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An Approach for the Specification, Verification and Synthesis of Secure Systems

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Abstract

In this paper we describe an approach based on *open system analysis* for the *specification*, *verification* and *synthesis* of secure systems. In particular, by using our framework, we are able to model a system with a possible intruder and verify whether the whole system is secure, i.e. whether the system satisfies a given temporal logic formula that describes its secure behavior. If necessary, we are also able to automatically synthesize a process that, by controlling the behavior of the possible intruder, enforces the desired secure behavior of the whole system.

*Keywords:* open system analysis, partial model checking, secure systems analysis, synthesis of controller operators

# Overview

In the last few years, research on the definition of formal methods for the analysis and the verification of security properties of systems has increased greatly. This is mainly due to the practical relevance of these systems and moreover to prelimin- ary encouraging results achieved by the application of formal methods to security analysis.

Here we describe a logical approach for *speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation* and *synthesis*

of secure systems by summarizing some results of the works [[14](#_bookmark27),[16](#_bookmark28),[17](#_bookmark29)].

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The *speciﬁcation* is the first step of the analysis of a system. The language for the description of properties and the one for the description of systems must have a clear formal semantics. We consider for specification both declarative languages as temporal logic, in particular equational *μ*-calculus, and operational ones as process algebras, in particular *CCS* (see [[20](#_bookmark33)]).

We then specify the security of a system as the specification of a property of an *open system*, by following the approach given in [[14](#_bookmark27),[16](#_bookmark28)]. As a matter of fact the analysis of security properties is based on the idea that potential attackers should be analyzed as if they were un-specified components of a system. In this way we reduce security analysis to the analysis of open systems. The behavior of an open system may be not completely specified and may present some uncertainty. The main idea underling this approach is the following: at the beginning we have a system *S* and a temporal logic formula *φ* that describes a security property. It is possible that an intruder *X* works in parallel with *S* or it is also possible that *X* is a malicious component of *S*. In each of these cases we require that *S* composed with *X* (*S * *X*) satisfies *φ* whatever *X* is.

The *veriﬁcation* phase requires to check for any *X* that (*S * *X*) satisfies the property *φ*. In principle, this corresponds to an unbounded number of classical model checking problems in closed systems [3](#_bookmark1) . Indeed, the universal quantification on all possible intruders makes this problem difficult to manage. In order to solve it we use the *partial model checking* technique. It is introduced by Andersen in [[1](#_bookmark14)] in order to deal with compositional analysis of concurrent system. By using this technique, we may focus only on *X* and the previous problem becomes a validity checking problem. As a matter of fact by using the partial model checking technique, the property *φ* is projected on another one, says *φ*' = *φ*// , depending only on *S*

*S*

and *φ*, that only the component *X* must satisfy. Here, there is still the universal

quantification, but the problem is now a validity checking one, that has been solved for many logics, including *μ*-calculus.

We consider the following *synthesis* problem. Assume to have a system *S* that is secure in isolation, but that in composition with a certain component *X* does not enjoy the desired security property, say *φ*. Then, we are able to synthesize a process *Y* that controlling the component *X* guarantees the whole system with *S* works correctly, i.e. it satisfies *φ*.

Hence we have extended the line of research of [[14](#_bookmark27),[16](#_bookmark28)] with a method for automat- ically enforcing the desired security properties (see [[17](#_bookmark29),[18](#_bookmark30),[19](#_bookmark32)] ). We define process algebra operators called *controller operators* and denoted by *Y d X* where *Y* is the *controller program* i.e. the process that controls the un-specified component *X*. In particular we define controller operators that are able to model security automata described in [[3](#_bookmark15),[4](#_bookmark17),[22](#_bookmark35)] for enforcing safety properties as well as others able to force *Non-interference* properties (see [[19](#_bookmark32)]), under certain assumptions.

As before we start from a system *S* and a security property *φ* and we project

3 Actually, there exists a verification problem, called module checking, i.e. model checking of open system, introduced in [[12](#_bookmark24)]. Such a problem can be solved using the technique we are going to present here, e.g. see [[15](#_bookmark31)].

*φ* on *φ*' by partial model checking. In this way we have to monitor only the neces- sary/untrusted part of the system, here *X*. Then we can force *X* to enjoy *φ*' by using an appropriate controller *Y* D *X*. Moreover, our approach permits us to auto- matically synthesize a controller program *Y* for a given controller operator *Y d X* by exploiting satisfiability procedure on process algebra and temporal logic.

