ε*(*s*) is *ε* masquerading as *s*. *α* and *β* denote two different runs.

Message *α.*1. *a* → *ε*(*s*) : *a, s, b,* {*ta, r*1}*pk*(*s*)

Message *α.*1'. *ε*(*a*) → *s* : *a, s, b,* {*te*1*, re*}*pk*(*s*)

Message *α.*2. *s* → *b* : *s, b, a*

Message *α.*3. *b* → *ε*(*s*) : *b, s, a,* {*tb, r*2}*pk*(*s*)

Message *α.*3'. *ε*(*b*) → *s* : *b, s, a,* {*ta, r*1}*pk*(*s*)

Message *α.*4. *s* → *ε*(*a*) : *s, a, b, v*(*re, r*1)

Message *β.*1. *ε*(*a*) → *s* : *a, s, b,* {*te*2*, r*1}*pk*(*s*)

it in a new run *β*, even if the intruder uses a new (not expired) timestamp *te*2, the formula *F*5 does not hold since *v*1 is not fresh (note that *s* is the *same* server, involved in both runs *α* and *β*). It is important to notice why this attack represents a vulnerability of the protocol. According to Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki, the server has to check for the validity of the timestamps in order to guarantee the freshness of *R*1 and *R*2; as we can see in this attack, this is not sufficient. To the best of our knowledge, this vulnerability was never exposed before.

* 1. *Second modification*

A modification to assure authentication of the initiator and responder to the server consists in using *SA* and *SB*, shared secrets between *S* and *A* and *B* respectively, in the following manner:

Message 1. *A* → *S* : *A, S, B,* {*TA, SA, R*1}*pk*(*S*)

Message 2. *S* → *B* : *S, B, A*

Message 3. *B* → *S* : *B, S, A,* {*TB, SB, R*2}*pk*(*S*)

Message 4. *S* → *A* : *S, A, B, v*(*R*1*, R*2)

After receiving messages 1 and 3, the server can authenticate *A* and *B*, respectively, since (by assumption) secrets *SA* and *SB* are shared *only* between the server and the respective agents. To check if the protocol accomplishes the authentication goal of *A* and *B* to *S*, we translate this in a formula that states that if *S* received a message *M* apparently from *A* (resp. *B*), then it was *really* sent by *A* (*B*). Server *S* authenticates *A* after receiving the

first message, so at that point we set our formula: *F*5 = ∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*A* : *A, S, B,* {*TA, SA, R*1}*pk*(*S*) *d S*⟩. Similarly, *S* authenticates *B* after the third message: *F*7 = ∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*B* : *B, S, A,* {*TB, SB, R*2}*pk*(*S*) *d S*⟩.

We performed verification with some test scenarios and did not find any trace that violates the above security requirements. Thus, we can regard the protocol to be secure for the system scenarios we tested; of course, bigger scenarios can be tested to increase confidence about the protocol security.

* 1. *Mutual authentication*

Even though Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki do not state the mutual authentica- tion of *A* and *B*, it is interesting to consider this case (Lowe and Roscoe [[9](#_bookmark21)] also discuss this.) We can translate this requirement by redefining two formu- lae, namely *F*3 and *F*2. We define *F*3 to express the local security property of A to B and *F*2 expressing the authentication of B to A:

* *M* authenticity of *A* to *B*: *F*3 = ∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*A* : *A, S, B,* {*TA, SA, R*1}*pk*(*S*) *dS*⟩;
* *M* authenticity of *B* to *A*: *F*2 = ∃*e* : *e* = ⟨*B* : *B, S, A,* {*TB, SB, R*2}*pk*(*S*) *dS*⟩.

Proceeding with verification, we found traces that violate *F*2 and *F*3. The attack trace for *F*3 is straightforward, consisting in only one message, sent from *ε*(*s*) to *b*: *s, b, a*. But this is sufficient to violate formula *F*3, since when *b* receives *s, b, a* she wants to check if *a* sent *a, s, b,* {*ta, sa, v*1}*pk*(*s*), which she did not (this attack is similar to attack 7.1 in [[9](#_bookmark21)].)

* 1. *Novel authentication attacks*

In Table [2](#_bookmark10) we report two attacks that violate *F*2.

Table 2

B to A authentication attacks

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *α.*1. | *a* → *ε*(*s*) : | *a, s, b,* {*ta, sa, r*1}*pk*(*s*) | *α.*1.*a* → *ε*(*s*) : *a, s, b,* {*ta, sa, r*1}*pk*(*s*) |
| *α.*2. | *ε*(*s*) → *b* : | *s, b, ε* | *β.*1.*ε* → *s* : *ε, s, a,* {*te, se, re*1}*pk*(*s*) |
| *α.*3. | *b* → *ε*(*s*) : | *b, s, ε,* {*tb, sb, r*2}*pk*(*s*) | *β.*2.*s* → *ε*(*a*) : *s, a, ε* |
| *β.*1. | *ε*(*a*) → *s* : | *a, s, b,* {*ta, sa, r*1}*pk*(*s*) | *β.*3.*ε*(*a*) → *s* : *a, s, ε,* {*ta, sa, r*1}*pk*(*s*) |
| *β.*2. | *s* → *ε*(*b*) : | *s, b, a* | *β.*4.*s* → *ε* : *s, ε, a, v*(*re*1*, r*1) |
| *β.*3. | *ε*(*b*) → *s* : | *b, s, a,* {*tb, sb, r*2}*pk*(*s*) | *α.*4.*ε*(*s*) → *a* : *s, a, b, v*(*r*1*, re*1) |
| *β.*4. | *s* → *ε*(*a*) : | *s, a, b, v*(*r*1*, r*2) |  |
| *α.*4. | *ε*(*s*) → *a* : | *s, a, b, v*(*r*1*, r*2) |  |

