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Static Analysis for Stack Inspection

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**Abstract**

We propose two control flow analyses for the Java bytecode. They safely approxi- mate the set of permissions granted/denied to code at run-time. This static infor- mation helps optimizing the implementation of the stack inspection algorithm.

# Introduction

A main innovation of the Java platform concerns its approach to security: the language comes equipped with constructs and mechanisms for expressing and enforcing security policies. Since the code actually executed is on the form of an intermediate object-oriented language – the bytecode – *bytecode veriﬁcation* is the basic building block of Java security.

Over the past few years, there has been considerable effort in developing formal models of the Java bytecode verifier. Some authors showed that the problem of bytecode verification can be formally understood and described at static time using type systems [[3,4,14].](#_bookmark19) All the proposals are proved to en- joy the type soundness properties (on the bytecode fragments they consider). Also, the type inference algorithm can be turned into a correct bytecode ver- ifier, see e.g. [[2,5,10].](#_bookmark20)

Another crucial aspect of the Java security architecture is the dynamic check of the permissions granted to running code. Roughly, one has to make sure that whenever a principal invokes a certain method, it has the rights to. At run-time, permissions are enforced by *stack inspection*: a permission is granted, provided that it belongs to *all* principals on the call stack. An exception are the so-called *privileged operations*, which are allowed to execute any code granted to their principal, regardless of the calling sequence.

Since the analysis of stack frames may be expensive, the run-time over- head due to stack inspection may grow very high: effective techniques which improve and optimize stack inspection are therefore in order.

In this paper we develop a static analysis which improves run-time check- ing of permissions. We reduce the number of frames to be examined, while maintaining the same accuracy of the plain stack inspection algorithm. Also,

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our analysis may be used for optimizing bytecode, by moving checks where they are actually needed, and by removing redundant ones.

Our approach is based on Control Flow Analysis (CFA) [[9],](#_bookmark20) a static tech- nique for predicting safe and computable approximations to the set of values that the objects of a program may assume during its execution. These approx- imations are then used to analyze properties of programs in a safe manner: if a property holds at static time, then it will always hold at run-time. The vice-versa may not be true: the analysis may “err on the safe side”. CFA and other static program analysis techniques are generally more efficient than program verification, and for that reason more approximate, because the focus is on the fully automatic processing of large programs.

Our main technical contribution is the formulation of a couple of control flowanalyses over an abstract representation of Java programs. This abstract representation specializes the usual call graph, focussing on permission checks and method invocations (and protection domains), similarly to [[8].](#_bookmark18) Call graphs are given an operational semantics. Essentially, the states that a program can pass through are represented by stacks *σ*, made of nodes of the call graph, each interpreted as an abstraction of the actual stack frames. The control point is the top *n* of the stack *σ* : *n*, and a computation step is represented by a transition between stacks, written as *σ ✄ σ'*.

For each node *n* our first analysis computes an approximation, i.e. a sub- set *δ*(*n*) of those permissions that are *denied* to *n*, in every run leading to

*n*. Similarly, our second analysis computes a subset *γ*(*n*) of the permissions *granted* to *n* in every run leading to *n*. Both analyses are correct with respect to the operational semantics. Suppose that *n* is a security check of permission *P* , and that *P ∈ δ*(*n*) (resp. *P ∈ γ*(*n*)). Then, whenever there is a compu- tation [] *✄ ... ✄ σ* : *n*, the security check *always* fails (resp. succeeds). The approximations computed by our analyses are then used to reduce the depth at which the stack inspection algorithm stops. When checking privileges to- wards a permission *P* , it suffices to reach a frame *m* such that *P ∈ δ*(*m*) or *P ∈ γ*(*m*). In the first case an AccessControlException is raised, while in the second one the check succeeds.

# Program model

We represent bytecode programs as oriented graphs where only security checks and control floware made explicit. On them, we base our analyses.

A *call graph* is a triple *G* = (*N, E, S*), where:

* + *N* is the set of nodes, including a distinguished element *⊥N* . Each node *n ∈ N \ {⊥N }* is associated with a label *l*(*n*), describing the control flow primitive represented by the node. Labels give rise to three kinds of nodes: call nodes, representing method invocation, return nodes, which represent return from a method, and check nodes, which enforce the access control

policy. Roughly, we can think of a node labelled check(P) has having the same meaning of an AccessController.checkPermission(P) instruction in the Java language. The distinguished node *⊥N* plays the technical role of a single, isolated entry point.