We also show a related specification framework called *GN DC* (e.g., see [[8](#_bookmark21)]) that is able to describe security properties, e.g. *Non-interference, Agreement, Authen- tication, Non-Repudiation* and so on. By using this schema we are also able to uniformly model *dependable systems* and analyze *dependablity properties*. *GN DC* was firstly introduced in [[8](#_bookmark21)] as a framework where family of security properties could be uniformly expressed and compared. Generally speaking a *GN DC* property has the following form:

*S* satisfies *GN DC*α(S) iff ∀ *X S * *X a α*(*S*)

a

This means that a system *S* enjoys *GN DC*α(S) iff *S* shows w.r.t. a certain *behavioral relation* [4](#_bookmark2) *a*, the same behavior of *α*(*S*). This is must to be true even if *S* is composed with a possible un-trusted component *X*, whatever it is. By using characteristic formulae (e.g. see [[21](#_bookmark34)]) for expressing the relation *a*, we can reduce this problem to a usual open system analysis one.

a

Summing up our aim is to present a logical approach based on *open system* analysis and *partial model checking* technique for the specification, verification and synthesis of secure systems.

*This paper is organized as follows*. Section 2 briefly recalls the basic theory about process algebra and temporal logic. Section 3 explains our approach for the specification and verification of secure systems. Section 4 presents how we are able to define and synthesize controller programs. Section 5 shows a related approach used also to deal with dependability properties. Eventually, Section 6 concludes the paper.

# Background

* 1. *Process Algebra: CCS*

*CCS* (see [[20](#_bookmark33)]) is a calculus for describing the behavior of concurrent processes.

The *CCS* language assumes a set *Act* = L∪ L¯ of (observable) *communication actions* built from a set L of names and a set L¯ of co-names. The purpose of putting a line, called complementation, over a names is to show that the corresponding action can synchronize with its complemented action. Complementation follows

the rule that *a***¯** = *a*, for any communication action *a* ∈ *Act*.

A special symbol, *τ* , is used to model any (unobservable) *internal action*; hence the full set of possible actions is *Act*r = *Act* ∪ {*τ* }. We let *a, b,...* range over

4 There are a lot of different behavioral relations that can be studied. In particular we are interested in simulation, bisimulation and trace equivalences.

Prefixing:

*a.P* −a→ *P*

Choice:

*P* −a→ *P* '

*P* + *Q* −a→ *P* '

Parallel:

*P* −a→ *P* '



*P Q* −a→ *P* ' *Q*

*Q* −a→ *Q*'

*P* + *Q* −a→ *Q*'

*Q* −a→ *Q*'



*P Q* −a→ *P Q*'

*P* −→l

*P* ' *Q* ¯l *Q*'

Restriction:



*P Q* −r→ *P* ' *Q*'

−→

*P* −a→ *P* '

*P* \*L* −a→ *P* '\*L*

Relabeling:

*P* −a→ *P* '

f(a)

'

*P* [*f* ]

−→ *P* [*f* ]

Constant: *P* −a→ *P* ' *A* −a→ *P* '

Table 1

*SOS* system for CCS.

*Act*r . The following grammar specifies the syntax of the language defining all *CCS*

processes:

*P, Q* ::= 0 | *a.P* | *P* + *Q* | *P Q* | *P* \*L* | *P* [*f* ] | *A*

where *L* ⊆ *Act* and the relabeling function *f* : *Act*r '→ *Act*r must be such that

*f* (*τ* )= *τ* .

Informally, 0 is the process that does not perform any action. *a.P* is the process ready to perform the action *a*, then, it behaves as *P* . Process *P* + *Q* can choose *non-deterministically* to behave either as *P* or as *Q*. *P Q* is the *parallel operator* where *P* and *Q* evolve concurrently. In *P* \*L*, actions *a* ∈ *L* ∪ *L*¯ are prevented from

happening. *P* [*f* ] is the process obtained from *P* by changing each *a* ∈ *Act*r into

*f* (*a*). A process identifier *A* defines a process and it is assumed that each identifier

*.*

*A* has a defining equation of the form *A* = *P* .

