[Applied Computing and Informatics 15 (2019) 59–66](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aci.2017.10.003)



Contents lists available at [ScienceDirect](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22108327)

Applied Computing and Informatics

journal homepage: [www.sciencedirect.com](http://www.sciencedirect.com/)

Original Article

HTTP flood attack detection in application layer using machine learning metrics and bio inspired bat algorithm



Indraneel Sreeram [⇑](#_bookmark0), Venkata Praveen Kumar Vuppala

*Department of CSE, St. Ann’s College of Engineering & Technology, Chirala, India*

# a r t i c l e i n f o

*Article history:*

Received 13 May 2017

Revised 9 October 2017

Accepted 14 October 2017

Available online 18 October 2017

*Keywords:*

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks Application Layer DDoS (APP-DDoS) Bio inspired approaches

# a b s t r a c t

The internet network is mostly victimized to the Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack, which is one that intentionally occupies the computing resources and bandwidth in order to deny that services to potential users. The attack scenario is to flood the packets immensely. If the attack source is single, then the attack is referred as denial of service (DOS) and if attack is sourced from divergent servers, then it is referred as DDOS. Over a decade many of the researchers considered the detection and prevention of DDOS attack as research objective and succeeded to deliver few significant DDOS detection and preven- tion strategies. How fast and early detection of DDOS attack is done in streaming network transactions is still a significant research objective in present level of internet usage. Unfortunately the current bench- marking DDOS attack detection strategies are failing to justify the objective called ‘‘fast and early detec- tion of DDOS attack”. In order to this, in this paper we devised a Bio-Inspired Anomaly based application layer DDoS attack (App-DDOS Attack) detection that is in the aim of achieving fast and early detection. The proposed model is a bio-inspired bat algorithm that used to achieve the fast and early detection of the App-DDOS by HTTP flood. The experiments were carried out on bench marking CAIDA dataset and the results delivered are boosting the significance of the proposed model to achieve the objective of the paper.

© 2017 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is an

open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>).

1. Introduction

Global network of computers interconnected through different media using a standard protocol is called internet. Modern human beings rely on the Internet for their education, trade, socialization and entertainment, among many other important aspects of human life. Information sharing, E-commerce and entertainment have taken a new dimension. Evidently, the Internet is the biggest revolution in the computing and communications world. Web threats pose a broad range of risks, including financial damages, identity theft, loss of confidential information or data, theft of net- work resources, damaged brand/personal reputation, and erosion of consumer confidence in e-commerce and online banking.

\* Corresponding author.

*E-mail addresses:* [indraneels123@gmail.com](mailto:indraneels123@gmail.com), [sreeram.indraneel@gmail.com](mailto:sreeram.indraneel@gmail.com) (I. Sreeram).

Peer review under responsibility of King Saud University.

**Production and hosting by Elsevier**

DoS attack is an intentional attempt by malicious users to com- pletely disrupt or degrade the availability of services/resources to legitimate users. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a form of DoS attack which slowdowns the server in responding to the client/refuses the client request. Now-a-days, the impact of DDoS attacks on internet security is growing excessively. In general, this type of attack is launched explicitly from a collection of compromised systems known as botnet by an attacker. The main goal of such attack is to exhaust server resources such as CPU, I/O bandwidth, sockets and memory etc. As the result, the resources available to other normal users/clients get limited or sometimes may not be available. The recent familiar victims of DDOS attack are explored in [[1,2]](#_bookmark12) and strategies for successful attack mitigating are explored in [[3]](#_bookmark12).

The DDoS attacks are classified based on [[4,5]](#_bookmark12) into different fac- tors. On the basis of network protocol stack, DDoS can be further classified as Network/transport level and Application level DDOS attacks.

Network*/transport level DDoS attack:* These attacks are launched at half opened connections by using TCP, UDP, ICMP and DNS protocols. *Application level DDoS attack:* These attacks typically consume less bandwidth and are stealthier in nature in comparison

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aci.2017.10.003>

2210-8327/© 2017 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>).

to volumetric attacks. However, they will have an identical impact to service as they aim specific characteristics of well-known appli- cations like HTTP, DNS, VoIP or simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). These attacks are specialize in disrupting legitimate users services by exhausting the resources. An Application layer DDoS attack overloads an application server by creating excessive login, information search or search requests. Application DDoS attacks are tougher to detect than other forms of DDoS attacks. As the con- nections are already established, the requests could seem to be from legitimate users. However, once identified, these attacks will be stopped and back-traced to source more simply than the other varieties of DDoS attacks.

Application Layer DDoS attack is a DDoS attack that sends out requests following the communication protocol, thus these requests are indistinguishable from legitimate requests in the net- work layer .Consequently, traditional defense systems become less or even not applicable for application layer DDoS attacks which make use of the asymmetric computation between client and ser- ver, as they are proper-looking requests from the protocol and traffic.

Flooding attacks: Flooding attacks are launched in following ways [[5,6,41,42]](#_bookmark12):

*In ReflectFon/AmplFficatFon based floodFng attacks*, the attacker initiates small DNS queries with forged source IP addresses which provoke a large extent of network traffic. And the DNS response messages are significantly larger than DNS query messages. As the result, this large extent of network traffic is directed towards the targeted system to incapacitate it.

*HTTP based floodFng attacks aTe classFfied Fnto fo5T tPpes:* In Session flooding attack, the Session connection request rates initi- ated from the attackers are higher the requests generated from legitimate users. Thus the server resources are exhausted and lead to flooding.

*In Request flooding attack,* the attacker send sessions that con- tains more number of requests than the normal users, which leads to flooding.

*In Asymmetric attack,* the attacker sends sessions that contains larger amount of high workload requests. The ultimate aim of the attacker is to devour resources like CPU, memory of the server and degrade it.

