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Numerically-aided Deductive Safety Proof for a Powertrain Control System

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**Abstract**

The use of deductive techniques, such as theorem provers, has several advantages in safety verification of hybrid systems. There is often a gap, however, between the type of assistance that a theorem prover requires to make progress on a proof task and the assistance that a system designer is able to provide. To address this deficiency we present an extension to the deductive verification framework of differential dynamic logic that allows the theorem prover KeYmaera to *locally reason* about behaviors by leveraging forward invariant sets provided by external methods, such as numerical techniques and designer insights. Our key contribution is a new inference rule, the forward invariant cut rule, introduced into the proof calculus of KeYmaera. We demonstrate the cut rule in action on an example involving an automotive powertrain control systems, in which we make use of a simulation-driven numerical technique to compute a local barrier function.

*Keywords:* Cyberphysical system, hybrid system, verification, safety property

# Introduction

Most cyberphysical systems are *hybrid* in nature, i.e., have both continuous state evolution governed by differential equations and discrete mode transitions. Unfortu- nately, the problem of verifying safety properties for hybrid systems is undecidable [[6](#_bookmark13)], and most techniques that are used to verify software are not directly applicable. Many approaches to hybrid system verification focus on creating an overapproxi- mation of the set of system states reachable over a fixed time horizon [[9](#_bookmark15)],[[3](#_bookmark9)],[[4](#_bookmark11)],[[2](#_bookmark10)]. While these approaches enjoy a high degree of automation, they are restricted in scope and scalability. An alternative is to employ deductive techniques that attempt to construct a symbolic proof of safety using a semi-interactive theorem prover [[10](#_bookmark16)]. Unlike reachable-set computation techniques, theorem provers can handle nonlinear

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dynamics directly, without introducing approximation artifacts. Further, theorem provers can handle proof tasks that involve symbolic parameters.

Safety verification of hybrid systems via theorem proving may incorporate hu- man insight in the form of a *safety certiﬁcate*, i.e., a symbolic expression representing a set containing all reachable states from a given initial set, while excluding unsafe states [[1](#_bookmark8),[10](#_bookmark16)]. However, a designer usually has better insight about local behaviors in different operating regimes rather than overarching knowledge about the entire sys- tem. In [[8](#_bookmark17)], we demonstrated a numerical technique for discovering local invariants. This technique can be used to search for local invariants in specific regions of inter- est. In contrast to previous work focused on obtaining a global safety certificate, our approach encourages *local reasoning* and *lazy construction* of such certificates. To support local reasoning, we introduce a new proof rule called the *forward invariant cut rule* in the calculus of the theorem prover KeYmaera. This rule is similar to an inductive invariant; given a region of operation and a proposed local safety certificate (in the form of a forward invariant), the rule allows us to decompose the overall proof into three proof obligations: (1) a proof of invariance of the proposed certificate, (2) a proof that the local certificate guarantees safety, and (3) a proof of safety of everything *excluding* the behaviors associated with the

region pertaining to the local certificate.

We demonstrate this rule in a case study on safety verification for a powertrain control system. This system is a simplified model of a control system responsible for maintaining the air-to-fuel (A/F) ratio in a gasoline engine near an optimal setpoint. We describe the overall proof, but primarily describe the role of the forward invariant cut rule to prove that the A/F ratio remains within 10% of the optimal setpoint in KeYmaera.

# Hybrid systems and hybrid programs

A hybrid dynamical system consists of a set of continuous-valued state variables **x** that take values from a domain *X ⊆* R*n* and a discrete-valued state variable *q* (also known as a *mode*) taken from a finite set *Q*. The system evolves in continuous or discrete time, and the configuration of a hybrid system at time *t* can be described by the values of its continuous and discrete state variables. In mode *q*, the evolu- tion of the continuous-valued state variables is typically described using ordinary differential equations (ODEs) of the form **x**˙ (*t*) = *fq*(**x**(*t*)), where *fq* is a function from *X* to *X*. Though hybrid systems can have external inputs, here, we consider only *autonomous systems*, i.e., systems in which all transitions depend only on the system states. The state-dependent conditions that allow the system to transition from one discrete state to another (possibly same) discrete state are called *guards*. While hybrid automata are often a convenient modeling formalism for such sys- tems, here we use the *hybrid programs* notation to facilitate the use of the KeY- maera theorem prover, the workhorse for our deductive approach. To specify hybrid programs and specifications, KeYmaera uses the formalism of *differential dynamic*

*logic* [2](#_bookmark3) denoted by d*L* .

