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A Probabilistic Polynomial-time Calculus For Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols (Preliminary Report)

J. Mitchell 1*,*3*,*4

*Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 USA*

A. Ramanathan 1

*Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 USA*

A. Scedrov 1*,*2*,*5

*Mathematics Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA 19104-6395 USA*

V. Teague 1*,*6

*Computer Science Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 USA*

**Abstract**

We describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the pur- pose of analyzing security protocols. The process calculus is a restricted form of

*π*-calculus, with bounded replication and probabilistic polynomial-time expressions

allowed in messages and boolean tests. In order to avoid problems expressing se-

curity in the presence of nondeterminism, messages are scheduled probabilistically instead of nondeterministically. We prove that evaluation may be completed in probabilistic polynomial time and develop properties of a form of asymptotic proto- col equivalence that allows security to be specified using *observational equivalence,* a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact with the protocol. We also relate process equivalence to cryptographic concepts such as pseudo-random number generators and polynomial-time statistical tests.

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# Introduction

A variety of methods are used for analyzing and reasoning about security pro- tocols. The main systematic or formal approaches include specialized logics such as BAN logic [8,13], special-purpose tools designed for cryptographic pro- tocol analysis [20], and theorem proving [32,31] and model-checking methods using several general purpose tools described in [24,26,29,34,35]. Although these approaches differ in significant ways, all reflect the same basic assump- tions about the way an adversary may interact with the protocol or attempt to decrypt encrypted messages. In the common model, largely derived from [12] and suggestions found in [30] (see, *e.g.,* [10]), a protocol adversary is allowed to nondeterministically choose among possible actions. This is a convenient idealization, intended to give the adversary a chance to find an attack if there is one. In the presence of nondeterminism, however, the set of messages an adversary may use to interfere with a protocol must be restricted severely. Although the Dolev-Yao-style assumptions make protocol analysis tractable, they also make it possible to “verify” protocols that are in fact susceptible to simple attacks that lie outside the adversary model. Another limitation is that a deterministic or nondeterministic setting does not allow us to analyze probabilistic protocols.

In this paper we describe some general concepts in security protocol anal- ysis, mention some of the competing approaches, and describe some technical properties of a process calculus that was proposed earlier in [23,22] as the ba- sis for a form of protocol analysis that is formal, yet closer in foundations to the mathematical setting of modern cryptography. The framework relies on a language for defining communicating polynomial-time processes [28]. The reason we restrict processes to probabilistic polynomial time is so that we can reason about the security of protocols by quantifying over all “adversarial” processes definable in the language. In effect, establishing a bound on the running time of an adversary allows us to relax the simplifying assumptions. Specifically, it is possible to consider adversaries that might send randomly chosen messages, or perform sophisticated (yet probabilistic polynomial-time) computation to derive an attack from messages it overhears on the network. An important aspect of our framework is that we can analyze probabilistic as well as deterministic encryption functions and protocols. Without a proba- bilistic framework, it would not be possible to analyze an encryption function such as ElGamal [14], for which a single plaintext may have more than one

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ciphertext.

Some of the basic ideas of this work are outlined in [23], with the term language presented in [28] and further example protocols considered in [22]. The closest technical precursor is the Abadi and Gordon spi-calculus [3,2] which uses observational equivalence and channel abstraction but does not involve probability or computational complexity bounds; subsequent related work is cited in [1], for example. Prior work on CSP and security protocols, e.g., [34,35], also uses process calculus and security specifications in the form of equivalence or related approximation orderings on processes.

Although our main long-term objective is to base protocol analysis on standard cryptographic assumptions, this framework may also shed new light on basic questions in cryptography. In particular, the characterization of “se- cure” encryption function, for use in protocols, does not appear to have been completely settled. While the definition of *semantic security* in [18] appears to have been accepted, there are stronger notions such as *non-malleability* [11] that are more appropriate to protocol analysis. In a sense, the difference is that semantic security is natural for the single transmission of an encrypted message, while non-malleability accounts for vulnerabilities that may arise in more complex protocols. Our framework provides a setting for working back- wards from security properties of a protocol to derive necessary properties of underlying encryption primitives. While we freely admit that much more needs to be done to produce a systematic analysis method, we believe that a foundational setting for protocol analysis that incorporates probability and complexity restrictions has much to offer in the future.

# Preliminaries

* 1. *Probabilistic Functions*

**Definition 2.1** We define a probabilistic function *F* on the sets *X, Y* as a function *F* : *X × Y →* [0*,* 1] that satisfies the following condition:

Σ

*∀x ∈ X* : *F*(*x, y*) *≤* 1 (1)

*y∈Y*

For some *x ∈ X, y ∈ Y* , if *F*(*x, y*) = *p*, we say that *F* takes on the value *y* at

*x* with probability *p* or that *F*(*x*) = *y* with probability *p*.

* 1. *Composition of Probabilistic Functions*

**Definition 2.2** We define the *composition F* : *X × Z →* [0*,* 1] of two proba- bilistic functions *F*1 : *X ×Y →* [0*,* 1] and *F*2 : *Y ×Z →* [0*,* 1] as a probabilistic function that satisfies the following condition:

Σ

*∀x ∈ X.∀z ∈ Z* : *F*(*x, z*) = *F*1(*x, y*) *· F*2(*y, z*) (2)

*y∈Y*

We write the composition of *F*1 and *F*2 as *F*2 *◦ F*1.

**Lemma 2.3** *Given two probabilistic functions F*1 : *X × Y →* [0*,* 1] *and F*2 : *Y ×Z →* [0*,* 1]*, the composition F*2 *◦F*1 = *F* : *X ×Z →* [0*,* 1] *is a probabilistic function, i.e., it satisﬁes the condition ∀x ∈ X* : *z∈Z F*(*x, z*) *≤* 1*.*

Σ

**Proof.** For any fixed *x ∈ X*:

Σ *F*(*x, z*) = Σ Σ *F*1(*x, y*) *· F*2(*y, z*) by defn. 2*.*2

*z∈Z*

*z∈Z y∈Y*

= Σ *F*1(*x, y*) *·* Σ *F*2(*y, z*) factoring

*y∈Y*

*z∈Z*

*≤* 1 by defn. 2*.*1

Hence, composition is a probabilistic function. *✷*

* 1. *Terminology*

In what follows, *P* denotes a process, *T* denotes a term, *p*(*x*) denotes one of an infinity of *bandwidth polynomials* such that *∀a ∈* N : *p*(*a*) *≥* 0. *cp*(*x*) denotes one of a countable infinity **C***q*(*x*) of *channel names* associated with the polynomial *p*(*x*) in such a way that no channel name is associated with more than one polynomial.

There is a special *security parameter, n*, that can appear in terms (sec- tion 2.3.1), as the parameter of the replication operator (defn. 2.13), as the argument to the bandwidth polynomials, and in contexts (defn. 2.21). The bandwidth polynomial gives, for each value of *n*, the maximum number of bits that can be transmitted on that channel (explored in more detail in defn. 3.3). The two-place relation *≡* stands for syntactic identity. We denote variables by the letters *x*, *y* and so on. Finally, the function *γ*(*x*) is a polynomial such that *∀a ∈* N : *γ*(*a*) *≥* 0.

**Definition 2.4** [6] An *oracle Turing machine* is a Turing machine with an extra oracle tape and three extra states *q*query, *q*yes and *q*no. When the machine enters state *q*query control passes to the state *q*yes if the contents on the oracle tape are in the oracle set; otherwise, control passes to the state *q*no.

Given an oracle Turing machine *M* , we will write *M* (*ϕ,* ***x***) to specify the behavior of *M* on input ***x*** using oracle *ϕ*.

We only consider binary oracles. Another way of saying this is that the binary oracle *ϕ* determines a set *Xϕ* since we can write *Xϕ* as *{x| ϕ*(*x*)*}*. Thus, a query to *ϕ* is a binary result saying if *x ∈ Xϕ*.

**Definition 2.5** An oracle Turing machine *M* runs in *oracle polynomial time* if there exists a polynomial *q* such that for all oracles *ϕ*, *M* (*ϕ,* ***x***) halts in time *q*(*|****x****|*) where ***x*** = *x*1*,..., xm* and *|****x****|* = *|x*1*|,..., |xm|*.

In order to query the oracle, *M* must write the number at which it wants to query the oracle on the oracle tape. If *M* runs in oracle polynomial time, then *M* (***x***) queries the oracle set with at most *q*(*|****x****|*) bits.

**Definition 2.6** Let *M* be a poly-time oracle Turing machine. We can view *M* as a *probabilistic poly-time Turing machine* if we randomly choose an or- acle from the space of oracles that can be queried in the time bound of *M* . More precisely, let *M* be an oracle machine running in time bounded by the polynomial *q*. Since *M* (***x***) can only query the oracle with at most *q*(***x***) bits, we have a finite space of oracles that run in time bounded by *q*. Call this space

**q**. Then, we can view *M* as a probabilistic poly-time Turing machine where we say that *M* (***x***) = *y* with probability *p* if, choosing an oracle *ϕ* uniformly at random from **q**, the probability that *M* (***x****, ϕ*) = *y* is *p*.