*In Slow request/response attack,* the attacker sends HTTP request in pieces slowly (one at a time) and the request is not complete ini- tially. As the result, the server keeps the indulged resources in waiting stage until it receives the entire data. This attack is catego- rized into slowloris attack, HTTP fragmentation attack, slow post attack and slow reading attack.

The major focus of an HTTP flood DDoS attack is toward gener- ating attack traffic that closely simulates legitimacy of a human user. Thereby it becomes harder for a victim to differentiate between legitimate and attack traffic. Because of this type of attacks, the server becomes unavailable to legitimate users. The main impact of application layer DDoS attacks are :unusually slow network performance (opening files or accessing web sites), unavailability of a particular web site, inability to access any web site, dramatic increase in the number of spam emails received.

1. Related work

The recent escalation of application layer DoS attacks have attracted a significant interest of a research community. Since application layer attacks usually do not manifest themselves at the network level, they avoid traditional network based detection mechanisms. As such, security community focused on specialized application-layer DoS attacks detection mechanisms. These research efforts can be broadly divided into several groups:

application-based, puzzle-based approaches and network traffic characteristics based.

*Application-based techniques* are generally geared toward legiti- mate and thus expected characteristics of an application behavior. These approaches include detection of deviations from normal behavior of users browsing web pages [[7–10]](#_bookmark12), monitoring charac- teristics of HTTP sessions [[11,12]](#_bookmark13), monitoring a number of clients requests [[13]](#_bookmark17), and analyzing popularity of certain websites [[14]](#_bookmark18). In many of these approaches, rate-limiting serves as a primary defense mechanism.

*Puzzle-based methods* are similar to these approaches. However, instead of monitoring characteristics of particular applications, puzzle-based methods, as the name suggests, offer a puzzle to solve and detect potential DoS attack by the ability of the client at the IP addresses to solve it or by their reaction to the offered puzzle. One of these techniques is the detection of attacks using CAPTCHA puzzle [[14]](#_bookmark18). Although this technique may offer a simple approach to attack detection and mitigation, a number of studies showed its ineffectiveness [[15,16]](#_bookmark20).

Monitoring characteristics of *network traffic for application-laye*r DoS detection is defined and has been employed for differentiation of flash crowd and true DoS attacks as per the suggestions made in [[17]](#_bookmark24). The approach has also found its application in several studies in a form of IP address monitoring [[18,19]](#_bookmark26). Most of these studies deal with general type application-layer denial-of-service attacks. With the introduction of low-rate application-layer DoS attack, a number of research efforts were focused on various detection and mitigation techniques [[20,21,30,23]](#_bookmark27). Most of these techniques focus specifically on characteristics of incoming network traffic aiming to reveal/prevent patterns specific to low-rate DoS attacks. As such Tang [[20]](#_bookmark27) developed a CUSUM-based approach that mon- itors packet arrival rate. Macia-Fernandez et al. proposed to modify the implementation of application servers in terms of their pro- cessing of incoming requests [[21]](#_bookmark29).

Fadir Salmen et al. [[22]](#_bookmark14) created digital signature of network phase for flow analysis by using two meta-heuristic approaches. To investigate the behavior of planned approaches they injected abnormal traffic and showed improved accuracy in detection DDoS attacks however the primary model is incapable for detection the DoS attacks.

In [[23,24]](#_bookmark14) the authors proposed a model where the conversa- tions between server and its client and The practical cyber sur- roundings that generated realistic traffic patterns of end users are used to check the proposed approach.

Vijayalakshmi et al. [[25]](#_bookmark14) proposed IP Traceback defense mecha- nism used to detect both network layer and application layer attacks. The hybrid IP traceback function comprised of Packet marking (IP address is fragmented and marked), Reconstruction procedure (two phases: address identification and address recov- ery) and Attacker’s source identification using entropy (Entropy variation is calculated). In mitigation component, when attack is detected an alert file generated.

Yu et al. [[26]](#_bookmark14) proposed TMH (Trust Management Helmet) which is light weight mechanism uses trust management to differentiate normal (legitimate) user and attackers. The DDoS resilient sched- uler determines which session is granted to forward requests and when, relying on the scheduling policy and scheduler service rate. Wen et al. [[27]](#_bookmark14) proposed CALD is a defense mechanism to protect web servers against application layer DDoS attacks that pretend as flash crowds. The anomalous source IP (identified based on thresh- old of entropy) is sent to filter so that it can defend the attack.

Liu et al. [[28]](#_bookmark14) proposed DAT (Defending Systems Against Tilt DDoS Attacks) is built with two coordinated defenders namely In/egress filter (IF) and Behavior Analyzer (BA). The counter- attack mechanism offers different services to each user depending on their degree of deviation. Yu et al. [[29]](#_bookmark14) proposed DOW (Defense

and Offense Wall) defense mechanism is integration of detection technology and currency technology . The encouragement model encourages the session expelled by anomaly detection method if it is legitimate. That is encourages the users to resend the session connection requests.

Yang et al. [[30]](#_bookmark14) proposed a generalized entropy metrics and information distance metrics to detect low rate application layer ddos attack. This is a router based solution and requires control of all routers in the network. Ying et al. [[31]](#_bookmark14) proposed a Group- Testing based approach. Prasad et al. [[32]](#_bookmark15) defined machine learning strategy called Anomaly based Real Time Prevention (ARTP) of under rated App-DDoS attacks. The complexity of the process reduced and attained maximum detection accuracy compared to other existing machine learning approaches. The results are good but still it can be improved further.

Senthilnath et al. [[33,34]](#_bookmark16) explored the use of firefly algorithm for clustering. Local Minima is obtained by using the k-means clus- tering and this drawback was overcome by the firefly algorithm. The authors used k-means and firefly algorithm for clustering pur- pose which increases the time complexity and this is not applica- ble for detecting application layer DDoS attacks in real time analysis.