2 The syntax and semantics of d*L* are described in detail in [[10](#_bookmark16)]; we provide only a minimal overview here.

* 1. *The logic dL*

A *hybrid program* is specified by the grammar

*α, β* ::= *x* := *θ | x* := *∗| {xj*

1

= *θ*1*,..., xj*

= *θn*&*H} |*?*H | α ∪ β | α*; *β | α∗* (1)

where *α, β* are hybrid programs, *θ, θ*1*,..., θn* are terms, and *H* is a logical formula. The program *x* := *θ* means that *x* is assigned the value of the term *θ*. The program *x* := *∗* means that *x* is nondeterministically assigned an arbitrary real value. The

*n*

program *{xj*

1

= *θ*1*,..., xj*

= *θn*&*H}* means that the *xi* variables evolve continuously

for some duration, with derivatives *θi* subject to the constraint that the values taken by the *xi* variables satisfy *H* during the entire flow. The hybrid program ?*H* behaves as a *skip* if the logical formula *H* is true, and as an *abort* otherwise. The rest follows notation similar to that for regular expressions, *∪* denotes nondeterministic choice,

*n*

; denotes sequential composition, and *∗* denotes arbitrary repetition. The formulas of d*L* are described by the grammar:

*φ, ψ* ::= *θ*1 = *θ*2 *| θ*1 *≥ θ*2 *| ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ → ψ |* [*α*]*φ | ⟨α⟩ φ* (2)

where *φ*, *ψ* are formulas of d*L* , *θ*1, *θ*2 are terms, and *α* is a hybrid program. The box modality [*α*]*φ* means that *φ* holds after all traces of the hybrid program *α*, and

*⟨α⟩ φ* means that *φ* holds after some execution of hybrid program *α*.

# Safety verification with the forward invariant cut rule

**The safety verification problem.** The safety verification problem is to decide whether the state of a hybrid program *α* is always contained within a given safe set *S* when starting from a designated initial set *I* (i.e., to decide if *I →* [*α∗*]*S*).

We say that a set is *initialized* if it includes the initial set, *safe* if it excludes the unsafe set, and *invariant* if whenever a system behavior enters it, the behavior remains in the set for all future time. A *global safety certiﬁcate* is an initialized, invariant and safe set. Arguments with safety certificates are captured in d*L* using the invariant proof rule, where *G* is a global safety certificate:

*I → G G →* [*α*]*G G → S*

*I →* [*α∗*]*S* (3)

The general task of finding a global safety certificate is difficult. In this work, we instead use knowledge of the system structure to propose sets that are invariant and safe, but not necessarily initialized, and leverage them in the proof procedure. We call such sets *local safety certiﬁcates*.

**The forward invariant cut rule.** A cut in a logical proof allows introducing a lemma. We introduce a new cut rule that, in our experience, simplifies the proof procedure by leveraging knowledge of local invariance properties. The following proof rule asserts that if a set *C ⊆ I* is locally invariant (*C →* [*α*]*C*) and safe (*C → S*), the remaining conditions (*I ∧ ¬C*) can be separately addressed to prove safety. We remark that we can prove that this proof rule is sound, but omit the proof for brevity.

**Rule 3.1 (Forward Invariant Cut Rule)**

*I ∧ ¬C →* [(*α*; ?*¬C*)*∗*]*S C →* [*α*]*C C → S*

*I →* [*α∗*]*S* (4)

We note that the first branch in ([3](#_bookmark4)) concerns a global invariant set *G* that must hold for all initial states *I*, but the forward invariant cut set *C* need not hold for all initial states *I*. Thus, the first branch in ([4](#_bookmark5)) corresponds to the states in *I* that are not included in *C*.

**Numerical methods to obtain forward invariants.** We briefly mention some existing techniques to generate safe forward invariant sets. In the hybrid systems community, barrier certificates have been proposed as a Lyapunov-like analysis tech- nique to prove that starting from an initial set of states *X*0, no system trajectory ever enters an unsafe set *U* [[11](#_bookmark18)]. To discover barrier certificates, we employ a modi- fication of a technique from [[12](#_bookmark19)], which uses concrete system executions to generate a series of candidate barrier functions. Our technique, which is based on [[8](#_bookmark17)], uses concrete executions to generate a set of linear constraints. The linear constraints are used to construct the series of candidates. The final candidate is verified using a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) solver that is capable of handling nonlinear theories over the reals, dReal [[5](#_bookmark12)].