Given a poly-time probabilistic Turing machine *M* , we will write *M* (***x***) to specify the behavior of *M* on input ***x*** using a randomly chosen oracle.

**Definition 2.7** A probabilistic poly-time Turing machine *M computes* a prob- abilistic function *F* if for all inputs ***x*** and for all outputs *y* we have that *F*(***x****, y*) = Prob *M* (***x***) = *y* .

**Definition 2.8** A probabilistic function *F* is *poly-time* if it is computed by a probabilistic poly-time Turing machine.

* + 1. *Terms*

A functional term calculus based on [19,7] and a semantics for that calculus are studied in [28]. Though we omit the details here, we do note that terms can contain the security parameter *n* as well as a function *rand* that returns one random bit.

For each term *T* with variables *x*1*,..., xk*, there is a probabilistic poly-time Turing machine *MT* of *k* + 1 inputs and a polynomial *qT* (*v*1*,..., vk*+1) such that the following two theorems hold:

**Theorem 2.9** *[28] Let T be a term with k variables and let MT be the machine associated with T. Then MT* (*a*1*,..., ak, n*) *halts in time at most qT* (*|a*1*|,..., |ak|, |n|*)*.*

**Theorem 2.10** *[28] For each probabilistic poly-time function f, there exists a term T such that MT computes f.*

While there may be many assignments of Turing machines to terms that satisfy the above two theorems, for our purposes the exact nature of the assign- ment is irrelevant. In fact, we will simply consider the probabilistic poly-time Turing machine *MT* to define the meaning of the term *T* .

**Definition 2.11** We write *T −→r*

*a* on inputs *x ,...,x*

if the probability that

*e* 1 *k*

*MT* (*x*1*,..., xk, n*) = *a* is *r*. We say that *T evaluates* to *a* with probability *r*.

**Definition 2.12** We define two probabilities here: (1) the probability of two terms evaluating to the same number, and, (2) the probability of two terms evaluating to different numbers.

* + - 1. Prob= *T*1*, T*2 = Σ*a s*1*s*2,

*a*, and

where *a ∈* N*, T*1

*−s→*1

*e*

*a, T*2

*−s→*2

*e*

* + - 1. Prob*/*= *T*1*, T*2 = Σ*⟨a*1*,a*2*⟩ s*1*s*2,

1

2

1

2

1

*e*

1

2

*e*

2

* + 1. *Processes*

where *a ,a*

*∈* N*,a*

*/*= *a ,T*

*−s→*1

*a ,T*

*−s→*2

*a* .

**Definition 2.13** The syntax of processes is given by the following grammar:

*P* ::= **0** (termination)

*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*P* ) (private channel)

*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*P* ) (input)

*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩* (output)

[*T* = *T* ]*.*(*P* ) (match)

(*P | P* ) (parallel composition)

!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*P* ) (*γ*(*|n|*)-fold replication)

Every input or output on a private channel must appear within the scope of a *ν*-operator binding that channel. Otherwise the expression is considered unevaluable.

Another word about channel names. The polynomial *p*(*|n|*) associated with the channel *c* is a *bandwidth parameter* on *c*—for further details see section

3.3. Also, as mentioned in section 2.3, no channel name is associated with more than one polynomial.

For simplicity, after fixing *n*, when we evaluate a process *P* , we replace all subexpressions of *P* of the form !*γ*(*|n|*)*.R* with *γ*(*|n|*) copies of *R* in parallel. Furthermore, we define !*γ*(*|n|*)*.R* to be left associative. Finally, we assume that all channel names and variable names are *α*-renamed apart.

Finally, in what follows we will tend to omit parentheses if the parse tree of an expression is unambiguous.

**Definition 2.14** We define an *input expression* as a process of the form

*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P* and an *output expression* is of the form *cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*.

**Definition 2.15** We call a process expression with no free variables a *closed*

process expression.

**Definition 2.16** Let *P* be a process expression and let *T* be a term. If *T* is not in the scope of any input operator, we say that *T* is an *exposed term*. Similarly, let [*T*1 = *T*2]*.R* be a subexpression of *P* . We will say that [*T*1 = *T*2]*.R* is an *exposed match* if it does not appear in the scope of any input operator.

**Definition 2.17** We define the indicator function Eq?**0**(*P* ) as a unary func- tion on processes that has the value 1 when its input is the **0** process and 0 otherwise:

Eq?**0**

1. = 0 if *Q /≡* **0***,*

1 if *Q ≡* **0***.*

**Definition 2.18** *outerEval* is a probabilistic function on closed process ex- pressions and closed process expressions with all exposed terms reduced to atoms and no exposed matches:

*outerEval*(**0***,* **0**) = 1

*outerEval*(*νc .*(*P* )*, νc .*(*P '*)) = *s*1 *outerEval*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)*, cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = 1 *outerEval*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩, cp*(*|n|*)*⟨a⟩*) = *s*2 *outerEval*([*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*1)*, Q*2)

*p*(*|n|*) *p*(*|n|*)

= *s*3 *·* Prob= *T*1*, T*2 + Eq?**0**(*Q*2) *·* Prob*/*= *T*1*, T*2

*outerEval*((*P*1 *| P*2)*,* (*P ' | P '*)) = *s*4 *· s*5

1 2

*outerEval*(*P, Q*) = 0 otherwise.

where *outerEval*(*P, P '*) = *s*1,

*a ∈* N*,T −s→*2

*e a*,

*outerEval*(*Q*1*, Q*2) = *s*3, *outerEval*(*P*1*,P'*) = *s*4*, outerEval*(*P*2*,P'*) = *s*5

1

2

If *outerEval*(*P, P '*) = *s* then we say that *P outer-evaluates* to *P '* with prob-

ability *s*, or that *P −→s P '*.

*o*

The match case in the definition of *outerEval* bears some discussion. Con- sider the match [*T*1 = *T*2]*.P* . We wish to compute the probability of *P* outer- evaluating to *P '*. There are two distinct cases here:

* 1. *P ' /≡* **0**, and,
  2. *P ' ≡* **0**.

In the first case, we will only outer-evaluate *P* if the match succeeds, *i.e., T*1 = *T*2. In the second case, however, we can arrive at **0** either by passing the match and outer-evaluating *P* to **0** or by simply failing the match. Hence, the probability of outer-evaluating to *P '* is given by the sum of the product of the probability of passing the match and outer-evaluating *P* to *P '* and, in the case that we wish to outer-evaluate to a **0**, failing the match—hence the use of the indicator function in the second term of the sum.

We must be sure, however, that we do not over count in this expression. From the definition of cases i and ii we can see that *P '* can never satisfy both cases simultaneously—hence cases i and ii are disjoint. We do not over count inside case ii as the sets over which we define the two summations in case ii (one from the Prob= *T*1*, T*2 term and one from the Prob*/*= *T*1*, T*2 term) are

disjoint.

**Lemma 2.19** *Let P, Q and R be closed process expressions such that P −s−*1*−>→*0 *Q and Q −s−*2*−>→*0 *R. Then, Q has all exposed terms reduced to atoms and no exposed matches, Q ≡ R, and s*2 = 1*.*

*o*

*o*

**Proof.** By a straightforward induction on the structure of *P* . We give a sketch of the proof.

The bases, *P ≡* **0** and *P ≡ cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*, are easy to see.

In the case that *P ≡ νc .*(*P '*) we notice that *Q ≡ νc .*(*Q'*) where

*p*(*|n|*) *p*(*|n|*)

*P ' −s→*1 *Q'*. By the inductive hypothesis, we have that *Q' −→*1 *Q'* and the result

*o o*

follows. In the case that *P ≡ cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P '* we notice that *P*

*o*

*−→*1 *Q* and the

result follows. In the case that *P ≡* [*T*1 = *T*2]*.P '* we have two cases. If both

*T*1 and *T*2 evaluate to the same number then *Q ≡ Q'* where *P '*

*o*

*−→t*1 *Q'*. By

the inductive hypothesis *Q' −→*1 *Q'* and the result follows. In the case that *T*

*o* 1

and *T*2 evaluate to different numbers we can see that *Q ≡* **0** and the result follows easily. In the case that *P ≡ P*1 *| P*2 the inductive hypothesis gives us

that *P*1

*s'*

*−→*1

*o Q*1

*−→*1

*Q*1 and *P*2

*s'*

*−→*2

*o Q*2

*−→*1 *Q*

and the result follows. *✷*

So, in a composition of two *outerEvals*, only the first *outerEval* does any work. Specifically, it converts all exposed terms to atoms and eliminates all exposed matches.