In [[35,36]](#_bookmark19), the model of Intelligent IDS proposed that based on ontology. The proposed system thwarts ontology based on encod- ing scheme, port number, system component, policies, and attack type and the model is vulnerable to DDOS attacks. In [[37]](#_bookmark21) deploy- ment of wireless sensor networks and mobile ad-hoc networks in applications poses the threat of various cyber hazards, intrusions and attacks as a consequence of these networks’ openness.

In [[43]](#_bookmark28) the authors investigated the effect of signaling attacks and storms in mobile networks, focusing on signaling anomalies that exploit the radio resource control (RRC) protocol in UMTS net- works. As mobile devices and apps increasingly access the Cloud in order to offload computationally intensive or energy-costly activities, signaling storms can create heavy overloads that can sig- nificantly impair system performance and offer very poor quality of service to users. In [[44]](#_bookmark30) authors defined the detection and miti- gation technique for storms that uses a software counter for each mobile user, within mobile devices or in signaling system.

From the review of many of the recently proposed models, it is imperative that there are many constraints in the existing models that are to be addressed for improving the effective solution for countering DDoS attacks, categorically the HTTP flood attacks and more specifically majority of them are assessing on the session based. However, in real-time scenario, a user can adapt different sessions for performing set of requests to ensure order of sequence or parallel. Considering such limitations, in this paper the proposed solution is about a bio-inspired strategy for preventing HTTP flood based DDoS attacks. The objective of the proposed model is to

assess the HTTP transaction is flood or not, which carried out using

differentiate, hence such signatures minimizes the process complexity.

1. HTTP flood attack detection using machine learning metrics and bio inspired bat algorithm
   1. *The exploration of the metrics considered to train and test the model*

The need of metrics should explore in contrast to packet pat- terns. The detailed exploration of the constraints observed in exist- ing contemporary models, which are stated in related work (see Section [2](#_bookmark1)), it is obvious to state that, in distributed environment, diversified packet flow is easy to achieve through minimal time frames and session time. The arrival rate based on human users, including a proxy server seems to constitute the non-pattern (ran- dom) cases. Hence, to challenge this constraint, this manuscript devised a novel set of metrics, which are derived from absolute time interval rather than the session time and packet patterns.

* + 1. *Discovering time frame length*

Let *CS* be the cached user sessions *CS* = {*s*1; *s*2; ... ; *s*|*C*|} and each session is set of transactions given for Training, such that each request is said to be transaction {*t*E*t* ∈ *si* Λ *si* ∈ *CS*} labeled as *N* (normal) or *D* (DDOS attack). The cached transactions *CS* is segre-

gated into *CSN* and*CSD*, those contains requests labeled as *N* (nor- mal) and labeled as *D* (DDOS attack) respectively.

For each dataset *CS* (which is the aggregation of *CSN* and *CSD*), order the sessions in ascending order of their initiated time.

Let

*SB* = {*sb*(*s*1E*s*1 ∈ *SC*); *sb*(*s*2E*s*2 ∈ *SC*); .. . ; *sb*(*s*|*SC*|E*s*|*SC*| ∈ *SC*)}

as the set that represents the session begin time of all sessions belongs to*SC*.

Let

*SE* = {*se*(*s*1E*s*1 ∈ *SC*); *se*(*s*2E*s*2 ∈ *SC*); .. . ; *se*(*s*|*SC*|E*s*|*SC*| ∈ *SC*)}

as the set that represents the session end time of all sessions belongs to*SC*.

Let

*SL* = {*sl*(*s*1E*s*1 ∈ *SC*); *sl*(*s*2E*s*2 ∈ *SC*); .. . ; *sl*(*s*|*SC*|E*s*|*SC*| ∈ *SC*)}

as the set that represents the session life time of all sessions belongs to*SC*.

Session life time of a session {*si*E*si* ∈ *CS*} is calculated as follows:

*sl*(*si*E*si* ∈ *CS*) = *se*(*si*E*si* ∈ *CS*)— *sb*(*si*E*si* ∈ *CS*)

Find session begin time absolute deviation (Leys, 2013) of *SB*

## qPﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ|*S*ﬃﬃ*B*ﬃﬃ|ﬃ(ﬃﬃ⟨ﬃﬃ*S*ﬃﬃ*B*ﬃﬃﬃ⟩ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*b*ﬃﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃEﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃﬃ∈ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*S*ﬃﬃ*B*ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2ﬃﬃ

multiple metrics extracted based on absolute time interval rather session. To intensify the search towards the defined metrics, the

*sbtAD* =

*i*=1

))

|*SB*|

bio-inspired strategy of Bat algorithm is adopted.

The proposed solution assesses the similarities of HTTP transactions with fair and flood data chosen for training. The proposed model extracts the features from request stream

observed during an absolute time interval rather than based on

Here in the above equation, |*SB*| is the size of *SB* and ⟨*SB*⟩ is the aver- age of *SB*.

Find session end time absolute deviation of *SE*

## qPﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ|*S*ﬃﬃ*E*ﬃﬃ*N*ﬃﬃ|ﬃ(ﬃﬃ⟨ﬃ*S*ﬃﬃﬃ*E*ﬃﬃ⟩ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*e*ﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃEﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃﬃ∈ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃﬃ∈ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*S*ﬃﬃ*E*ﬃﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃ2ﬃ

user sessions and packet patterns. Unique set of features pro- posed (see Section [3.1](#_bookmark2)). The fast and scalable evolutionary search

*setAD* =

*i*=1

|*SE*|

technique called Bat algorithm used to perform search to assess the compatibility during test phase. The cosine metric is used to identify the signatures of given transactions is used in training phase. The cosine similarities identify attribute set that imposes a discernibility relation. The signatures set that imposes the dis- cernibility is critical since, the signatures having similar context in both records of normal and flood formats are obsolete to

Here in the above equation, |*SE*| is the size of *SE* and ⟨*SE*⟩ is the aver- age of *SE*.

