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On the Formal Verification of Middleware Behavioral Properties

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Abstract

Distribution middleware is often integrated as a COTS, providing distribution facilities for critical, embedded or large-scale applications. So far, typical middleware does not come with a complete analysis of their behavioral properties. In this paper, we present our work on middleware modeling and the verification of its behavioral properties; the study is applied to our middleware architecture: PolyORB. Then we present the tools and techniques deployed to actually verify the behavioral properties of our model: Petri nets, temporal logic and advanced algorithms to reduce the size of the state space. Finally, we detail some properties we verify and assess our methodology.

*Keywords:* Middleware design, Verification, Petri nets, LTL, Symmetries

# Introduction: Issues in Middleware Engineering

Distribution middleware is now widely integrated as *Components Oﬀ-The- Shelf* (COTS) in Distributed Real-Time Embedded (DRE) systems. The properties of each building block must be known to ensure its correct inte-

gration to such system [[4](#_bookmark15)] and to ensure the correctness of the system as a whole.

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In this context, the European Spatial Agency (ESA) identified several use cases for middleware. They include ground stations interacting with satel- lites as well as fleets of collaborating satellites and drones. These applications require multiple distribution mechanisms to handle variations in communica- tion channels, flexible resource management, and ensure autonomy for long missions.

In addition to distribution needs, these systems come with non-functional requirements, inherited from real-time engineering such as reliability, avail- ability, dependability. Hence, properties (like determinism, safety, liveness, timeliness) must be verified during the design process and in particular at the middleware level.

Middleware solutions now support the requirements of most distributed applications. They usually supports one given distribution model: a combina- tion of one or several mechanisms to enable distribution, e.g. Message Passing (MP), Remote Procedure Call (RPC), Distributed Object Computing (DOC) or Shared Memory (SM). Yet, they usually do not address the verification of key behavioral properties such as request fairness, absence of deadlock or correct resource dimensioning.

This calls for a next-generation of middleware that addresses these many challenges [[20](#_bookmark31)]. Middleware architecture should be versatile to meet appli- cation needs. Moreover it should follow an extensive proof-based system en- gineering approach to provide strong evidence it is correct with respect to application requirements.

This paper details a joint work on middleware verification lead by the CS department of the ENST (middleware experts) and SRC/LIP6 (verification experts).

We first review well-known existing middleware architectures, and show they do not facilitate verification; then, we introduce the schizophrenic mid- dleware architecture as a solution to achieve verification. To verify key behav- ioral properties in our middleware, we refine our middleware components, we model them using Petri nets and we assemble models to build one middleware configuration. As the system may be very complex, we present the algorithms we used to address state space explosion and apply them to check middleware behavioral properties. This provides a first step towards building proof-based middleware.

# Problem statement

In this paper, we focus on the complete characterization of distribution mid- dleware. In this section, we present some background on middleware archi-

tectures. We then discuss the use of formal methods to verify behavioral properties of middleware.

Formal modeling and middleware engineering are usually considered as two different expert domains. For instance, they are considered either by separate teams of the project or at separate steps in the design process. To efficiently reach our objective, we propose to reconcile system modeling and middleware engineering, and join ENST and LIP6 efforts. The ENST has a long experience in middleware implementations, including GLADE, the only industrial implementations of the Distributed System Annex of Ada 95; Ada- Broker an Open Source CORBA ORB. The LIP6/SRC department has a long experience in the development of algorithms and tools to apply formal methods to distributed systems, it has developed the CPN-AMI tool-suite to model and then analyse systems using Petri nets.

* 1. *Middleware for DRE systems*

DRE systems require adaptable distribution models and middleware archi- tectures: Rajkumar [[19](#_bookmark30)] advertised Message Passing as a solution for DRE systems, and proposed the Real-Time Publisher/Subscriber service. The Ada Distributed Systems Annex [[13](#_bookmark24),[17](#_bookmark28)] integrates several mechanisms (DOC, RPC, SM). RT-CORBA extends CORBA’s DOC mechanisms for real-time systems and integrates support for many QoS policies [[21](#_bookmark32)]. This leads to several tai- lorable middleware architectures.

For instance, *configurable middleware*, such as TAO [[22](#_bookmark33)], let applications select specific run-time policies to support the DOC distribution model. It

relies on architectural and design patterns [[9](#_bookmark16)] to support a large number of policies.