The operational semantics of *CCS* terms (see [[20](#_bookmark33)]) is described by a *labeled transition system* that is a tuple (E *, Act*r *,* →), where E is the set of all *CCS* terms and →⊆ E × *Act*r ×E is a *transition relation* defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the set of *Structural Operational Semantics* (*SOS*) rules of Table [1](#_bookmark3). The transition relation → defines the usual concept of derivation in one step. As a matter of fact *P* −a→ *P* ' means that process *P* evolves in one step

into process *P* ' by executing action *a* ∈ *Act*r . The transitive and reflexive closure

of

a∈Act*τ*

−a→ is written →∗.

Given a *CCS* process *P* , *Der*(*P* )= {*P* '|*P* →∗ *P* '}, is the set of its derivatives.

A *CCS* process *P* is said *ﬁnite state* if *Der*(*P* ) is finite. *Sort*(*P* ) (called the *sort of*

*P* ) is the set of names of actions that syntactically appear in the process *P* .

* 1. *Behavioral Equivalences*

Several behavioral relations are defined in order to compare the behavior of different processes.

* + 1. *Simulation and Bisimulation Equivalences*

Definition 2.1 Let (E *, Act*r *,* →) be an *LTS* of concurrent processes, and let R be a binary relation over E. Then R is called *strong simulation*, denoted by ≺, over (E *, Act*r *,* →) if and only if, whenever (*E, F* ) ∈R we have:

if *E* −a→ *E*' then there exists *F* ' s.t. *F* −a→ *F* ' and (*E*'*,F* ') ∈ R.

A *strong bisimulation* is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are strong simulations. We represent with ∼ the union of all the strong bisimulations.

We give the notion of *observational relations* as follows: *E* ⇒r *E*' (or *E* ⇒ *E*')

if *E* →r ∗ *E*'; for *a* /= *τ* , *E* ⇒a *E*' if *E* ⇒r →a ⇒r *E*' [5](#_bookmark4) . Let *γ* ∈ *Act*∗ be a sequence of

γ

actions, i.e. *γ* = *a*1*,... , a*n, then *E* =⇒ *E*' iff there exist *E* = *E*0*, E*1*,... , E*n = *E*'

a1 a*n*

s.t. *E*0 =⇒ *E*1 *... E*n−1 =⇒ *E*n.

The *weak bisimulation* relation (see [[20](#_bookmark33)]) permits to abstract to some extent from the internal behavior of the systems, represented by the internal *τ* action.

Definition 2.2 Let (E *, Act*r *,* →) be an *LTS* of concurrent processes, and let R be a binary relation over E. Then R is called weak simulation, denoted by ≤, over (E *, Act*r *,* →) if and only if, whenever (*E, F* ) ∈R we have:

then there exists *F*

s.t. *F* =⇒ *F*

and (*E ,F* ) ∈ R,

if *E* −a→ '

*E*

' a ' ' '

A weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are weak simulations. We represent with ≈ the union of all the weak bisimulations.

Every strong simulation is also a weak one (see [[20](#_bookmark33)]).

* + 1. *Trace Equivalence*

Most of the security properties are based on the simple notion of *traces*: two pro- cesses are equivalent if they exactly show the same execution sequences (called *traces*). In order to formally define traces, we define *trace preorder* (≤trace) and *trace equivalence* (≈trace) as follows.

Definition 2.3 For any *E* ∈E the set *T* (*E*) of *traces associated with E* is *T* (*E*)=

{*γ* ∈ *Act*∗ | ∃*E*'

γ

: *E* =⇒

*E*'}. *F* can execute all traces of *E* (notation *E* ≤

trace *F* )

iff *T* (*E*) ⊆ *T* (*F* ). *E* and *F* are *trace equivalent* (notation *E* ≈trace *F* ) iff *E* ≤trace *F*

and *F* ≤trace *E*, i.e. iff *T* (*E*)= *T* (*F* ).

5 *τ a* ' *τ* ' '

Note that it is a short notation for E ⇒ E*τ* → E*τ* ⇒ E

that is not important for this framework.

where E*τ* and E*τ* denote intermediate states

T)' = *S*  F)' = ∅ *Z*)' = *ρ*(*Z*) *φ*1 ∧ *φ*2)' = *φ*1)' ∩ *φ*2)'

ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ

*φ*1 ∨ *φ*2)' = *φ*1)' ∪ *φ*2)' ⟨*a*⟩*φ*)' = {*s* | ∃*s*' : *s* →a *s*' and *s*' ∈ *φ*)' }

ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ

ρ

[*a*]*φ*)'