# Engine Fuel Control Case Study

**Model.** We present a case study involving a hybrid system representing an automo- tive fuel control system. Environmental concerns and government legislation require that the fuel economy be maximized and the exhaust gas emissions be minimized. At the ideal air-to-fuel (A/F) ratio, also known as the *stoichiometric* ratio, both quantities are optimized. We study an automotive control system whose purpose is to accurately regulate the A/F ratio.

The system dynamics and parameters were derived from a published model [[7](#_bookmark14)] and then simplified, as in [[8](#_bookmark17)]. The model consists of a simplified version of the physics of engine subsystems responsible for air intake and A/F ratio measurement, along with a computer control system tasked with regulating the A/F ratio. The objective of the controller is to maintain the A/F ratio within 10% of the nominal operating conditions. The experiment that we model involves an engine running at a fixed speed. The controller has two modes of operation: (1) a recovery mode, which controls fuel in an open-loop manner, i.e., with only feedforward control action, where the system runs for at most 8ms, and (2) a normal run mode, which uses feedback control to regulate the A/F ratio.

The controller measures both the air flow through the air-intake manifold, which it uses to estimate the air pressure in the manifold, and the oxygen content of the exhaust gas, which it uses to compute the A/F ratio. The recovery mode represents the behavior of the controller when recovering from a sensor fault (e.g., aberrant sensor readings or environmental conditions that cause suspicion of the sensor readings). During the recovery mode, the controller has no access to oxygen sensor measurements and must operate in a feedforward manner (i.e., using only the manifold air flow rate). The normal mode is the typical mode of operation,

**Algorithm 1:** A d*L* model of a closed-loop fuel control system

*∪* m*fail* ]*S*

**1** *EFC ≡ I →* [ m1 *∪* m2 *∪* s1*'→*2*∪* s

*∗*

*{*1*,*2*}'→fail*

**2** *I ≡* ((*τ* = 0) *∧* (*M* = *recovery* ) *∧* (*pest* = 0) *∧* (*i* = 0) *∧*

(*−*10*−*3 *≤ p ≤* 10*−*3) *∧* (*−*10*−*3 *≤ r ≤* 10*−*3))

**3** m1 *≡* (**?***M* = *recovery* ; **?***τ ≤* 0*.*008;

*{∃l*1*.∃l*2*.∃l*3*.*(*−*0*.*86 *≤ l*1 *≤* 0*.*74) *∧* (*−*0*.*17 *≤ l*2 *≤* 0*.*18) *∧* (*−*0*.*81 *≤ l*3 *≤* 0*.*68)

*∧* (*p′* = *l*1) *∧* (*r′* = *l*2) *∧* (*p′* = *l*3) *∧* (*i′* = 0) *∧* (*τ′* = 1) & *τ ≤* 0*.*008*}*)

*est*

**4** s1*'→*2*≡* (**?***M* = *recovery* ; **?***τ ≥* 0*.*008;

*M* := *normal* ;)

**5** m2 *≡* (**?***M* = *normal* ;

*{*(*p′* = *fp*) *∧* (*r′* = *fr* ) *∧* (*p′*

*est*

= *fpest* ) *∧* (*i′* = *fi*)

**6** s*{*1*,*2*}'→fai≡l*

& (*−*0*.*02 *≤ p ≤* 0*.*02) *∧* (*−*0*.*02 *≤ r ≤* 0*.*02) *∧*

(*−*0*.*02 *≤ pest ≤* 0*.*02) *∧* (*−*0*.*02 *≤ i ≤* 0*.*02)*}*) (**?***r < −*0*.*1 *∨ r >* 0*.*1;

*M* := *fail* ;)

**7** m*fail ≡* (**?***r < −*0*.*1 *∨ r >* 0*.*1; *M* := *fail* )

**8** *S ≡ M /*= *fail*

where the oxygen sensor measurements are used for feedback control.

Algorithm [1](#_bookmark6) is a hybrid program representing this system [3](#_bookmark7) . The ODEs rep- resenting the continuous dynamics in each mode and the model parameters are omitted for brevity, but they can be found in [[8](#_bookmark17)]. The state variables *p*ˆ*, r*ˆ*, p*ˆ*est*, and ˆ*i* represent the manifold pressure, the ratio between actual air-fuel ratio and the sto-

ichiometric value, the controller estimate of the manifold pressure, and the internal state of the PI controller; these variables have all been translated so that the equi- librium point coincides with the origin. In the *recovery* mode, the continuous-time state **x** is the tuple (*p*ˆ*, r*ˆ*, p*ˆ*est,*ˆ*i, τ* ). The additional state variable in the *recovery*

mode represents the state of a timer that evolves according to the ODE *τ*˙ = 1.