*Adaptive and reflective middleware* [[20](#_bookmark31),[3](#_bookmark14)] extends middleware configura- bility mechanisms to enable adaptability to specific changes in application context. This architecture provides promising properties to meet QoS appli-

cations requirements.

*Generic middleware*, such as Jonathan [[26](#_bookmark36)], defines abstract canonical com- ponents and architecture, their instantiation provides a specific distribution model. Jonathan provides a CORBA personality (*David* ), a Java RMI per- sonality (*Jeremie*) and specialized personalities for multimedia systems.

These architectures can meet stringent requirements. But they only par- tially determine their properties: they usually rely on the testing of specific scenarios such as Boeing’s Bold Stroke OFP [[23](#_bookmark34)]. However, there is a double combinatorial explosion when considering middleware as a whole: the number of possible execution scenarios for one middleware configuration increases with the interleaving of threads and requests; the number of possible configurations

increases with middleware adaptability and versatility.

Thus, we claim testing is not sufficient to assess middleware behavioral properties such as *absence of deadlocks*, *request fairness*, or *correct resource dimensioning*. We propose to use formal methods to model and then verify our system.

* 1. *Formal methods for middleware verification*

This sections discusses the choice of a modeling language and its formal veri- fication methods that are appropriate to model and then verify middleware.

There are currently two families of formal methods: proof-based verifica- tion (such as B [[1](#_bookmark12)] or Z [[8](#_bookmark17)]) and model checking (using tools and languages such as SPIN [[11](#_bookmark21)] or LUSTRE [[10](#_bookmark22)]). In proof-based methods, the model is described by means of axioms, properties are theorems to be verified using a theorem prover. In model checking, the model is expressed using a language from which an exhaustive execution can be computed (this usually requires a mathematically based definition). An “execution engine” produces the ex- haustive state space associated to the system as a graph where actions (atomic instructions in the language) relate to states (a given possible value of the sys- tem’s context). It is then possible to explore the graph to check if a property is satisfied.

These two approaches are complementary. Proof-based techniques allow the analysis of infinite systems. However, the use of a theorem prover is a very difficult and a very technical task that is hard to automate. On the contrary, model checking is dedicated to finite-state systems but modeling and verification can be done using graphical toolkits and most steps can be automated [[6](#_bookmark18)].

We selected *Well-formed Petri nets (WN)* [[5](#_bookmark19)] as an input language for model checking. WN are high-level Petri nets, in which tokens are typed

data holders. This allows for a concise and parametric definition of a system, while preserving its semantics. One main feature of *WN* is that they allow the automatic and efficient construction of the *symbolic reachability graph*: a quotient state-space, in which nodes are equivalence classes of states, and

arcs equivalence classes of events. This graph is built by exploiting symme- try, yielding a symbolic state-space sometimes exponentially smaller than the concrete state-space, and thus more manageable.

Recent works have automated the analysis of the symmetries allowed by a system [[25](#_bookmark37)], and of the symmetries allowed by a property [[2](#_bookmark13)], allowing full LTL model-checking while efficiently fighting the well-known combinatorial state- space explosion problem. As we show in sections [5.2](#_bookmark6) and [6.1](#_bookmark9), the use of these symmetry-based reductions allows us to verify the properties of our system,

while plain state-space generation is unfeasible with classic techniques.

In the remainder of the paper, we present the Schizophrenic Middleware architecture, and show how we reengineer it to enable the verification of mid- dleware. Then, we detail the algorithms we used and analyze our middleware architecture.

# The Schizophrenic Middleware Architecture

In this section, we introduce the key elements of the “schizophrenic middleware architecture”; and present its role in the verification of behavioral properties. Middleware combines two complementary facets: (1) a framework to im- plement distributed systems, using the host and operating system resources (e.g. tasks, I/O); and (2) a set of services to build portable distributed appli- cations. In [[12](#_bookmark23)], we introduced the “schizophrenic middleware” architecture: a unique architecture that advertises these two aspects, and enforces separation

of concerns.

In [[28](#_bookmark38)], we present PolyORB, our implementation of such a schizophrenic middleware. We assess its suitability as a middleware platform to support multiple specifications (CORBA, Ada Distributed Systems Annex, Web Ap- plications, Ada Messaging Service close to Sun’s JMS) and as a COTS for industry projects [3](#_bookmark2) .

