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A Formal Approach for the Evaluation of Network Security Mechanisms Based on RBAC Policies

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Abstract

Security policy models allow reasoning about security goals achievements. When security mech- anisms are implemented, it is difficult to formally validate the security properties against the security goals especially in a network environment. To assess the implemented security proper- ties, one should consider details regarding the network topology, the forwarding as well as filtering and transform engines. In this paper, we present a Colored Petri Net based tool which allows to describe graphically a given network topology, the network security mechanisms and the security goals required. The tool computes the different functionalities to set up the security properties and formally validates the solution using the dead state of the generated reachability graph analysis. Different security properties such as confidentiality and availability can be studied.

*Keywords:* Network Security, Security Management, Colored Petri Nets.

# Introduction

The design, operation, and maintenance of network configurations constitute an important part of the security management task. Basically, the security of distributed applications is supported by a set of network security services which are implemented by means of security mechanisms.

The administrator should determine the security services to use and the security mechanisms configurations to apply. Once deployed, network security

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policies often become unmanageable over time since more rules are added and there is a real difficulty in retrieving, managing and getting rid of old unnecessary rules. This fact leads to ever increasing pains in managing active security policies in network devices.

Traditional management platforms which use SNMP agents are too simple to tackle the problem complexity. For this reason, different architectures and techniques have recently appeared which increase the management agents’ capacities in order to automate the management task.

In this context we find the policy based management approach which con- siders abstract security policies [[4](#_bookmark16),[12](#_bookmark21),[18](#_bookmark30),[20](#_bookmark32),[33](#_bookmark41),[34](#_bookmark46)] that can be represented at different levels [[25](#_bookmark37),[30](#_bookmark42)], ranging from business goals to device-specific configu- ration parameters. The process that transforms a definite goal into the corre- sponding configurations is called derivation process [[2](#_bookmark14),[24](#_bookmark36),[31](#_bookmark43)]. With a similar perspective the multi-agent system paradigm based approach [[14](#_bookmark22)] wishes the management agents to be more autonomous in order to be able to cooperate for creating strategies that fulfill to defined objectives. The terms strategies objectives employed here take after the policy abstraction level in the former approach. Finally as a third approach, the latest emerging works [[36](#_bookmark48),[37](#_bookmark49),[38](#_bookmark50),[39](#_bookmark51)] proceed with this idea by the “Self-Adaptive Autonomic Computing” concept using the prefix “self” as a leitmotiv.

However, the automation sought after via the above cited approaches, is not adequate for security management yet. There is no automatic evaluation method of network security policies indeed. Access control models [[5](#_bookmark17),[9](#_bookmark23),[29](#_bookmark44)] provide a solution for the definition of security objectives.

In fact they afford a formal technique for defining what is and what is not allowed. Moreover, there are several techniques besides, associated [[7](#_bookmark19),[9](#_bookmark23),[28](#_bookmark40),[32](#_bookmark45)] with each model, to guarantee that a security policy is correct.

Nevertheless, these models do not consider the associated security mecha- nisms or strategies. Network security management is by nature a distributed function supplied by the coordination of a variety of devices with different ca- pabilities (PCs, routers, secure gateways, firewalls, etc). By consequence the same objective can be enforced by different compositions thus different strate- gies. For example, confidentiality can be implemented by filtering mechanisms or encryption mechanisms. It is then necessary to develop an automated for- mal evaluation technique for defining what a correct security network strategy is.

There is a variety of formal verification techniques used in the security context: theorem provers (EHDM [[22](#_bookmark34)], PVS [[27](#_bookmark39)]) and model checking/finding techniques (SMV [[6](#_bookmark18)], NPA [[21](#_bookmark33)], Alloy [[13](#_bookmark24)]). All formal specification languages such as Z, LOTOS or Petri Nets [[16](#_bookmark28),[19](#_bookmark31)] were also used. Unfortunately, there

is no model associated with network security proposed to be used with these techniques. Accordingly, we propose a new formal verification tool which is specific to network security policy. It includes a model of the application security policies, the network security policies/mechanisms and the network topology.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain what is meant by network security from our perspective. In section 3, we define our formal specification language and our formal evaluation method. In section 4, we present our tool which implements the previous concepts and automates the evaluation task. Also, we expose a small example of use. Finally, in section 6, we show our conclusions and our plans for future work.

# Definition of a network security policy

Among the access control models [[5](#_bookmark17),[29](#_bookmark44)], we have chosen the NIST RBAC model [[9](#_bookmark23)] because it simplifies the management tasks. Actually, the role con- cept allows aggregating the users’ permissions and then it facilitates the users’ rights modifications made by an administrator. Moreover, the hierarchies be- tween roles represent a good tool for modelling an organization according to different points of view.

* 1. *The NIST RBAC model*


The NIST group proposes the standardization of the RBAC model [[9](#_bookmark23)]. It is made up of two sub-models: the core model and the hierarchical model (Fig. [1](#_bookmark1)). The core model includes five sets of basic data elements:

* A “user” is an active entity, i.e., human or intelligent agent.
* A “role” is a job function within the context of an organization with some associated semantic regarding the authority and responsibility on the user assigned to the role. We can notice that the definition is very vague.
* A “permission” is an approval to perform an operation on one or more protected objects.
* An “operation” is an executable image of a program, which upon invocation executes some function on behalf of the user.
* An “object” is an entity that contains or receives information.

Finally, a set of roles is assigned to a user, and a set of permissions is assigned to a role. A session is a mapping of one user to a set of authorized roles.

The hierarchical model adds relations for supporting role hierarchies. There exist different approaches for constructing a role hierarchy: based on privileges

Role hierarchy



User

User Assignement

Role

Permission Assignement

Operation

Object

User\_Session

Role\_Session

Permission

Session

Fig. 1. The NIST RBAC Model

[[26](#_bookmark38)] or based on users’ job functions [[8](#_bookmark20),[23](#_bookmark35)].

