[Egyptian Informatics Journal 23 (2022) 145–162](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eij.2022.10.001)

Contents lists available at [ScienceDirect](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/11108665)

Egyptian Informatics Journal

journal homepage: [www.sciencedirect.com](http://www.sciencedirect.com/)

[](http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.eij.2022.10.001&domain=pdf)Provably throttling SQLI using an enciphering query and secure matching

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a r t i c l e i n f o

*Article history:*

Received 7 March 2022

Revised 12 September 2022

Accepted 13 October 2022

Available online 16 November 2022

*Keywords:*

SQL injection Cryptography Searchable encryption Web application Internet Security

a b s t r a c t

Web applications, which dominate the internet, act as communication media between customers and service providers. Web applications are an internet innovation that provide customer services such as e-banking, e-commerce and e-booking. Developing web applications has become increasingly compli- cated because of security threats and service issues that involve valuable information. Attack methods such as structured query language (SQL) injection insert malicious code within user input data requests to gain unauthorised access, and then the attacker targets a database to manipulate information. In this paper, we propose a prevention method against SQL injection attacks through cryptography and search- able encryption. The proposed method uses a cryptography technique to encrypt all database informa- tion, where each piece of user information is encrypted with a separate key. The rest of the database information is ciphered with secret keys, and a searchable encryption technique is used for other data- base operations to preserve privacy. The login process compares the ciphered username from the data- base and user entry to authenticate the user. The proposed method is implemented on the PHP and MySQL databases, which are open-source applications. The results show efficient prevention of SQL injec- tion, and the database remains protected against SQL injection attacks

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1. Introduction

The industry is moving toward web applications to support remote services with ubiquity and cost efficiency [[1]](#_bookmark70). Organisation and companies rely on web applications to deliver services to cus-

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Peer review under responsibility of Faculty of Computers and Information, Cairo University.

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tomers while reducing the cost to a minimum because the infras- tructure is based on the internet. Services such as e-banking, shopping, e-governance and reservations increase productivity in daily life due to speed and utility flexibility [[2]](#_bookmark71).

Web applications are built upon a number of program layers in tier architecture to handle complexity and specific functions. The basic internet technology architecture is client–server, whereas a web application adds a third level (i.e., database tier) to manage information [[3]](#_bookmark72). The database contains records for managing the web application and authenticating users. However, any breach in web application authorisation leads to the disclosure of all data- base records and information [[4]](#_bookmark73). Access to the database is con- trolled by access control policies, but other data operations are not controlled or limited. In other words, access policies define how to access but not how to use data [[5]](#_bookmark60).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eij.2022.10.001>

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The rapid development of the internet has become a primary concern of businesses, and the growing amount of information online has led to increasing concerns about information security and threats. Moreover, businesses rely on the internet for valuable transactions such as banking, which caused attackers to attempt access to web application databases [[6]](#_bookmark61). One web application attack is known as a Structured Query Language (SQL) injection attack (SQLI), which targets the database for unauthorised access. SQLI attacks are classified as severe and harmful for web applica- tions because SQLI can gain unauthorised access, manipulate data- base information and may result in denial of service [[7]](#_bookmark63).

According to the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [[8]](#_bookmark64), SQL injection, which is defined as injecting untrusted data into normal commands or queries to gain access to a database, is the major threat to web application databases [[9]](#_bookmark65). The attacker injects malicious code in the SQL query that targets the back-end web application database [[10]](#_bookmark66). An attacker will cause a security breach to a database, wherein the severity of impact depends on the type of SQL injection and the web application problem [[11]](#_bookmark67). An attacker’s intention involves a transaction between a web ser- ver and a database, and the way SQL is written and called. The SQLI method uses the normal SQL statement and rules, which is the rea- son that the server–database communication needs to be validated or the mode of communication needs to be hidden [[12,13]](#_bookmark68).

The attacker’s code is a normal text format which is interpreted by the web server as an SQL command and executed in the data- base. Thus, the code injected does not contain any special charac- ters that further complicate detection [[14]](#_bookmark69). Prevention is added in complex analysis processes to the web server. This causes delays and requires page coding for each user input field. The lack of a prevention technique in a web application has severe conse- quences such as loss in confidentiality, integrity and authentica- tion [[15]](#_bookmark74).

In this paper, we present a method to prevent SQLIs. The pro- posed method is based on the encryption of the database informa- tion and searchable encryption. To authenticate the user, the username is encrypted using a symmetric cipher with a key equal to a password. Searchable encryption is used to preserve the pri- vacy of the information while searching records. The results show that the proposed method prevents SQLIs, and the results are com- parable with those of the newest methods in terms of time and size. [Fig. 1](#_bookmark11) illustrates the dominance of PHP in building web applica- tions [[16]](#_bookmark75). Some solutions of SQLI are based on the language level [[2,6,17,18,19]](#_bookmark71), whereas PHP is targeted for the above reason. The proposed method is based on a database and not on a specific ven- dor or language, making the solution highly robust. In other words, the proposal is independent of server compiler language, so it can

be deployed on any platform.




Fig. 1. Usage statistics of web applications [[16]](#_bookmark75).

The main contributions of this work are as follows:

* We present a method to prevent SQLI.
* The proposed method can protect web applications such as e- banking from injection attacks.
* The encryption of information resists tautology and comment attacks.
* Searchable encryption is presented to withstand other types of SQLI.
* The proposed method is not specified for a platform or any pro- gramming language.
* The results show that the proposal to counter SQLI does not affect the system performance.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: [Section 2](#_bookmark10) provides preliminary and contextual information. [Sec-](#_bookmark17)

[tion 3](#_bookmark17) describes previous works related to the subject. [Section 4](#_bookmark21) explains the proposed method. [Section 5](#_bookmark33) demonstrates the imple- mentation and the experiments carried out to verify the proposal. [Section 6](#_bookmark36) presents the results of the experiment and a discussion. [Section 7](#_bookmark41) explains the security analysis carried out, and the final section presents the conclusion and future works.