From our experiments, we note that a reduced set of services is sufficient to describe various distribution models. We identify seven steps in request processing, each of which is defined as one fundamental service. Services are generic components for which an general implementation is provided. Devel- opers may provide an alternate implementation. Each middleware instance is one coherent assembling of these entities. The *µ*Broker component coordinates these different services, it is responsible for the correct request propagation in the middleware instance.

**Request propagation**

**µBroker**

**µBroker**

**Server object**

**Client**

Fig. 1. Request propagation in the Schizophrenic Middleware architecture

3 PolyORB is supported by AdaCore (<http://libre.act-europe.fr/polyorb>)

Figure [1](#_bookmark3) illustrates how PolyORB services cooperate to transmit one re- quest between two application entities, located on two separate nodes.

The client looks up server’s reference using the *addressing* service (1), a dictionary-like component. Then, it uses the *binding* factory (2) to establish a connection with the server, using one communication channels (e.g. sockets,

protocol stack).

Request parameters are mapped onto a representation suitable for trans- mission over network, using the *representation* service (3), this is a mathe- matical mapping that convert a data into a byte stream (e.g. CORBA CDR). A *protocol* (4) is implemented for transmissions between the client and the server nodes, through the *transport* (5) service, which establishes a commu- nication channel between the two nodes. Both can be reduced to *automata*. Then the request is sent through the network and unmarshalled by the server.

Upon the reception of a request, the middleware instance ensures that a concrete entity is available to execute the request, using the *activation* ser- vice (6). Finally, the *execution* service (7) assigns execution resources to pro- cess the request. These two services rely on the *factory* and *resource manage- ment* design patterns.

Hence, services in our middleware architecture are *pipes and filters*: they

compute a value and pass it to another component. Our experiments with PolyORB showed they follow the same semantics, they are only adapted to match precise specifications. They can be reduced to well-known abstractions. The *µ*Broker handles the coordination of these services: it allocates re- sources and ensures the propagation of data through middleware. Besides, it is the only component that controls the whole middleware: it manipulates critical resources such as tasks and I/Os or global locks. It holds middleware

behavioral properties.

The Schizophrenic Middleware architecture provides a comprehensive de- scription of middleware. This architecture separates a set of generic services dedicated to request processing from the *µ*Broker. The latter is directly re- sponsible for middleware behavior. Thus, we isolate the control loop of our system, present in all middleware instances: it is the key component to be verified first.

# *µ*Broker: source code and formal model implementa- tions

We identified the *µ*Broker as the control loop of our architecture. We now discuss its architecture and mapping to both source code and formal imple- mentations.

* 1. *µBroker architecture*

We first propose an architecture for the *µ*Broker, and detail its components. Several “strategies” have been defined to create and use middleware re-

sources: [[18](#_bookmark29)] detail different request processing policies implemented in TAO;

the CARISM project [[14](#_bookmark25)] allows for the dynamic reconfiguration of commu- nication stacks. Hence, the *µ*Broker must be adaptable enough to support most of them, and still provides a clear design to enable modeling and then verification.

We propose the following architecture for the *µ*Broker(figure [2](#_bookmark4)):

* the *µBroker Core API* handles the functional parts of the interactions with other middleware services; it provides an interface to configure the middle- ware instance and helper routines to execute specific functions such as man- aging I/O. This component interacts directly with middleware the *Binding*,

*Transport*, *Execution* and *Addressing* services;

* the *µBroker Controller* manages the state automaton associated to the *µ*Broker. It grants access to middleware internals (tasks, I/O and queues) and schedules tasks to process requests. It is responsible for the behavioral part of the *µ*Broker. Several policies refines its behavior: the *Asynchronous*

*Event Checking* policy sets up the polling and read strategies to check events on I/O sources; the *Request Scheduler* sorts request to be processed (e.g. FIFO, EDF orders), the *Dispatcher* selects threads that execute requests.