* 1. *What is the relation between an application security policy and a network security policy?*

When a user accesses a service, a set of data flow is exchanged between the de- vice which the user launches the service and the devices supporting the service execution (Fig. [2](#_bookmark2)). So, a relation between a network security policy and an application security policy can be perceived. For example, if the application se- curity policy states that user *u*1 can read object *o*1- noted (*u*1*, o*1*,* +*read*), then it implies that a corresponding data flow *flow*(*o*1*,* +*read*) between the device of user *u*1 and the device of *o*1 can exists on the network. Consequently, the associated network security policy must allows the data flows *flow*(*o*1*,* +*read*) between these two devices - noted (*device*(*u*1) ↔ *device*(*o*1)*,* +*flow*(*o*1*, read*)). Conversely, if the application security policy states that user *u*2 cannot read object *o*2 noted (*u*2*, o*2*,* −*read*), there should not be a flow *flow*(*o*2*, read*) be- tween the devices of *u*2 and *o*2. Therefore, the network security policy must forbid *flow*(*o*2*, read*) between the devices of *u*2 and *o*2, i.e., (*device*(*u*2) ↔ *device*(*o*2)*,* −*flow*(*o*2*, read*)). We report this information from application to network level, in order to stop these data flows and so to prevent Deny of Service or exploits/payloads based attacks.

Definition 2.1 The derivation relation noted ⇒*d* is defined as

∀*u* ∈ *USERS,* ∀*o* ∈ *OBJECT S,* ∀*a* ∈ *ACT IONS,*

(*u, o,* ±*a*) ⇒*d* (*device*(*u*) ↔ *device*(*o*)*,f low*(*o,* ±*a*))*.* (1)

* 1. *Towards an “RBAC network security policy”*

Users are considered in an RBAC system by their assigned role. Consequently, the derivation relation becomes: ∀*r* ∈ *ROLES,* ∀*oi* ∈ *OBJECT S,* ∀*opj* ∈

Computer Server



Acces Control Rules

Application Security Policy

Data Flows

Network Security Policy

Derivation

Fig. 2. Security policy derivation

*OPERAT IONS,* 6*u, u*' ∈ *USERS, u* /= *u*' • (*r,* (*opj, oi*)) Λ *assigned*(*u, r*) Λ ч*assigned*(*u*'*, r*) ⇒*d* (*device*(*u*) — *device*(*oi*)*,* +*flow*(*oi, opj*)) Λ (*device*(*u*') — *device*(*oi*)*,* —*flow*(*oi, opj*)).

Hereafter, we consider that there is no hierarchy and that roles have disjoint privileges (if this is not the case, we may create a partition of this set): such a constraint will help us to group data flows based on the permissions assigned to one role and then identifying them by the role. Afterward, we note by the name of the role the set of flows corresponding to the permissions assigned to the role.

According to these definitions, we present our method that includes a net- work architecture specification language and a security mechanisms validation against an RBAC security policy process.

# Network architecture model and security mechanisms analysis

In a network environment, all the applicable treatments on data flow can be brought together into four categories of functionalities:

* Mechanisms that *consume/produce data flows* such as the end-systems,
* Mechanisms that *propagate data flows* such as the supports of communica- tion,
* Mechanisms that *transform data flows* into another one such as the security protocols,
* Mechanisms that *ﬁlter data flows* such as the firewall ones.

So, our process consists of modeling these functionalities and interactions be- tween these functionalities. Hence, we define a graphical language with a formal semantic in order to support the network security policy verification process.

User A User B Data

Access Control Rules



*Network Infrastructure*

**C**

: End Flow Functionality  : Filter Functionality  : Active Entity

: Channel Functionality : Transform Functionality  : Passive Entity



**C**

Fig. 3. The model of network topology

In our model (Fig. [3](#_bookmark3)), we find a set of active entities and a set of passive entities, and a set of functionalities (end-flow, channel, transform and filter) which act on information flows. An active entity corresponds to a user in the RBAC model, and a passive entity is a set of objects in the RBAC model.

We describe the semantic of our language using the Colored Petri Nets (CPNs). CPNs [[15](#_bookmark27),[17](#_bookmark29)] provide a framework for the construction and analysis of distributed and concurrent systems. A CPN model of a system describes the states in which the system may be and the transitions between these states.

* 1. *Colored Petri Nets*

The states of a CPN are represented by means of places (which are drawn as ellipses or circles). Each place has an associated type (color set) deter- mining the kind of data that the place may contain. A state of a CPN is called a marking. It consists of a number of tokens positioned (distributed) on the individual places. Each token carries a value (color), which belongs to the type of the place on which the token resides. The tokens present on a particular place are called the marking of that place. The tokens of a CPN are distinguishable from each other and hence “colored”, in contrast to low level Petri nets which have “black” indistinguishable tokens. The marking of a place is, in general, a multi-set of token values. A multi-set is similar to a set, except that there may be several appearances of the same element. This means that a place may have several tokens with the same token value. For

example, 1‘*c*1 + +2‘*c*2 means that the place contains 3 tokens, one with the value *c*1 and two with the value *c*2. The actions of a CPN are represented by means of transitions (which are drawn as rectangles). Transitions and places are connected by arcs. The actions of a CPN consist of occurrences of transi- tions. An occurrence of a transition removes tokens from places connected to incoming arcs (input places), and adds tokens to places connected to outgoing arcs (output places), thereby changing the marking (state) of the CPN. The exact number of tokens added and removed by the occurrence of a transition, and their data values are determined by the arc expressions. In addition to the arc expressions, it is possible to attach a boolean expression (with variables) to each transition. The boolean expression is called a guard. It specifies that we only accept bindings for which the boolean expression evaluates to true. A CPN has a distinguished marking - the initial marking - which is used to describe the initial state of the system. A CPN may also have one or more markings - dead markings - which cannot generate any other marking. They describe the dead states of the system.

Nevertheless, CPNs do not bring any additional power of description com- pared to the PNs, they just allow a compression of information. Any marked CPN can thus be associated with an isomorphic PN. The phase of transfor- mation of a CPN into a PN is called the “unfolding”. Afterwards, the analysis is performed with the CPN or the PN (temporal logic with occurrence graph, linear algebra with incidence matrix, classical PN properties).

* 1. *Deﬁnition of the functionalities*

We model data flows with tokens. The characteristics of data flows (source, destination, service used) are represented by the tokens’ colors. Each func- tionality is modelled by a specific CPN sub-network that acts on the tokens. Then, a CPN model of a specification is an interconnection of sub-networks. We thus define a total function that maps all specification into a sub-set of CPN. This component approach makes it possible to transform a specification into an equivalent CPN in an automatic way.

* + 1. *The end-flow functionality*

An end-flow (EF) is a functionality that is specific to end-systems, i.e., data and application servers as well as workstations. It transmits applications/users flows to the network. Thus, the functionalities which produce/consume data flows are specified by CPN sub-nets that generate tokens with correspond- ing colors and receive tokens (Fig. [4](#_bookmark4)). We consider two types of end-flow functionalities:



r1,r2, ...,rn

tef em

i

1'(SENDER,role1,EF,efi)++

1'(SENDER,role2,EF,efi)++

...

