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[](http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.eij.2021.04.001&domain=pdf)Building a trust model system to avoid cloud services reputation attacks

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The safety of cloud services within a Trust Model System (TMS) is certainly compromised by a lack of defense against security threats as well as by inaccuracy of the trust results. Our proposed model addresses well-known security threats to the reputation trust model system, and is shown to deal with all possible potential attack threats, such as Sybil, on–off, and collusion attacks, by specifying the identity of users and tracking activities undertaken by them in order to easily track unauthorized consumers or attackers and to provide proof of any kind of data leakage. The TMS can also oversee the authorization of whoever uploads feedback into the system. It can also identify invalid feedback and discard it from the system. The algorithms of the TMS first establish a variety of trust criteria in which trustworthiness is calculated. Then, feedback from the cloud service provider nodes is accepted only according to the rules of the TMS. A consumer’s trust value is finally computed using a flexible system capable of guaranteeing a good balance of consumer trust and owners’ feedback. Furthermore, a majority of the existing TMS mod- els do not take full account of interaction importance, thus impeding the accuracy of the trust values, a shortcoming that has been rectified in our proposed model.

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1. Introduction

Consumers of cloud computing services are constantly exposed to a variety of threats, including trust and reputation attacks. These threats arise from the highly dynamic, distributed, and non- transparent nature of cloud computing services [[1]](#_bookmark27), which makes it extremely challenging for cloud service providers and consumers to maintain and manage trust within the cloud system [[2]](#_bookmark28). Risks can also be attributed to the fact that cloud computing services are offered in a public domain, which gives access to many users. Threats are evident from the behavior of malicious users of cloud services who frequently submit feedback on their experiences with other cloud service consumers.

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According to Noor, Sheng, and Alfazi [[1]](#_bookmark27), service providers’ feed- back on their clients is a good source of information that can be used to assess the trustworthiness of cloud service consumers. Var- alakshmi, Judgi, and Balagi [[3]](#_bookmark29) also highlight the importance of ser- vice providers’ feedback in computing trust for cloud-based service consumers. Trust management systems and detection systems for reputation attacks have been extensively used by cloud computing providers and consumers to enhance the security and privacy of online data.

Despite the availability of trust management and reputation attack detection systems, cloud computing systems still experience targeted attacks from a variety of sources [[4,5,6]](#_bookmark21). The literature reveals a gap in the availability of detection strategies targeted against reputation attacks [[7,8]](#_bookmark21). This study will therefore provide essential insights on how reputation attack detection can be effectively used for effective assessment in cloud services, and particularly in addressing the reputation attacks that undermine trust assessment in cloud computing. This research will contribute significantly to the existing literature on how consumers and pro- viders of cloud services can enhance the security and privacy of the services, hence improving the overall user experience.

The fact that cloud services are often provided in the public domain makes security and privacy crucial and ought to be main-

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tained as public platforms that can be accessed by a wide range of users [[9,10,11]](#_bookmark21). The invention of cloud data storage is certainly rev- olutionary, as it has eliminated the costliness, inconvenience, and need for more space that additional hardware brings. It allows sig- nificantly large amounts of data to be stored at a low cost [[12,13]](#_bookmark21). This has dramatically increased the number of cloud services offered online as well as the number of consumers of such services. However, privacy and security have always been a challenge for digitally available data, as most of the data resides in the public domain, where every model of trust management service is endan- gered by some security threats [[14]](#_bookmark22). These threats may either ele- vate the reputation of a specific entity with malicious intentions or entirely ruin it. Security threats that endanger a trust management service may sometimes arise from the consumers of the service themselves. However, in such cases, it can be very difficult to determine which kind of activities are malicious.

* 1. *Problem statement*

Authorization issues concerning access to cloud computing storage are of serious concern when there are a large number of consumers using the big data of cloud computing for sensitive data [[15,16,17]](#_bookmark23). In most cases this has resulted in the use of access con- trols in cloud computing server application platforms. Neverthe- less, a serious lack of reliability has been discovered on access controls associated with distributed systems. This has been largely caused by failure to establish consumers’ identity in advance and their dynamic and complex population [[18,19]](#_bookmark24). Such concerns can be properly attended to through the integration of control models with trust models as a better alternative for decentralized systems [[20,21]](#_bookmark25). These models have resulted from a series of attempts by developers to design new trust models capable of resolving the most intricate and advanced issues of authorization [[22,23]](#_bookmark26). There have been several proposals on integrated trust models with access controls that are still vulnerable to some attacks [[24,25]](#_bookmark30). These threats may either elevate the reputation of any entity with a distinct extent with malicious intentions or entirely ruin it [[26]](#_bookmark31). The security threats endangering a trust man- agement service may sometimes arise from the consumers of the service themselves.