* + *E* = *Ecall ] Etrans ] Eentry ⊆ N ×* (*N \ {⊥N }*) is the set of edges. Edges are split into *call edges n −→ n' ∈ Ecall* , modelling inter-procedural flow, and *transfer edges n* −−· *n' ∈ Etrans*, which instead correspond to intra- procedural flow. Moreover, we have the set of *entry edges •−→ n ∈ Eentry* , containing all pairs (*⊥N , n*) for *n ∈ S*. The *⊥N* element only appears in entry edges.
  + *S ⊆ N \ {⊥N }* is the non-empty set of entry nodes. We assume that a program may have many entry points, as it actually happens with programs designed to be launched both as applets and as stand-alone applications.

In order to give a specification of the access control policy being consistent with the one introduced by the JDK 1.2, we endow each node *n ∈ N \ {⊥N }* with the following additional information:

* + *Permissions(n)*, the set of permissions associated with *n*. The Java secu- rity architecture bounds permissions to whole *protection domains*, that our model does not handle explicitly. We only require that, whenever *n* −−· *n'*, both *n* and *n'* carry the same permission set.
  + *Priv(n)*, a boolean predicate indicating whether *n* represents *privileged* code.

In what follows, we assume that all the information above is extracted from the bytecode, e.g. by the constructions presented in [[7,8,9].](#_bookmark20)

Throughout the paper we will make use of an example taken from [[8],](#_bookmark18) that describes a small e-commerce application. The call graph extracted from the Java program is shown in figure [1](#_bookmark1) (for more details, we refer the reader to [[8]).](#_bookmark18) Circled nodes represent blocks of privileged code. The mapping between protection domains and nodes is illustrated in Fig. [2.](#_bookmark2)

The operational semantics of call graphs is defined by a transition sys- tem whose configurations are sequences of nodes, modelling call stacks. The transition relation is defined in Fig. [3](#_bookmark3) (the definition of the *JDK* predicate is discussed later on).

We also need a reachability relation *▶* stating when the execution of a program

*G* can lead to a given state:

*G ▶* []

*G ▶ σ σ ✄ σ′*

*G ▶ σ′*

We say that a state *σ* is *reachable* by *G* if and only if *G ▶ σ*.

Here, we use a slightly simplified version of the full access control algorithm presented in [[6],](#_bookmark16) as we let privileged frames to exploit all of their own permis- sions. The simplified algorithm performs a top-down scan of the call stack. Each frame in the stack refers to the protection domain containing the class to



spender()

*n*3: call

main()

*n*1: call

clyde()

*n*6: call

*n*4: call

*n*2: call

*n*7: call

*n*5: call

debit()

*n*11: check(*Pdebit*)

*n*12: call

canpay()

*n*8: check(*Pcanpay*)

*n*13: call

*n*9: call

*n*14: call

*n*10: return

*n*15: return

read()

write()

Fig. 1. A call graph.

*n*16: check(*Pread*)

*n*17: return

*n*18: check(*Pwrite*)

*n*19: return

which the called method belongs. As soon as a frame is found whose protec- tion domain has not the required permission, an AccessControlException is raised. The algorithm succeeds when a privileged frame is found that car- ries the required permission, or when all frames have been visited. A formal specification of this algorithm is given in Fig. [4,](#_bookmark4) that defines *JDK*.

We stress an important point here. In the JDK 1.2 security architecture, a permission *P* may be granted to a piece of code, lying inside a protection domain *D*, even if *P* does not belong to the permissions explicitly associated

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Protection Domain | Methods | Permissions |
| Client Unknown Provider  System | spender() clyde() canpay(), debit()  main(), read(), write() | *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *∅*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }*  **Permission** |

Fig. 2. Protection domains.

*n ∈ S*

[] *✄* [*n*]

[*✄*∅]

*l*(*n*) = call *n −→ n′*

*σ* : *n ✄ σ* : *n* : *n′*

[*✄call*]

*l*(*n*) = check(P) *σ* : *n ▶ JDK*(*P* )

*σ* : *n ✄ σ* : *n′*

*n* −−· *n′*

[*✄check*]

*l*(*m*) = return *n* −−· *n′*

*σ* : *n* : *m ✄ σ* : *n′*

[*✄return*]

Fig. 3. Operational semantics.