ρ

= {*s* | ∀*s*' : *s* →a

*s*' implies *s*' ∈ *φ*)' }

Table 2 Equational μ-calculus

* 1. *Equational μ-Calculus*

The equational *μ*-calculus is a modal logic (see [[5](#_bookmark18)]) based on fix-point equations. Let *Z* be a variable ranging over a set *V* of variables, a least (greatest) fix-point equation is *Z* =μ *φ* (*Z* =ν *φ*), where *φ* is an *assertion*. The syntax of assertions (*φ*) and of lists of equations (D) is defined as follows:

*assertion φ* ::= T | F | *φ* ∧ *φ* | *φ* ∨ *φ* | ⟨*a*⟩*φ* | [*a*]*φ*

*equations list* D ::= (*Z* =μ *φ*)D| (*Z* =ν *φ*)D | *ϵ*

where the symbol T means *true* and F means *false*; ∧ is the symbol for the con- junction of formulae, i.e. *φ*1 ∧ *φ*2 holds iff both of the formulae *φ*1 and *φ*2 hold, and

∨ is the disjunction of formulae and *φ*1 ∨ *φ*2 holds when either *φ*1 or *φ*2 holds. The *possibility operator* ⟨*a*⟩*φ* means that “there exists a transition labeled by *a* after that *φ* holds”. The *necessity operator* [*a*]*φ* means “for all *a*-actions performed *φ* holds”. The semantics of the equational *μ*-calculus is defined over labeled transition systems. In order to give the semantics of an equation list we show our notation: let M be a labeled transition system and *ρ* be a function, called environment, from variables to a subset of the set of states of M, H represents the union of disjoint environments, and [] denotes the empty environment. Let *σ* be in {*μ, ν*}, *σU.f* (*U* ) represents the *σ* fix-point of the function *f* in one variable *U* . The semantics, D)ρ

is defined by the following equations:

*ϵ*)ρ = [] (*Z* =σ *φ*)D)ρ = D)(ρH[U'/Z]) H [*U* '*/Z*]

where *U* ' = *σU.* *φ*)(ρH[U/Z]Hρ'(U )) and *ρ*'(*U* )= *D*)(ρH[U/Z])

Informally (*Z* =σ *φ*)D)ρ says that the solution to (*Z* =σ *φ*)D is the *σ* fixed point solution *U* ' of *φ*)ρ where the solution to the rest of the list of equations D is used as environment. A labeled transition system M satisfies an equation list

D, written M |=ρ D ↓ *Z* if the initial state of M is in D)ρ*Z*, where *Z* is the first variable in the list D. We omit *ρ* out when it is evident from the context or when D is closed.

The semantics, *φ*)ρ, of an assertion *φ* is defined in Table [2](#_bookmark5).

The following standard result of *μ*-calculus will be useful in the reminder of the paper.

Theorem 2.4 ([[23](#_bookmark36)]) *Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time in the length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an*

*example of such model.*

* 1. *Partial Model Checking*

*Partial model checking* is a technique that relies upon compositional methods for proving properties of concurrent systems [[1](#_bookmark14),[2](#_bookmark16)].

The intuitive idea underlying the partial model checking is the following: proving that *E * *F* satisfies *φ* is equivalent to prove that *F* satisfies a modified specification *φ* = *φ*//*E* , where *//*E is the partial evaluation function for the parallel composition operator (see Table [A.1](#_bookmark37) in Appendix) [6](#_bookmark7) .

Hence, the behavior of a component has been partially evaluated and the re- quirements are changed in order to respect this evaluation.

We give the following main result (see [[2](#_bookmark16)]).

Lemma 2.5 *Given a process E * *F and an equational speciﬁcation* D↓ *Z we have:*

*E * *F* |= D↓ *Z iff F* |= D↓ *Z*//*E*

A lemma similar to the previous one holds for each *CCS* operator.

* + 1. *Characteristic Formulae*

A *characteristic formula* is a formula in equational *μ*-calculus that completely char- acterizes the behavior of a (state in a) *LTS* modulo a chosen notion of behavioral relation. It is possible to define the notion of characteristic formula for a finite state process E w.r.t. several behavioral relations (see [[21](#_bookmark34)]). Here we present the definition of characteristic formula w.r.t. (weak) simulation as follows.