**Functionnal**

**components**

**Binding Transport Execution Addressing**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Middleware services** | |  | **µBroker policies** | |
|  | **µBroker Core API** | **µBroker**  **Controller** |  |
|  |
|  |
|  | |  | |

Fig. 2. The two sides of the *µ*Broker

**Behavioral**

**components**


**Asynchronous Event Checking Request Scheduler Request Dispatcher Task management**

*µ*Broker entities are defined by their interface and a common high-level behavioral contract, instances of these entities may refine this behavior to sup- port different policies. This architecture has been implemented in PolyORB. It uses well-defined entities, and demonstrates its adaptability to support clas- sical policies found in configurable middleware or defined in specifications such as RT-CORBA.

The *µ*Broker pattern proposes a comprehensive description of the middle- ware control loop, and a step towards verification of middleware behavioral properties.


* 1. *Modeling one middleware configuration*

1. Models library

1. Assembling a configuration 3. Evalutating one configuration





Initial Marking for scenario


Communication places

Fig. 3. Steps of the *µ*Broker modeling

We now describe the modeling of our architecture using Petri nets as a language for system modeling and verification (figure [3](#_bookmark5)).

*Step 1:* we elaborate one Petri net module for each middleware components variation. Petri net transitions represent atomic actions; Petri net places

are either middleware states or resources. Common places between different modules define interactions between Petri nets modules, they act as *channel places* [[24](#_bookmark35)].

*Step 2:* for one configuration of the *µ*Broker, some Petri net modules are selected to produce the complete model. Communications places (outlined in black) represent links to other *µ*Broker functions or to middleware services.

*Step 3:* the selected modules are merged to produce a global model. This model and one initial marking enable the verification of the middleware prop- erties.

Functions can be separately verified and then combined to form the com- plete Petri net model. Multiple models can be assembled from a common library of models. Thus, we can test for specific conditions (policies and set- tings).

The initial marking of the Petri Net defines available resources (e.g. threads, I/O); or sets up internal counters. Its state space covers all possible interleav- ing of atomic actions: we test all possible execution orders.

We have detailed the steps from middleware requirements for DRE sys- tems, down to the modeling of one configuration using Petri nets. This allows us to verify specific middleware behavioral properties on our models.

# Verifying properties of the *µ*Broker

In this section, we introduce some of the expected properties the *µ*Broker as well as the formal techniques used to verify them by model-checking.

* 1. *µBroker configurations and models*

In this section, we review the key parameters that characterize the *µ*Broker, and some of the properties one might expect from such a component.

The *µ*Broker is defined by the set of policies and the resources it uses. These settings are common to a large set of applications. We consider one

middleware instance, in server mode, that processes all incoming requests. We study two configurations of the *µ*Broker: *Mono-Tasking* (one main envi- ronment task) and *Multi-Tasking* (multiple tasks, using the Leader/Followers policy described in [[18](#_bookmark29)]). The latter allows parallel request processing.

We assume that middleware resources are pre-allocated: we consider a static pool of threads; a bounded number of I/O sources and one preallocated memory pool to store requests. This hypothesis is acceptable: it corresponds to typical engineering practices in the context of critical systems. Our imple- mentations and the corresponding models are controlled by three parameters:

* *Smax* is the upper bound of I/O Sources listening for incoming data;
* *Tmax* is the number of Threads available within the middleware;
* *Bsize* is the size of the Buffer allocated to read data from I/O sources.

*Smax* and *Tmax* define a workload profile for the middleware node, *Bsize* de- fines constraints on the memory allocated by the *µ*Broker to process requests. These parameters control middleware throughput and execution correctness.

We list four essential properties of our component. They represent key properties our component must verify to fulfill its role.

* *P* 0 (symmetry): threads and I/O are unordered, elements in a class are equivalent;
* *P* 1 (no deadlock): the system may always process incoming requests;
* *P* 2 (consistency): there is no buffer overflow;
* *P* 3 (fairness): every event on a source is detected and processed.

*P* 0, *P* 1, *P* 3 are difficult to verify only through the execution of some test cases: one has to examine all possible execution orders. This may not be affordable or even possible due to the many possible threads and requests interleaving. Besides, the adequate dimensioning of static resources to ensure

consistency (*P* 2) is a strong requirement for DRE systems, yet it is a hard

problem for open systems such as middleware. Thus, we propose to verify them by model-checking.