[] *▶ JDK*(*P* )

[*JDK*∅]

*P ∈ Permissions(n) σ ▶ JDK*(*P* )

*σ* : *n ▶ JDK*(*P* )

[*JDK≺*]

*P ∈ Permissions(n) Priv(n)*

*σ* : *n ▶ JDK*(*P* )

[*JDKPriv* ]

Fig. 4. Specification of the access control policy.

with *D*. [1](#_bookmark5) Our model prevents this behaviour, because the *JDK* rules ensure that:

*∀n ∈ N, σ ∈ N∗. P ∈/ Permissions(n)* =*⇒ σ* : *n b JDK*(*P* )

Note also that our inference rules for *JDK* are *ﬁxed*, as well as those for

*✄*. So we are prevented from modelling permissions like AllPermission and FilePermission("\*","write"), as they may breach security by altering the Java system binaries.

In the following, we will say that a permission *P* is *denied* (resp. *granted* ) to a state *σ* if *σ b JDK*(*P* ) (resp. *σ ▶ JDK*(*P* )). Also, the *ﬁnite* set of all permissions referenced to in a given call graph will be denoted by **Permission**.

Back to our example, consider node *n*16: both callers *n*9 and *n*13 are priv- ileged and have the permission *Pread*. Hence, the security check at *n*16 will

1 This may happen through the implies() method.

*DP in* (*n*) =

[

(m,n)*∈*E

*{DP out* (*m, n*)*}*

*DP out* (*m, n*)

=



*Permissions(n)*

if *−• → n*



*DP* (

*call*

*m*) *∩ Permissions(n)*

*DP trans* (*m*)

if *m −→ n*

if *m* −−· *n*

*DP call* (*n*) =

*Permissions(n)*

*DP in* (*n*)

if *Priv(n)*

otherwise



*∅*

if *l*(*n*) = check(P) and *kill*(*n, P* )

*DP trans* (*n*) =



[ *{DP*

(m,n)*∈*E

*out*

(*m, n*)*}* if *l*(*n*) = check(P) and *¬kill*(*n, P* )

and *¬Priv(n)*



P *∈*DP (m,n)

*out*



*DP in* (*n*)

otherwise

*kill*(*n, P* ) =*def ∀*(*m, n*) *∈ E. P ∈/ DP out* (*m, n*)

Fig. 5. The Denied Permissions Analysis.

always pass. The same holds for *n*18, as its only caller is the privileged *n*14. Nowconsider *n*11: one of its callers (*n*4) has permission *Pdebit*, while the other (*n*6) has not. Indeed, the security check at *n*11 is necessary. Also, note that no execution involving clyde will ever pass the check in *n*11: then the permission *Pcanpay* is always granted to both callers of *n*8 (*n*3 and *n*12), and the check at *n*8 turns out to be redundant, too.

Our static analyses aim at discovering the redundant checks, i.e. those that always succeed, as well as those that always fail.

# Static analyses

Our first analysis is called *Denied Permissions Analysis* (DP for short). It computes, for each program node *n*, a safe approximation, i.e. a subset of the set of permissions that are denied to any state *σ* : *n*. The analysis is defined by the system of control flow equations *DP* (*G*) in Fig. [5](#_bookmark6) (actually it defines the complement *DP* of *DP* w.r.t. **Permission**). Note that DP is a *forward* analysis, and that we are interested in the *largest* sets satisfying the equalities. The control flowinformation is represented through a finite *property space*

*L* = *Lin × Lout × Lcall × Ltrans*,where *Lin, Lcall , Ltrans* are total function spaces from *N* to *P*(**Permission**), while *Lout* is a total function space from *E* to *P*(**Permission**). Assuming that *P*(**Permission**) is partially ordered by *⊇*,a standard construction equips each of these spaces with a pointwise order. As an example, the set *Lin* is partially ordered by the relation *±in* given by:

*lin ±in l'*

*in*

=*def ∀n ∈ N. lin*(*n*) *⊇ l'*

(*n*)

Similarly, we define a join operator on these spaces. Back to our example:

*in*

*lin Hin l'*

*in*

=*def λn* : *N. lin*(*n*) *∩ l'*

(*n*)

With the above, our function spaces turn out to be finite complete lattices.

*in*

Thus, also *L* is a finite complete lattice.