*o*

*o*

2

**Corollary 2.20** *Let P and Q be processes and let −→o,m represent the m-fold composition of −→ . If P −s−>→*0 *Q, then Q −→*1 *Q.*

*o o o,m*

**Proof.** Directly from lemma 2.19. *✷*

**Definition 2.21** Let Γ be the set of expressions generated by the following grammar:

*C*[ ] ::= [ ]*i*

*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*C*[ ])

*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*C*[ ])

*P*

[*T* = *T* ]*.*(*C*[ ])

(*C*[ ] *| C*[ ])

!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*C*[ ])

where *i ∈* N.

A *context* is a process expression that is a member of Γ whose “holes” (indicated by numbered empty square brackets [ ]*i*) are numbered uniquely.

Given a context *C*[ ] and processes *P*1*,..., Pm*, the notation *C*[*P*1*,..., Pm*] means that we substitute the process *Pi* for the hole [ ]*i* in *C*[ ].

Finally, we will indicate the number of holes is a context by placing an (often un-numbered) empty square bracket for each hole in the context. For example, *C*[ ] will be a one-hole context while *D*[ ][ ][ ] has three holes.

**Definition 2.22** We will say that *B* is a *sub-process* of *A* if there exists a context *C*[ ] such that *C*[*B*] *≡ A*. If *C*[ ] */≡* [ ] we will say that *B* is a *strict* sub-process of *A*.

**Definition 2.23** Let *P* and *Q* be process expressions and *cp*(*|n|*) be a channel. We say that *P* is *bound by cp*(*|n|*) *in Q* if *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.D*[*P* ] is a sub-process of *Q* for some variable *x* and some context expression *D*[ ].

**Definition 2.24** Let *C*[ ] be a context and *P* a process. Then, *C*[ ] is *minimal for P* if every free variable of *P* is bound in *C*[*P* ] and each channel to which *P* is bound in *C*[*P* ] binds a free variable of *P* .

**Definition 2.25** The set of *schedulable processes S*(*P* ) of an outer-evaluated process *P* is defined inductively as:

*S*(**0**) = *∅*

*S*(*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*)) = *S*(*Q*) *S*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = *{cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)*} S*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*) = *{cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩}*

*S*((*Q*1 *| Q*2)) = *S*(*Q*1) *∪ S*(*Q*2)

Note that every process in *S*(*P* ) is either waiting for input or ready to output.

**Definition 2.26** The set of *communication triples C*(*P* ) is defined as:

*{⟨P*1*, P*2*, QP*1*,P*2 [ ]*⟩| P*1 *≡ cp*(*|n|*)*⟨a⟩, P*2 *≡ cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.R, Pi ∈ S*(*P* )*,*

*P ≡ QP*1*,P*2 [*P*1*, P*2]*}*

Given a process *P* and a context *QP*1*,P*2 [ ], *P*1 and *P*2 are uniquely deter- mined.

**Example 2.27** Consider the process expression:

*P ≡ cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ | cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ | cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.dq*(*|n|*)*⟨*1*⟩*

The process expression *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.dq*(*|n|*)*⟨*1*⟩* could receive its input from either one of the two output expressions. While both communications look the same, their outputs come from distinct locations in *P* . We distinguish between the two communications by associating the context [ ]1 *| cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ |* [ ]2 with the

first communication (the one where the output ‘came’ from the first process in the parallel composition) and associating the context *cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ |* [ ]1 *|* [ ]2 with the second communication (the pair where the output ‘came’ from the second process in the parallel composition). So, *C*(*P* ) is the set:

*⟨cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩, cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.dq*(*|n|*)*⟨*1*⟩,* [ ]1 *| cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ |* [ ]2*⟩ ,* ,

*⟨cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩, cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.dq*(*|n|*)*⟨*1*⟩, cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*0*⟩ |* [ ]1 *|* [ ]2*⟩*

**Definition 2.28** The set of *eligible processes E*(*P* ) is defined as:

*C*(*P* ) iff every channel in

*E*(*P* ) =

*C*(*P* ) is public,

*C*(*P* )*|*private channels otherwise.



Note that restricting *E*(*P* ) to just private channels anytime *C*(*P* ) contains a private channel ensures that all private communications occurs prior to public communication. This allows us to “hide” private communications from a prying observer by making private communications privileged.

# Evaluation

* 1. *Scheduler Reduction*

**Definition 3.1** We write [*a/x*] *P* to mean “substitute *a* for all free occur- rences of *x* in *P* .” We will define the *substitution operation* as follows:

[*a/x*] **0** = **0**

[*a/x*] *νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*) = *νcp*(*|n|*) *.*([*a/x*] *Q*)

[*a/x*] *cp*(*|n|*)(*y*)*.*(*Q*) = *cp*(*|n|*)(*y*)*.*([*a/x*] *Q*)

[*a/x*] *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*) = *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*) [*a/x*] *cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩* = *cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*(*λx.T* ) *a⟩*

[*a/x*] [*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*) = [(*λx.T*1) *a* = (*λx.T*2) *a*]*.*([*a/x*] *Q*)

[*a/x*] (*P*1 *| P*2) = ([*a/x*] *P*1 *|* [*a/x*] *P*2) [*a/x*]!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*Q*) = !*γ*(*|n|*)*.*([*a/x*] *Q*)

We can generalize the substitution operation to contexts, *i.e.,* to substituting

*a* for all free occurrences of *x* in *C*[ ].

**Definition 3.2** We define a scheduler *S* to be a probabilistic function from sets of communication triples to communication triples such that for every set of communication triples *E*, if *S*(*E, e*) *>* 0 then *e ∈ E*. If *S*(*E, e*) = *r* we will

say that the scheduler *S* picks the communication triple *e* from the set *E* with probability *r*.

**Definition 3.3** Let *a* be a natural number, *n* the value of the security param- eter, and *S* a scheduler. We will say that *P* reduces to *P '* in *one communication step with respect to S with probability r* if and only if:

*∃e ≡ ⟨P*1*, P*2*, QP*1*,P*2 [ ]*⟩∈ E*(*P* ): *S*(*E*(*P* )*, e*) = *r,*

*P*1 *≡ cp*(*|n|*)*⟨a⟩,*

*P*2 *≡ cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P ',*

2

*P ' ≡ QP ,P* [**0***,* [*a'/x*]*P'*] *,*

1 2 2

We write this as *P −→r P '*.

*S*

*a'* = *a* mod 2*p*(*|n|*) *−* 1*.*

We reduce *a* modulo 2*p*(*|n|*) *−* 1 in order to ensure that at most only the

*p*(*|n|*) least significant bits of *a* are transmitted.

By stipulating that at most *p*(*|n|*) bits of a message can be transmitted we ensure that we cannot create exponential-time processes out of polynomial- time process expressions—something that we can do if we allowed arbitrary length messages to be transmitted. Consider the process expression:

*P ≡* !*γ*(*|n|*)*.cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.cp*(*|n|*)*⟨x*2*⟩ | cp*(*|n|*)*⟨*2*⟩*

Let the polynomial *γ*(*|x|*) return *x* always. While more complex polynomials will make the results more dramatic, this choice of *γ* simplifies matters. It is clear that *P* will square its input (here initialized to 2) *n* times. We will call the output of this process *Pn*.

The table below shows outputs for several different values of *n*:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *n* | *Pn* | *|Pn|* |
| 1 | 4= 22 | 2= 21 |
| 2 | 16= 24 | 4= 22 |
| 3 | 256= 28 | 8= 23 |

4 65*,* 536 = 216 16= 24

5 4*,* 294*,* 967*,* 296 = 232 32= 25

. . .

Clearly, *P* outputs values of length exponential in *n*. Now if the output of *P* is used as the input to some poly-time process expression *Q*, then we will obtain an exponential-time process since *Q* must run on exponentially long values.

However, if we truncate the messages transmitted then no message can ever get too long, *i.e.,* exponentially long.

* 1. *Evaluation*
     1. *Macro-Step Reduction*

Intuitively, we define the *macro-step reduction* of *P* to *P '* based on the follow- ing three stage procedure:

* + - 1. We outer-evaluate *P* , yielding *R*.
      2. The scheduler picks a process triple *E* from *E*(*R*) and performs the se- lected communication. This results in the process expression *R'*.
      3. Finally, we outer-evaluate *R'*, yielding *P '*.

Thus, macro-step reduction is merely shorthand for a procedure whereby we select a communication to perform and evaluate the result until it becomes nec- essary for the next communication to be selected. The first outer-evaluation simply ensures that the process expression on which we perform the commu- nication step satisfies the condition on *S*(*P* ) specified in defn. 2.25. Barring the first outer-evaluation, then, the evaluation of process expressions becomes an alternating series of process evaluations (the outer-evaluations) and com- munication steps. We will define macro-step reduction so that it is just a communication step followed by a process evaluation—with a preceding pro- cess evaluation for the reason mentioned above.