1. Preliminaries
   1. *SQL injection attack*

SQL injection attacks exploit vulnerabilities in a database layer [[20]](#_bookmark76). Most vulnerabilities are caused by developers’ lack of knowl- edge about SQLI threats or that they ignore such vulnerabilities because a secure web application means higher costs. The follow- ing are some of the most popular types of SQLI [[21] and [22]](#_bookmark80).

* + 1. Tautology

An attacker exploits the condition format after (WHERE) clus- tering in the SQL statement. The basic condition for a login query is to check the username and password. Meanwhile, an attacker injects an input that will always be true for the condition. The result of such an attack is to gain access to a web application. [Table 1](#_bookmark12) provides an example of a tautology attack.

* + 1. Commenting

An attacker inserts SQL comments, which are denoted by a dou- ble dash: ‘‘--.” Practically, when a username is known, an attacker comments the password fields to achieve an unauthorised login. [Table 2](#_bookmark12) provides an example of a commenting attack.

* + 1. Piggybacked

The objective of such an attack is to insert a query to be exe- cuted with the legal or original query. The second query is not built by the developer, which means the web server cannot handle the result. Hence, this scenario limits the attacker query options with- out retrieved information. The basic query is updated and inserted, but most of the used queries are deleted. This attack may be exe- cuted on any page such as login, search or insert, and the result directly affects the database without raising an alert. [Table 3](#_bookmark13) pro- vides an example of a piggybacked attack.

* + 1. Union

An attacker inserts ‘‘UNION” after the original query to retrieve more information about the original queried table. The result of the

Table 1

Example of tautology attack.

*Attacker input*

Username = a’ or ’a’=’a Password = a’ or ’a’=’a

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = ’a’ or ’a’=’a’ and password=’a’ or ’a’=’a’;

*Database result*

Attacker gain access to web application as legal user.

Table 5

Example of alternate encoding attack.

*Attacker input*

Note: char(0x73687574646f776e) is ’’shutdown’’

search field (id) 5; exec(char(0x73687574646f776e));

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE id = 5; exec(char(0x73687574646f776e));

*Database result*

The database turns off (shutdown) when query passes any character filter mechanism.

Table 2

Example of commenting attack.

Table 6

*Attacker input*

Username = admin’ – Password = xx

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’ – and password=’xx’;

*Database result*

Attacker gains access to web application as ’’admin.’’

Example of logical incorrect attack.

*Attacker input*

Username = test’ Password = test

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = ’test’’ and password= ’test’;

*Database result*

Display error (syntax to use near ’’ and password = test’ at Line 1)

Table 3

Example of piggybacked attack on search page.

*Attacker input*

search field (id) 5; drop table users;

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE id = 5; drop table users;

*Database result*

Users table is deleted from database, which prevents access to web application

Table 4

Example of union attack.

*Attacker input*

Note:(admin, moh) is legal username and password pair

Username = admin Password = moh’ UNION ALL SELECT \* FROM users;

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = ’admin’ and password = moh’ UNION ALL SELECT \* FROM users;

*Database result*

Database displays user information to attacker

attack is to collect information for future use, but the attacker has already gained direct access to the SQL database panel. [Table 4](#_bookmark15) pro- vides an example of a union attack where the attacker has an authorised account and tries to retrieve all other accounts via a union attack query.

* + 1. Alternate encoding

The alternate method is based on transferring a query into a code explainable by a database, such as ASCII. An attacker uses this method to defraud a web server phrase filter, which is used to block the injected query. [Table 5](#_bookmark14) provides an example of an alter- nate encoding attack where the attacker tries to override the stored procedure keyword filter by changing ‘‘shutdown” to hexadecimal encoding and pass the procedure through the search page.

* + 1. Logical incorrect

An attacker’s objective is to collect information about a data- base such as table names and column properties. The technique is based on inserting incorrect symbols into the query to activate

a database exception to a user, which will display an error notifica- tion such as a table name. [Table 6](#_bookmark14) provides an example of a logical incorrect attack where the attacker tries to insert a symbol in the username field, which results in a database error.

* + 1. Blind

An attacker needs a GET HTTP request to execute a blind attack, which is based on inserting malicious code into the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). The objective of this attack is to gather information about the database by trying or comparing letters by letters. An automatic tool such as SQL-map is proposed because the manual method is rigorous and time-consuming. SQL-map and other tools make a blind attack easy to perform. [Table 7](#_bookmark18) pro- vides an example of a blind attack where the attacker tries to find if any table in database starts with ‘‘a” by condition result. In other words, the search page will display if there is a table starting with ‘‘a.”.

* + 1. Stored procedure

Database application becomes increasingly complicated, which presents new items such as procedures and triggers. The procedure is a code stored at the database end to perform a special task. When an attacker runs a procedure remotely, a stored procedure attack is achieved. [Table 8](#_bookmark19) provides an example of a stored proce- dure attack where the attacker tries to shut down a database remo- tely through a stored procedure.

* 1. *Searchable encryption*

The well-known method to secure information uses cryptogra- phy techniques, especially in a public environment such as the cloud. As the name implies, searchable encryption allows searching over encrypted information to preserve privacy [[23]](#_bookmark80).

One of the searchable encryption approaches is based on key- word search. The information is encrypted and stored in the data- base with information keywords in plain text. The database retrieves records according to keywords [[24]](#_bookmark80).

* 1. *System architecture model*

The web application is a model based on the internet environ- ment for communicating model parties and transferring data

Table 7

Example of blind attack.

*Attacker input: on the URL*

<https://localhost/nor/searchbook.php?nam> = 5 and 1=(SELECT 1 FROM information\_schema.tables WHERE TABLE\_SCHEMA=‘‘DBname” AND table\_name REGEXP ’^[a]’ LIMIT 0,1)

*Web server result*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = ’test’’ and password= ’test’;

*Database result*

I If the search page displays a result page, then the database contains a table name starting with ’’a.’’ When there is no page display, there are no tables name starting with ’’a’’

Table 8

Example of stored procedure attack.

*Attacker input*

search field (id) 5; exec(SHUTDOWN);

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE id = 5; exec(SHUTDOWN);

*Database result*

The database turns off (shutdown).