One of the common types of threats in cloud environments is an on–off attack, where the user of a cloud service acts maliciously within a small time period but resumes the proper code of conduct afterward with the aim of deceiving the trust system and main- taining his/her own reputation. Another type of threat is a collu- sion attack, also called collusive malicious feedback behaviors, in which a group of people acting in concert gives false feedback aimed at ruining the reputation of someone else (a slandering attack) or increasing their own position (a self-promoting attack). Finally, there is the Sybil attack, where the attacker begins by cre- ating multiple memberships within the trust management service. Afterward, he/she make use of these fake identities in giving par- ticular people/entities regular feedback, which could either be pos- itive or negative. As such, the adversary is capable of boosting or ruining the reputation of those entities. This paper focuses on building a Trust Model System (TMS) that ensures the security of a cloud storage system by preventing reputation attacks.

* 1. *Contribution*

Among the key security requirements in cloud computing is access control. This is due to the fact that user access occurs remo-

tely when an organization transfers its applications to the cloud, which calls for the need to establish access control policies. Several studies have addressed a wide range of access control policies that seem suitable for implementation in cloud computing, but it is still vulnerable to some threats. In order to cover all threats in the pro- posed trust model, we will propose strategies that must be taken into consideration when we design our trust evaluation process. This paper will endeavor to decide the best possible solution to the trust issues with access control approaches and will propose trust models that can improve the security of information in dis- tributed storage frameworks that utilize cryptographic access con- trol approaches. In the investigation, it was determined that a trust model should provide accurate results in the assessment of trust- worthiness, which is the basis of our plan for the proposed trust- based distributed storage framework. The plan permits trust proto- types to be coordinated into a framework that utilizes the crypto- graphic access control approach. To make this effective, we propose a trust model that contributes to the following:

* + - Upholding the utmost privacy of the consumers of cloud ser- vices, as their association with the trust management services may involve highly sensitive data.
    - Effectively protecting cloud services through effective detection of malicious as well as unbecoming behaviors by applying trust algorithms that detect on–off attacks, collusion attacks, and Sybil attacks, where each trust algorithm employs different cri- teria to avoid reputation attacks.
    - Ensuring trust management service availability sufficient to cloud services’ dynamic nature.
    - Offering reliable solutions for preventing reputation attacks and making consumers’ trust values more accurate by taking inter- action importance into consideration.
  1. *Related works*

The number of techniques used to assess and manage trust for online services has been growing recently. The techniques, accord- ing to Noor, Sheng, and Alfazi [[1]](#_bookmark27) in 2013, are informed by feedback from consumers of cloud services. The advantage of this study is that the techniques focus on detecting the occasional and periodic reputation attacks that frequently hinder the security and privacy of cloud computing. However, the authors did not focus on how to prevent these attacks.

The evident lack of focus on solutions for periodic and occa- sional reputation attacks on cloud services can be attributed to the dynamic nature of cloud computing, which is further compli- cated by the fact that a single consumer may own multiple accounts for accessing a single service. The study by Noor, Sheng, and Alfazi [[12]](#_bookmark21) in 2013 provided essential information regarding the efficiency of occasional attack detection models in detecting occasional and period reputation attacks but did not focus on specific attacks such as on–off attacks. In 2014, Noor, Sheng, and Bouguettaya [[27]](#_bookmark32) also explored trust management in cloud computing, but their work not discuss how trust management models could avoid the three mentioned attacks. In 2015, Tong, Liang, Lu, and Jin [[28]](#_bookmark33) proposed a trust model that considers score value similarity and collusion size score but does not consider the effect of scoring time, nor include provisions to avoid all reputa- tion attacks.

Similarly, in 2015 Labraoui, Gueroui, and Sekhri [[29]](#_bookmark34) carried out a study to assess the effectiveness of trust and reputation networks in hindering reputation attacks. The study proposed the on–off (O2)

trust mitigation for trust systems, which is used in wireless sensor networks. The mitigation system works by penalizing the history of misbehavior on each network node. The penalties affect the trust value of each network node, hence averting the consequences of

expressed as a percentage. Interaction Trust (*IT*) is calculated as [(1)](#_bookmark1).

misbehavior. The main contribution of this study is that it provides essential information regarding the O2 Trust approach. However, it

*n*—1

*IT*(*CR*) =

X

*at* (*CR*) + *PCR*

*at* (*CR*) + *PCR* + *bt*(*CR*) + *NCR*

*i*

(1)

does not explore whether the same approach would be effective in averting collusion and Sybil Attacks.