1'(SENDER,role3,EF,efi)++

(s,r,t,name)

ef rec (s,r,t,name)

i

ef em

(s,r,t,name)

i

Fig. 4. The end-flow functionality CPN model

* + - * *Active End Flow functionality* (AEF): An EF is said active if any active entity is connected to this EF.
      * *Passive End Flow functionality* (PEF): An EF is said passive if any passive entity is connected to this EF.

We append a list of roles to each EF for indicating the flows that the EF can produce. The list corresponds to the set of roles assigned to the user representing the connected active entity for an AEF. In the case of a PEF, it is the set of roles assigned to the permissions that concern an object of the connected passive entity. In a CPN built from one of our specification, a token corresponds to a particular flow.

Consequently, a token is a tuple *< SENDER, ROLE, T Y PE, NAME >*

that defines the color domain FLOW where:

* + - * *SENDER* ∈ {*AEF, PEF* },
      * *ROLE* ∈ *ROLES* that is the set of roles,
      * *TY PE* ∈ {*EF, T R*} means that the flow is transformed or not (see “The transform functionality”),
      * *N AME* is the name of the end-flow functionality.

We specify the producer ability with a place (*ef em*) that initially contains all data flow tokens that the end-flow functionality can send (that is

*i*

*assigned ef* (*R,efi*)

1' *< SENDER, ROLE, EF, NAME >*) and transition (*tefi*)

to connect it to another functionality. Its consumer capability is represented

by one place (*ef rec*) that stores the received tokens.

*i*

* + 1. *The channel functionality*

The channel functionality models the physical network. It receives the flow on an interface and retransmits it to all the connected entities. This functionality may be viewed as a broadcast channel. When a flow is oriented, it is not only received by the addressed destinations but also by all of the systems connected to this channel. The functionalities which propagate data flows are specified

Funct1 Funct2



. . . .

. . . Functn

Funct1

Funct2

Channel

...

Functn

(s,r,t,name) (s,r,t,name) (s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name)

ci\_fct1

(s,r,t,name)

ci\_fct2

(s,r,t,name)

ci\_fctn

[not(member((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)] [not(member((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)] [not(member((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)]

tci\_fct1

tci\_fctn

tci\_fct2

updatelist((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)

flow\_list

flow\_list

updatelist((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)

flow\_list

updatelist((s,r,t,name),flow\_list)

ci\_hist

Fig. 5. The channel functionality CPN model

by CPN sub-nets that receive a token from a functionality and send replica to all the other connected functionalities.

So, channel sub-networks are composed of a set of couples (place, transi- tion) for each connected functionality (Fig. [5](#_bookmark5)). Transitions are connected to all other functionalities. For instance, *tcif ct*1 is connected to *funct*2, *funct*3,

, *functn*. We also add a place (*ci hist*) which contains the list of all the to- kens that have passed through the channel. It is connected to each transition to ensure us that a token can pass once and only once through a channel functionality.

* + 1. *The transform functionality*

The transform functionality receives a data flow on one of its two interfaces, and according to transformation rules, it sends via the other interface this data flow or a transformation of it. The BNF definition of the syntax of transform functionalities configuration is as follows:

*<*TransformConfiguration*>* ::=

[*<*interface*>* “→”*<*interface*><*rule*>*] [*<*interface*>* “←” *<*interface*><*rule*>*]

*<*rule*>* :: = [*<*name*>* “=”] *<*roles list*>*

*<*roles list*>* ::= *<*role*>* | *<*role*>* “,” *<*roles list*>*

Consequently, transform CPN sub-nets change the color of some tokens ac- cording to the transformation rules. We set up the functions on the post-arcs transitions to change the color of the token (*T ransf funct*1 and *T ransf funct*2 in Fig. [6](#_bookmark6)). Moreover, if a functionality can transform a flow, it should be able to recover the original flow (see section [7.1.1](#_bookmark53)). We also add two places (*hist tfi f ct*1 *f ct*2 and *hist tfi f ct*2 *f ct*1) to save traces of all the flows that

Roles\_List1



hist\_tfi\_fct1\_fct2

(s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name) tf \_fct

i

(s,r,t,name)

1\_fct2

transf\_funct1(s,r,t,name)

Funct1

Funct2

tf \_fct \_fct

(s,r,t,name)

i 2 1

transf\_funct2(s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name)

hist\_tf \_fct \_fct

i 2 1

ttfi\_fct2\_fct1

ttfi\_fct1\_fct2

Funct1

Funct2

Roles\_List2

Fig. 6. The transform functionality CPN model

have passed through this functionality.

* + 1. *The ﬁlter functionality*

The filter functionality stops or forwards a data flow. We find this functionality in firewalls, Application Level Gateways or filtering routers. But we restrict it to only connect two functionalities. The filtering rules explicitly express the permitted flows between its two interfaces. If they are preceded by “EF” then they arrive untransformed from an end-flow functionality, else if they are preceded by “TR” then they have been modified by a transform functionality. The BNF definition of the syntax of filter functionalities configuration is as follows:

*<*FilterConfiguration*>* ::=

[ *<*interface*>* “→” *<*interface*> <*rules*>*] [“;”] [ *<*interface*>* “←” *<*interface*> <*rules*>*]

*<*rules*>* ::=

*<*name*>* “=” [“EF” *<*flow list*>*] [“TR” *<*flow list*>*]

*<*flow list*>* ::= *<*flow*>* | *<*flow*>* “,” *<*flow list*>*

*<*flow*>* ::= “(” *<*EF type*>* “,” *<*role*>* “)”

*<*EF type*>* ::= “AEF” | “PEF”

Consequently, the filter CPN sub-nets stops or not some tokens according to their color and the filtering rules (Fig.[7](#_bookmark7)). We represent the filtering rules by restricting the colors permitted by the transitions with guards (see section [7.1.2](#_bookmark54)). Then, a token with a color that is not in the guard of a transition

cannot be fired. The transition *tfifct fct* (resp. *tfifct fct* ) is used to filter

1 2 2 1

data flows coming from *funct*1 (resp. *funct*2) to *funct*2 (resp. *funct*1). In

addition, we add two places (*hist fi f ct*1 *f ct*2 and *hist fi f ct*2 *f ct*1) to save all the flows that have passed through this functionality.