The equation system in Fig. [5](#_bookmark6) defines a *transfer function FDP* between elements of this lattice, i.e. *FDP* : *L→ L*. Any solution *δ ∈L* of the control flow equations must satisfy *δ* = *FDP* (*δ*): in this case, we write *δ |*= *DP* (*G*). Actually, *FDP* is a monotonic (and continuous) function, therefore the chain

*⊥L ± F*(*⊥L*) *± F*2(*⊥L*) *± ···* eventually stabilises to the *largest* solution of the equation system.

We can nowstate the correctness of our DP analysis. For every reachable state *σ* : *n*, the permissions denied to *n* are a superset of the *δcall* (*n*) component of any solution.

## Theorem 3.1 (Correctness of DP Analysis)

*Let G be a call graph, G ▶ σ* : *n and δ |*= *DP* (*G*)*. Then:*

*P ∈ δcall* (*n*) =*⇒ σ* : *n b JDK*(*P* )

The intuition follows on how a solution is built. The permissions non- denied at the entry of a node are the union of those (non-denied) at the exit of all its callers. Call nodes generate non-denied permissions only if they are privileged; otherwise they propagate the non-denied permissions of their entry points. A check node propagates the permissions of the callers that may pass the check. Return nodes have no outgoing edges, so they are irrelevant here. Note that permissions can be discarded when crossing the boundaries of protection domains. As an example, the *δout* component for the edge *n*6 *→ n*11 in Fig[.1](#_bookmark1) is:

*δout* (*n*6*, n*11) = *δcall* (*n*6) *∩ Permissions(n*11*) ⊆ δcall* (*n*6) = *δin* (*n*6)

= *δout* (*n*2*, n*6) *∪ δout* (*n*7*, n*6)

= (*δcall* (*n*2) *∪ δcall* (*n*7)) *∩ Permissions(n*6*)* = *∅.*

(1)

Our second analysis is called *Granted Permissions Analysis* (GP for short). Similarly to DP, it gives, for every node *n*, a safe approximation of the set of

*GPin* (*n*) =

\

*{GPout* (*m, n*)*}*

(m,n)*∈*E

*GP* (

*out*

*m, n*

) = *GP*



*Permissions(n)*

if *−• → n*



*call*

(

*m*) *∩ Permissions(n)*

*GPtrans* (*m*)

if *m −→ n*

if *m* −−· *n*

*GPcall* (*n*) =

*Permissions(n)*

*GPin* (*n*)

*∅*

if *Priv(n)*

otherwise



if *l*(*n*) = check(P) and *kill*(*n, P* )

*GPtrans* (*n*) =



\ *{GP*

(m,n)*∈*E

*out*

(*m, n*)*}∪ {P }* if *l*(*n*) = check(P) and *¬kill*(*n, P* )

and *¬Priv(n)*



P *∈*DP (m,n)

*out*



*GPin* (*n*)

otherwise

Fig. 6. The Granted Permissions Analysis.

permissions that are granted to any state with top *n*. The analysis is defined by the system of equations *GP* (*G*) in Fig. [6.](#_bookmark7) Also GP is a forward analysis, and we look for the largest sets satisfying the equalities.

The permissions granted at the entry of a node are those granted at the exit of *all* its callers. Call nodes generate granted permissions only if they are privileged; otherwise they propagate those at their entry points. A check node generates both the permissions it enforces and those granted to *all* of the callers that *may* pass the check. As an example of the GP analysis, we compute the set of permissions granted to node *n*16:

*γcall* (*n*16) = *γin* (*n*16) = *γout* (*n*9*, n*16) *∩ γout* (*n*13*, n*16)

= (*γcall* (*n*9) *∩ γcall* (*n*13)) *∩ Permissions(n*16*)*

= *Permissions(n*9*) ∩ Permissions(n*13*)*

= *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }*

(2)

We can now state the correctness of our GP analysis. For every reach- able state *σ* : *n*, the permissions granted to *n* are a superset of the *γcall* (*n*) component of any solution.

## Theorem 3.2 (Correctness of GP Analysis)

*Let G be a call graph, G ▶ σ* : *n and γ |*= *GP* (*G*)*. Then:*

*P ∈ γcall* (*n*) =*⇒ σ* : *n ▶ JDK*(*P* )*.*

Back to our example, the correctness theorem for GP ensures that any state whose top node is *n*16 will pass the security check, because *Pread ∈ γcall* (*n*16) (see Eq. [2).](#_bookmark8) Thus, the GP analysis statically captures the redundancy of this check, which however is dynamically tested, as intuitively discussed in Section [2.](#_bookmark0) This is an example of how our analysis can be used to optimize stack inspection by removing redundant checks from the code.