In 2018, Ghafoorian, Abbasinezhad-Mood, and Shakeri [[30]](#_bookmark35) also explored the use of the role-based access control (RBAC) model as a

P

*i*=1 *i*

*i*

*t t* ··· *at t*

*a*

*a*

*n*—1

*a*

1 2

*n*

0 1

*CR*1 *V* 1;1 *V* 1;2 ··· *V* 1;*n*—1 *V* 1;*n*

*CR*2

*V* 2;1 *V* 2;2

··· *V* 2;*n*—1 *V* 2;*n*

trust and reputation-based model used to secure data storage in the cloud. The study found that the RBAC model is effective in addressing security threats related to the trust and reputation of

cloud-based systems. In another study in 2018 [[31]](#_bookmark36), the authors

*n i*=1

*at* (*CR*) = . .

. .

*i*

B

C

. .

@

A

*CRn Vn*;1

. . . .

. .

.

*Vn*;2 ··· *Vn*;*n*—1 *Vn*;*n*

*b*1*t b*2*t* ··· *bn* — 1*t bnt*

*CR*

*V* 2; 1 *V* 2; 2

··· *V* 2; *n* — 1

*V* 2; *n*

@

tried to decrease the overhead of the trust model while improving

*CR*1 0 *V* 1; 1 *V* 1; 2 ··· *V* 1; *n* — 1

*V* 1; *n* 1

the detection rate of malicious nodes. However, they did not con-

P *i* = 1 *bi* (*CR*) = . 2 B . . .

### . . C

sidered all security requirements for the metrics of a reputation-

based system.

*n t* . .

. A

Other approaches for managing trust and reputation in cloud systems have been explored. In 2019, Nwebonyi, Martins, and Cor- reia [[32]](#_bookmark37) and Chang [[33]](#_bookmark38) investigated the effectiveness of different

*PCR*

= *n*

*NCR*

*at* (*CR*)×*II NF*

*bt* (*CR*)×*II*

*n*

=

*NF*

*CRn*

*Vn*; 1

*Vn*; 2

···

*Vn*; *n* — 1

*Vn*; *n*

models in averting reputation and trust threats in cloud-based sys- tems. However, these studies primarily focus on the overall secu- rity and privacy of the system, thereby failing to address some of the specific attacks.

In a 2020 study [[34]](#_bookmark39), where the authors proposed a QoS-based model for trust evaluation of cloud service providers by calculating accumulative trust value. However, the authors did not focus on how to avoid all reputation attacks.

* 1. *Organization*

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the material and methods for a solution that prevents on–off, collusion, and Sybil attacks. In section 3, we analyze the components of the trust model. In section 4, we present the simu- lation results for reputation attacks. Finally, in sections 5 and 6 we discuss the results, along with plans for future works, and provide

a conclusion.

*i*

*i*

× *PO*2 )

Where *at* represents positive feedback at a specific time, *bt*

represents negative feedback at a specific time, *P* represents

the value of new positive recommender feedback, *N* represents the value of new negative recommender feedback, *II* represents the interaction importance value, and *NF* represents the feedback number.

To avoid the danger of on–off attacks (*O*2), we need to add the penalty for an on–off attack (*PO*2 ), which is set from 1 to *n*, such that 1 represents no danger from a consumer role, and *n* represents high interaction importance multiplied by the danger rate (*DR*). The trust model will compute *PO*2 for any consumer by applying a new procedure, where *PCO*2 represents the limit of a minimum of the interactions with the greatest value.

( *if II* ≥ *PC and a* < *II then P* = *II* × *DR*

*O*2 *t O*2

*n*

*else PO*2 = 1

*n*—1 *t*

*IT*(*CR*) = X *ai* (*CR*)+ *PCR*

2. Material and methods

*i*=1

(*at* (*CR*)+ *P*

*CR*

)+ (*bt*(*CR*)+ *N*

*CR*

(2)

This study will focus on three types of attacks, which have sev- eral similarities, although they differ in how they are perpetrated in a cloud computing environment.