Rule1

Funct1

Funct2



(s,r,t,name)

hist\_fi\_fct1\_fct2

Funct1

[value or value or ...]

1 2

Funct2

(s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name)

f \_fct \_fct

(s,r,t,name)

i 1 2

[value'1 or value'2 or ]

(s,r,t,name)

(s,r,t,name) (s,r,t,name) f \_fct \_fct

i 2 1

(s,r,t,name)

hist\_fi\_fct2\_fct1

tfi\_fct2\_fct1

tfi\_fct1\_fct2

Rule2

Fig. 7. The filter functionality CPN model

* 1. *Security analysis*

We use the model checking technique to determine if a specification satisfies the security properties. Nevertheless, this technique is sensitive to the com- binatorial explosion problem. Thus, we expose two theorems that allow us to limit our analysis of the CPN to only two states of the reachability graph.

Theorem 3.1 *There is one and only one dead state in the reachability graph of a CPN produced by any speciﬁcation.*

Proof. see section [7.2.1](#_bookmark55).

Theorem 3.2 *The analysis of the initial and dead states is necessary and suﬃcient.*

Proof. see section [7.2.2](#_bookmark56).

The theorem 3.2 guarantees that we only have to study the initial and dead states in the reachability graph. The first theorem ensures us obtaining the dead state by simulation. Consequently, there is no combinatorial explosion problem for the dead state analysis and then big size specifications can be studied.

We now present the security properties that the initial and dead state must satisfy.

We use the following notation:

* *FUNCT* , the set of functionalities,
* *FILTER*, the set of filter functionalities,
* *ACT IV E*, the set of active end-flow functionalities,
* *PASSIV E*, the set of passive end-flow functionalities,
* *ROLES*, the set of roles,
* *SENDER* = {*AEF, PEF* },
* *Connected* ⊆ *FUNCT* × *FUNCT* , the relation that defines direct connec- tion between functionalities,
* *Assigned* : (*ACT IV E* ∪ *PASSIV E*) → 2*ROLE*, the relation that defines the set of roles assigned to an end-flow functionality,
* *COLOR*, the set of colors in the CPN,
* *P LACE*, the set of places in the CPN,
* *T okens* : *P LACE* → *Bag*(*COLOR*), where Bag(COLOR) is the set of multiset over COLOR. It provides the set of colored tokens present in a place and a state.

For simplifying writing properties, we use the special character “ ” for indicating that one of the possible values is a member of the variable type. The expression *state* |= *property* denotes that the state in the CPN reachability graph satisfies the property - *si* is the initial state and *sf* is the dead sate. Now, we define the security properties.

Definition 3.3 *Property of conﬁdentiality*

Basically, the property of confidentiality protects the data from unauthorized disclosure. Thus, in our model, it prohibits an end-flow functionality from receiving at any time an untransformed data flow from any unassigned role.

6*ef* ∈ *ACT IV E,* 6*r* ∈ *ROLES, r* ∈*/ Assigned*(*ef* )

⇒ *sf* |=*< , r, EF, >*∈*/ T okens*(*ef rec*) (2)

Definition 3.4 *Property of integrity*

Classically, the property of integrity prohibits non authorized entities from any creation, modification or destruction of objects. Then, in our model, this property implies that an end-flow functionality can only generate data flows through its assigned roles.

6*ef* ∈ *ACT IV E* ∪ *PASSIV E,* 6*r* ∈ *ROLES, r* ∈*/ Assigned*(*ef* )

⇒ *si* |=*< , r, , ef >*∈*/ T okens*(*ef rec*) (3)

Definition 3.5 *Property of availability*

This property stipulates that all the granted services must be available to all the authorized entities. In the network environment, the data flows cor- responding to these services, must be able to travel between both devices. Consequently, translating it in our model results in: all active (resp. passive) end-flow functionalities must be able to consume all the data flows with an

assigned role sent by every passive (resp. active) end-flow functionality. Let *ACT IV Er* = {*efa* ∈ *ACT IV E*|*r* ∈ *Assigned*(*efa*)}

*PASSIV Er* = {*efp* ∈ *PASSIV E*|*r* ∈ *Assigned*(*efp*)}

6*r* ∈ *ROLES,* 6*efa* ∈ *ACT IV Er,* 6*efp* ∈ *PASSIV Er,*

*sf* |=*< PEF, r, EF, efp >*∈ *T okens*(*ef rec*)Λ *< AEF, r, EF, efa >*∈ *T okens*(*ef rec*)

*a p*

(4)

As we intend to address devices configurations, we complete these classical security properties with new ones.

Definition 3.6 *Property of partitioning*

With this propertiy, we wish to limit the propagation of data flows as much as possible. It declares that a data flow can only pass a filter functionality that is situated between the data flow source and a possible correct destination. Let *ACT IV Er* = {*efa* ∈ *ACT IV E*|*r* ∈ *Assigned*(*efa*)}

*PASSIV Er* = {*efp* ∈ *PASSIV E*|*r* ∈ *Assigned*(*efp*)}

6*f* ∈ *FILTER,* 6*f ct*1*,fct*2 ∈ *FUNCT,* 6*r* ∈ *ROLES,*

*Connected*(*f, fct*1) Λ *Connected*(*f, fct*2)

Λ (*sf* |=*< AEF, r, , >*∈ *T okens*(*hist f f ct*1*f ct*2) ⇒

∃*efa* ∈ *ACT IV Er* Λ *f ct*2 ∈ *P ath*(*f, efa*))

Λ (*sf* |=*< PEF, r, , >*∈ *T okens*(*hist f f ct*1*f ct*2) ⇒

∃*efp* ∈ *PASSIV Er* Λ *f ct*2 ∈ *P ath*(*f, efp*)) (5)

The two following constraints aim to suppress implemented filtering or transform rules that are not used in a usual context.

Definition 3.7 *Non productive ﬁltering rule*

Let *f* , be a filter functionality connected to the functionalities *f ct*1 and *f ct*2. We say that the filtering rule FRL, which lets the data flow *< s, r, t, ef >* pass, from *f ct*1 to *f ct*2, is non productive if this flow never tries to pass through the filter functionality.