[[25]](#_bookmark80). [Fig. 2](#_bookmark20) shows three theoretical parties, namely, the client, ser- ver and database. Practically, a client connects to a network and provides a graphical user interface (GUI) for a user through a web browser. A server handles client request–response using web server applications such as Apache and connects to a database that is mostly on the same server [[4]](#_bookmark73).

A web application communicates to the database owing to SQL statements that restrict inserting, updating, deleting and selecting commands. The use of SQL limits GUI pages to add, modify, delete, search and login, in which the first three are handled in the same way [[26]](#_bookmark80).

The modification or deletion of records from a database is exe- cuted practically in two main scenarios.

Scenario A for modifying records:

* + 1. A user requests the page.
    2. The table main column is presented to the user as a drop- down selection.
    3. The user selects one selection and submits it to the server.
    4. The fields of the selected record are viewed.
    5. The required field(s) are modified.
    6. The table is updated.

Note: When deleting records, the selected record is deleted after step 3.

Scenario B for modifying records:

1. A user requests the page.
2. A page with an empty text box is viewed.
3. The value of the table main column (e.g., id) is entered and submitted to the server.
4. If the value exists, then view the fields. Otherwise, return an error page.
5. The required field(s) are modified.
6. The table is updated.

Note: When deleting records, if the value indicated in step 4 exists, then the selected record is deleted.

1. Related works

The injection attack is claimed until reaching the first threat on a web application according to OWASP 2021. In recent years, a con- siderable amount of research has been conducted to detect and prevent SQLI. The following are some proposed methods based on encryption and encoding mechanisms to prevent SQLI.

Raj et al. [[17]](#_bookmark77) proposed a coded format to store data. This method is based on the reversal insertion algorithm (RIA). After reversing the input, a special character between each group of two letters is inserted to cancel the (OR) appearance. The proposal evaluates only the login page, and from Algorithm 2, multiple com- putation and comparison combinations load to the web server, which consumes more time.

D’silva et al. [[27]](#_bookmark80) proposed preventing SQLI by using the hashing technique. The method calculates the hash value of the login query with the correct values when a user creates and compares the results of the query hash value during the login phase. The disad- vantage of this method is that it can only be applied to the login phase, and compression adds extra processing to the web server.

Anjugam et al. [[28]](#_bookmark81) proposed Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption on token SQL queries. The token generates a dynamic client-side table, which is encrypted and sent to the ser- ver with the original query. The server generates a lookup table from the user query, decrypts the client dynamic table and then compares both tables. If both tables are equal, then the query is forwarded to the database; otherwise, the query is blocked. How- ever, this duplicates the request size, which is sent to the server, and consumes bandwidth between the client and server. The need for a client to store a dynamic table may be blocked by blocking the client-side script.

Kumar et al. [[29]](#_bookmark82) presented a method that is divided between a client and server. The client-side function filters sensitive charac- ters, and the query length is retrieved from the database, whereas the server-side function compares the message authentication




Fig. 2. System architecture model.

code (MAC) value during the user creation and login phases. Retrieving information at the client-side filter increases traffic, and the method protects only the login phase.

Namdev et al. [[18]](#_bookmark78) used the hash technique for securing logins. The hash value computes for the username and password and then calculates the EXOR between them. The login procedure depends on the EXOR value to authorise a user. The approach protects only the login from tautology attacks, and the EXOR calculation is eval- uated on a web server.

Avireddy et al. [[19]](#_bookmark79) proposed a coding-based scheme where each character maps up to four possible random characters. The selected value from the table is based on the next character. The lookup table must be maintained on the client and the server sides, which is the main drawback of the scheme.

Balasundaram et al. [[30]](#_bookmark83) proposed a scheme based on AES to verify a user. The database stores the username, password and secret key for each user. The client encrypts the username and password before being sent to the server. The server verifies the username and password after decrypting the received query by using the stored key in the database table. The disadvantage of such a scheme is that users must enter their username, password and secret key for each login. The scheme prevents only tautology attacks.

Zhu et al. [[31]](#_bookmark84) proposed modular automation of the SQL state- ment in which the module maintains a list for a known anomaly pattern. The disadvantage is centred on pretreatment, which con- sumes considerable time in a web server due to the extraction of the pattern and extra size to store known patterns.

Dalai et al. [[32]](#_bookmark85) suggested comparing the string after the ‘where’ cluster in two cases. The first case is without user input, and the second case has user input after removing the type of correct vari- able. Their work was evaluated using Java and only handles select clusters. The author evaluated the tautology and removes the alphabet without removing (‘a’=’a’). The main drawback is that the method does not solve the insert and update clusters.

Xiao et al. [[33]](#_bookmark85) detected SQL injection through behaviour and response analysis. The method calculates the normal state and

stores the results in the database. When a user requests, a service is executed and compared with the stored result for any unusual value. The first disadvantage is the overwhelming amount of data, and the second disadvantage is that the request is first executed and then blocks the user. Finally, saving the user IP and port in a blacklist does not guarantee blocking the user where the user may run some proxy.

Ghafarian [[26]](#_bookmark80) used a hybrid method from static and dynamic analysis to prevent and detect SQLI. The main method is based on extracting table names and conditions from the input query and then reconstructing a SELECT query. If the result returns the symbol from the database, then the query is rejected. The method prevents only tautology attacks.

The proposed method is based on using encryption information in the database to prevent SQLI. The encryption is used only with the insertion of information and keyword search, which can increase the time in contrast to the security offering. Searchable encryption is used to preserve information privacy and save decryption time.

1. Proposed method

According to [Section 2](#_bookmark10), a security breach occurs within user input fields, in other words, HTML text box fields. The proposed method is extended from [[34]](#_bookmark85), which is based on encrypting all user input before processing. This method helps defuse all mali- cious codes. Encryption refers to a symmetric cipher that is being handled at the database level, as shown in [Fig. 3](#_bookmark22).

The related studies state that the majority solution covers only the login phase/page. In contrast, the proposed scheme solves login and other pages through encryption and searchable encryption. Subsection 2.3 shows that the majority of website pages deal with a database to store web application data and information. In such web applications, login, insert and update pages can be protected by encrypting user input. However, in this proposal, the search page can be protected by applying searchable encryption. The role of searchable encryption is to preserve privacy to the database’s




Fig. 3. Proposed method.