Definition 2.6 Given a finite state process, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak

simulation) *D*E ↓ *Z*E is defined by the following equations: for every *E*' ∈ *Der*(*E*),

*Z*E' =ν a∈Act([*a*]( E

*a*

'

''

:E ⇒E

'' *Z*E'' )).

Following the reasoning used in [[21](#_bookmark34)], the following proposition holds.

Lemma 2.7 *Let E be a ﬁnite-state process and let φ*E,≤ *be its characteristic formula*

*w.r.t. simulation, then F* ≤ *E* ⇔ *F* |= *φ*E,≤*.*

# Specification and Verification of Secure Systems

Following the approach proposed in [[14](#_bookmark27),[16](#_bookmark28)], we describe here a methodology for the formal analysis of secure systems based on the concept of open systems and partial model checking technique.

6 We present the partial model checking technique w.r.t. parallel operator because its application w.r.t this operators is more intuitive than w.r.t. another CCS operator.

* 1. *Open Systems Analysis for Security*

A system is *open* if it has some unspecified components. We want to make sure that the system with an unspecified component works properly, e.g. fulfills a certain property. Thus, the intuitive idea underlying the verification of an open system is the following:

*An open system satisﬁes a property if and only if, whatever component is substituted to the unspeciﬁed one, the whole system satisﬁes this property*.

In the context of formal languages for the description of system behavior, an open system may be simply regarded as a term of this language which may contain “holes” (or placeholders). These are unspecified components. For instance *A * ( ) and *A * *B * ( ) may be considered as open systems.

The main idea is that, when analyzing security-sensitive systems, neither the enemy’s behavior nor the malicious users’ behavior should be fixed beforehand. A system should be secure regardless of the behavior the malicious users or intruders may have, which is exactly a *veriﬁcation* problem of open systems. According to [[14](#_bookmark27),[16](#_bookmark28)], for defining security properties as open systems properties we study the following problem:

For every component *X S * *X* |= *φ* (1)

where *X* stands for a possible enemy, *S* is the system under examination and *φ* is a (temporal) logic formula expressing the security property. It roughly states that the property *φ* holds for the system *S*, regardless of the component (i.e. intruder, malicious user, hostile environment, *etc.*) which may possibly interact with it.

Our aim is to reduce such a verification problem as in Formula ([1](#_bookmark8)) to a validity checking problem. To obtain this, we apply the partial model checking techniques as follows:

∀*X S * *X* |= *φ* iff *X* |= *φ*//*S* (2)

In this way we find the sufficient and necessary condition on *X*, expressed by the logical formula *φ*//*S* , so the whole system *S * *X* satisfies *φ* if and only if *X* satisfies *φ*//*S* .

Several results exist about the decidability of such problems for temporal logic

and, for several interesting properties, like several *safety properties* (“nothing bad happens”), the validity problem expressed by Formula ([2](#_bookmark9)) may be efficiently solved.

# Synthesis of Controller Programs

In previous sections we have presented our approach for analyzing secure systems as open systems. As we have already said, the universal quantification over all possible intruders in Formula ([1](#_bookmark8)) it is not easy to manage.

Our aim in this section is to present our method to enforce a system to behave correctly whatever the behavior of the target is. To do this we define several *process algebra controller operators* that permit to control possible un-trusted behaviors of a target. We denote them by *Y d X*, where *X* is the target and *Y* is a *controller*

*program* i.e. the process that controls *X* in order to guarantee that a given security property is satisfied.

By using a controller operator the specification of the system changes from Formula ([1](#_bookmark8)) to:

∃*Y* ∀*X* s.t. *S * (*Y d X*) |= *φ* (3) By partially evaluating *φ* w.r.t. *S* the Formula ([3](#_bookmark10)) is reduced as follows:

∃*Y* ∀*X Y d X* |= *φ*' (4)

where *φ*' = *φ*// .

*S*

It is important to note that, by using partial model checking we need to control only the possible un-trusted component of the system. This is an advantage of our approach because often not all the system needs to be checked or it is simply not convenient to check it as a whole or also it is not possible to do. Some components could be trusted and one would like to have a method to constrain only the un- trusted ones (e.g. downloaded applets). Our method allows one to monitor only the necessary/untrusted part of the system, here *X*. Sometimes it could be possible that not the whole system can be checked but only some of its components.

Moreover, for some security properties, we are able to automatically synthesize a controller program for a controller operator.