Then the absolute time frame *atf* can be measured as follows

*atf* = (⟨*SE*⟩+ *seAD*)— (⟨*SB*⟩+ *sbAD*)

*Cl5steT the sessFons bP rmsd*(*SBN*) *and rmsd*(*SEN*) *dFstance*

Finding K (count of centroids) value as follows:

Let K be the set of centroids and move session with least session begin time to the K.

For each session {*si*E*si* ∈ *SBN* Λ *i* = 2; 3; ... ; |*SBN*|} Begin

*flag* = *true*

For each session {*sj*E*sj* ∈ *K*} Begin

1. *ctr* = *ctr* + 1
2. *tsi* = *tsi* + (*e*(*si*)— *b*(*si*))
3. End (of step g)
4. End (of step f)
5. *asi*(*tidx*) = *tsi*// absolute session interval *asi*(*tidx*) of absolute time interval *tidx* represented by counter *idx*

*ctr*

If q(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*b*ﬃﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃ)ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*b*ﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*j*ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2ﬃﬃ <

))

then Begin *flag* = *false* End

End

if (*flag*) then Begin

*K* ← *si*

End

End

*sbtAD*||q(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*e*ﬃﬃﬃ(ﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*i*ﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*e*ﬃﬃﬃ(ﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*j*ﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃ)ﬃ2ﬃﬃ < *setAD*

1. End (of step b)
2. *bT* ← *bT* + *ati*
3. If (*bT* + *ati*) < *eT*) Continue the process from step b
   * 1. *Maximum number of Sessions (ms)*

All transactions are formed into sessions that can be either ran- dom or variable timings. Their exists different number of sessions for each time interval. Count of number of sessions observed in one time interval gives maximum number of sessions of that time interval which helps in observing the user sessions to detect appli- cation layer DDoS attacks.

Then apply K-Means to find number clusters with sessions in approximately similar time frames.

Let *C* = {*c*1; *c*2; ... ; *cK* } be the set of clusters of size *K*.

Then for each cluster {*ci*E*ci* ∈ *C* Λ *i* = 1; 2; 3; ... ; *K*}, find the time frame as the elapsed time between least session begin time and

max session end time as follows:

For each {*ci*E*ci* ∈ *C* Λ *i* = 1; 2; 3; ... ; *K*} Begin

Let *SBN*(*ci*) = {*sb*1; *sb*2; ... ; *sb*|*ci* |} be the ascending ordered set of

session begin times of the sessions belongs to cluster *ci*.

Let *SEN*(*ci*) = {*se*1; *se*2; ... ; *se*|*ci* |} be the descending ordered set of session end times of the sessions belongs to cluster *ci*.

Then the time frame *tf* (*ci*) of the cluster *ci* is measured as follows:

*tf* (*ci* ) = q(ﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*e*ﬃﬃﬃ1ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*s*ﬃﬃ*b*ﬃﬃ1ﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃ2ﬃﬃ

Then find the average of time frames length observed from all the clusters as follows

* + 1. *Page access count (pac)*

User will access multiple pages in different sessions of time interval. How many pages are accessed in one time interval helps in observing whether the environment in network is malicious or normal. Page access count of absolute time interval is the number of web pages accessed in that time interval.

* + 1. *Minimum time interval between two pages (mti)*

This feature is calculated for two page requests which are in sequence of absolute time interval. How frequently the web pages are accessed by the user and the least amount of time gap that is required between two pages is measured that will help in observ- ing the user behavior. Average of unique time gaps between two page requests which are in sequence of absolute time interval gives its minimum time interval. Let the unique time gap set of interval

be tg = {tg1; tg2; .. .}

P i

## |tg| tg Minimum Time Interval(mti) = i=1

|tg|

P*K tf* (*ci*)

⟨*tf* (*C*)⟩ = *i*=1

### *K*

Further find Time Frame Absolute Deviation *tfAD* observed from all the clusters as follows

## qPﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*K*ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ⟨ﬃﬃ*t*ﬃ*f*ﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*C*ﬃﬃﬃ)ﬃﬃ⟩ﬃﬃﬃ—ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ*t*ﬃﬃ*f*ﬃﬃ(ﬃﬃ*c*ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2ﬃﬃ

* + 1. *Packets observed per each type of packet (PC)*

Request can be sent through any of the packets like HTTP, FTP, SMTP etc., . Each time interval contains different type of packets for which count of each packet is measured. The deviation in count of

### *tfAD* =

*i*=1

### *K*

*i*))

packets from one time interval to another time interval signifies the attack packet presence in the traffic. p = {p1; p2; p3; .. .} be

Then fix the time frame *tf* as the sum of average of time frames length and Time Frame Absolute Deviation as follows.

*tf* = ⟨*tf* (*C*)⟩ + *tfAD*

* + 1. *Session time observed for each absolute time interval*

For a given normal or flood transactions set, the total observa- tion time *T* will be partitioned into sub intervals of size *ati* and measures average session time observed as follows:

Let *bT*, *eT* are the respective begin time and end time of the transaction set observation time *T*

* + - 1. *idx* = 0 // absolute time intervals counter set to 0 initially
      2. If (*bT* + *ati*) 6 *eT* begin
      3. *idx* = *idx* + 1

the packets observed in that interval and pc = {p1c;p2c;p3c; .. .}

be the number of packets observed for each type of packet.