* 1. *Analysis methods*

The system we model is complex and uses different resources, its state-space is expected to be huge. We detail the figures in section [6.1](#_bookmark9): the system has a state-space of up to 1011 states for the values we considered and is thus impossible to treat with classic methods. We therefore decided to reduce

the problem by performing a symmetry analysis of the model, and using the results to generate a compact representation of the state-space of the system, suitable for model-checking. This symmetry analysis is fully automated, and is performed for each given configuration of the middleware we considered. We also take into account the property to be checked, allowing further reductions by abstracting away behaviors that are not observed by the property, using dynamically adapted on-the-fly algorithms. This section superficially explains how the tools work (complete descriptions of the algorithms can be found in [[25](#_bookmark37),[2](#_bookmark13)]). Moreover, these techniques may be used through a simple interface, that requires no knowledge of these internals.

* + 1. *P0: Analyzing the symmetries of the model*

We wish to prove property *P* 0 (symmetry) ; the first step is a symmetry analysis that explores the model’s structure to determine which data types present a homogeneous behavior. Two elements *e*1 and *e*2 of a given data type are symmetric if exchanging *e*1 with *e*2 at any point in the execution of the

system does not modify its behavior. By behavior, we mean that *from an observer’s point of view*, the system appears to be the same.

For this analysis, we first consider the LTL point of view of an *action-based* observer that sees all events happening as a sequence. To this slightly myopic observer, the actual values used to trigger the events are blurred, only the sequences of occurrences of actions are visible. Such a sequence is called an *ω*- word, the alphabet of which is an occurrence of an action. The set of *ω*-words that the system can generate using the alphabet of event occurrences is called

the *language* of the *actions* of the system. Due to interlacement semantics,

this language may be exponentially smaller than the language of the system over an alphabet that sees operation arguments. It can be represented by a *quotient* state-space graph, thus exponentially smaller than the concrete state-space graph.

To analyze the symmetries of a system, our algorithm [[25](#_bookmark37)] examines each action (transition) of the system to find which elements (if any) it distin- guishes, and concludes that any element distinguished by at least one action should be distinguished in R. The result of this symmetry analysis is an

*equivalence relation* R that lists for each data type the symmetric values with

respect to the language of the actions of the system. This automatic com- putation ensures that any elements considered equivalent under R are not distinguished by *any* action of the system. R defines a set allowable permuta- tions or rotations [[5](#_bookmark19)] that can be applied to the objects of the system without

affecting the transition relation.

We then translate high-level annotations to symbolically expressed ones that use R in a simple and readily analyzable form, the rigorous syntax of Well-Formed nets [[5](#_bookmark19)]. Finally we construct a *quotient reachability graph under* R, using the GreatSPN [[7](#_bookmark20)] kernel, in which nodes represent an equivalence

class of states under R. Let us mention that computation of symmetries is very fast since it is a *structural property* of the Petri net. Its complexity is thus related to the size of the specification (number of places and transitions), but not to the state space size.

Symmetry analysis of the *µ*Broker is computed on the structure of our models. It yields an equivalence relation R that states that all Threads (resp. Sources) are equivalent. Therefore, we prove that *P* 0 *(symmetry)* is true. Note that this property was not true on the first versions of the model, and that

to obtain it we had to adapt some modeling choices of the components of the

*µ*Broker.

* + 1. *P1, P2: Verifying symmetric properties*

The property *P* 1 states that there exists no deadlock; this is a property that our action-based LTL observer can see. We therefore can verify this property on the quotient produced under the relation R. The quotient graph lists at most *Smax*!·*Tmax*! permutations for each state in a compact manner, it is thus

exponentially smaller than the concrete state-space, allowing faster verification

of the property.

To verify *P* 2 *(consistency)*, we check that accesses to memory pools are correct. The places (D*ata*S*lotsi*)*i*∈1*..M* represent the memory pool. Write operations insert a token in one place from this set, read operations withdraw

one. Data inconsistency occurs when writing more than once in a slot. It is tested by a safety property expressed by an LTL formula ([1](#_bookmark7)), that asserts that such a state is unreachable.

∀*d* ∈ D*ata*S*lots,* G(*card*(*d*) ≤ 1) (1) The interesting point is that this property is directly observable on the

graph produced under R, as permutations of elements will not change the cardinality of the place that is tested in *P* 1. Therefore if we consider a node of the quotient state-space, as all its elements are equivalent under R, we

can assert whether or not it verifies *card*(*d*) ≤ 1 directly. An analysis of the symmetries of the property proves and uses this property automatically,

without user’s intervention.