* 1. *On-off attacks*

In a direct trust model, on–off attacks are characterized by

We also need to add penalty of trust decline (*PTD*) to avoid dan- gers of trust decline (*TD*)*,* where *PTD* is set from 1 to *n*, such that 1 represents no danger from this consumer role and *n* represents

high danger, *PCTD* represents the curve of a penalty of trust decline with an integer greater than 1, and *LII* represents the limit of low interaction.

opportunistic malicious behavior at different nodes, which com- promises the trust of the system. The behavior switches between good/bad, creating a facade that makes the node pass as trust- worthy even when it is behaving badly [[29]](#_bookmark34). For example, a node

*i*

*n*—1

*IT*(*CR*) =

X

*i*=1

(*at* (*CR*)+ *PCR*

*at* (*CR*)+ *PCR*

)+ (*bt*(*CR*)+ *NCR*

*i*

*i*

× *PO*2 × *PTD*)

# (3)

that passes as trustworthy on an e-commerce site can initiate malicious behavior, remaining undetected because the system initially considered the node trustworthy. First, the trust model system will calculate the interaction trust (*IT*), which provides an accurate result for the trust value of each cloud service con- sumer (*CR*) by computing the service providers (*SP*'*s*) interaction importance (*II*)*.* The feedback (*F*) is regarding an interaction is

*t TD TD*

*n*

*if a* < *II then P* = *PC*

*else PTD* = 1

P

*PCTD* = *TD II PTD*

*P*

>*L*

To avoid this attack, we use *PCTD* to determine the value of pen- alty of trust decline (*PTD*) and we use the danger rate (*DR*) and the penalty for on–off attacks (*PO*2 ). Algorithm 1 is as follows:

Algorithm 1: On/off Attack Algorithm

*Input*: *F*, *II*;

*Output*: *Consumer Trust Value*;

*1: procedure Interaction Trust*

*2: at* (*CR*) = *F*

*n*

*3: bt* (*CR*) = *F* — 1

*n*

*4: PCR* ← (*at* (*CR*)× *II*)/*NF*

*n*

*5: NCR* ← (*bt* (*CR*)× *II*)/*NF*

*n*

*6: if II* ≥ *PCO*2 *and at* < *II then PO*2 = *II* × *DR*

*n*

*7: else PO*2 = 1

*8: endif*

*9: if at* < *II then PTD* = *PCTD*

*n*

*10: elsePTD* = 1

*11: f or i* = 1, *i* ≤ *n* — 1;

*12: IT*(*CR*) ← *at* (*CR*) + *PCR* / *at* (*CR*) + *PCR*

*i*

*i*

+ *bt*(*CR*) + *N*

× *PO*2 × *PTD* )

recommenders cooperate to decrease the trust value of a specific consumer in the TMS.

To prevent collusion attacks, we propose a new solution by cal- culating three criteria representing different factors. The first crite- rion is malicious recommendations detection (*MRD*), which detects suspicious recommenders’ groups by measuring the probability of a suspicious recommender’s group being a collusion recom- mender’s group. In this criterion, the trust model will compute the time range of the collusion attack to determine the time range of all attacks that have happened in a short time. If there are any attacks from malicious recommenders to a specific consumer, the time range of these attacks will be very small. After that, the trust model will calculate the second criterion, malicious recom- menders’ behavior (*MRB*), which represents the similarity of mali- cious recommenders’ behaviors, which will be more similar when the malicious recommenders attack a specific consumer. The mali- cious recommendations detection (*MRD*) and malicious recom-

*i*

*CR*

menders’ behavior (*MRB*) are calculated as (4).

8> *for i* = 1 *t on* — 1

> 8>

*13: end f or*

> >

*if T*(*F* , *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*F* , *CR*)*FS* ≤ *TR*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* ≥ *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FSand V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* ≤ *maxVR*

*n*

*i*

*14: endif*

*15: end procedure*

>< ><

*then move*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FSfrom FS to SS*

*else if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* ≤ *TR*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS*

> >

< *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS*

— *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS*

≥ *minVR*

We can examine an example of an on–off attack detailed below. The

> >

: *endfor*

8

*then move*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FSfrom FS to SS*

*end else if*

>> >:

*end if*

example should exhibit how the penalty of on–off attack and pen- alty of trust decline impacts the roles’ trust values.