Let the rule FRL =*f ct*1 → *f ct*2 t (s, r) where *f ct*1*,fct*2 ∈ *FUNCT,*

*t* ∈ {*EF, T R*}*,s* ∈ *AEF, PEF, r* ∈ *ROLES* then FRL is non productive iff

*sf* |=*< s, r, t, >*∈*/ T okens*(*hist f f ct*1*f ct*2) (6)

Definition 3.8 *Non productive transform rule*

Let *tf* , be a transform functionality connected to the functionalities *f ct*1 and *f ct*2. We say that the transform rule TRL, that transforms the data flows with the role *r* from *f ct*1 to *f ct*2 is non productive if any flow with the role

*r* pass through the transform functionality in the direction *f ct*1-*f ct*2 at any time.

Let TRL = *f ct*1 → *f ct*2 r where *f ct*1*,fct*2 ∈ *FUNCT, r* ∈ *ROLE*

then TRL is non productive iff *sf* |=*< , r, EF, >*∈*/ T okens*(*hist f f ct*1*f ct*2)

∨ *< , r,T R, >*∈*/ T okens*(*hist f f ct*2*f ct*1) (7)

# A network security policy evaluation example

In this example, we consider a traditional case of an enterprise network in- frastructure. It is composed of a private network and a DMZ. The whole is connected by an edge router. In the private network, an *App Server* server is installed and a *FTP* server in the DMZ (Fig.[8](#_bookmark10)). The application level security policy is a non hierarchical RBAC policy. It defines two user groups: the group *VPNmembers* and the group *Others*. This organization is only based on the granted privileges. The *App Server* server is dedicated only to services used by the *VPNmembers* group. The *FTP Server* has two directories: /con- fidential and /pub. The directory *conﬁdential* contains data only accessible by the *VPNmembers* users group. Data of the *pub* directory is accessible by everyone. User1, User2, User3 and User4 belong to VPNmembers and Others groups. User5 is only member of the Others group.


The application level security policy can be expressed as:

Permissions(VPNmembers) = {(+all access,FTP Server/confidential),

(+all access, App Server)} Permissions(Others) = {(+all access, FTP Server/pub)}

Fig.[8](#_bookmark10) shows also the network topology specification and the network level security policy implemented in our language. We have also appended the name used in the CPN specification to each functionality. First of all, we point out that our approach does not take into account devices as entities, but is based on the treatments carried out on data flows. The Private Network, the DMZ and the Internet interconnection infrastructures are specified thanks to channel functionalities because we use their transmission functionality. This approach of specification with large granularity only considers the minimum set of functionalities provided by these infrastructures: their interconnection capability.

On the contrary it is possible to refine a specification as the edge router shows it. It has obviously the interconnection functionality (the channel func- tionality), setting as a security gateway with filtering capabilities (the three filter functionalities) and encryption mechanisms (the transform functionality,



App\_Server

User5

Private Network

Internet

User1

Router

User3

User2

DMZ

User4

FTP\_Server

/Confidential

/pub



VPNmembers

ef1

VPNmembers Others

ef2

Private Network



Rule1 Rule2

f1

Edge Router

f2

Rule3

Rule4

VPNmembers

tf1

Rule5 Rule6

f3

ef5

Internet

tf2

Others

VPNmembers



VPNmembers Others

ef3 ef4

DMZ

VPNmembers

Others

Fig. 8. Architecture and graphical sepcification of our VPN example

for example an IPsec module is installed). The modelling of routing is done by filtering rules on the filter functionalities.

The servers are specified by two PEF. The *App Server* server has the *VPNmembers* role because only the users with the *VPNmembers* role have access rights. The PEF corresponding to the *FTP server* has the roles *Others* and *VPNmembers* because the permission (+all access, FTP Server/pub) is assigned to the *Others* role and (+all access, FTP Server/confidential) to the *VPNmembers* role.

The devices of *user*1 and *user*2 are represented by a single AEF (*EF*1) because *user*1 and *user*2 have the same roles (*Others* and *VPNmembers*) and these AEF are connected to the same channel functionality thanks to the concept of role which reduces the overall size of the specification. In the same way, the devices of *user*3 and *user*4 are specified by the AEF *EF*5. The device of *user*5 is specified by the AEF *EF*4. Arbitrarily adding an AEF with roles whose permissions are reduced makes it possible to define a degree of confidence (see [3] to get the complete definition of the “channel trust property”) that can be granted to a channel functionality. In this example,

we do not specify the structure of the Internet network, but it is perceived as an interconnection environment where any connected user has at least the permission to access the /pub directory of the FTP Server. This allows a great flexibility of specification according to the level of desired and/or known details.

We will now explain the security policy. The filtering rules associated with

the filter functionalities of our example are:

* *Rule*1 = *EF* (*AEF, Others*)*,* (*AEF, V PN members*)
* *Rule*2 = *EF* (*PEF, Others*)
* *Rule*3 = *EF* (*PEF, Others*)*,* (*PEF, V PNmembers*)*,* (*AEF, V PN members*)
* *Rule*4 = *EF* (*AEF, Others*)*,* (*AEF, V PN members*)
* *Rule*5 =*EF* (*PEF, Others*)*,* (*AEF, Others*) *T R*(*PEF, V PNmembers*)
* *Rule*6 =*EF* (*AEF, Others*)

*T R*(*AEF, V PN members*)

Two transform functionalities are defined to secure the *VPNmembers* role data flows on the Internet channel functionality. Indeed, users connected to the Internet channel functionality with the *Others* role can never access confidential data at the *FTP Server* or the *App Server*.

We have used CPN/tool [[40](#_bookmark52)] to create the CPN (Fig. [10](#_bookmark12)) associated to the specification. It shows the initial marking. Fig. [10](#_bookmark12) points out that the CPN becomes complicated to be manually built for big size specifications. So, we have developed using Java programming language a tool that automates the evaluation task. It takes as an input a specification file (Fig. [9](#_bookmark11)). First, it analyzes the syntax. If the syntax is correct, it generates the equivalent CPN and checks all the properties. Finally, it produces as a result a file (Fig. [11](#_bookmark13)) indicating if the properties are satisfied or not. If a property is not satisfied, the reason is explained.