Fig. 4. Login procedure.

Table 9

Login checking code.

$userid = $\_POST[’userid’];

$password = $\_POST[’password’];

@ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$pw = hash(’sha3-5120 , $password);

$query = ‘‘select \* from users where username = AES\_ENCRYPT (’$userid’,’$pw’)‘‘;

$result = $db->query($query);

if ($result->num\_rows) echo ’’Authorized Login’’; else echo ’’Not Authorized’’;

encrypted information, so the database information is not revealed by data decryption.

The following subsection will explain the proposed scheme on the basis of page type and procedure (each entity function and messages).

* 1. *Login procedure*

A user calls this procedure every time to access web applica- tions. A user first calls a login form that contains an empty text box for the username and password. The form is displayed as an HTML page. Afterwards, a user fills in the text fields, and the brow- ser submits the data to a web server script such as PHP. The web server extracts the data from the HTTP request, calculates the secret key and submits the data to the database. The key is gener- ated through a hash function (SHA3 [[35]](#_bookmark85)) to the password text value. The database engine encrypts the username using the secret key and executes a select query for the cipher username. If found, then the user is an authorised user; otherwise, an error page is dis- played, as shown in [Fig. 4](#_bookmark23) and [Table 9](#_bookmark24).

Remark: MD5, SHA1 and SHA2 suffer from collision resistance, which is an easier approach than a brute-force attack. While SHA-1




Fig. 5. Insert procedure.

and SHA-2 are mathematically and structurally comparable, SHA-3 is more secure due to its collision and preimage resistance. In light of this, SHA-3 is increasingly replacing other hash functions [[36,37]](#_bookmark85).

* 1. *Insert procedure*

A user executes the insert procedure when entering the user account with the authorised username. The first form is in HTML

Table 10

Insert code.

$un=$\_POST[’n10 ];

$pw=$\_POST[’n20 ];

@ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$pw1 = hash(’sha3-5120 , $pw);

$query = ‘‘insert into users values(NULL,AES\_ENCRYPT(’$un’,’$pw10 ))”;

$result = $db->query($query);

if ($result) echo $un.‘‘ is Added”; else echo ’’Error’’;

and contains the necessary information with username and pass- word pairs. In modern forms, fields are required to be completed by users, and any missing information causes the server to reject the information and display an error. In normal scenarios, a web server generates a secret key, which is the hash value (SHA3) from the password and the secret key used to encrypt (e.g., AES [[38,39]](#_bookmark85)) the username to store ciphered in the database. As shown in [Fig. 5](#_bookmark25) and [Table 10](#_bookmark26), if the insertion is successful, then the web server returns to the user an HTML page containing the succeeding insert procedure.

Remark: The data encryption standard (DES) suffers from brute- force attacks, whereas the advanced encryption standard (AES) is the solution to DES drawbacks [[40]](#_bookmark86). The AES key is the default size, which is 128 bits. The SHA3 output is more than sufficient com- pared with the key length, but such a size will deceive attackers as a man-in-the-middle attack, and the key driven from SHA3 will not be saved. In other words, there is no waste in database information.




Fig. 6. Update procedure.

Table 11

Update code.

$id=$\_POST[’n10 ];

@ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$key = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’subber’);

$query = ’’select \* from books where id = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$id’, ’$key’)‘‘;

$result = $db->query($query); if ($result)

{

//View the record

echo ‘‘<table border = 1>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > id</td><td><input type=’text’ name=’n10 value = AES\_DECRYPT(id, ’$key’)></td></tr>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > Book Title</td><td><input type=’text’ name=’n20 value = AES\_DECRYPT(title, ’$key’)></td></tr>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > Author Name</td><td><input type=’text’ name=’n30 value = AES\_DECRYPT(author, ’$key’)></td></tr>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > Details</td><td><input type=’text’ name=’n40 value = AES\_DECRYPT(details, ’$key’)></td></tr>”; echo ‘‘</table>”;

}

else echo ’’Error: Not Found’’;

Update the Record

$id=$\_POST[’n10 ]; $ti=$\_POST[’n20 ]; $au=$\_POST[’n30 ]; $de=$\_POST[’n40 ]; @ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$key = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’subber’);

$query = ’’update books set title = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$ti’, ’$key’), author = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$au’, ’$key’), details = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$de’, ’$key’)where id = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$id’, ’$key’)‘‘;

$result = $db->query($query);

if ($result) echo ’’Updated’’; else echo ’’Error’’;




Fig. 7. Delete procedure.

Table 12

Delete code.

$id=$\_POST[’n10 ];

@ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$key = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’subber’);

$query = ’’Delete \* from books where id = AES\_ENCRYPT(’$id’, ’$key’)‘‘;

$result = $db->query($query);

if ($result) echo ’’Deleted’’; else echo ’’Error: Not Found’’;

* 1. *Update procedure*

In this proposal, the update procedure is based on scenario B in [Section 2.3](#_bookmark16) because scenario A causes decryption of all table main columns in the server to view in step 2.

The user input is encrypted using a secret key stored in the web server and executes a select query in the database to find the

requested record. The database decrypts the found record, which is displayed to the user by the web server. After a user submits the required modification, the database encrypts the fields and updates the table record, as shown in [Fig. 6](#_bookmark27) and [Table 11](#_bookmark28).

* 1. *Delete procedure*

The delete procedure is based on scenario B in [Section 2.3](#_bookmark16) and is demonstrated in [Fig. 7](#_bookmark29) and [Table 12](#_bookmark30). In this procedure, user input is encrypted and a select query is run. The records are deleted if found.

* 1. *Search procedure*

The search procedure in this proposal is based on searchable encryption because the database information is encrypted. Search-




Fig. 8. Search procedure.

Table 13

Search code.