Thus, we verify there is no data corruption for *Smax*≤ *Bsize*, by model checking for different values of *Smax*and *Bsize*, but we notice that data-corruption

occurs otherwise. We interpret this result by the fact that model semantics does not allow more than *card*(D*ata*S*lots*) successive write operations, and thus does not overflow the buffer.

* + 1. *P3: Exploiting* observed *behavioral symmetries*

We have seen the equivalence relation of the system R, although permissive, can allow verification of symmetric properties. However, to verify *P* 3 *(fair- ness)*, we need to evaluate the LTL formula:

⎧⎨ ∀*s* ∈ S*ources, a* = {*s*} ⊆ ModifiedSrc*,b* = {*s*} ⊆ DataOnSrc*,*

⎩ G(*a* ⇒ F *b*)

(2)

It states that any event on a given source *s* will eventually be handled. If so, the token representing *s* should move from the notification place ModifiedSrc (“the *µ*Broker detected a pending request”) to initial place DataOnSrc (“new incoming request”). This property cannot be observed reliably by our action- based LTL observer, as it requires that the binding of *s* in the action “the *µ*Broker detected a pending request from *s*” be remembered, so that we can verify that the same *s* is eventually seen moving to DataOnSrc. However,

thanks to symmetry, if ∃*s* ∈ S*ources* such that *P* 3 holds true, as we know all sources to be equivalent, we will have proved the property ∀*s* ∈ S*ources*. This avoids redundant verification for each source, although this would also

be possible as the number of sources is supposed finite.

We therefore choose a source *s* that we individualize, by constructing a quotient graph under more restrictive relation R' such that *s* cannot be per- muted with other sources. Thus our observer can now see events relating to *s*

as different from events relating to other sources. However, the cost of distin- guishing even a single source is up to a factorial increase (*card*(S*ources*)!) in the state-space size. Thus even if the system is structurally symmetric, when

the formula is not –as in this case– its evaluation generates again (though with a delay) the state-space explosion problem.

Thus, the quotient reachability graph suffers from a major limitation: it does not tackle *partially symmetric systems* or *partially symmetric properties*.

However recent advances have shown that these partial symmetries can be exploited in LTL verification, through the Symbolic Synchronized Product (SSP) method [[2](#_bookmark13)]. The basic intuition is to use an observer capable of *zooming*

*in* (i.e. by using a refined R') whenever there is a potential problem, and

*zooming out* (i.e. by allowing more permutations in R') when a “blurred” vision is enough to verify the property.

For instance, the property may distinguish objects only in *parts of an execution run*, e.g. *P* 3. Sources can be permuted when there are no re- quests pending. We need to distinguish the source *s* only when the place ModifiedSrc contains a request from a source *s*. This partial temporal asym-

metry can be captured by working with the Büchi automaton that represents the LTL property [[27](#_bookmark39)]. To perform model-checking, we compute the intersec-

tion of the language recognized by the *negation* of a property with the language of the system. This operation is computed by the *synchronized product* of the

state-space and the automata of the formula. It is thus usually of complexity polynomial over the product of the sizes of the automaton of the LTL formula, and of the state-space itself. However, we construct our symmetry-aware Sym- bolic Synchronized Product on the fly, and we adapt the relation R' (our zoom setting) under which we build the successors of a state, to the arc of the LTL automaton with which it is being synchronized.

Consider the automata corresponding to the

negation of *P* 3 represented figure [4](#_bookmark8). An *ω*-word

**,**

J,˜¸*q*` 0 .\,

vz

*a*∧¬*b*

,

J, ,J˜¸¸˜*q* ` `1 ,\\, ,

(or sequence of events) recognized by this automa-  .

*true* ¬*b*

ton is composed of a finite sequence of events (we

don’t care which, synchronizing with the arc true), followed by an event such that *a* ∧ ¬*b* becomes true after the event, and then ¬*b* always remain

Fig. 4: Automata of the negation of property *P* 3

true (accepting state *q*1). Such a sequence contradicts *P* 3, thus producing a

counter-example. In the SSP construction, while synchronizing with the arc "true", no asymmetry is introduced thus all model objects are equivalent, we

can zoom out; but a synchronization with the arc " *a* ∧ ¬*b*" forces to individ- ualize the source "s" (zoom in) to allow a correct symbolic verification.