In our example, the tool indicates (Fig. [11](#_bookmark13)) that the property of confi- dentiality is satisfied and there is no non-productive transform rule. Never- theless, the availability is not satisfied because *ef*2 cannot receive any flow with the role *VPNmembers* from *ef*5, *ef*1 cannot receive any flow with the role *VPNmembers* from *ef*3 and *ef*5 cannot receive any flow with the role *VP- Nmembers* from *ef*2. The partitioning property is not satisfied because of the rule *EF* (*AEF, Others*) from *tf*1 to Internet in the filter functionality *f*3. And finally, the filtering rule *EF* (*AEF, V PN members*) from *dmz* to *edge router* in the filter functionality *f*2 is non productive. To sum up, this specification

/\* end-flow functionalities definition \*/

<AEF>

#name = ef1

#roles = others, vpn-members; #connection = private\_network

<PEF>

#name = ef2

#roles = vpn-members; #connection = private\_network

<PEF>

#name = ef3

#roles = others, vpn-members; #connection = dmz

<AEF>

#name = ef4 #roles = others;

#connection = internet

<AEF>

#name = ef5

#roles = others, vpn-members; #connection = tf2

/\*transform functionalities definition \*/

<TRANSF>

#name = tf1

#connection1 = edge\_router #connection2 = f3

#rules\_1->2 = vpn-members; #rules\_2->1 = NONE;

<TRANSF>

#name = tf2 #connection1 = ef5 #connection2 = internet

#rules\_1->2 = vpn-members; #rules\_2->1 = NONE;

/\* filter functionalities defintion \*/

<FILTER>

#name = f1

#connection1 = private\_network #connection2 = edge\_router

#rules\_1->2 =

EF (AEF,others), (AEF, vpn-members); TR NONE;

#rules\_2->1 =

EF (PEF, others); TR NONE;

<FILTER>

#name = f2 #connection1 = dmz

#connection2 = edge\_router #rules\_1->2 =

EF (PEF,others), (PEF, vpn-members), (AEF, vpn-members);

TR NONE;

#rules\_2->1 =

EF (AEF, others), (AEF, vpn- members);

TR NONE;

<FILTER>

#name = f3 #connection1 = tf1

#connection2 = internet #rules\_1->2 =

EF (PEF,others), (AEF, others); TR (PEF, vpn-members);

#rules\_2->1 =

EF (AEF, others);

TR (AEF, vpn-members);

/\* channel functionalities definition \*/

<CHANNEL>

#name = private\_network #connection = ef1, ef2, f1;

<CHANNEL>

#name = edge\_router #connection = f1, f2, tf1;

<CHANNEL>

#name = internet #connection = f3, ef4, tf2;

<CHANNEL>


#name = dmz #connection = ef3, f2;

is not secure.

# Related works

Fig. 9. The specification file

Different works focus on suitable tool assistance. The approach of model based management [[18](#_bookmark30),[20](#_bookmark32)] utilizes object-oriented models of managed system to support the derivation which is divided into three abstraction levels. The designer graphically defines the three abstraction level models and the tool guides the derivation. In addition, one of the most advanced tools [[34](#_bookmark46)] proposes

1‘(AEF,Others,EF,ef4)

ef4em

**updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)**

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

LIST\_FLOW

[] hist\_c2 list\_f

(s,r,t,n)

tef4

ef4rec

FLOW

ef2rec

**(s,r,t,n)**

hist\_f1\_c1c2

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)

1‘(PEF, VPNmembers,EF,ef2)

(s,r,t,n)

ef2em tef2

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))] (s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n) (s,r,t,n) [(s=AEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse

c2f1

(s,r,t,n)

FLOW

tc2f1

hist\_tf1\_c2c4

case r of

hist\_f3\_tf1c4 FLOW

FLOW

c4ef4

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))] (s,r,t,n) tc4ef4

list\_f

FLOW

c1ef2

FLOW

tc1ef2

(s=PEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=EF) ]

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

VPNmembers => 1‘(s,r,TR,n)

(s,r,t,n) | \_ => 1‘(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

[(s=PEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f) []

(s,r,t,n)

f1c1c2

FLOW

tf1c1c2

c2tf1

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))] (s,r,t,n)

tc2tf1

tf1c2c4

ttf1c2c4

f3tf1c4

FLOW

(s=AEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse tf3tf1c4 (s=PEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=TR) ]

list\_f

hist\_c4

LIST\_FLOW

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

c4tf1

(s,r,t,n)

tc4tf1

1‘(AEF,VPNmembers,EF,ef1)++ 1‘(AEF,Others, EF,ef1)

ef1rec

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

[(s=PEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) ]

tf1c2c1 (s,r,t,n) f1c2c1

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

c2f2

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))] (s,r,t,n)

tc2f2

ttf1c4c2

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

tf1c4c2

(s,r,t,n) FLOW

tf3c4tf1

(s,r,t,n)

f3c4tf1

FLOW

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

c4tf2

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

(s,r,t,n) tc4tf2

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)

list\_f

ef1em

(s,r,t,n)

tef1

(s,r,t,n) (s,r,t,n)

c1ef1 tc1ef1

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

FLOW

case r of

[(s=AEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse

hist\_tf1\_c4c2 (s=AEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=TR) ]

FLOW

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

FLOW

c1f1

FLOW

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))] (s,r,t,n)

tc1f1

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

hist\_f1\_c2c1

FLOW

FLOW

hist\_f2\_c3c2

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

tf2c3c2

f2c2c3

**(s,r,t,n)**

VPNmembers => 1‘(s,r,EF,n)

| \_ => 1‘(s,r,t,n)

FLOW

(s,r,t,n) hist\_f3\_c4tf1

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

FLOW tf2c4ef5

case r of

VPNmembers => 1‘(s,r,TR,n) ttf2ef5c4 | \_ => 1‘(s,r,t,n)

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)

list\_f

[(s=PEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse (s=PEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=EF) orelse (s=AEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=EF) ]

FLOW

(s,r,t,n) (s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

hist\_f2\_c2c3

FLOW

hist\_tf2\_c4ef5

FLOW (s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n)

(s,r,t,n) tf2ef5c4

(s,r,t,n)

hist\_tf2\_ef5c4

f2c3c2

tf2c2c3 [(s=AEF andalso r= Others andalso t=EF) orelse (s=AEF andalso r= VPNmembers andalso t=EF) ]

case r of

ttf2c4ef5

FLOW

FLOW

hist\_c1

[] LIST\_FLOW

(s,r,t,n) FLOW

c3ef3 (s,r,t,n)

FLOW

(s,r,t,n) c3f2

(s,r,t,n) FLOW

VPNmembers => 1‘(s,r,EF,n)

| \_ => 1‘(s,r,t,n)

ef5rec

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

tef5

(s,r,t,n)

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

[not (member((s,r,t,n), list\_f))]

(s,r,t,n)

1‘(AEF,VPNmembers,EF,ef5)++

ef5em

list\_f

tc3ef3

tc3f2

(s,r,t,n)

ef3rec

FLOW

(s,r,t,n)