* 1. *The dataset preparation*

For given Flood and normal transaction sets CSN and CSD the record sets absolute time interval (ati) is formed as follows:

Each absolute time interval is considered as one record that contains the values of attributes in order of session time observed (see Section [3.1.2](#_bookmark6)), Max number of sessions (Section [3.1.3](#_bookmark3)), page access count (Section [3.1.4](#_bookmark3)), Minimum Time interval (Section [3.1.5](#_bookmark4)) and packet observed for each type (sec Section [3.1.6](#_bookmark5)). These attri- butes will be referred as a set *al* in further draft of the article. The number of attributes in each record will be 5 which is the size

of *al* that can be referred as |*al*|.

1. *tsi* = 0 // the sum of all possible session intervals is set to 0

initially

1. *ctr* = 0 // a counter flag initialized with 0
2. For each session {*si*E*si* ∈ *S* Λ *i* = 1; 2; .. . ; |*S*|} begin
3. If (*tB* 6 *b*(*si*) 6 (*tB* + *ati*))&&(*tB* 6 *e*(*si*) 6 (*tB* + *ati*)) Begin

Absolute time interval id

Session time observed

Max number of sessions

Page access count

Minimum Time interval

Packet observed for each type

* 1. *Bat approach*

Many bio-inspired algorithms exist; bat algorithm belongs to this class which is based on swarm intelligence. The bat algorithm uses the echo based location determining behavior of bats to solve both single objective and multi-objective optimization problems. In proposed approach bat algorithm is used for classification (clas- sify the attack traffic and normal traffic).

* + 1. *Nature of bats*

Bats can find their prey and discriminate different types of insects even in complete darkness. The BAT algorithm is a popula- tion based evolutionary algorithm where each bat represents a solution. It is designed according to the echolocation behavior of the virtual bats. This property enables them to detect the position of their prey. Frequency modulated signals are used for echoloca- tion. Bats listen to the sound pulse emitted by them when it bounces back from the prey or the surrounding objects. As the bat approaches near its prey, it reduces the loudness of their echo and increases the rate of the sound pulse.

The three generalized rules for bat algorithms:

1. All bats use echolocation to sense distance, and they also guess the difference between food/prey and back-ground barriers in some magical way.
2. Bats fly randomly with velocity vi at position xi with a fixed frequency fmin, varying wavelength and loudness A0 to search for prey. They can automatically adjust the wave- length (or frequency) of their emitted pulses and adjust the rate of pulse emission r depending on the proximity of their target.
3. Although the loudness can vary in many ways, it is assumed that the loudness varies from a large (positive) A0 to a min- imum constant value Amin.
   * 1. *Classification using bat algorithm*

An initial population of bats is generated. After initialization modify the parameters needed for fitness, and subsequently the fit- ness is evaluated for each bat in population.

Step1: for *i* = 1:Number Of Iteration delwt = wt

Step2: for *j* = 1: *n*

read *Dj*

Step3:compute each *batj* frequency as *f*j *fj* = *c*1 ⁄ Mean(*Dj*)

Step4: compute class (object) distance from *batj* as *S object j*

Sobject j = fj ⁄ Dj ⁄ delwt Step5: compute for each class

*Ej* = S*object j* – 1, update *wt* = *wt*-2⁄l⁄*Ej*

Step6: compute the new position *Pj* and change pulse rate controller *c*1 of *Bat*j

if *E*j < *E*j-1

Pj = Pj + Ej

*c*1 = *fj* + *c*2 ⁄ *Pj* ⁄ *Ej*

end Step7: end

Step8: calculate the error and update *wt*

err(*i*) = Mean(*E*), *wt* = *wt*- *delwt*

Step9:end

Step10: Plot the error as sigmoid (*err*) Step11:Use the above *wt* and *f* with testing data Step12: Print confusion matrix from S*object j* Step13: Compute percentage of accuracy

*PTocess foT geneTatFng the classFfieTs Fs as follows*

Step 1 and 2: Initialize the bat population has to be produced. One record is treated as one bat for which it has any number of features. Define the random number between m, T. Where m is the number of features, and T is the number of classes.

Step 3: Calculate the frequency *fi* of each bat

*fj* = *c*1 ⁄ Mean(*Dj*) Where, c1 is the pulse rate controller initially taken as 0.6, it can change for every iteration.

Step 4: calculate the class (object) distance from each bat. Step 5: calculate the Ej of each class and update the random number wt.

Update *wt* = *wt*-2⁄l⁄*Ej*

where, l is the constant number 0.2.

Step 6: now, consider the class of one bat and compare with the previous class of the bat, if it is less than the other, then calcu- late the new position Pj and pulse rate controller C1 of that bat. Now the process has to be repeated with remaining bats.

Step 7: Above process has to be done for remaining all bats. Step 8: calculate the error and update the random number. Step 9: Do the next iteration by using the above process until it reaches the maximum number of iterations.

Prepared dataset of both normal and attack is given as input for the Bat algorithm individually. For normal dataset, each record is considered as one bat and compare with the remaining bats to know how much distance it has to move towards the remaining bats. This has to be done for all the remaining bats. Updated records are carried over to next iteration or generation. Maximum number of iterations has to be performed for getting the accurate classifiers. Once all the iterations are completed, the normal classi- fier is extracted and marked as normal signature. The same process is carried for attack training records to get the attack signature.

* 1. *Application layer DDoS attack detection*

Testing dataset has to be preprocessed by using the dataset pre- processing process. Prepare the dataset with five attributes as like in the dataset preparation. Calculate the total weight (light inten- sity) of the testing records individually. Calculate the cosine simi- larity of testing record with both normal and attack signatures and declare whether the testing record is attack or normal by using the rules defined in Section [4.2](#_bookmark10).