$nm=$\_GET[’nam’];

@ $db = new mysqli(’localhost’,’root’,’’,’libmoh’);

$key = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’subber’);

$query = ‘‘select id, AES\_DECRYPT(title, ’$key’) ti,AES\_DECRYPT(author, ’$key’) au, AES\_DECRYPT(details, ’$key’) de from books where kw like AES\_ENCRYPT(’$nm’, ’$key’)”;

$result = $db->query($query);

$num\_results = $result->num\_rows; for ($i = 1; $i <=$num\_results; $i++)

{

$row = $result->fetch\_assoc();

$id=$row[’id’]; $ti=$row[’ti’];$au=$row[’au’]; $de=$row[’de’];

echo ‘‘<table border = 1>”; echo ‘‘<tr><td > id</td><td>$id</td></tr>”; echo ‘‘<tr><td > Book Title</td><td>$ti</td></tr>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > Author Name</td><td>$au</td></tr>”;

echo ‘‘<tr><td > Details</td><td>$de</td></tr>”; echo ‘‘</table>”;

}

able encryption based on keywords is used, as mentioned in sub- section 2.2, but here the keywords are encrypted and stored in the database. The procedure starts by encrypting the user keyword and executing the selected query in the database. If the keyword is found, then it will display the related records to the user after decryption, as shown in [Fig. 8](#_bookmark31) and [Table 13](#_bookmark32).

1. Implementation and experimental tests

The attack occurs at the application layer where the browser defines the protocol rules [[41]](#_bookmark87). The browser handles normal client and attack requests in the same way regardless of the application layer protocol carrying the request. Practically, HTTP or HTTPS will handle browser requests, as in [[6,17,32,33]](#_bookmark61). HTTP is used in the experiment. The HTTP helps the network analyser program read messages that are transferred in plain text.

* 1. *Implementation*

The proposal is implemented using XAMP 7.2.11 [[42]](#_bookmark88) as a local- host server, which contains Apache 2.4.35, PHP 7.2.11 and MySQL

5.0.12. The web application consists of creating user accounts, log- ging in, logging out and search functions. The ideal implementation with previous proposals is implemented for comparison purposes. These are listed in [Table 14](#_bookmark34).

The main database tables are users, table1 and books, which contain book information from the dataset in [[43]](#_bookmark89). The dataset information is split into title, author, details and keywords, where the detailed column contains other uncategorised data. ’table10 is meant to test piggybacked drop table attacks. If successful, table1 is removed. The ’users’ table is meant for storing authorised user information for login purposes. The table ‘books’ is the same as all previous proposals except the proposed method, and the user table is different for all proposals, as shown in [Table 14](#_bookmark34).

The created user account function is implemented by using two pages. The first is the HTML page, and the second is the PHP page to perform the insert query to the ’users’ table. The login function contains a single PHP page, which executes select queries to the ’users’ table. If successful, then the session is created. The logout is a single PHP page that ends the session and empties the session variable. Finally, the search function is based on two pages, HTML and PHP, which perform the selected query to the books table and display the results. [Table 15](#_bookmark35) shows the list of functions with related files for each function.

* 1. *Experimental tests*

SQL attacks can be categorised depending on the level of injec- tion, and the experiment is chosen according to each category. The first category contains attacks that gather database information by injecting malicious codes in URLs or by incorrect requests. This cat-

Table 14

Implementation and table columns of proposed method.

Proposal DB name Tables and columns

Normal (Ideal) libnormal users (id, username, password) table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details)

Raj [[17]](#_bookmark77) libraj users (id, username, password, keyvalue, userlen) table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details)

Dsilva [[27]](#_bookmark80) libdsilva users (id, username, password, hashdigest) table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details)

Namdev libencp users(id, username, password, hashusername, (ENCP)[[18]](#_bookmark78) hashpassword, hashexor)

table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details)

Kumar libmac users (id, username, password, qlength, smac) (MAC) [[29]](#_bookmark82) table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details)

Our proposal libmoh users (id, username) (moh) table1(id, name)

books (id, title, author, details, keywords)

Table 15

Functions and files.

Functions File name Called file name

Create user account inuser.html adduser.php Login authmain.php authmain.php

Logout logout.php authmain.php

Search search.html search.php

egory includes blind and logical incorrect attacks, which are based on trial and error and can be experimented with easily using the sqlmap tool. All pages use the HTTP POST request in the Moh pro- posal to withstand the first category attacks, as shown in [Fig. 9](#_bookmark37).

The second category includes the Union attack, which needs console access for the database because the victim site did not pre- pare to handle the Union result; in other words, there is no exper- imental test. The Moh proposal protected against Union attack; this is proven in the security analysis section if the site is prepared to handle all client queries. The third category is targeted at the database procedures, which include stored procedures and alter- nate encoding attacks. The proof is in the security analysis section. The fourth category is targeted at the site input fields, which include tautology, commenting and piggybacked attacks. The experiment uses a localhost server, which runs Apache to handle HTTP messages, a PHP compiler and MySQL database. Two situa- tions, without and with attack, are used to evaluate browsing web applications. Each function of the proposed method or solu-

tion is evaluated on the basis of the following experimental procedure.

* + 1. Create user account
       1. Run the browser application on the client.
       2. Call inuser.html using a browser address bar.
       3. Enter the username and password.
       4. The server calls adduser.php and sends insert query to the database.
       5. The server displays the ‘user added successfully’ message.
    2. Login
       1. Run the browser application on the client.
       2. Call authmain.php using the browser address bar.
       3. Enter the username and password for login.
       4. The server calls authmain.php and sends the select query to the database.
       5. If the user is authorised, then the server sets a session variable and displays login successfully.
       6. If the user is not authorised, then the server displays an error message.
    3. Logout
       1. The user selects the logout link when the user success- fully logs in.
       2. The server calls logout.php and unsets the session variable.
       3. The server displays the ‘successfully logged out’ message.
    4. Search
       1. Run the browser application on the client.
       2. Call search.html using browser address bar.
       3. Enter search text or keyword.
       4. The server calls search.php and sends a select query to the database.
       5. The server displays the results to the user.

The attack scenario injects the malicious code into the login and search functions. The attacker uses the tautology and commenting type of SQL injection on the login and a piggybacked attack on the search function. [Table 16](#_bookmark38) illustrates the attacks.