**Definition 3.4** More precisely, *macro-step reduction with respect to scheduler*

*S* is the probabilistic function defined by the composition:

*−→o ◦* (*−→S ◦ −→o*) (3a)

The probability *r* of the macro-step reduction of *P* to *P '* is obtained directly from definition 2.2:

*r* = Σ

*b*

*Q,Q'| P −→a*

*o*

*Q−→*

*abc* (3b)

*S*

*Q'−→c*

*o*

*P'*

We will write the macro-step reduction of *P* to *P '* with respect to the scheduler

*S* with probability *r* as *P −→r*

1*,S*

*P '*.

* + 1. ***m****-Step Reduction*

**Definition 3.5** Let *P* and *P '* be two process expressions. Define the set Paths*P,P '* as:

*{{Q ,...,Q*

*}| P p*1

*Q p*2

*pm−*1

*Q*

*pm P '}*

1 *m−*1

*−→*1*,S*

1 *−→*1*,S ··· −−−→*1*,S*

*m−*1 *−→*1*,S*

We call Paths*P,P' the set of paths from P to P '*.

**Definition 3.6** The probability that *P reduces to P ' in m steps with respect to the scheduler S* is given by:

*{Q*1*,··· ,Qm*Σ*−*1*}∈*Paths*P,P '*

*p*1*p*2 *··· pm*

*p*1 *p*2

*pm−*1

*pm '*

*P −→*1*,S Q*1*−→*1*,S ···−−−→*1*,S Qm−*1*−→*1*,S P*

We write the *m*-step reduction of *P* to *P '* with probability *r* as *P −→r P '*.

*m,S*

* + 1. *Evaluation*

**Definition 3.7** We say that *P evaluates to Q with respect to the scheduler S* if, using the scheduler *S*, *P* reduces to *Q* via some number of macro-steps. We write the evaluation of *P* to *P '* with respect to the scheduler *S* as *P .→S P '*.

# Polynomial-Time Bound on Evaluation

We are interested in the worst-case time of evaluation. Since the probability of a particular reduction has no bearing on the worst-case time of evaluation, we need not consider the probabilities of the various reductions in our analysis.

Our bound on evaluation will be derived as a certain combination of three bounds: a bound on the length of any evaluation sequence, a bound on any outer-evaluation step, and a bound on any communication step.

* 1. *A Bound on the Length of any Evaluation Sequence*

**Definition 4.1** Let *P* be a process expression. We define *inputs*(*P* ), the

*number of inputs in P* , inductively as follows:

*inputs*(**0**) = 0

*inputs*(*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*)) = *inputs*(*Q*) *inputs*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = 1 + *inputs*(*Q*) *inputs*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*) = 0

*inputs*([*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*)) = *inputs*(*Q*)

*inputs*((*Q*1 *| Q*2)) = *inputs*(*Q*1)+ *inputs*(*Q*2)

*inputs*(!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*Q*)) = *γ*(*|n|*) *· inputs*(*Q*)

It is clear from the definition that *inputs*(*P* ) is a polynomial in *|n|* that is positive for all input values.

**Definition 4.2** Let *P* be a process expression. We define *outputs*(*P* ), the

*number of outputs in P* , inductively as follows:

*outputs*(**0**) = 0 *outputs*(*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*)) = *outputs*(*Q*) *outputs*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = *outputs*(*Q*) *outputs*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*) = 1 *outputs*([*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*)) = *outputs*(*Q*)

*outputs*((*Q*1 *| Q*2)) = *outputs*(*Q*1)+ *outputs*(*Q*2)

*outputs*(!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*Q*)) = *γ*(*|n|*) *· outputs*(*Q*)

It is clear from the definition that *outputs*(*P* ) is a polynomial in *|n|* that is positive for all input values.

The following lemma is straightforward.

**Lemma 4.3** *Let P be a closed process. Then, for all n and schedulers S, during any evaluation of P, at most inputs*(*P* ) *communication steps occur.*

**Corollary 4.4** *Let P be a closed process. Then, for all n and schedulers S, during any evaluation of P, at most inputs*(*P* ) *macro-steps occur.*

* 1. *A Bound on Outer-Evaluation Time*

**Definition 4.5** We have a natural number *LT* , the *length* of *T* , associated with each term *T* .

If *T* is a term, *LT* is the product of a constant and the syntactic length of *T* , *i.e., LT* = *c · length*(*T* ) where *c* is a constant. More details about *LT* can be found in the proof of lemma 4.10.

**Definition 4.6** Let *P* be a process expression and *n* be the value for the security parameter. We define a polynomial *normlength*(*P* ), the *length of P* , inductively as follows:

*normlength*(**0**) = 1 *normlength*(*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*)) = *c* + *normlength*(*Q*) *normlength*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = *c* + *normlength*(*Q*)

*normlength*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*) = *c* + *LT*

*normlength*([*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*)) = *c* + *LT*1 + *LT*2 + *normlength*(*Q*) *normlength*((*Q*1 *| Q*2)) = *c* + *normlength*(*Q*1)+ *normlength*(*Q*2) *normlength*(!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*Q*)) = *γ*(*|n|*) *· c · normlength*(*Q*)

where *c* is a constant and *LT* is the length of the term *T* .

Since the length of a term does not depend on *n* (*i.e.,* it is a constant for our purposes), it is clear from the definition that *normlength*(*P* ) is polynomial in *|n|*. Furthermore, *normlength*(*P* ) is positive for all *n*.

**Definition 4.7** Let *P* be some process. Let **p** be the set of bandwidth poly- nomials that appear in *P* . Note that **p** is a finite (polynomial in *|n|* big) set. For each *i ∈* N, let **a** be the set of the coefficients of the *xi* terms in each polynomial in **p**. Notice that **a** is finite since **p** is finite. For each *i ∈* N we

define the term *ai* as the maximum term in **a**. Since **a** is finite, the greatest

coefficient is well-defined. We then define the polynomial *χ*(*x*) as Σ*∞ aixi*.

*i*=0

Notice that *∀b ∈* N*.∀p*(*x*) *∈* **p** : *χ*(*b*) *≥ p*(*b*).

Let *P* be a process and let *χ*(*x*) be defined as per defn. 4.7. We now specify a Turing machine that will pad out *P* . The Turing machine initially rewrites each variable *x* in *P* so that it takes up *χ*(*|n|*) spaces on the input tape. It does so by inserting *χ*(*|n|*) *−* 1 blank symbols before the variable so that *x* becomes the string Δ *···* Δ *x*. Since the length of *P* is a polynomial in the size of *n* there are at most a polynomial in the size of *n* variables each of which have a polynomial in the size of *n* number of blank symbols inserted before it. Thus, it is easy to see that padding out the variables of *P* can be done by the Turing machine in at most a polynomial in the size of *n* number of steps. What this padding does is to ensure that substituting a value for *x* can be done without increasing the length of a padded process *P* (since *χ*(*|n|*) exceeds the size of any bandwidth polynomial and since we only need to write down at most a bandwidth polynomial number of bits when substituting a value for a variable, we will always have plenty of space).

During the evaluation of *P* there can be at most *inputs*(*P* ) communication steps (lemma 4.3). Let *T* be an arbitrary term in *P* . Each communication step during the evaluation of *P* can hide *T* behind one level of *λ*-abstractions; at the end of evaluation, in the worst case, *T* will be hidden behind *inputs*(*P* ) *λ*-abstractions. The increase in the length of the term *T* caused by a single *λ*-abstraction is a constant—*T* becomes (*λx.T* )*a*. The symbols added to *T* are ‘*λ*’, ‘*x*’, ‘*.*’, ‘(’, ‘)’ and ‘*a*’—recall that *a* is considered to be *χ*(*|n|*) bits long. Thus, if we add *inputs*(*P* ) *· c · χ*(*|n|*) blank spaces before each term in *P* , we will have enough space around each term to ensure that we can account for the maximal increase in the size of terms incurred during evaluation due to the creation of *λ*-abstractions during communication steps. Again, this padding can be done in a polynomial in the size of *n* amount of time since there are at most a polynomial in the size of *n* number of terms and *inputs*(*P* ) is a polynomial in the size of *n*.

Hence, padding *P* can be done in a polynomial in the size of *n* amount of time by a Turing machine.