1. Experimental results
   1. *CAIDA dataset*

The proposed technique is tested against CAIDA [[38]](#_bookmark22) (Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis) dataset 2007. Core Objectives of this dataset are collection and sharing of data for research or scien- tific analysis of internet traffic, topology, routing, performance and security related events. Dataset contains the parameters like server IP address, Timestamp, Time Zone, Object ID/URL of the web page, Response code/status, Number of bytes sent.

Table 1

data set details.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Number of transactions considered for both training and testing | 213,066 |
| Number of Normal transactions | 94,164 |
| Number of Attack transactions | 118,902 |
| Number of transactions for training | 127,839 |
| Number of transactions for testing | 85,227 |

Table 2

Rules defined for attack detection.

Rule1 Weight of the testing time interval is less than the normal classifier weight and greater than the attack weight

*A*(*w*) < *T*(*w*) 6 *N*(*w*) Normal

Rule2 2.1 similarity of testing record with the normal classifier is more than 98 percent *similarity*(*test*; *normal*) P 98% Normal

2.2 similarity of testing record with the attack classifier is more than 98 percent *similarity*(*test*; *attack*) P 98% Attack

Rule3 Similarity of testing record with normal classifier is more than the similarity of testing record with attack classifier

*similarity*(*test*; *normal*) >*similarity*(*test*; *attack*) Normal

Rule4 All the above conditions are failed Suspicious

Table 3

Performance parameter calculations.

Total Number of records consider for training and testing 213,066

Total Number of intervals consider for training and testing 401

Number of intervals used for training (Normal + Attack) 243 (108 + 135)

Number of intervals used for testing (Normal + Attack) 158 (69 + 89)

True Positive (tp) The number of transactions identified as intruded, which are actually intruded 91

False Positive (fp) The number of transactions identified as normal, which are actually intruded 3

True Negative (tn) The number of transactions identified as normal, which are actually normal 69

False Negative (fn) The number of transactions identified as intruded, which are actually normal. 5

Precision *tp*

*tp*+*fp*

Recall/sensitivity *tp*

*tp*+*fn*

Specificity *tn*

*tn fp*

+

2 \*

0.945

0.94

0.936

Accuracy

*tn*+*tp tp*+*tn*+*fp*+*fn*

0.948

F-Measure *recall*\**precision* 0.9457

*recall*+*precision*

Table 4

Comparison of Bat algorithm with ARTP and FCAAIS.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Bat algorithm | ARTP | FCAAIS |
| Precision | 0.945 | 0.895 | 0.869 |
| Recall | 0.94 | 0.985 | 0.942 |
| Specificity | 0.936 | 0.914 | 0.894 |
| Accuracy | 0.948 | 0.944 | 0.917 |
| F-measure | 0.9457 | 0.938 | 0.855 |

* 1. *Training & testing records*

The total number of transactions considered for experiments were 213,066 which includes N (normal-94164) and D (DDoS attack-118902). The total transactions are partitioned for training and testing into 60%(127,839) and 40%(85,227) respectively. Each metric is calculated on the dataset CS which includes N (normal) as CSN and D (DDoS attack) as CSD and its detection accuracy is

assessed. Number of intervals are 401. The number of intervals in normal dataset DSN is 178 in which 60% of transactions i.e., 108 are considered for the training process and 40% of transactions i.e., 69 for the testing process. The total number of intervals in attack dataset DSD is 224 in which 60% of transactions i.e., 135 are considered for the training process and 40% of transactions i.e., 89 for the testing process. The details are given in [Table 1](#_bookmark7).

Training dataset of CSN is formed into sessions that are of either random or same timings. Then K-Means algorithm is applied on the training set of normal to prepare clusters. Clusters have to be grouped to find the time interval value as explained in machine learning metrics. Now divide the sessions with respective of absolute time interval value. Each time interval is considered as one record that contains the value of attributes defined in metrics. Now the records are given to bat algorithm to generate single nor- mal signature. The same process is repeated for attack training dataset to generate attack signature. Testing dataset is mixture of both normal and attack traffic. Calculate all the attributes for each




Fig. 1. Comparison of Bat algorithm with ARTP and FCAAIS.




Fig. 2. Comparison of Detection rate observed in Bat algorithm with ARTP and FCAAIS.




Fig. 3. Comparison of Processing time observed in Bat algorithm with ARTP and FCAAIS.

interval. Testing time interval Cosine similarity is calculated with both attack and normal signatures and at last classifies the testing time interval according to proposed rules in [Table 2](#_bookmark8).

* 1. *Performance evaluation*

The performance of proposed approach is evaluated based on the following parameters [[22]](#_bookmark14). The calculations are shown in [Table 3](#_bookmark8).

* *PTecFsFon* shows the class agreement of the data labels with the positive labels given by the classifier.
* *Recall* shows the effectiveness of a classifier to identify the pos- itive labels.
* *SpecFficFtP* shows how effectively a classifier identifies the neg- ative labels.
* *Acc5TacP* shows the overall effectiveness of a classifier.
* */-meas5Te* shows the relation between data’s positive labels and those given by a classifier.

Munivara Prasad proposed ARTP [[31]](#_bookmark14) for Detecting Application layer DDoS attacks by using the Machine learning approach. Jyoth- sna and Prasad proposed FAIS [[39]](#_bookmark23) and FCAAIS [[40]](#_bookmark25) for detecting DDoS attacks. The experiments in above papers are conducted on the same dataset and results are indicating that these models are

also scalable and robust towards forecasting the DDoS attacks scope of a network transaction (observed detection accuracy is approx. 91%), but the major obstacle observed these models are that compared to the proposed model is process complexity, which influence the statistical metrics defined for measuring the perfor- mance. As per these results, the accuracy of our proposed model was improved when compared to FCAAIS, ARTP and also attained maximum prediction accuracy which is shown in [Table 4](#_bookmark9) and the performance comparisons are given in [Figs. 1–3](#_bookmark11).