1. Results and discussions

The data collected from the above experiments are categorised depending on functions without and with attacks. These functions are mentioned in [Section 5](#_bookmark33). The data are captured for each proce- dure using Wireshark [[44]](#_bookmark90), where the information is extracted on the basis of HTTP messages. HTTP messages are requests and





Fig. 9. Experiment SQLmap on Moh proposal.

Text input in attacks.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Attack | on function | Input text |
| Tautology | Login | username: a’ or ’a’=’a |
|  |  | password: a’ or ’a’=’a |
| Commenting | Login | username: admin’ – |
|  |  | password: x |
| Piggy-backed | Search | London’; drop table table1 |

responses that have basic metrics of time and size. Round trip time (RTT) is the time difference between the arrived response and sent request. RTT includes the request time to reach the server, web ser- ver calculation time, database access and retrieval time, and time spent from the server to the client. Size indicates the amount of data transfer between the client and server.

[Table 17](#_bookmark40) shows the web server pages, tables and database sizes. Some file sizes are fixed because the current proposal does not affect page codes, such as inuser.html, logout.php and search.html. The size changes in adduser.php can be ignored because the page is called once for each user. The authmain.php page is called fre- quently for each login where Kumar’s file size is the largest and all others are within the normal state. Moh has the largest file size for search.php caused by the keyword comparison code. The book table size is greater because of the encrypted keywords for each record. The number of columns for each proposal will affect the user table size, where the Namdev table is the largest because of the number of details for each user.

The proposal results were compared with other approaches and methods that prevent SQLI attacks in web applications. The results are shown in the next subsections. The following results are divided on the basis of the function, and a result value of (0) means the attack is blocked.

* 1. *Create account*

The created account function is tested against RTT, HTTP request and HTTP response size to compare different proposals. This function is not tested against attacks that are tested in depth with a search function.

[Fig. 10](#_bookmark39) and [Table 18](#_bookmark42) demonstrate the RTT for the creation account function, which includes the server processing time. The Normal is the shortest RTT, which is evident because no encryption or encoding process occurs. Namdev is the longest RTT because of the number of processes where the hash function is calculated twice and the EXOR operation for 160 bits. The Moh proposal is the second longest, but this function is generated or called once for each user.

The call web page sizes for request and response are the same for all proposals because the content is equal. This is essentially the HTML page part, as shown in [Fig. 11](#_bookmark43) and [Table 19](#_bookmark44). The created account request has the same value because the information car- ried is the username and password. Finally, the response size for

Fig. 10. RTT created account.

creating an account is based on the server HTML response after successfully creating the user.

* 1. *Login and logout*

The logout function occurs when a user successfully logs in authorised or unauthorised user scenarios. If no logout occurs, then the attacker is blocked.

From [Figs. 12](#_bookmark45), [13](#_bookmark47), [14](#_bookmark49) [Tables 20](#_bookmark46), [21](#_bookmark48) and [22](#_bookmark50), the call web page is calculated from the average where all proposals take almost the same RTT, request and response size. The logout without attack is equal for all proposals in all metrics. Kumar login is the longest time and largest size because the number of operations is taken into account, whereas the call page is large in response size because of predefined conditions and values. Moh has the second largest RTT value because of the encryption operation. All propo- sals block tautology attacks with different RTTs, which is based on the proposal complexity.

Notably, Namdev and Dsilva do not block or prevent comment- ing attacks, which is prevented by other proposals, and the Moh proposal takes a shorter RTT value. The response size is within average means, RTT expresses the server decision time, which var- ies, and Kumar takes the longest time to evaluate.

* 1. *Search*

The request size from [Fig. 16](#_bookmark52) and [Table 24](#_bookmark55) and the response size from [Fig. 17](#_bookmark53) and [Table 25](#_bookmark56) explain the search function for all tested proposals. All tested proposals have the same size in scenarios without and with attacks. However, the Moh proposal for response sizes under attack is different from the other scenarios because the

Table 17

Size of files, table and database (Bytes).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Normal | Namdev | Raj | Dsilva | Kumar | Moh |
| inuser.html | 381 | 381 | 381 | 381 | 381 | 381 |
| adduser.php | 684 | 826 | 900 | 756 | 774 | 717 |
| authmain.php | 1558 | 1725 | 1892 | 1734 | 3723 | 1589 |
| search.html | 295 | 295 | 295 | 295 | 295 | 295 |
| search.php | 1185 | 1183 | 1182 | 1185 | 1182 | 1223 |
| table1.sql | 995 | 993 | 992 | 995 | 992 | 992 |
| users.sql | 1518 | 2204 | 1698 | 1746 | 1788 | 1463 |
| books.sql | 317,543 | 317,541 | 317,540 | 317,543 | 317,540 | 545,602 |
| database size | 320,056 | 320,738 | 320,230 | 320,284 | 320,320 | 548,057 |

Table 18

RTT created account (milliseconds).

Normal Raj Kumar Dsilva Namdev Moh

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Call web page | 2.674 | 0.607 | 1.036 | 1.959 | 0.619 | 0.976 |
| Create Account | 34.262 | 44.279 | 65.745 | 77.803 | 145.474 | 139.457 |




Fig. 11. Created account (request–response size).

attacker is blocked from dropping the table. All input for Moh is encrypted to generate the keyword that will defuse a piggybacked attack.

Moh takes the longest time in RTT ([Fig. 15](#_bookmark54) and [Table 23](#_bookmark51)) but prevents piggybacked attacks during the time a decision is made. On the one hand, this time period is reasonable compared with the benefit of preventing a piggybacked attack. On the other hand, the time delay in Moh is not very long in contrast to other tested proposals and even the normal technique..

* 1. *Discussions*

HTML pages have fixed averages for RTT, HTTP request and HTTP response size. The only difference is in PHP files or the server-side script because that response is based on processing user input to make decisions or to generate dynamic HTML pages. The results indicate the robustness of the proposal (Moh). Over time, the proposal prevents tautology, commenting and piggy- backed attacks. No other proposals prevent or detect the attacker related to the search function, such as a piggybacked attack. Kumar’s proposal suffers from a long processing time to prevent tautology and commenting. Raj’s proposal calls for a shorter time

to prevent login attacks because no cryptography is proposed. Namdev and Dsilva prevent only tautology attacks and even the use of cryptography.