**Definition 4.8** Let *P* be a process expression and *n* be the value for the

security parameter. We define a polynomial *length*(*P* ), the *padded length of*

*P* , inductively as follows:

*length*(**0**) = 1

*length*(*νcp*(*|n|*) *.*(*Q*)) = *c* + *length*(*Q*) *length*(*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*Q*)) = *c* + *χ*(*|n|*)+ *length*(*Q*) *length*(*cp*(*|n|*)*⟨T⟩*) = *c*1 + *LT* + *inputs*(*P* ) *· c*2 *· χ*(*|n|*)

*length*([*T*1 = *T*2]*.*(*Q*)) = *c* + (*d*1 + *LT*1 + *inputs*(*P* ) *· d*2 *· χ*(*|n|*))

+ (*e*1 + *LT*2 + *inputs*(*P* ) *· e*2 *· χ*(*|n|*)) + *length*(*Q*)

*length*((*Q*1 *| Q*2)) = *c* + *length*(*Q*1)+ *length*(*Q*2)

*length*(!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*Q*)) = *γ*(*|n|*) *· c · length*(*Q*)

where *c*, *c*1, *c*2, *d*1, *d*2, *e*1, *e*2 are constants and *LT* is the length of the term *T* .

Since the length of a term does not depend on *n* (*i.e.,* it is a constant for our purposes), it is clear from the definition that *length*(*P* ) is polynomial in

*|n|*. Furthermore, *length*(*P* ) is positive for all *n*.

The rationale behind the construction of *length*(*P* ) should be clear given the discussion of padding on page 15. Essentially, for technical reasons, we assume that a variable has length *χ*(*|n|*) (see lemma 4.10 where *χ*(*x*) is a polynomial bigger everywhere than any bandwidth polynomial that appears in *P* . This allows us to substitute values for variables without pushing symbols around since the variables leave enough space for any conceivable value. Ad- ditionally, each term leaves enough blank space for the *λ*-abstractions created by communication steps (recall that at most *inputs*(*P* ) such communication steps can occur during evaluation).

In what follows, we shall mean by the phrase “length of *P* ” the padded length of *P* and not the unpadded (normal) length of *P* unless otherwise explicitly stated.

Let us observe that the length does not increase as a result of macro-steps.

**Lemma 4.9** *Let P be a closed process and R a process such that R is the result of performing some number of macro-steps on P. Then for all n, length*(*R*) *≤ length*(*P* )*.*

We now show that any outer-evaluation step may be carried out on a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine. We rely on the assignment of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines *MT* to terms *T* discussed in section 2.3.1.

**Lemma 4.10** *Let T*1*,..., Tm be terms and let MT*1 *,..., MTm be their associ- ated probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. Let P be a closed pro-*

*cess containing terms* (*λx*1 *··· λxr.Tj*) *a*1 *··· ar, where* 1 *≤ j ≤ m. From MT*1 *,..., MTm one can construct a probabilistic Turing machine that outer- evaluates P in time polynomial in |n|.*

**Proof.** Let us make the following two assumptions. First, we assume that variables have length *χ*(*|n|*). This ensures that when we substitute a value (recall that the length of values are limited by the appropriate bandwidth polynomials due to the truncation in the communication step) for a variable, it is easy to replace the variable with the value, *i.e.,* we do not need to “push” forward the symbols following the variable in order to make room for the value we want to write down.

Second, we assume that when we evaluate a term, we only write down the *χ*(*|n|*) least significant bits of the resultant value. In principle we allow arbitrarily large values to be written down—it is only during communication that these values are truncated. However, this means that as terms evaluate the process expression we are working on might arbitrarily increase in size. Since the only time a value created by a term evaluation is used occurs when we communicate the value, truncating the value at creation does not change anything. It is true that values generated by term evaluations are used in the match—however we do not write down these values; we simply write down either **0** or the result of outer-evaluating the process expression bound to the match.

The result of these two assumptions is that each outer-evaluation either does not change the length of the process or decreases the length of the process (by replacing inputs and outputs with **0**s and evaluating matches).

If we pad *P* prior to outer-evaluating it we can guarantee these assump- tions. Furthermore the padding can be done, as we have seen, in a polynomial in size *n* amount of time.

We will now construct the desired probabilistic Turing machine, pTM. Es- sentially, the pTM must evaluate each exposed term and each exposed match in *P* (it is easy to determine if a term or match is exposed—every time an in-

put operator, say *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P* , is encountered, we consider every subexpression

of *P* as being not exposed). Since we know that *P* will only contain terms that are substitution instances of terms from the set *{T*1*,..., Tm}*, we can associate each term *Ui* from *P* with an algorithm *MTi'* where *Ti'* is the term of which *Ui* is a substitution instance. By theorem 2.9 we have that *MT* computes, in polynomial time, the value to which *Ti'* evaluates on some input. Since *Ui*

*i'*

is a substitution instance of *Ti'* we have that *Ui ≡* (*λx*1 *··· λxr.Ti'* ) *a*1 *··· ar*. Hence, we can compute the value of *Ui* by evaluating *MTi'* at *a*1*,..., ar* and *n*.

So we define our pTM so that when it encounters a substitution instance of one of those *m* terms, it invokes the appropriate algorithm (in the case that it encountered *Ui ≡* (*λx*1 *··· λxi.Ti'* ) *a*1 *... ai*, it invokes *MTi'* at *a*1*,..., a*1

and *n*). Recall that each communication step creates *λ*-substitution instances

of terms, *i.e.,* the substitution of values into terms is delayed until term-

evaluation time. So, our pTM evaluates each exposed term it encounters by evaluating the associated algorithm at the values specified by the substitution instance. Evaluating a match simply involves evaluating the two terms and writing either the **0** or outer-evaluating the bound process.

How much does this cost in the sense of time complexity? The pTM “touches” each syntactic element of the process expression *P* . Whenever it hits a term (*λx*1 *··· λxi.T* ) *a*1 *··· ai*, it evaluates *T* by evaluating the algorithm

*MT* at *a*1*,..., ai*. This takes a polynomial *qT* (*|a*1*|,..., |ai|, |n|*) time. So, the

cost of outer-evaluating *P* on a pTM is a function of both the length of *P* and the costs of evaluating each exposed term that the pTM encounters. The length of *P* is given inductively in defn. 4.8 as *length*(*P* ). Assuming that

there are terms *U*1*,..., Us* in *P* out of which the first *i* are exposed, the cost

of outer-evaluating *P* is:

*i*

Σ

*t*1(*P* ) = *c · length*(*P* )+ *LUj* + *qTj* (*|a*1*|,..., |aα*(*Uj* )*|, |n|*) (5a)

*j*=1

where *Ux ≡* (*λx*1 *··· λxb.Tx*) *a*1 *··· ab* and *α*(*Ux*) = *b*. The *LUx* term accounts for the cost of actually determining the *α*(*Ux*) arguments to *Tx*. Finally, the term *c · length*(*P* ) accounts for the cost of parsing a padded *P* to determine whether a term or an expression is exposed or not (note that the expansion in length caused by padding *P* is accounted for in the definition of *length*(*P* )).

We observe that any argument to *Tx* is at most *χ*(*|n|*) bits long. Hence

*t*1(*P* ) *≤ t*2(*P* ) where *t*2(*P* ) is:

*i* , *α*(*Uj* ) times 

*c · length*(*P* )+ Σ .*LUj* + *qTj* (¸*χ*(*|n|*)*, .*x*.*`*., χ*(*|n|*˛)*, |n|*). (5b)

*j*=1

But, *qTj* then becomes just a function of *χ*(*|n|*) and *|n|*. Since *LUj* does not depend on *n*, we can rewrite *t*2(*P* ) as:

*i*

Σ

*q*

*τ* (*P* ) = *c · length*(*P* )+

*j*=1

*'* (*χ*(*|n|*)*, |n|*)

(5c)

where *q'*

*Uj*

(*χ*(*|n|*)*, |n|*) = *LUj*

*α*(*Uj* ) times

+ *qTj* (¸*χ*(*|n|*)*, .*x*.*`*., χ*(*|n|*˛)*, |n|*).

*Uj*

Thus, clearly *τ* (*P* ) is a polynomial in *|n|* (as *length*(*P* ) is polynomial in

*|n|*) that bounds the amount of time the pTM takes to outer-evaluate *P* . *✷*

¿From probabilistic Turing machines *MT*1 *,..., MTm* we have constructed a probabilistic Turing machine that outer-evaluates *P* for all values of *n*. So, we will say that the pTM is *uniformly constructed* from the pTMs *MT*1 *,..., MTm* .

**Definition 4.11** We define *κ*(*P* ), the cost of outer-evaluating a closed process expression *P* , as:

*s*

Σ

*κ*(*P* ) = *c · length*(*P* )+

*j*=1

*'* (*χ*(*|n|*)*, |n|*)

where the process *P* has the terms *T*1*,..., Ts* and *q'*

*q*

*Tj*

*Tj*

is defined as for equation

(5c) and *c* is a constant that accounts for the cost of parsing a padded *P* to determine exposed expressions and terms.

Whereas *τ* (*P* ) is the time needed to outer-evaluate just the exposed terms and matches in *P* , *κ*(*P* ) is the cost of outer-evaluating every term and match in *P* . The following lemma is immediate.

**Lemma 4.12** *Let P be a closed process. Then, τ* (*P* ) *≤ κ*(*P* )*.*

It may also be shown that macro-steps do not increase the cost of outer- evaluation.