* 1. *Controller Operators*

We can define several kinds of controller operators. Each of them has different capabilities. For instance, in [[17](#_bookmark29),[18](#_bookmark30),[19](#_bookmark32)] we have dealt with security automata (*trun- cation, suppression, insertion, edit* ) defined in [[3](#_bookmark15),[4](#_bookmark17)] by modeling them by process algebra controller operators *Y d*K *X*, where *K* ∈ {*T, S, I, E*} [7](#_bookmark12) .

Referring to [[3](#_bookmark15),[4](#_bookmark17)], we recall the informal definition of security automata as fol- lows:

Truncation automata: The truncation automaton (similar to Schneider’s ones (see [[22](#_bookmark35)])) can recognize bad sequences of actions and halt the program execution before security property is violated, but cannot otherwise modify the program behavior.

Suppression automata: The suppression automaton can halt program execution and suppress individual program actions without terminating the program out- right.

Insertion automata: The insertion automaton can insert a sequence of actions into the program actions stream as well as terminate the program.

Edit automata: The edit automaton combines the power of suppression and inser- tion automata. It can truncate actions sequences and insert or suppress security- relevant actions at will.

7 T stays for *Truncation*, S for *Suppression*, I for *Insertion* and E for *Edit*.

According to [[3](#_bookmark15),[4](#_bookmark17)], these operators are applied in order to enforce safety properties. As a matter of fact for this class of formulae it is possible to prove that if *E* and *F* are two processes, s.t. *F* ≤ *E* then *E* |= *φ* ⇒ *F* |= *φ*. In [[18](#_bookmark30)] we have proven that *Y d*T *X* is weakly similar to *Y* . Hence, in order to satisfy the Formula ([4](#_bookmark11)) it is sufficient to prove the following one:

∃*Y Y* |= *φ*' (5)

In this case we obtain a satisfiability problem in *μ*-calculus, that can be solved by Theorem [2.4](#_bookmark6). Hence we are able to find a process *Y* that halts the execution of the target whenever it is unsafe.

It is important to note that a similar result can be proven also for the other controller operators. As a matter of fact, by defining appropriate relabeling function *f*K, we have proven that *Y d*K *X* is weakly similar to *Y* [*f*K] for *K* ∈ {*S, I, E*}. So, by partial model checking w.r.t. relabeling operator (see Table [A.1](#_bookmark37) in Appendix) we are able to calculate *φ*'' = *φ* to reduce Formula ([4](#_bookmark11)) as follows:

//

[*fK* ]

∃*Y Y* |= *φ*'' [8](#_bookmark13) (6)

Also in this case we can solve the problem by Theorem [2.4](#_bookmark6).

Other controller operators can be defined in order, for example, to enforce not only safety properties but also *information flow properties* (see [[19](#_bookmark32)]).

# A General Schema for Security and Dependability Properties: The *GN DC* Schema

Referring to the open system approach defined before, here we present a gen- eral schema to specify several security properties. It is called *Generalized NDC*, *GN DC*α for short, where *a* and *α* are two parameters that express a behavioral equivalence and a property respectively. (It is a generalization of *Non Deducibility on Compositions*,NDC for short, (see [[6](#_bookmark19)]).) This general schema permits to study relationships among different security properties in a fairly simple way. Indeed, their comparison can be carried out by simply studying the relations among the relative *α*’s and *a*’s. It is worth noticing that some of the properties we consider have been proposed for completely different aims. For instance, *NDC* has been introduce for studying *non-interference properties* in non-deterministic systems while *Agreement* has been proposed for the analysis of entity authentication in protocols.

a

The idea is similar to the one of the analysis as open systems, but it considers as correct specification of the behavior another process rather than a formula.

The main idea is that a system *E* is *GN DC*α iff for every process *X* the com- position of the system with such a *X* satisfies a specification *α*(*E*). Essentially, *GN DC*α guarantees that the property identified by *α* is satisfied, w.r.t. relation even when the system is composed with any possibly hostile process.

Q

Q

8 The interested reader can find more details in [[18](#_bookmark30)].

Definition 5.1 *E* is *GN DC*α

Q

*iff*

∀*X E * *X*\*H* *α*(*E*)

The property is parametric with respect to *α*(*E*) and *a* that can be instantiated in order to obtain different security properties. In particular *α* : E → E is a func- tion between processes and *α*(*E*), w.r.t. a given *E*, specifies which should be the “correct” (intended) behavior of *E*; *a* ⊂E × E is a relation between processes that represents our notion of “observation”. The idea is that just by studying different *α* functions, one could compare different properties. This has been useful to form- ally show, as the intuition suggests, that non-interference properties are usually the strongest ones. (The interested reader may check [[7](#_bookmark20)] for a deeper discussion.)