1. Conclusion

Bio-Inspired Anomaly based HTTP-Flood Attack Detection (BIFAD) devised in this article. In this, we adopted the Bat algo- rithm, which is a bio-inspired approach with magnified speed in search. First we defined feature metrics to identify the request stream behavior is of attack or normal. Unlike traditional approaches, the assessment of feature metrics done on the stream of requests observed in an absolute time interval rather in a ses- sion. The Second contribution is to customize the Bat algorithm to train and test. The devised Bat algorithm amplified the detection accuracy with minimal process complexity. The experiments were conducted using CAIDA dataset . Hence the model devised here in this paper is significantly accurate and retains the maximal predic- tion accuracy.

References

1. J. Udhayan, R. Anitha, Demystifying and rate limiting ICMP hosted DoS/DDOS flooding attacks with attack productivity analysis, in: IEEE International Conference on Advance Computing, 2009, pp:558–564.
2. Xia Chun-Tao, D. Xue-Hui, C. Li-Feng, An algorithm of detecting and defending CC attack in real time, in: International Conference on Industrial Control and Electronics Engineering, 2012, pp. 1804–1806.
3. S.M. Lee, Distributed denial of service: taxonomies of attacks, tools, and countermeasures, in: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security in Parallel and Distributed Systems, San Francisco, 2004, pp. 543–550.
4. [Raj kumar, Manisha Jitendra Nene, A survey on latest DoS attacks:](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0020) [classification and defense mechanisms, Proc. Int. J. Innov. Res. Comput.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0020) [Commun. Eng. 1 (8) (2013)](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0020).
5. Erol Gelenbe, Michael Gellman, George Loukas, An autonomic approach to denial of service defence, in: Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks, 2005. WoWMoM 2005, June 2005,

pp. 537–541.

1. [Yadong Wang, Lianzhong Liu, et al., A survey of defense mechanisms against](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0030) [application layer distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, IEEE Commun.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0030) [Surv. Tut. (2015)](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0030).
2. Y. Xie, S. Zheng Yu. A novel model for detecting application layer DDoS attacks, in: First International Multi-Symposiums on Computer and Computational Sciences, 2006. IMSCCS ’06, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 56–63.
3. J. Yu, Z. Li, H. Chen, X. Chen. A detection and offense mechanism to defend against application layer DDoS attacks, in: Third International Conference on Networking and Services, 2007. ICNS, 2007, pp. 54–54.
4. C. Ye, K. Zheng, Detection of application layer distributed denial of service, in: 2011 International Conference on Computer Science and Network Technology (ICCSNT), vol. 1, 2011, pp. 310–314.
5. S. Ranjan, et al., DDoS-resilient scheduling to counter application layer attacks under imperfect detection, in: Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2006, pp. 23–29.
6. [S. Ranjan, R. Swaminathan, M. Uysal, A. Nucci, E. Knightly, DDoS-shield: DDoS-](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0055) [resilient scheduling to counter application layer attacks, IEEE/ACM Trans.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0055) [Netw. 17 (1) (2009) 26–39](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0055).
7. [Y. Xuan, I. Shin, M. Thai, T. Znati, Detecting application denial of-service](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0060) [attacks: A group-testing-based approach, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 21](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0060)

[(8) (2010) 1203–1216](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0060).

1. [Y. Xie, S. Zheng Yu, Monitoring the application-layer DDoS attacks for popular](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0065) [websites, IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 17 (1) (2009) 15–25](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0065).
2. [M. Mehra, M. Agarwal, R. Pawar, D. Shah, Mitigating denial of service attack](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0070) [using captcha mechanism, in: Proceedings of the International Conference](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0070) [&#38; Workshop on Emerging Trends in Technology, ICWET ’11,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0070) [ACM, New](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0070) [York, NY, USA, 2011, pp. 284–287](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0070).
3. [J. Jung, B. Krishnamurthy, M. Rabinovich, Flash crowds and denial of service](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0080) [attacks: characterization and implications for cdns and web sites, in:](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0080) [Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on World Wide Web,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0080) [WWW ’02,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0080) [ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2002, pp. 293–304](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0080).
4. [S.Y. Nam, T. Lee, Memory-efficient IP filtering for countering DDoS attacks, in:](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0085) [Proceedings of the 12th Asia-Pacific Network Operations and Management](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0085) [Conference on Management Enabling the Future Internet for Changing](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0085) [Business and New Computing Services, APNOMS’09, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0085) [Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 301–310](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0085).
5. [S. Bhatia, D. Schmidt, G. Mohay, Ensemble-based DDoS detection and](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0090) [mitigation model, in: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0090) [Security of Information and Networks,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0090) [ACM, 2012, pp. 79–86](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0090).
6. [Y. Tang, Countermeasures on application level low-rate denialof-service](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0095) [attack, in: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Information](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0095) [and Communications Security, ICICS’12,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0095) [Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0095) [2012, pp. 70–80](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0095).
7. [G. Maciá-Fernández, R.A. Rodríguez-Gómez, J.E. Díaz-Verdejo, Defense](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0100) [techniques for low-rate dos attacks against application servers, Comput.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0100) [Netw. 54 (15) (2010) 2711–2727](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0100).
8. [G. Maciá-Fernández, J.E. Díaz-Verdejo, P. García-Teodoro, Evaluation of a low-](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0105) [rate dos attack against iterative servers, Comput. Netw. 51 (4) (2007) 1013–](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0105)

[1030](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0105).