**Lemma 4.13** *Let P be a closed process expression and S a scheduler. Let R be a process such that R is obtained by performing a ﬁnite number of macro- steps on P. Then for all n and k, κ*(*R*) *≤ κ*(*P* )*.*

Thus we also obtain

**Lemma 4.14** *Let P be a closed process. Let R be a process such that P*

*evaluates to R in at most m macro-steps. Then τ* (*R*) *≤ κ*(*P* )*.*

* 1. *A Bound on the Communication Step*

**Lemma 4.15** *Let P be a closed process and π a communication triple. Then there exists a pTM such that for all P, π, n and k, the pTM performs the communication step indicated by π on P in time polynomial in |n|.*

**Proof.** We begin by padding *P* . This allows us to assume, as we did in the proof of lemma 4.10, that variables are *χ*(*|n|*) bits long. This means that we can easily substitute values for variables by simply overwriting the variable.

In order to perform the communication step, we make one pass to remove the input and output specified in *π*. Specifically, we rewrite the subexpression *cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.Q* specified as the input in *π* with ΔΔΔΔΔ*Q* (where Δ is a special character that the pTM ignores—this allows us to delete subexpressions of

*P* without having to push symbols around) and we rewrite the subexpression *cp*(*|n|*)*⟨a⟩* specified as the output in *π* with ΔΔΔ**0**. So, the pTM performs a pass, prior to performing the substitution indicated by the communication step, to eliminate the input and output process expressions.

We then make another pass over the process replacing all instances of *x* with *a*. Since we assume that all channels are *α*-renamed apart and that both *a* and *x* are at most *χ*(*|n|*) bits long, we can do this substitution without any

real effort except when we create a *λ*-substitution instance out of a term *T* . When this happens, we need to insert symbols. However, each communication step adds one level of *λ*-abstraction; so, when we write the process down we leave sufficient room around each term *T* , *i.e.,* we add some fixed amount of blank space after each term. Since the notation for a single *λ*-abstraction is constant sized and the value to apply to that *λ*-abstraction is at most *χ*(*|n|*) bits long, a fixed amount of space per term will suffice. We added this extra space to each term during the initial pass that padded out *P* . Essentially, we are adding a polynomial in *|n|* amount of padding to the process—the length of the expression is a polynomial in *|n|* and an upper-bound on the number of terms in the process.

Then, we can easily perform the needed rewriting necessitated by the com- munication step without moving symbols around. Thus, a single pass over the process should suffice to perform the communication step.

So, the time needed to perform the communication step is just *σ*(*P* ) = *c*0 *· length*(*P* ) where *c*0 is a constant that accounts for the multiple passes (one to eliminate the input and output expressions and another to perform the sub-

stitutions indicated by the communication step) and *length*(*P* ) accounts for the increased length caused by padding out *P* . Clearly, *σ*(*P* ) is a polynomial in *|n|* since *length*(*P* ) is such a polynomial. *✷*

**Definition 4.16** Let *P* be a process expression. We notice that if there are *inputs*(*P* ) inputs and *outputs*(*P* ) outputs in *P* , then there are at most *inputs*(*P* ) *· outputs*(*P* ) communication steps possible. Let *ci* be the constant factor that accounts for the multiples passes incurred during the evaluation of the *i*th communication step (meaning, the *i*th communication out of the set of *inputs*(*P* ) *· outputs*(*P* ) communication steps; not the communication taken at the *i*th evaluation step).

We define *ϕ*(*P* ), the cost of performing a substitution given by a commu- nication triple *π* on the closed process expression *P* , as:

*ϕ*(*P* ) = *c*0 *· length*(*P* )+ *c*1 *· length*(*P* )+ *···* + *ck · length*(*P* ) where *k* = *inputs*(*P* ) *· outputs*(*P* ).

*σ*(*P* ) is the time needed to perform the substitution specified by *π*. How- ever, *ϕ*(*P* ) is meant to bound the cost of any substitution that might possibly occur in the course of evaluating *P* . A process has *inputs*(*P* ) inputs and *outputs*(*P* ) outputs. Since an arbitrary substitution consists of one input ex- pression and one output expression, there are at most *inputs*(*P* ) *· outputs*(*P* ) possible communications that can occur. At any communication step (by lemma 4.4, there are at most *inputs*(*P* ) such steps), only one potential com- munication occurs. Hence *ϕ* is an upper bound on the time needed to perform any communication that might occur in the evaluation of *P* .

It is clear that

**Lemma 4.17** *Let P be a closed process. Then, σ*(*P* ) *≤ ϕ*(*P* )*.*

It follows from lemmas 4.9 and 4.17 that

**Lemma 4.18** *Let P be a closed process expression and S a scheduler. Let R*

*be a process such that R is obtained by a ﬁnite number of macro-steps from*

*P. Then for all n, σ*(*R*) *≤ ϕ*(*P* )*.*

* 1. *A Bound on Evaluation Time*

We now use the bounds obtained in the previous three subsections to obtain a polynomial bound on total evaluation time.

**Definition 4.19** Let *P* be a process expression. We define an *evaluation context for P* as a context *C*[ ] of the form:

*c*1*p*1(*|n|*)(*x*1) *... cipi*(*|n|*)(*xi*)*.*[ ] *| c*1*p*1(*|n|*)*⟨a*1*⟩ | · · · | ctpt*(*|n|*)*⟨at⟩*

where *t* = *i* + *inputs*(*P* ), there are no free variables in *C*[*P* ], *aj ∈* N, and each

*x*1*, ··· , xi* either appears free in *P* or does not appear at all in *P* .

We will sometimes specify that the evaluation context *C*[ ] is an (*i, t*)- evaluation context, meaning that it has *i* inputs and *t* outputs.

If *P* is a process and *C*[ ] is an evaluation context for *P* , then *C*[*P* ] is a closed process.

**Definition 4.20** Let *P ≡ P*1 *| · · · | Pm* be a process such that *P* is the result of outer-evaluating some process expression *Q*. If, for each *Pi* such that *Pi ≡ cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P '* there does not exist a *Pj* with *j /*= *i* such that *Pj ≡ cp*(*|n|*)*⟨a⟩*, we say that *P* is a *normal form*.

*i*

It should be clear from defn. 4.20 that if a process *P* is a normal form, then *P* cannot be further evaluated as *E*(*P* ) = *∅*.

**Theorem 4.21** *Let P be a process expression. Then, there exists a polyno- mial q*(*x*) *with all positive coeﬃcients such that for all n, all poly-time sched- ulers S and minimal evaluation contexts C*[ ] *for P, the process C*[*P* ] *evaluates to a normal form on a probabilistic Turing machine in time at most q*(*|n|*)*.*

The idea behind this theorem is that given a process *P* (that is possibly not closed) and an evaluation context *C*[ ] that closes *P* and provides *P* with all the necessary inputs, *C*[*P* ] evaluates, on a probabilistic Turing machine, to a normal form in at most polynomial time.

**Proof.** By lemma 4.3, we have that at most *inputs*(*C*[*P* ]) (recall that this is a polynomial in *|n|*—see defn. 4.1) communication steps (and hence macro- steps) occur during the evaluation. Thus, all we need to do is determine the time it takes to perform a macro-step.

We note that the second outer-evaluation of a macro-step composes with the first outer-evaluation of the next macro-step. Since outer-evaluation is

idempotent (lemma 2.19), neither the probability distribution nor the resul- tant process changes as a consequence of the double outer-evaluation. All that happens is that we take a little extra time.

The time to outer-evaluate any process that can be obtained by a reduction from *C*[*P* ] on a Turing machine is given by lemma 4.14 as a polynomial in

*|n|*—call this *qo*(*|n|*). Recall that outer-evaluation is performed by making a pass over the process expression and replacing each exposed term that has no free variables with a number (truncated so that its size doesn’t exceed the band-width of the channel). In the case of matches, we do not write down the value of the two terms being compared. Instead we outer-evaluate the

bound process or write down **0**. Since the length of *C*[*P* ] is polynomial in *|n|*

outer-evaluation takes time polynomial in *|n|*.

The time to perform any communication step that might arise in the eval- uation of *C*[*P* ] is given by lemma 4.18 as a polynomial, *qc*, in *|n|*. Recall that a communication step that substitutes *a* for *x* is performed by making a pass over the process expression and replacing each instance of the variable *x* with

*a*. Since the length of *C*[*P* ] is polynomial in *|n|* communication takes time polynomial in *|n|*.

However, there is an additional cost incurred in actually selecting the com- munication step. It requires a single pass over the process expression to build *S*(*C*[*P* ]) and then time proportional in *|S*(*C*[*P* ])*|* to build *E*(*C*[*P* ]). But there are at most *inputs*(*C*[*P* ]) input expressions and *outputs*(*C*[*P* ]) output expres- sions in *C*[*P* ]. Consequently *|S*(*C*[*P* ])*|* is at most *inputs*(*C*[*P* ])*·outputs*(*C*[*P* ]) which is a polynomial in *|n|*. Consequently, generating *E*(*C*[*P* ]) from *C*[*P* ] takes polynomial in *|n|* time.