In the current case, as *P* 3 holds true, the sequences of the synchronized product that match “ *a* ∧ ¬*b*” but not “ ¬*b* always true” are eventually garbage collected. The final size of the SSP proving the validity of *P* 3 is therefore no

more than the size of the quotient graph under R allowing all permutations, as all actions in the SSP end up synchronizing with the arc *true*.

The SSP is a powerful technique, also able to tackle partially symmetric systems, in which objects behave asymmetrically only in localized parts of the model. Usually, as the action-based symmetry analysis is global, these local

asymmetries will yield a restrictive relation R, and the graph built under R may be as large as the concrete state-space. A typically encountered case is distributed systems that present an initialization phase in which privileged ini- tiators play a different role, but then all participants behave like symmetrical peers once the system is running. SSP addresses this problem (by zooming in just when running the initialization), but as the *µ*Broker is (by design) fully symmetric, this particular reduction was not used for our verification. We plan to use this capability in further works, for more advanced and complex configurations.

# Verification results and performances

In this section, we detail figures and performance of the verification of the

*µ*Broker.

* 1. *Modeling and analysing the µBroker*

The *Mono-Tasking* model has 47 places, 38 transitions and 134 arcs. *Multi- Tasking* model is twice as large. Number of tasks and I/Os has no effect on the size of the model (it is coded as types for Petri net tokens), the size of the

buffer has an impact on the number of places and transitions.

Figure [5](#_bookmark10) summarizes the size of the state space for *Bsize*=5 and *Smax*= 4. Petri Net models have an average size, yet the state space is large, it denotes the complexity of the system. Its size increases exponentially with *Tmax* and *Smax*. We also note that the symbolic reachability graph is smaller by several powers of ten, and that this ration increases with *Tmax*. Thus, computations can be completed within acceptable delays on usual workstations, in less than 10 hours for the biggest models, on 2.6GHz Pentium-4 computers with 512MB of memory running GNU/Linux.

From these different figures, we claim that the analysis of PolyORB could not have been performed without the use of these advanced model checking techniques because of intrinsic memory limitations of typical workstations. This is depicted in figure [5](#_bookmark10). It clearly shows an exponential ratio between the concrete state space and the quotient reachability graph. As an illustration, even for common middleware configurations (7 threads and 4 I/O sources)

the system presents about 1011 states, but we could compute and evaluate its

properties on a quotient reachability graph on a computer having 512MB of memory without swapping. We also observe that the quotient graph evolution decreases. As an example, from 4 to 5 threads, the quotient graph increases by a factor of 80% and from 5 to 6, by a factor of 57%. At a given stage, it should reach an asymptote (e.g. when adding new threads does not impact

3,5E+05



1,E+12

1,E+11

1,E+10

1,E+09

1,E+08

1,E+07

1,E+06

1,E+05

1,E+04

1,E+03

1,E+02

1,E+01

State space

Quotient graph ratio

1,E+00



symbolic

SSP

3,0E+05

2,5E+05

2,0E+05

1,5E+05

1,0E+05

5,0E+04

0,0E+00

Fig. 5. *µ*Broker’s state space and quotient reachability graph for *Smax*=4 and *Bsize*= 5.

Fig. 6. Number of nodes examined to evaluate

*P* 3 when *Tmax*=2 and *Bsize*= 4.

on the system symbolic complexity at all). This is of particular interest since the state space evolution remains exponential.

The SSP technique brings further reductions as illustrated by figure [6](#_bookmark11), that compares it to the global symmetry approach. It shows how the gain from the reduction increases as the parameters increase. It is equivalent to the global symmetry approach for one source (no symmetry to exploit), then offers a polynomial size reduction over *Smax*. No value is provided when *Smax* reaches 5: *Bsize* is 4 and the property is not verified as we have shown in the previous section, thus the the on-the-fly counter-example production algorithm interrupts state-space examination.

We verified two configurations: we tested LTL formulae representing ex- pected properties, we extracted scenarios that help dimensioning resources. Our model-checking tools overcome the complexity of the *µ*Broker model. The verified properties provide strong evidence that our architecture is correct.