In the *normal* mode, the state is given by (*p*ˆ*, r*ˆ*, p*ˆ*est,*ˆ*i*). We assume the system is

within 1*.*0% of the nominal value at the initialization of the *recovery* mode. This represents the case where the system was previously in a mode of operation that accurately regulated the A/F ratio to the desired setpoint. A domain of interest for the state variables is given by **x ***∞ <* 0*.*2, which contains the set of reasonable values for the state variables.

**Safety proof using forward invariant cut.** The verification goal is to ensure that in the given experimental setting, the system always remains within 10% of the nominal A/F ratio after a fixed recovery time of 8*.*0 ms has passed. We describe an interactive proof using KeYmaera. To assist the proof procedure, we generated a barrier function, *B* : R*n →* R, using the numeric technique outlined in Sec. [3](#_bookmark5). We then use the set enclosed by the barrier, *{***x***|B*(**x**) *≤* 0*}*, to formulate the forward invariant cut:

*C ≡* (*M* = *normal* ) *∧* (*B*(**x**) *≤* 0)*.* (5)

We apply the forward invariant cut inference rule ([4](#_bookmark5)), producing three proof obli- gations that KeYmaera has to discharge.

**Obligation 1:** *C →* [*α*]*C***.** From the definition of *C*, the hybrid programs m1 and

3 Note that apparent redundancies appear in the hybrid program due to the explicit conversion from the representation of the system as a hybrid automaton to a hybrid program.

*s*1*'→*2 may be ignored, as both have the hybrid program ?*M* = *recovery* as their first item, which is inconsistent with *C*. Thus, this obligation only needs to be proved for the programs m2, s*{*1*,*2*}'→fail*, and m*fail*. To discharge this obligation for the program m2 we use the barrier certificate rule that we have added to KeYmaera’s proof calculus, below.

*I →* (*B*(**x**) *≤* 0) (*B*(**x**)= 0) *→ ∂B · f* (**x**) *<* 0 (*B*(**x**) *≤* 0) *→ S*

*∂***x**

*I →* [*{xj* = *f* (**x**)*}*]*S*

(6)

To apply the barrier certificate rule, we use the initial states *I* defined in Algorithm [1](#_bookmark6) and substitute *S* with *C*. The first and the third proof obligations in the barrier certificate rule are trivially satisfied due to our choice of the barrier function and the nature of the forward invariant cut. For the middle proof obligation KeYmaera asks dReal if the query (*B*(**x**)= 0) *∧* ( *∂B · fnormal*(**x**) *> −ϵ*) is unsatisfiable.

*∂***x**

To discharge the proof obligation for m2, s*{*1*,*2*}'→fail*, KeYmaera needs to show that if *B*(**x**) *<* 0 holds, either of these programs cannot invalidate *C* by transitioning to mode *fail*. It proves this by showing that the set *B*(**x**) *<* 0 is a subset of the safe set using dReal.

**Obligation 2:** *C → S***.** This obligation is trivial as *S* requires the mode to anything but *fail*, while *C* says that the mode is *normal* mode.

**Obligation 3:** *I ∧ ¬C →* [(*α*; ?*¬C*)*∗*]*S***.** Here we introduce *C*1, which is invariant for all initial conditions in *I ∧ ¬C*.

*C*1 *≡* (*M /*= *fail*) *∧* (0 *≤ τ ≤* 0*.*008) *∧* (*x ∈ Sreach*) (7)

Here *Sreach* is an overapproximation of reachable sets by using upper and lower bounds on *p*˙ and *r*˙ computed using dReal. There is one additional barrier certificate application to show that the normal mode, when starting in this set, lands within the barrier certificate and hence also respects this invariant. This requires a derivative negativity argument, which KeYmaera resolves by querying dReal. The rest is handled by KeYmaera’s standard deduction procedures.

**Conclusion.** We demonstrated how to leverage local knowledge of the powertrain control system to propose a set that is invariant and safe. We used the set to apply the forward invariant cut rule to prove a safety property for the system.

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