Figure [7](#_bookmark9) displays the largest solutions of the DP and GP analyses for the e-commerce example.

The largest solutions of the DP and the GP analyses can be computed by a slight adaptation of a standard worklist algorithm (see [[9]).](#_bookmark20) Our ba- sic operations are the binary set union and intersection. Their computation requires a number of steps linear on *|***Permission***|*, i.e. the size of the per- missions set. Then a (coarse) upper bound on the number of basic opera- tions performed by the a naive implementation of the worklist algorithm is *O*(*|E|*2 *· |***Permission***|*2).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *n* | *δcall* (*n*) | *γcall* (*n*) |
| *n*1 *− n*2 *n*3 *− n*5 *n*6 *− n*7 *n*8  *n*9 *n*10 *n*11 *n*12  *n*13 *− n*14  *n*15 *n*16 *− n*19 | *∅*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *∅*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *∅*  *{Pread , Pwrite }*  *∅* | **Permission**  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *∅*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *∅*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay }*  *{Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite }* |

Fig. 7. The largest solutions for *DP* and *GP* .

# Optimized stack inspection

The correctness results of the previous section shed light on a possible opti- mization of the stack inspection algorithm. When an access control decision has to be made towards a permission *P* , the call stack (with nodes in place of protection domains) is examined top-down as follows. Assume *n* to be the

currently scanned node. If *P ∈ δcall* (*n*), then an AccessControlException is thrown. Otherwise, if *P ∈ γcall* (*n*) the algorithm succeeds. If neither case occurs, the search goes on.

This optimized stack inspection algorithm is specified in Fig. [8](#_bookmark10) and is proved to yield the same results of the standard *JDK*.

[] *▶ JDK*٨(*P* )

[*JDK*٨ ]

∅

*P ∈/ δcall* (*n*) *σ ▶ JDK*٨(*P* )

*σ* : *n ▶ JDK*٨(*P* )

[*JDK*٨]

δ

*P ∈ γcall* (*n*)

*σ* : *n ▶ JDK*٨(*P* )

[*JDK*٨]

γ

Fig. 8. Specification of the optimized access control policy.

## Theorem 4.1 (Correctness of *JDK٨*)

*Let G be a call graph and G ▶ σ. Then, for any permission P:*

*σ ▶ JDK*(*P* ) *⇐⇒ σ ▶ JDK٨*(*P* )

# Concluding Remarks

In this paper we developed two Control Flow Analyses for the Java byte- code. The first analysis yields a safe approximation of the set of permissions granted to bytecode at run-time, and the second one approximates the denied permissions. The analyses provide us with the basis for reducing the run- time overhead due to stack inspection. Here, we focussed on Java bytecode, however the same static techniques can be applied to deal with programming languages or systems whose security architecture provides dynamic checking of permissions through stack inspection (e.g. C*]* [[19]).](#_bookmark25)

Many authors advocated the use of static techniques to optimize the check of security properties. Walker [[16]](#_bookmark22) develops a notion of typed compilation schemata: types encode assertions about program security ensuring that no run-time violation of the security properties will occur. Another approach is proposed by Jensen, Le M`etayer and Thorn [[8].](#_bookmark18) They formalize classes of security properties (including stack inspection) through a linear time temporal logic. Then, model checking is used to prove that local security checks enforce a given global security policy.

The problem of optimizing stack inspection is addressed by Wallach and Felten in [[17,18]](#_bookmark24) by exploiting a belief logic [[1]](#_bookmark12) and a technique called *security- passing style*. Pottier, Skalka and Smith [[11]](#_bookmark20) introduce a type system to model

a simplified version of Java stack inspection. These two approaches implicitly characterize the checks thar are redundant, while our control flow analyses do it directly.

The extension of our proposal to the full access control policy requires the call graph construction algorithm to single out the program points where new threads can be generated. This step seems to be the hard part of the job. Indeed, we feel then that our analyses only require slight modifications.

Our program model does not handle *dynamic linking* features of Java. Actually, the whole program is available prior the construction of its call graph. The extension of our approach to cope with dynamic linking requires substantial efforts. The first step consists in linking dynamically the relevant call graphs. Then the available solutions for the various program fragments have to be combined. Some preliminary work on data flow analysis taking care of dynamic linking can be found in [[13,15].](#_bookmark21)

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