The attack of Table [2](#_bookmark10) (left side) is successful since the intruder can ma- nipulate the first three non-encrypted fields. Notice how *F*2 is violated: when *a* receives message *α.*4, *b never* sent message *b, s, a,* {*tb, sb, r*2}*pk*(*b*). The attack reported in Table [2](#_bookmark10) (right side) is stronger, since the principal *b* is not alive in the run of *a*.

We believe these attacks over this modified version of the TMN protocol have never been reported before in the literature.

# Related Work

In this section we discuss some related work. In [[16](#_bookmark28)], Roscoe identifies two ways of specifying protocol security goals: firstly, using *extensional* specifi- cations, and secondly using *intensional* specifications. An extensional spec- ification describes the intended service provided by the protocol in terms of behavioural equivalence [[6](#_bookmark18),[1](#_bookmark14),[17](#_bookmark29)]. On the other hand, an intensional specifica- tion describes the underlying mechanism of a procotol, in terms of states or events [[2](#_bookmark15),[21](#_bookmark32),[16](#_bookmark28),[19](#_bookmark31),[15](#_bookmark27),[7](#_bookmark20)].

The approach presented in this paper belongs to the spectrum of inten- sional specifications, and is related to [[16](#_bookmark28),[19](#_bookmark31)]. In [[19](#_bookmark31)], a requirement speci- fication language is proposed. This language is useful for specifying sets of requirements for classes of protocol; the requirements can be mapped onto a particular protocol instance, which can be later verified using their tool, called NRL Protocol Analyzer. This approach has been subsequently used to specify the GDOI secure multicast protocol [[12](#_bookmark24)].

In [[16](#_bookmark28)], Roscoe presents a method for describing the underlying mechanism of a protocol, using a CSP specification. The method consists of four steps: Firstly, one identifies an execution point of the protocol that should not be reached without a corresponding legitimate run having occurred. Secondly, one describes the possible sequences of messages that should have occurred before this execution point; thirdly, one creates a specification which groups all the CSP processes modelling the protocol participants (this step is similar to our scenario setting). Finally, one verifies the specification using FDR. This method has been also used by Lowe in [[9](#_bookmark21)].

The approaches just mentioned employ languages specifying security prop- erties in a global fashion, as opposed to our technique which deals with local security properties.

In [[4](#_bookmark16)], Cremers, Mauw and de Vink present another logic for specifying local security properties. Similarly to us, in [[4](#_bookmark16)] the authors define the message authenticity property by referring to the variables occurring in the protocol role. In addition, in [[4](#_bookmark16)], it is defined a new kind of authentication, called

*synchonization*, which is then compared with the Lowe’s intensional specifica- tion. The logic presented in this paper cannot handle the specification of the synchronization authentication. In fact, we cannot handle the weaker notion of injective authentication, since we cannot match corresponding events in a trace. However, we believe we can extend our logic to support these prop- erties. Briefly, this could be achieved by decorating the different runs with label identifiers and adding a primitive to reason about events that happenned before others in a trace.

# Conclusions and Future Work

We have developed a *trace logic* for expressing *local security properties*. Using this trace logic, the protocol designer can specify precisely the (local) security properties a protocol should satisfy to accomplish the security goals for which it has been designed.

The main differences between our approach and the ones mentioned in Section [5](#_bookmark11) can be summarized as follows:

1. Our trace logic formulae are *local* to the participants, in the sense that are dependent to the principal’s point of view, instead of *global* to the protocol specification. This allow us to define properties more precisely, in the sense of what should hold for each principal at each execution step. Furthermore, our technique can be used to integrate the specification within the design of a cryptographic protocol. Methodologically, this allows for the integration of the verification phase within the design one, speeding up the feedback from the verification, and providing the basis

for an integrated environment for protocol engineering.

1. Without having to use temporal operators, the logic we presented can express classical security properties including freshness and authenticity of the exchanged values during a protocol run.
2. Our logic is applied *directly* to the protocol messages. This allow us to reason about (local) security properties without having to use artificial *event* messages.

As future work, we plan to apply the methodology to more complex case studies, such as multicast protocols e.g. LKH group communications protocol [[20](#_bookmark33)]. We also plan to study how to *compose* local security specifications: we believe this is a very important advantage of our approach over the other global ones.

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