Furthermore, the scheduler is defined to be poly-time, *i.e.,* given the eli- gible process set *E*(*C*[*P* ]), the scheduler takes a polynomial in *|E*(*C*[*P* ])*|* =

*|S*(*C*[*P* ])*|*2 amount of time to choose a communication step. But this is just a polynomial in *|n|*. Hence, in order to generate *E*(*C*[*P* ]) and make a choice we require a polynomial, *qd*, in *|n|* amount of time. Since macro-steps do not in- crease the length of a process expression, *qd* is an upper-bound on the amount of time required to schedule a communication when evaluating *R* where *R* is a process expression obtained from *C*[*P* ] via some number of macro-steps.

Hence the time needed for evaluation *q* is given by:

*inputs*(*C*[*P* ]) *·* *qo*(*|n|*)+ *qd*(*|n|*)+ *qc*(*|n|*)+ *qo*(*|n|*) (6) which is just a polynomial in *|n|*. *✷*

# Equivalence

**Definition 5.1** We define an *observation* to be a test on a particular public channel for a particular natural number. More precisely, we will define *Obs* to be the set of all possible observations, *i.e.,* the set of pairs *⟨i, cp*(*|n|*)*⟩* where

*i ∈* [0*..*2*p*(*|n|*) *−* 1] is a natural number and *cp*(*|n|*) is a public channel. If, during an evaluation of process expression *P* , the scheduler selects the communication triple *⟨cp*(*|n|*)*⟨i⟩, cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P , Qcp*(*|n|*)*⟨i⟩,cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.P '⟩* we will say that the observable

*'*

*⟨i, cp*(*|n|*)*⟩∈ Obs* was observed and write *P ❀ ⟨i, cp*(*|n|*)*⟩*.

**Definition 5.2** Let ∆ be the set of expressions generated by the following sub-grammar of the one which produces contexts (see defn. 2.21):

*C*[ ] ::= [ ]*i*

*cp*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.*(*C*[ ])

*P*

[*T* = *T* ]*.*(*C*[ ])

(*C*[ ] *| C*[ ])

!*γ*(*|n|*)*.*(*C*[ ])

where *i ∈* N.

An *adversarial context* is a process expression that is a member of ∆—∆ is just the subset of the set of contexts (Γ) where a hole doesn’t appear in the scope of a *ν*-operator. As for a standard context, the “holes” are numbered uniquely.

**Definition 5.3** A process *P* may contain the security parameter *n* (section 2.3). We will write *Pm* to signify that the parameter *n* is assigned the natural number *m*. A *process family P* is the set *⟨Pi| i ∈* N*⟩*. Since contexts may contain the process parameter *n*, we can define the *context family C*[ ] and the *adversarial context family C*[ ] analogously.

We evaluate a process family by picking a value for *n* and then evaluating the indicated member of the process family. In this manner we can extend all the concepts regarding process expressions and contexts to process and context families.

**Definition 5.4** We define **P** to be the set of all process families, **C** to be the set of all context families and **A** to be the set of all adversarial context families.

* 1. *Observational Equivalence*

**Definition 5.5** Let *P* be a process family. We will say that the channel name *cq*(*|n|*) *appears in P* just when there are inputs and outputs on *cq*(*|n|*) that are subexpressions of *P*.

**Definition 5.6** Let *P* and *Q* be two process families. Let **q** be the set of polynomials *q*(*x*) such that *∀y* : *q*(*y*) *>* 0. We will say that *P* and *Q* are

*observationally equivalent* if:

*∀q*(*x*) *∈* **q***.∀C*[ ] *∈* **A***.∀o ∈ Obs.∃no.∀n > no* :

Prob *Cn*

[*Pn*

] *❀ o* *−* Prob *Cn*

[*Qn*

] *❀ o ≤* 1

*q*(*n*)

If this is so, we will write that *P ∼*= *Q*.

It is our goal to define adversaries to a protocol as adversarial contexts. Then, we will be able to prove security properties by stating observational equivalences.

The idea here is that if two process families are the same, then no adver- sarial context (*i.e.,* attacker) can distinguish between the two with significant probability once the security parameter gets large enough—the probability of one process family producing an observable is indistinguishable (to within an arbitrary polynomial factor) from the probability of the other process family producing that same observable.

However, if we forced observational equivalence to hold under all con- texts, then we are essentially saying that adversaries can attack a protocol by changing the way a protocol executes (by specifying the scope of a pri- vate channel and, thereby, being able to read values transmitted on private channels). However, such attacks do not seem appropriate given our model of adversary capabilities. Hence, we discount such contexts from our definition of observational equivalence.

We can only guarantee such a property in the case that *n* is large enough as most any security system can be defeated by brute-force searches if the search-space is small enough. So, even though a context (*i.e.,* a brute force search over, say, keys) may distinguish two process families (that is break one protocol and not the other), once we up the security parameter sufficiently, that context will get defeated.

**Proposition 5.7** *∼*= *is an equivalence relation.*

Because the definition of observational equivalence involves all adversarial contexts (definition 5.6), it is plain that

**Property 5.8 (**SUBST-EQ**)** *P ∼*= *Q ⇐⇒ ∀C*[ ] *∈* **A** : *C*[*P*] *∼*= *C*[*Q*]*.*

We shall refer to the property SUBST-EQ as the rule of *substitutive equiva- lence*.

A series of properties follow immediately from SUBST-EQ.

**Property 5.9 (**REPL-EQ**)** *If P ∼*= *Q then* !*r*(*|n|*)*.P ∼*= !*r*(*|n|*)*.Q where r is a polynomial such that ∀a ∈* N : *r*(*a*) *≥* 0*.*

**Property 5.10 (**OUTPUTS-EQ**)** *If P ∼*= *Q then:*

*c*1*p*(*|n|*)*⟨m*1*⟩ | · · · | cip*(*|n|*)*⟨mi⟩ | P ∼*= *c*1*p*(*|n|*)*⟨m*1*⟩ | · · · | cip*(*|n|*)*⟨mi⟩ | Q*

**Property 5.11 (**MATCH-EQ**)** *If P ∼*= *Q then* [*T*1 = *T*2]*.P ∼*= [*T*1 = *T*2]*.Q.*

**Property 5.12 (**REST-SUBST-EQ**)** *Let* **A** *⊆ {R| R is a process family} be a set such that* **0** *∈* **A***. Let P and Q be process families. Then,*

*∀A ∈* **A***.* (*A | P ∼*= *A | Q*) *⇐⇒ P ∼*= *Q.*

**Property 5.13 (**PARALLEL-COMP**)** *If P*1 *∼*= *P*2 *and Q*1 *∼*= *Q*2*, then P*1 *| Q*1 *∼*= *P*2 *| Q*2*.*

Another basic property of observational equivalence involves the relation- ship among the probabilistic polynomial-time computable functions, the terms of our calculus, and the polynomial-time oracle Turing machines, described in section 2.3.1.

**Property 5.14 (**EQ-DISTRIB**)** *Let f and g be probabilistic polynomial-time computable functions such that range*(*f* ) = *range*(*g*) = *X ⊆* N *and both f and g induce the same distribution on X. Let Tf be the term such that MTf computes f and Tg be the term such that MTg computes g. Then there exists a polynomial q such that cq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩ ∼*= *cq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tg⟩.*

# Cryptographic examples

Let us show that our asymptotic notion of observational equivalence be- tween probabilistic polynomial-time processes coincides with the traditional notion of *indistinguishability by polynomial-time statistical tests*, a standard way of characterizing cryptographically strong pseudorandom number gener- ators [37,17,16,25,15].

*6.0.1 Pseudorandom Number Generators*

We begin by recalling several standard notions from cryptographic literature [37,17,16,25,15].

**Definition 6.1** [function ensemble] A *function ensemble f* is an indexed fam- ily of functions *{fn* : *An → Bn}n∈*N.

The reader might wish to review defns. 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 for details before proceeding.

**Definition 6.2** A function ensemble *f* : *An → Bn* is *uniform* if there exists a single Turing machine *M* that computes *f* for all values of *n*, *i.e., M* (*n, x*) = *fn*(*x*).

**Definition 6.3** A uniform function ensemble *f* : *An → Bn* is *poly-time* if there exists a polynomial *q* and a single Turing machine *M* such that *M* (*n, x*) computes *fn*(*x*) in time at most *q*(*|n|, |x|*).

**Definition 6.4** A uniform function ensemble *f* : *An × Bn →* [0*,* 1] is *proba- bilistic poly-time* if there exists a single probabilistic poly-time Turing machine

*M* such that *M* (*n*) computes *fn*.