1. Security analyses

Theorem 1. *The Moh proposal is protected from the SQL Tautology Attack.*

*Proof*. According to [Section 2](#_bookmark10), tautology attacks a login page where the injection code places the username and password fields. The Moh proposal method encrypts the username and password from the client before being entered into the database. [Table 26](#_bookmark56) shows the query result as an example of a tautology attack on the Moh proposal.

[Table 26](#_bookmark56) shows a proof that the Moh proposal is protected from SQL tautology attacks and shows even how hard an attacker will try to change the input combination. The proposal disables the ‘or’ effect by encrypting input text, which results in different text named cipher text.

Theorem 2. *If an attacker knows the username, then the attacker can inject an SQL commenting attack, but the Moh proposal is immune to such attacks.*

*Proof.* As mentioned in [Section 2](#_bookmark10), to accomplish a commenting attack, an attacker must know the username in advance. An attacker will disable the password condition by commenting on the fields after the known username. [Table 27](#_bookmark57) shows an example of a commenting attack if the known username is ‘admin’.

[Table 27](#_bookmark57) proves that Moh proposal is immune to SQL comment- ing attacks even if an attacker knows the username in advance. However, the proposal encrypts the input that will cancel the com- menting ‘--’ effect on the following fields.

Theorem 3. *Moh proposal prevents SQL Piggybacked attacks.*


*Proof.* An attacker injects the piggybacked malicious code as a second query, which can be made through the search page of any web application. The Moh proposal prevents such attacks because the proposal encrypts all client inputs and uses a searchable encryption method to search the encrypted database. [Table 28](#_bookmark58) demonstrates an example of such an attack.

[Table 28](#_bookmark58) is a proof of preventing a piggybacked attack where the keyword is encrypted rather than using plain text format.

Table 19

Created account (request-response size) (Bytes).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page (Request) | 639 | 636 | 636 | 637 | 637 | 715 |
| Create Account (Request) | 701 | 695 | 695 | 701 | 697 | 758 |
| Call web page (Response) | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 330 |
| Create Account (Response) | 464 | 536 | 590 | 587 | 639 | 517 |



|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | | Fig. 12. RTT login–logout. |  | | |
| Table 20 |  |  |  |
| RTT login-logout (milliseconds). |  |  |  |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 1.739 | 1.725 | 40.681 | 1.526 | 1.484 | 1.621 |
| Login (without) | 5.956 | 5.945 | 64.575 | 7.184 | 6.217 | 34.972 |
| Logout (without) | 1.73 | 2.223 | 2.488 | 3.087 | 2.197 | 4.113 |
| Login (Tautology) | 5.616 | 5.543 | 8.315 | 4.622 | 3.724 | 21.107 |
| Logout (Tautology) | 1.658 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Login (Commenting) | 7.336 | 6.532 | 16.623 | 17.838 | 6.512 | 8.293 |
| Logout (Commenting) | 1.567 | 0 | 0 | 2.103 | 1.62 | 0 |




Fig. 13. Request size login–logout.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 21  Request size login-logout (Bytes). |  | | | | | |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 583 | 577 | 577 | 583 | 579 | 684 |
| Login (without) | 708 | 702 | 1213 | 708 | 704 | 896 |
| Logout (without) | 583 | 577 | 577 | 583 | 579 | 623 |
| Login (Tautology) | 742 | 736 | 485 | 742 | 738 | 845 |
| Logout (Tautology) | 583 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Login (Commenting) | 712 | 706 | 485 | 712 | 708 | 815 |
| Logout (Commenting) | 583 | 0 | 0 | 583 | 579 | 0 |




Fig. 14. Response size login–logout.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 22  Response size login-logout (Bytes). |  | | | | | |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 855 | 861 | 2832 | 874 | 874 | 972 |
| Login (without) | 615 | 692 | 3400 | 777 | 746 | 698 |
| Logout (without) | 550 | 550 | 550 | 550 | 550 | 602 |
| Login (Tautology) | 623 | 952 | 798 | 1056 | 1010 | 953 |
| Logout (Tautology) | 550 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Login (Commenting) | 622 | 1077 | 798 | 788 | 755 | 1056 |
| Logout (Commenting) | 550 | 0 | 0 | 551 | 551 | 0 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 23  RTT search (milliseconds). |  | | | | | |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 0.784 | 0.762 | 0.793 | 0.741 | 0.63 | 0.763 |
| Search (without-Attack) | 12.624 | 18.201 | 9.428 | 8.671 | 20.253 | 33.993 |
| Search (Piggybacked) | 10.388 | 17.29 | 8.387 | 9.381 | 7.222 | 0 |



 

Fig. 15. RTT search.

Fig. 17. Response size search.




Fig. 16. Request size search.

Theorem 4. *The Moh proposal is protected against SQL piggybacked attacks even if the attacker knows the encryption key.*

*Proof.* Knowing the secret key will enable an attacker to decrypt the books table only if the attacker gains access to the database. The searchable encryption technique will limit the search to encrypted keywords. A malicious code from an attacker does not exist in the keywords.

Theorem 5. *If an attacker knows the encryption key, then the attacker does not threaten users’ table privacy.*

*Proof*. The encryption key is related to the books table or other database table information, whereas the user table is encrypted using a different key. Each user in the user table is encrypted using

the hash digits from the password as an encryption key. Each user uses a different key, which proves that disclosing the secret key does not threaten the user table.

Theorem 6. *The Moh proposal is protected from the SQL Union Attack.*

*Proof.* [Table 29](#_bookmark59) shows the query result as an example of a Union attack on the Moh proposal, which shows proof that encrypting input text will disable the attack purpose or target.

Theorem 7. *The Moh proposal is protected from the SQL alternate encoding attack.*

*Proof.* [Table 30](#_bookmark62) shows the query result as an example of an alter- nate encoding attack on the Moh proposal. This is proof that encrypting input text will disable the attack purpose or target.