1‘(AEF,Others,EF,ef5)

FLOW

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)

updatelist((s,r,t,n),list\_f)

[] list\_f

tef3

ef3em

FLOW1‘(PEF,VPNmembers,EF,ef3) ++

1‘(PEF,Others,EF,ef3)

LIST\_FLOW hist\_c3

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Fig. 10. The CPN model of our VPN example

Property of Confidentiality :

ef5 : OK ef4 : OK ef1 : OK

=> The property of confidentiality is satisfied

Property of Availability :

-------------------------

ef5 :

no flow with the role vpn-members from ef2 ef4 : OK

ef1 :

no flow with the role vpn-members from ef3 ef3 : OK

ef2 :

no flow with the role vpn-members from ef5

=> The property of availability is not satisfied

Non Productive Transform Rules :

-------------------------------

tf2 :

rules 1 -> 2 : OK

rules 2 -> 1 : OK

tf1 :

rules 1 -> 2 : OK

rules 2 -> 1 : OK

=> There is no non productive rule

Non Productive Filtering Rules : f3

rules 1 -> 2 : OK

rules 2 -> 1 : OK

f2

rules 1 -> 2 : [ EF (AEF, vpn-members) ], rules 2 -> 1 : OK

f1

rules 1 -> 2 : OK

rules 2 -> 1 : OK

=> There is one or more non productive rule

Partitioning Property :

----------------------

f3 :

Rule 1 -> 2 :

[ EF (AEF ,others) ]

Rule 2 -> 1 : OK

f2 :

Rule 1 -> 2 : OK

Rule 2 -> 1 : OK

f1 :

Rule 1 -> 2 : OK

Rule 2 -> 1 : OK

=> There is one or more partitioning problem

Fig. 11. The evaluation result file

to logically model network architecture without considering the specificities of the devices such as vendor or version. Then, the designer defines the network security policy (IPsec tunnels, NAT, firewall rules) which is translated into each specific device configuration language. These tools facilitate the design and the deployment of network security policies, but they do not guarantee the correctness of the security policy, i.e., the carried out decisions are relevant.

Most of the network security analysis techniques (for example [[1](#_bookmark15)]) only check rules conflicts. They do not consider the global security policy. The work [[10](#_bookmark25),[11](#_bookmark26)] is really interesting because it proposes a solution that formally evaluates IPsec VPNs. It models the network on a directed bipartite graph. The nodes of the graph are areas, collections of hosts and networks which are similar in terms of security policy; and devices, which are dual homed hosts or packet filtering/IPsec routers connecting the areas and moving packets between them. Nevertheless, the users are ambiguously considered. That implies that all hosts in a given area own the same set of privileges.

# Conclusion

The design of a security policy becomes increasingly difficult because of the complexity of the factors to consider. The common approach of defining differ- ent abstraction levels, up from the objectives till the devices configurations, is used to overcome the problem. Some existing tools implement this approach. Nevertheless, a formal and automatic evaluation of decisions must complete this achievement.

In this paper, we have presented a tool that realizes a formal evaluation of the network security policy. The language is quiet simple, but it owns the CPN formal analysis power. Moreover, we have demonstrated that all the defined security properties are checked at the initial and dead state. Consequently, our approach is not vulnerable to the combinatorial explosion problem and then is applicable to complex studies.

At present, we are testing our approach through different case studies to enhance our method. In addition, our future work will be focused on validating the real configurations on devices. Our tool - being independent from the security technologies implemented on the devices, confines itself to validating security mechanisms constraints. Therefore, we are working on bridging this gap thanks to the Common Information Model (CIM) [[35](#_bookmark47)] defined by the DMTF task force to harmonize the management systems. Hence, we could interconnect our work with management platforms.

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# Appendices

* 1. *Appendix A*

We define the equivalence between the definitions of filtering and transform rules in our specification language and the generated CPN sub-net model.

* + 1. *Transform rules translation*

Consider:

* + - * *T Fi* a transform functionality,
      * *funct*1 and *funct*2 the two functionalities connected to *T Fi*,
      * *Ci* the configuration of *T Fi*,
      * *tfi* a transform CPN sub-network,
      * *T ransf funct*1 the function associated to the *ttffct*1 *fct*2 post-arc,
      * *T ransf funct*2 the function associated to the *ttffct*2 *fct*1 post-arc. We say that *T Fi* ≡*TF tfi* iff

*Ci* = *funct*1 → *funct*2 *r*1*, r*2*,... rk funct*1 ← *funct*2 *rk*+1*,... rn*

and

6*E* ∈ {*AEF, PEF* }*,*

*T ransf funct*1(*< E, r*1*, EF, >*) =*< E, r*1*,T R, >* Λ

*...*

*T ransf funct*1(*< E, rk, EF, >*) =*< E, rk,T R, >* Λ

*T ransf funct*1(*< E, rk*+1*,T R, >*) =*< E, rk*+1*, EF, >* Λ

*...*

*T ransf funct*1(*< E, rn,T R, >*) =*< E, rn, EF, >* Λ

6 *< E, R,T, >*∈ {*AEF, PEF* }× *ROLES* × {*EF, T R*}× *N AME*

\{*< E, r*1*, EF, >,... ,< E, rk, EF, >, < E, rk*+1*,T R, >,... ,*

*< E, rn,T R, >*}*,*

*T ransf funct*1(*< E, R,T, >*) =*< E, R,T, >,*

and

6*E* ∈ {*AEF, PEF* }*,*

*T ransf funct*2(*< E, rk*+1*, EF, >*) =*< E, rk*+1*,T R, >* Λ

*...* Λ

*T ransf funct*2(*< E, rn, EF, >*) =*< E, rn,T R, >* Λ

*T ransf funct*2(*< E, r*1*,T R, >*) =*< E, r*1*, EF, >* Λ

*...* Λ

*T ransf funct*2(*< E, rk,T R, >*) =*< E, rk, EF, >,*

6 *< E, R,T, >*∈

{*AEF, PEF* }× *ROLES* × {*EF, T R*}× *N AME*

\{*< E, r*1*, EF, >,... ,< E, rk, EF, >, < E, rk*+1*,T R, >,... ,*

*< E, rn,T R, >*}*,*

*T ransf funct*2(*< E, R,T, >*) =*< E, R,T, >*.