**Definition 6.5** A *poly-time statistical test A* : *{*0*,* 1*}m*(*|n|*) *× {*0*,* 1*}→* [0*,* 1] is a *{*0*,* 1*}*-valued probabilistic poly-time function ensemble.

**Definition 6.6** [pseudorandom number generator] Let *q*(*x*) be a positive poly- nomial. A *pseudorandom number generator* (PRNG) is a uniform polynomial time function ensemble *f* : *{*0*,* 1*}k*(*|n|*) *→ {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) such that for all poly-time statistical tests *A*:

*—* Prob *A*(*r*) = “1” *≤* 1

*∀q*(*x*)*.∃no.∀n > no* : Prob*s∈R{*0*,*1*}k*(*|n|*) *A*(*fn*(*s*)) = “1”

*r∈R{*0*,*1*}l*(*|n|*)

*q*(*n*)

In general, *f* : *{*0*,* 1*}k*(*|n|*) *→ {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) is an interesting PRNG only when

*∀x ∈* N*.l*(*x*) *> k*(*x*).

The reader might wish to review the definition of a probabilistic func- tion (defn. 2.1) and composition of probabilistic functions (defn. 2.2) before proceeding.

**Definition 6.7** Let *f* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}q*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] be a probabilistic poly-time function ensemble. 7 Let *Tf* be a term such that *MT* computes *f* . Then, we say that *cq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩* is the *characteristic process family for f with respect to channel cq*(*|n|*).

*f*

Let *f* : *{ϵ} × {*0*,* 1*}q*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] be a probabilistic poly-time function ensemble and let *Pf ≡ cq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩* be its characteristic process family with r espect to channel *cq*(*|n|*). Then it is easy to see that *∀i ∈* N : Prob *f* (*ϵ*) =

*i*

= Prob ((*cq*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.***0**) *| Pf* ) *❀ ⟨i, cq*(*|n|*)*⟩* . This is the probability that *Pf* is

willing to communicate *i* on channel *cq*(*|n|*).

**Lemma 6.8** *Let A* : *{*0*,* 1*}m*(*|n|*) *× {*0*,* 1*} →* [0*,* 1] *be a poly-time statistical test. Let f* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}m*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] *be a probabilistic poly-time function ensemble and let Pf be its characteristic process family with respect to channel cm*(*|n|*)*. Then one can construct an adversarial context family CA*[ ] *using a new channel d*1*, such that for any ﬁxed value for n, it is the case that*

*∀i ∈* N : *Prob* (*A◦ f* )(*ϵ*) = *i* = *Prob CA*[*Pf* ] *❀ ⟨i, d*1*⟩ .*

**Proof.** If *A* is a poly-time statistical test then using theorem 2.10 we can construct the context family *CA*[ ] *≡* ((*d*1(*x*)*.***0**) *|* (*cm*(*|n|*)(*x*)*.d*1*⟨TA⟩ |* [ ]). Note that *CA*[ ] is an adversarial context family.

By assumption, *Pf* is the characteristic process family for *f* with respect to channel *cm*(*|n|*). Furthermore, *TA* is produced from *A* using theorem 2.10. Hence, the observables *⟨*0*, d*1*⟩* or *⟨*1*, d*1*⟩* are observed during evaluation of

7 *ϵ* is a dummy symbol. We wish to define a probabilistic function ensemble that takes no input and produces a probabilistic output. However *{} ×A* = *{}* where *A* is any set. Hence, we have function take as input a single dummy value *ϵ*.

*CA*[*Pf* ]. The probability that *⟨*0*, d*1*⟩* is observed must be the same as the probability that (*A ◦ f* )(*ϵ*) = 0. Similarly, the probability that *⟨*1*, d*1*⟩* is observed must be the same as the probability that (*A◦ f* )(*ϵ*) = 1. *✷*

We will say that an adversarial context family so constructed is a *poly-time attacker*.

**Definition 6.9** Let *P* be a process family and *o* an observable. We will say that *f* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*} →* [0*,* 1] is an *indicator for P with respect to o* when Prob *P ❀ o* = Prob *f* (*ϵ*) = 1 and Prob *P /❀ o* = Prob *f* (*ϵ*) = 0 .

**Lemma 6.10** *Let C*[ ] *be an adversarial context family and let o be an observ- able. Let f* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}m*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] *be any probabilistic poly-time function ensemble and let Pf be its characteristic process family. Then one can specify a poly-time statistical test t from the pair ⟨C*[ ]*, o⟩ such that t◦f is an indicator for C*[*Pf* ] *with respect to the observable o.*

**Proof.** We construct *t* as follows. We compute *t◦f* by evaluating *C*[*dq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩*] (where *MTf* computes *f* ) and returning 1 if the observable *o* was generated and

*o* and that Prob (*t ◦ f* )(*ϵ*) = 0 = Prob *C*[*dq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩*] */❀ o* . *✷*

0 otherwise. It is easy to see th at Prob (*t ◦ f* )(*ϵ*) = 1 = P rob *C*[*dq*(*|n|*)*⟨Tf ⟩*] *❀*

Clearly, given an adversarial context family and a process family, each

potential observable defines a poly-time statistical test.

We can now prove that an algorithm taking short strings to long strings is pseudorandom if and only if the process given by the algorithm, when evaluated on a short random input, is observationally equivalent to the process that returns a long random seed.

**Definition 6.11** A function ensemble *f* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] is *ran- dom poly-time* if *f* with respect to *n* is a poly-time function such that *∀x ∈*

*{*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) : *f* (*ϵ, x*) = 1 .

2*l*(*|n|*)

**Theorem 6.12** *Let f'* : *{*0*,* 1*}k*(*|n|*) *→ {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) *(∀x ∈* N*.l*(*x*) *> k*(*x*)*) be a uniform poly-time function ensemble. Let v* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] *and s* : *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}k*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1] *be uniform poly-time random function ensembles. Deﬁne f as f' ◦ s. Let F (resp. R) be the characteristic process family for f (resp. v).*

*Then, f' is a PRNG if and only if F ∼*= *R.*

Let *MTr* compute *v* and let *MTf* compute *f* . Then, *F* is a process family that, essentially, transmits a random seed generated by *s* to *f'* (a candidate PRNG—note that the type of *f' ◦ s* is *{ϵ}× {*0*,* 1*}l*(*|n|*) *→* [0*,* 1]) via function composition, and then transmits the value output by *Tf* on a public channel. In contrast, *R* is a process family that simply transmits the value output by *Tr* (a function that returns truly random values of the same length as those generated by *Tf* ) on a public channel.

**Proof.** Assume that *F ∼*= *R* and that, by way of producing a contradiction, *f'* is not a PRNG. Then, we have that there exists a poly-time statistical test *A* that distinguishes between the output of *f'* given a random input value (a seed) and the output of a truly random source. That is to say:

*∃q*(*x*)*.∀no.∃n > no* : Prob*x∈R{*0*,*1*}k*(*|n|*) *A*(*f* (*x*)) = “1”

*'*

*—* Prob *A*(*y*) = “1” *>* 1

*y∈R{*0*,*1*}l*(*|n|*)

*q*(*n*)

But we have that *∀j ∈* N : Prob*x∈*

and *∀j ∈* N : Prob*y∈*

*{*0*,*1*}k*(*|n|*) *f'*(*x*) = *j* = Prob (*f' ◦ s*)(*ϵ*) = *j*

*R*

*R*

*{*0*,*1*}l*(*|n|*) *y* = *j*

= Prob *v*(*ϵ*) = *j*

. Hence, by lemma 6.8,

we can construct a poly-time attacker *C*[ ] that distinguishes between *F* and

*R* with the same probability that *A* distinguishes between *f* and *v*. So *C*[ ] will distinguish between *F* and *R* with probability greater than 1 for some

*q*(*n*)

polynomial *q* (as *A* distinguishes between *f* and *v* with probability greater than 1 ), thus producing a contradiction.

*q*(*n*)

Now, assume that *f'* is a PRNG and that, by way of producing a contradic- tion, *F /∼*= *R*. Then we have that for some polynomial *p* there exists an adver- sarial context family *D*[ ] that distinguishes between the two processes with probability greater than 1 for some polynomial *p*. Let the distinguishing ob-

*p*(*n*)

se rvation be *⟨i, dq*(*|n|*)*⟩*. We notice that Prob *D*[*F*] *❀* *⟨j, cl*(*|n|*)*⟩* = Prob *f* (*ϵ*) =

*j*

where *j ∈* N and that Prob *D*[*R*] *❀ ⟨j, cl*(*|n|*)*⟩*

= Prob *v*(*ϵ*) = *j*

. We

can then use lemma 6.10 to construct a poly-time statistical test that distin-

guishes between the output of *f* and a truly random source with precisely the same probability that *D*[ ] distinguishes between *F* and *R*, thereby creating a contradiction. *✷*

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