As a matter of fact, we can instantiate the *GN DC* schema to obtain several properties. For instance, we can define *NDC*, *BNDC*, *Agreement*, *authentication* and *non-repudiation* by choosing particular instances of *a* and *α*(*E*).

Example 5.2 As we have already said, *Non Deducibility on Compositions*, *NDC* for short, (see [[6](#_bookmark19)]) has been proposed as a generalization of the classical idea of *Non-Interference* (see [[10](#_bookmark23)]) to non-deterministic systems.

Since *GN DC*α is a generalization of *NDC*, it can be instantiated in order to ob- tain *NDC* and also the *bisimulation* based *NDC*, called *BNDC*. We first redefine in our extended language the original definition as follows:

Q

*E* is *NDC* iff ∀ Π ∈ *High* users *,E * Π\*H* ≈trace *E*\*H* w.r.t. *Low* users

where *H* is a set of high actions. *NDC* requires that high level processes Π are not able to change the low level behavior of the system represented by *E*\*H*. As a matter of fact *E* \ *H* is the system where no high level activity is allowed. If it is equivalent to *E * Π\*H* this clearly means that Π is not able to modify in any way the execution of *E*.

We can obtain a bisimulation based *NDC* by simply substituting ≈trace with

≈.

*E* is *BNDC* iff ∀ Π ∈ *High* users , *E* \ *H* ≈ *E* Π \ *H*.

Note that *NDC* and *BNDC* correspond to *GN DC*E\H and *GN DC*E\H, respect-

≈*trace*

≈

ively.

Example 5.3 The approach proposed in [[13](#_bookmark26)] for the analysis of authentication properties, inside the framework of *CSP* [[11](#_bookmark25)] process algebra, can be rephrased in terms of our specification schema. The basic idea of the *Agreement* property is the following:

“A protocol guarantees to an initiator *A agreement* with a responder *B* on a set of data items *ds* if, whenever A (acting as initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder *B*, then *B* has previously been running the protocol, apparently with *A*, and *B* was acting as responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables in *ds*, and each such run of *A* corresponds to a unique run of *B*”.

What is technically done in the *agreement* property is to have for each party an action representing the running of the protocol and another one representing the completion of it. Hence

*E* satisfies *Agreement* iff *E* is *GN DC*α*Agree*(E).

≤*trace*

where *α*Agree says that even in the presence of an hostile process, *E* does not execute wrong traces.

The universal quantification over all possible intruders is yet problematic when trying to check a property, since, in principle, we have to verify it over infinitely many processes, one for each intruder.

The *GN DC* schema has a favorite verification method based on the so-called most-general intruder idea. For several kind of relations, it is possible to avoid the universal quantification and just consider one possible intruder. Thus, standard techniques and tools may be applied. Unfortunately, for several interesting proper- ties, e.g. *BNDC*, such approach does not work and the one based on logic presented in the previous sections should be applied.

* 1. *Related Problems: GN DC in Dependability*

It is possible to show that also *dependable systems* can be uniformly modeled in our framework and also *dependablity properties* can be analyzed within *GN DC* (see [[9](#_bookmark22)]). A system must be modeled by *CCS*, where both the *failing behavior* of the system and the related *fault-recovering procedures* are explicitly described. The environment acts as a *fault-injector* and it is the unspecified component of our framework. We call it *faulty environment*. We may note that the neat separation between the system and its environment given by *GN DC* is very useful.

The *GN DC* schema can be exploited for expressing properties peculiar of de- pendability analysis as *fail stop, fail safe, fail silent* (see [[9](#_bookmark22)] for the details). We briefly recall some definitions:

A failing system model is a *CCS* process *P*F obtained by extending the process *P* with the possibility of executing particular external actions from a set F of possible *fault actions*. After each fault action, the relative *failure mode* is also specified in *P*F .

A fault tolerant system model is a *CCS* process *P* #

F

obtained by adding to

*P*F some processes realizing error-recover strategies in accordance to some fault tolerant design strategy.

Occurrences of faults are induces by a *fault-injector* process *F*F that causes faults to happen. It interacts with *P* # exactly through *f* ∈F fault actions.