1. [G. Macia-Fernandez, J. Diaz-Verdejo, P. Garcia-Teodoro, Mathematical model](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0110) [for low-rate dos attacks against application servers, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0110) [Secur. 4 (3) (2009) 519–529](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0110).
2. Fadir Salmen, Paulo R. Galego Hernandes Jr, et al., Using firefly and genetic meta heuristics for anomaly detection based on network flows”, in: AICT : The Eleventh Advanced International Conference on Telecommunications, 2015.
3. Mikhail Zolotukhin, Timo Hamalainen, et al., Increasing web service availability by detecting application-layer DDoS attacks in encrypted traffic, in: IEEE, 23rd International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT).
4. Georgios Kambouakis, Tassos Moschos, Dimitris Geneiatakis, Stefanos Gritzalis, A fair solution to DNS amplification attacks. Second International Workshop on Digital Forensics and Incident Analysis, 2007, WDFIA 2007.
5. [M. Vijayalakshmi, S. Mercy Shalinie, IP traceback system for network and](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0130) [application layer attacks, 2012 International Conference on Recent Trends In](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0130) [Information Technology (ICRTIT),](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0130) [IEEE, 2012](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0130).
6. [J. Yu, C. Fang, L. Lu, Z. Li, Mitigating application layer distributed denial of](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0135) [service attacks via effective trust management, IET Commun. 4 (16) (2010)](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0135) [1952–1962](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0135).
7. [S. Wen, W. Jia, W. Zhou, W. Zhou, C. Xu, Cald: Surviving various application-](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0145) [layer DDoS attacks that mimic flash crowd, 2010 4th International Conference](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0145) [on Network and System Security (NSS),](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0145) [IEEE, 2010](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0145).
8. [Huey-Ing Liu, Kuo-Chao Chang, Defending systems against tilt DDoS attacks,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0150) [2011 6th International Conference on Telecommunication Systems, Services,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0150) [and Applications (TSSA),](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0150) [IEEE, 2011](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0150).
9. [Jie Yu, Zhoujun Li, Huowang Chen, Xiaoming Chen, A detection and offense](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0155) [mechanism to defend against application layer DDoS attacks, 2007. ICNS. Third](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0155) [International Conference on Networking and Services, IEEE, 2007](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0155).
10. [Yang Xiang, Ke Li, Wanlei Zhou, Low-rate DDoS attacks detection and](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0160) [traceback by using new information metrics, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0160) [6 (2) (June 2011) 426–437](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0160).
11. [Ying Xuan, Incheol Shin, My T. Thai, Taieb Znati, Detecting application denial-](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0165) [of-service attacks: a group-testing-based approach, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0165) [Syst. 21 (8) (2010) 1203–1216](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0165).
12. K. Munivara Prasad, A. Rama Mohan Reddy, K. Venugopal Rao, Anomaly based real time prevention of under rated App-DDoS attacks on web: an experiential metrics based machine learning metrics, Indian J. Sci. Technol. 9 (27) (2016), <https://doi.org/10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i27/87872>.
13. [J. Senthilnath, S.N. Omkar, V. Mani, Clustering using firefly algorithm:](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0175) [performance study, ELSEVIER, Swarm Evol. Comput. 1 (2011) 164–171](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0175).
14. Sufian Hameed, Usman Ali, On the Efficacy of Live DDoS Detection with Hadoop, arXiv preprint arXiv:1506.08953, 2015.
15. [A. Razzaq et al., Foundation of semantic rule engine to protect web application](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0195) [attacks, in: 2011 Tenth International Symposium on Autonomous](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0195) [Decentralized Systems,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0195) [IEEE, 2011, p. 2011](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0195).
16. [Saeed Javan Mardi, Mohammad Shojafar, Shahdad Shariat Madari, et al.,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0200) [PGSW-OS: a novel approach for resource management in a semantic web](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0200) [operating system based on a P2P grid architecture, J. Supercomput. 69 (2)](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0200) [(2014) 955–975](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0200).
17. [Shahaboddin Shamshirband, Nor Badrul Anuar, Miss Laiha Mat Kiah, Ahmed](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0205) [Patel, An appraisal and design of a multi-agent system based cooperative](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0205) [wireless intrusion detection computational intelligence technique, Eng. Appl.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0205) [Artif. Intell. 26 (9) (2013)](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0205).
18. MIT, M. I. . DARPA INTRUSION DETECTION EVALUATION. Retrieved from

Lincoln Laboratory: <<https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/1998data.html>>.

1. V. Jyothsna, V.V. Rama Prasad, Anomaly based network intrusion detection through assessing Feature Association Impact Scale (FAIS); Inderscience, Int. J. Inform. Comput. Secur. (IJICS), 2016, in press.
2. V. Jyothsna, V.V. Rama Prasad, FCAAIS: Anomaly based network intrusion detection through feature correlation analysis and association impact scale, in: ICT Express, The Korean Institute of Communications Information Sciences, Elsevier, August 2016, in press.
3. [E. Gelenbe, G. Loukas, A self-aware approach to denial of service defence,](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0225) [Comput. Netw. 51 (5) (2007) 1299–1314](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0225).
4. Daniele Gianni, Georgios Loukas, Erol Gelenbe, A simulation framework for the investigation of adaptive behaviours in largely populated building evacuation scenarios, in: Organised Adaptation in Multi-Agent Systems workshop at the 7th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, May 2008.
5. [Gokce Gerbil, Omer H. Abdelrahman, Mihajlo Pavloski, Erol Gelenbe, Modeling](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0235) [and analysis of RRC-based signalling storms in 3G networks, IEEE Trans.](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0235) [Emerging Topics Comput. 4 (1) (2016) 113–127](http://refhub.elsevier.com/S2210-8327(17)30165-5/h0235).
6. Erol Gelenbe, Omer H. Abdelrahman, Gokce Gorbil, Detection and mitigation of signaling storms in mobile networks, in: IEEE ICNC, 2016, pp. 1–5.