* + 1. *Filtering rules translation*

Consider:

* + - * *Fi* a filter functionality,
      * *funct*1 and *funct*2 the two functionalities connected to *Fi*,
      * *Ci* the configuration of *Fi*,
      * and *fi* a filter CPN sub-network.

We say that *Fi* ≡*F fi* iff

*Ci* = *funct*1 → *funct*2

*Rule*1 = *EF* (*e*1*, r*1)(*e*2*, r*2) *...* (*ek, rk*)

*T R*(*ek*+1*, rk*+1) *...* (*en, rn*); *funct*1 ← *funct*2

*Rule*2 = *EF* (*e*j1*, r*j1) *...* (*e*j*j, r*j*j*)

*T R*(*e*j*j*+1*, r*j*j*+1) *...* (*e*j*m, r*j*m*);

and

*guard*(*tfifct fct* ) = [*< e*1*, r*1*, EF, >, < e*2*, r*2*, EF, >,... ,< ek, rk, EF, >*

1 2

*,< ek*+1*, rk*+1*,T R, >,... ,< en, rn,T R, >*]

*guard*(*tfifct fct* )= [*< e*j1*, r*j1*, EF, >,... ,< e*j*j, r*j*j, EF, >,*

2 1

*< e*j*j*+1*, r*j*j*+1*,T R, >,... ,< e*j*m, r*j*m,T R, >*].

* 1. *Appendix B*

We present the proofs of both theorems.

* + 1. *Proof of theorem* [*3.1*](#_bookmark8)

First, we prove that all CPN generated from any specification is K-bounded.

We use the following notation:

* + - * У is the finite set of places in the CPN that have the color domain *F LOW* (i.e., all places excluding the places *ci hist* that have the color domain *F LOW LIST* ) ,
      * *Pre*P : У → 2P, the relation that defines the set of places which have one of their post-arcs connected to the same transition as one of the pre-arcs of a place in the CPN,
      * У*EF* = {*ef em*}, the finite set of places *ef em*,

*i* *i*

∀*i*

* + - * *nb tok* : У → N, provides the number of tokens that have passed in one

place,

* + - * *< x*1*, x*2*,... xn >* a structural path between *x*1 and *xn* in a CPN where

6*i >* 0*, xi* З У*, xi* З *Pre*P(*xi*+1),

* + - * [*x*1 *d xn*] the set of the possible structural paths between the places *x*1 and

*xn*.

By construction, we have:

* + - * 1. 6*p* З У\У*EF , nb tok*(*p*) ≤ Σ

∀*x*∈*Pre*P (*p*)

*nb tok*(*x*)

* + - * 1. 6*ef em* З У*EF , nb tok*(*ef em*)= *ki* where *ki* is the the number of tokens in

*i* *i*

*ef em* in the initial state

*i*

* + - * 1. 6*i, nb tok*(*ci hist*) = 1 because each *ci hist* contains an ordered list of tokens.

So, 6*p* З У\У*EF , nb tok*(*p*) ≤ Σ

∀*x*∈*Pre*P

Σ

≤

*nb tok*(*x*)

Σ

*nb tok*(*y*)

∀*x*∈*Pre*P (*p*) ∀*y*∈*Pre*P (*x*)

Σ

We can note it, 6*p* З У\У*EF ,* 6*y* З У*,< y,... p >, nb tok*(*p*) ≤ *nb tok*(*y*)

[*ydp*]

By recursion, we obtain

6*p* З У\У*EF ,* 6*ef em* З У*,< efem,... p >, nb tok*(*p*) ≤

Σ

*nb tok*(*ef em*)

*i i* *i*

[*ef emdp*]

*i*

1. if there is only one structural path between two places then

Σ *nb tok*(*ef em*)= Σ *ki*.

*i*

[*ef emdp*]

*i*

1. if there exists cycles in structural paths - e.g. *< x*2*, x*3 *>* is a cycle in the path *< x*1*, x*2*, x*3*, x*2*, x*3*, x*4 *>* - then there is an infinite number of pos- sible paths between *x*1 and *x*4, as *< x*1*, x*2*, x*3*, x*2*, x*3*, x*2*, x*3*, x*2*, x*3*, x*4 *>* because a token that can pass two time through a place can pass in- finitely. However by construction, a cycle in the CPN implies that the associated specification contains a cycle too (i.e., there are different paths between two functionalities). And always by construction, there are at least two channel functionalities in a cycle. A channel functionality re- transmits a token with a specific color *< a, b, c,d >* once. Considering that each flow can only take two possible colors *< a, b, EF,d >* and

*< a, b,T R,d >*, a cycle can be covered once by a data flow. Conse-

quently, Σ *nb tok*(*ef em*) *<* ∞

*i*

[*ef emdp*]

*i*

To sum up:

1. 6*p* З У\У*EF , nb tok*(*p*) *<* ∞
2. 6*ef em* З У*EF , nb tok*(*ef em*)= *ki*

*i* *i*

1. 6*i, nb tok*(*ci hist*)=1

So, any CPN associated to a specification is K bounded. As a consequence, the CPN is K-bounded and there a reachability graph can be computed.

Moreover, each token will be consumed by an end-flow or stopped by a filter or a channel functionality. They are also consumed by all the historic places. Then there is one or more dead state.

In addition, there is no choice (i.e., a place with different post-arcs) in the produced CPN, and tokens are arranged in order in the flow list of the *ci hist* places. Consequently, there is only one dead state.

* + 1. *Proof of theorem* [*3.2*](#_bookmark9)

For this proof, we use the theorem [3.1](#_bookmark8) which demonstrates that there is only one dead state in the reachability graph.

The property of confidentiality and the definition of non productive filter- ing/transform rules state that a specific place must never contains a specific colored token. In each case, this place does not have any post-arc. For that reason, if this place contains at a specific state a colored token then for all future states it contains this token. As a consequence, if the place never con- tains a colored token then the place does not contain the token at the dead state. And if the dead state does not contain a colored token, then there is no state such that the place contains the token.

Inversely, the properties of availability and partitioning impose that there must exists a state such that a specific place with no post-arc contains a specific colored token. If such a state exists then the dead state satisfies the property. Moreover, if the place contains the token in the dead state then such a state exists.

Finally, the property of integrity states that the place *ef rec* must never contain some colored tokens accordingly to its assigned roles. This place does not have pre-arc. So, if the place contains the token in a state, then there is no past state such that the place does not contain this token. Hence, if the place does not contain the token at the initial state then the place will never contain the token. And if the place never contains the token then the place doesn’t contain the token at the initial state.