F

Now we are able to give the characterization of fault tolerance as *GN DC* property as follows.

Definition 5.4 A process *P* satisfies *GN DC*α(P ) iff ∀*F*

∈E (*P* # *F*

)\F *aα*(*P* #)

a

where EF = {*X*|*Sort*(*X*) ⊆F ∪ {*τ* }}.

F F F F F

It is important to observe that the clear separation between the system model and the environment allows us to leave *F*F unspecified and to range it over EF .

As we have already said, different definitions of *α*(*P* ) characterize different fault

tolerance properties, e.g. fail stop, fail safe, fail silent and fault tolerance.

# Conclusion

In this paper we have shown how security properties can be conveniently *speciﬁed* as properties of open systems. Moreover, these properties can be *veriﬁed* in a uniform way by using a few concepts of concurrency and temporal logic theory, as, for instance, partial model checking. Logic provides rigorous methods to reason about the uncertainty of the execution environment of security systems. The *synthesis* of secure systems is also possible by means of logical techniques. More generally, we aim at providing a uniform approach for the specification\analysis\synthesis for several application areas, e.g. fault-tolerance, non-interference, network and system security, open systems analysis and so on.

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# A Tables of Partial Model Checking Function

Parallel:

(*D* ↓ *Z*)*//t* = (*D//t*) ↓ *Z*t *ϵ//t* = *ϵ*

(*Z* =σ *φD*)*//t* = ((*Z*s =σ *φ//s*)s∈Der(E))(*D*)*//t Z//t* = *Z*t

[*a*]*φ//s* = [*a*](*φ*//s) ∧

*a*

s−→s

' *φ//s*'*,* if *a* /= *τ φ*1 ∧ *φ*2*//s* = (*φ*1*//s*) ∧ (*φ*2*//s*)

⟨*a*⟩*φ//s* = ⟨*a*⟩(*φ//s*) ∨

*a*

s−→s

' *φ//s*'*,* if *a* /= *τ φ*1 ∨ *φ*2*//s* = (*φ*1*//s*) ∨ (*φ*2*//s*)

[*τ* ]*φ//s* = [*τ* ](*φ//s*) ∧

*τ*

s−→s

' *φ//s*' ∧

*a*

s−→s

' [*a*](*φ //s*')

⟨*τ* ⟩*φ//s* = ⟨*τ* ⟩(*φ//s*) ∨ *τ*

' *φ//s*' ∨ *a*

'⟨*a*¯⟩(*φ//*s' ) T*//s* = T F*//s* = F

Restriction:

s−→s

s−→s

*Z//*\*L* = *Z* (*Z* =σ *φD*)*//*\*L* = (*Z* =σ *φ//*\*L*(*D*)*//*\*L*)

⟨*a*⟩*φ//*\*L* =

⎧⎨ ⟨*a*⟩(*φ//*\*L*) if *a* /∈ *L* ∪ *L*¯

⎩ F if *a* ∈ *L*

[*a*]*φ//*\*L* =

⎧⎨ [*a*](*φ//*\*L*) if *a* /∈ *L* ∪ *L*¯

⎩ T if *a* ∈ *L*

*φ*1 ∧ *φ*2*//*\*L* = (*φ*1*//*\*L*) ∧ (*φ*2*//*\*L*) *φ*1 ∨ *φ*2*//*\*L* = (*φ*1*//*\*L*) ∨ (*φ*2*//*\*L*)

T*//*\*L* = T F*//*\*L* = F

Relabeling:

*Z//*[*f* ]= *Z* (*Z* =σ *φD*)*//*[*f* ]= (*Z* =σ *φ//*[*f* ](*D*)*//*[*f* ])

⟨*a*⟩*φ//*[*f* ]= b:f(b)=a⟨*b*⟩(*φ//*[*f* ]) [*a*]*φ//*[*f* ]= b:f(b)=a[*b*](*φ//*[*f* ])

*φ*1 ∧ *φ*2*//*[*f* ]= (*φ*1*//*[*f* ]) ∧ (*φ*2*//*[*f* ]) *φ*1 ∨ *φ*2*//*[*f* ]= (*φ*1*//*[*f* ]) ∨ (*φ*2*//*[*f* ])

T*//*[*f* ]= T F*//*[*f* ]= F

Table A.1

Partial evaluation function for parallel operator and relabeling operator.