* 1. *Assessment of our verification tools*

The tools we used have a significant role to achieve verification. Our models were created using CPN-AMI [[15](#_bookmark26)], a Petri net CASE environment that in- tegrates structural analysis tools and model checkers. We then analyse data type symmetries [[25](#_bookmark37)] and compute the reduced state space using the Great- SPN [[7](#_bookmark20)] tool-suite and extensions for SSP. Finally for LTL model-checking, we used the model checking library Spot [[16](#_bookmark27)], in conjunction with GreatSPN. All these tools have drivers available that make them plug-ins, homogeneously ac- cessible from CPN-AMI, and hiding the complexity of their interactions from

the end-user. CPN-AMI and SPOT are developed in LIP6/SRC. GreatSPN is developed at the Dipartimento di Informatica at the University of Torino. The LTL capabilities of GreatSPN and SSP computation are the result of a cooperation between Paris and Torino.

An important aspect of the verification process is that both the global structural analysis of the system and the partial symmetry analysis used in SSP were computed wholly automatically, thanks to our recently introduced extensions to the GreatSPN kernel [[25](#_bookmark37),[2](#_bookmark13)]. As we tested our properties over a wide range of configurations and parameter values, symmetry analysis "by hand" would have been unfeasible, and less reliable as it would have required human intervention.

Our symmetry-aware algorithms help us to address the state-space explo- sion. The reduced state-space is smaller than the ones produced by typical algorithms by a power of ten. This difference increases with the parameters *Smax*, *Tmax*, *Bsize*. This demonstrates that our tools make it possible to verify complex systems. The use of formal verification techniques on the *µ*Broker allowed to correct some bugs, and gives us a much higher level of confidence in the architecture of PolyORB.

# Conclusion

In this paper, we focused on middleware architectures and the verification of their behavioral properties. We outlined current trends in middleware en- gineering: multiple architectures exist to support the requirements of DRE systems; yet, verification is seldom contemplated. Indeed, verifying a dis- tributed infrastructure is a complex task as long as middleware development does not integrate very early in the design process both distribution functions and verification requirements.

We aim at providing a proof-based middleware. We present the Schizophrenic Middleware Architecture, and detailed steps to verify it. We chose Petri nets as a modeling language, and LTL to express and then verify its properties.

The schizophrenic architecture emphasizes on the separation of concerns in middleware: a set of fundamental services covers middleware functional components, a Middleware Main Loop coordinates them. Services can be adapted to support configurability and genericity requirements. thus, our schizophrenic middleware PolyORB is a good candidate to build proof-based middleware.

We identified the key component that controls the whole middleware be- havior and refined it to define the *µ*Broker pattern. This adaptable component proposes a complete definition of a middleware main control loop.

We detailed the steps to model and then verify it using Petri nets, a com- plete theoretical framework to assess properties of control systems such as the *µ*Broker. Then, we discussed the verification of several configurations of the *µ*Broker.

We introduced tools and algorithms to achieve verification. The state-space explosion is a typical problems when modeling system with Petri nets. We present advanced techniques used to overcome this problem. These techniques allows the testing of LTL formulas on reduced state space: the quotient state space. It fully exploits global and local symmetries of the model. Hence, we could assessed our model is fair for incoming requests, without deadlock; we detailed how we can check that resources are correctly dimensioned. We note that the ratio between the quotient graph and the complete state space is exponential; the state space evolution remains exponential since the quotient graph tends to an asymptote. This analysis could have never been performed using classical model checking techniques.

Thus, we achieved the complete verification of key middleware behavioral properties. this is a first step towards the construction of a proof-based mid- dleware. To reach this goal, we had to improve the schizophrenic architecture in order to address both distribution functions and behavioral verification re- quirements.

Besides, this analysis of middleware properties provides a case study for the use of formal methods to verify a complex system. We discussed the application of advanced techniques to overcome combinatorial explosions, and how to use at best system information to optimize the verification process.

Later work will consider two main directions. The first one is to apply verification to more complex configurations (more tasks, more complex poli- cies); but complete applications involving client and server nodes. The second direction is to increase the link between models and implementations of the *µ*Broker. We will investigate ways to deduce code patterns from our veri- fied formal specifications to directly produce source code for one middleware configuration. This will increase confidence in middleware as a COTS to be integrated in critical applications.

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