Theorem 8. *The Moh proposal is protected from the SQL Stored Procedure Attack.*

*Proof.* [Table 31](#_bookmark62) shows the query result as an example of a Stored Procedure attack on the Moh proposal. This is proof that encrypting input text will disable the attack purpose or target.

1. Conclusion and future works

An SQL injection attack is a web application safety threat whose technique is based on injecting malicious code into user input fields. An attacker’s objective is to target database information that can be affected according to the injection type. According to SQL injection types, an attacker may gain unauthorised access or manipulate database information.

The proposed method encrypts all user input before contact with the database and uses searchable encryption on the basis of encrypted keywords. Symmetric encryption is applied, which

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Table 24  Request size search (Bytes). |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 639 | 636 | 636 | 638 | 637 | 636 |
| Search (without-Attack) | 619 | 613 | 613 | 619 | 615 | 615 |
| Search (Piggybacked) | 646 | 640 | 640 | 646 | 642 | 642 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Response size search (Bytes). |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Normal | Raj | Kumar | Dsilva | Namdev | Moh |
| Call web page | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 | 279 |
| Search (without-Attack) | 6756 | 6758 | 6756 | 6756 | 6758 | 6758 |
| Search (Piggybacked) | 671 | 668 | 668 | 671 | 668 | 0 |

Table 26

Example of tautology attack on Moh proposal.

Attacker input

Username = a’ or ’a’=’a Password = a’ or ’a’=’a

*Web server generate query*

$pw = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’a’ or ’a’=’a’);

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’a’ or ’a’=’a’,’$pw’)

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’a’ or ’a’=’a’,’ 5e6b1a402c695983e878fb17ab80abb096a07f5b50491cc9a3eb8295eafd91984 580cf2baf15f8bca180886e10af17f5d55478129631251e3fcda46ab26322ca’)

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username=

*(*4641d08ce2cda412c1b8bc6e60ff3479*)HEX*

*Database result*

There is no match for the above username which display to the attacker ’Could not log you in’ message

Table 27

Example of commenting attack on Moh proposal.

Attacker input

Username = admin’ – Password = xx

*Web server generate query*

$pw = hash(’sha3-5120 , ‘xx’);

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’admin’ – ’,’$pw’);

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’admin’ – ’,’ ab585b96d532a05ebbff8653c430099964421248ac320dde44cab79388a78d1d2 230630e682cbe9e6ee3e2252cabbc8524fcb3b8f5a8efe42de278e2d33da3b00 );

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username= (0x4baa698de885afab73552073db7bb408)HEX

*Database result*

There is no match for the above username which display to the attacker ’Could not log you in’ message

Table 28

Example of piggybacked attack on Moh proposal.

Attacker input

search field (any keyword) London’; drop table users;

*Web server generate query*

$key = hash(’sha3-5120 , ’subber’);

SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword = AES\_ENCRYPT(’London’; drop table table1;’,’$key’); SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword= (0x8bce6926813c7d985eb978d44d731bea1352f26465785a04.. .)HEX

*Database result*

The result keyword does not match any encrypted keyword, there are no result and the table 1 not drop

Table 29

Example of union attack on Moh proposal.

Attacker input

Username = admin Password = moh’ UNION ALL SELECT \* FROM users;

*Web server generate query*

$pw = hash(’sha3-5120 , moh’ UNION ALL SELECT \* FROM users;);

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’admin’,’$pw’)

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username = AES\_ENCRYPT(’admin’,’ 0c94d2d819b1c0deba625dc37133ec3e8d547baa8fe911e6188e88c7dab163876 4e447b8883b7f72f316ec176806a3f7b1610dc0687fa64e39a81024dc08aeac’)

SELECT \* FROM users WHERE username=

*(*d4a8242e822289b27dc1003f2b627ce9*)HEX*

*Database result*

There is no match for the above username which display to the attacker ’Could not log you in’ message

Table 30

Example of an alternate encoding attack on the Moh proposal.

Attacker input

search field (id) London’; exec(char(0x73687574646f776e));

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword = AES\_ENCRYPT(’London’; exec(char(0x73687574646f776e));’,’$key’); SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword= (69eaa388e5a8a9392e5b893c97ee4198ee12aad0d0c934c9.. .)HEX *Database result*

The result keyword does not match any encrypted keyword, there are no result and procedure does not execute even if its encoded.

Table 31

Example of stored procedure attack on Moh proposal.

Attacker input

search field (id) London’; exec(SHUTDOWN);

*Web server generate query*

SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword = AES\_ENCRYPT(’London’; exec(SHUTDOWN);’,’$key’); SELECT \* FROM books WHERE keyword=

(bd79ef151b0beee216f4b2b4640044e5731b0d01aac0af6b.. .)HEX

*Database result*

The result keyword does not match any encrypted keyword, there are no results and procedure does not execute.

causes a slight delay in processing, as when creating an account. The RTT is 139 msec, while in the normal state it is 34 msec. This method prevents SQLIs, and the results are comparable with previ- ous methods where the encryption process takes a long time but can withstand attacks. The process time delay is reasonable because any attack is prevented. The RTT metric is shown in [Tables](#_bookmark48) [21 and 23](#_bookmark48). The Moh proposal measurements are within the average except a login without attack is 35 msec, login with tautology is 21 msec, and search without attack is 34 msec. Kumar’s proposal has the longest login without attack at 65 msec, and Namdev’s pro- posal has the second longest search at 20 msec. The request and response size as expressed in [Tables 21, 22, 24 and 25](#_bookmark48) are within the average value of other proposals and normal states except for Kumar’s proposal, which requires greater size in the login request without attack at 1213 bytes with a response of 3400 bytes.

The proposal has no limitation for platform or language and is applicable to any web application environment such as e- banking. The results with security analysis prove that the proposal is practical and secure. The future work of study will involve apply- ing the idea to cloud architecture and determining whether it can survive SQL injection assaults in various topologies.

Funding Statement

This work is supported by Natural Science Foundation of Top Talent of SZTU (Grant No. 20211061010016).

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing finan- cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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