8> *for i* = 1 *t on*

> >

*and V* (*F* , *CR*)

*if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS*

*FS*

≥ *V* (*F* , *CR*)*SSand V* (*F* , *CR*)*FS* — *V* (*F* , *CR*)

— *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*SS*

≤ *TR*

*SS*

≤ *maxVR*

Let us assume the last value of *IT*(*CR*) = 0.75 and *PCO*2

= 0.61,

>>>< >>><

*n* *i*

*then move*(*Fn*, *CR*)

*else if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*SS* ≤ *TR*

*then move*(*F* , *CR*)*FSfrom FS to SS*

*n* *i*

*FSfrom FS to SS*

which represents the limit of a minimum of the interactions with

the greatest value, and this value should be more than 0.5 to

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS*

> >

< *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SS*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS*

— *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SS*

≥ *minVR*

1.00, which is determined by the cloud administer. We have two conditions to apply this penalty in our formula. The first condition is if the interaction importance (*II*) is greater than or equal to *PCO*2 ,

and the second condition is the new feedback *at* is less than the

*n*

interaction importance *II*

>>> >>:

*n*

*end else if end if*

:

*endfor*

8>< *TR* = *T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *TC*

( ) of last interaction. If these two condi-

tions hold, then the trust model will compute the penalty of an on–off attack as *PO*2 = *II* × *DR*. Now, let us assume that the value

## *where*

*maxVR* = *V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *VC*

>: *minVR* = —*V*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *VC*

(4)

of the new feedback is *at* = 0.60 and the interaction importance

*n*

of these interactions is *II* = 0.90and the danger rate is *DR* = 3. In

this case, the trust model will compute the penalty of the on–off

attack *PO*2 = 0.90 × 3 = 2.7. Then, the TMS will calculate the new trust value of this consumer as follows:

*IT*(*CR*) = P*n*—1 *at* (*CR*)+*PCR*

*i*=1

*i*

2

(*at* (*CR*)+*PCR* )+(*bt* (*CR*)+*NCR* ×*PO* ×*PTD* )

*i*

*i*

The TMS will compare the time and the value of all feedback in the feedback set (*FS*) that are given to a specific consumer. In the first comparison, the TMS will compare the time of last feedback *T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* and the time of all *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* except for the last feed- back. After that, the TMS will compare between the value of the

last feedback *V F CR FS* and the value of all *V F CR FS* except the

( *n*,

)

( *i*,

)

last feedback. Then the trust model will compare between the time

*n*—1 0.75+0.27

*IT*(*CR*) = P = 0.45

*i*=1 (0.75+0.27)+(0.25+0.18×2.7×2)

*T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* and the value *V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* of the last feedback in feedback

*PCR* = 0.60×0.90 = 0.27

*SS SS*

0 2 set (*FS*) and the time *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)

and the value *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)

of all feed-

*NCR* =

2

.40×0.90 = 0.18

back in the suspected set (*SS*). In this way, the TMS will place all suspected feedback into the suspected set (*SS*). *TC* and *VC* are

* 1. *Collusion attacks*

A collusion Attack is a type of malicious behavior that is charac- terized by fake feedback from a single node, which is targeted at decreasing or increasing the productivity of ratings of products on an e-commerce site [[35]](#_bookmark40). The behavior can also be non- collusive, whereby the node gives multiple misleading feedback items as a way of self-promoting or slandering another entity. If

two parameters to determine the range of feedback time and feed- back value.

To detect the malicious recommendations, or collusion feed- back, the trust model will compute the third criterion, the collusion attack frequency (*CAF*) for each recommender who has feedback in

the suspected set *SS* = {*SF*1, *SF*2, ··· , *SFn*}, where the higher the fre-

quency of attacks, the greater the strength of the attack.

malicious users comprise greater than 50% in the trust model sys- tem, the TMS will be ineffective. This attack also threatens the cor- rectness of recommendation trust values. There are two main types

*CAF*

*FN*(*SR*, *CR*)

(*SR*, *CR*) = *FN*(*SS*, *CR*) (5)

of collusion attacks: a self-promoting attack, where the malicious recommenders cooperate to increase the trust value of a specific consumer in the TMS, and a slandering attack, where the malicious

*if CAF*(*SR*, *CR*) ≥ *FL then move SF* (*SR*, *CR*) *to CS*

*else move SF* (*SR*, *CR*) *to FS*

8<

: *end if*

First, the trust model will compute the collusion attack fre- quency (*CAF*), where *FN*(*SR*, *CR*) is the number of feedback items that are given from a specific recommender to a specific consumer in the suspected set (*SS*). *FN*(*SS*, *CR*) is the number of all feedback items in the suspected set (*SS*) that are given to the same con- sumer. If the collusion attack frequency (*CAF*) is greater than the feedback limit (*FL*), the trust model will move the suspected feed- back to the collusion set (*CS*), or else the trust model will move the

suspected feedback *SF*(*SR*, *CR*) from a specific recommender to a

specific consumer to the feedback set (*FS*).

To measure the attack scale (*AS*) for a specific consumer, the trust model will measure the size of the collusion set (*CS*), where the malicious recommenders in a recommender’s community must account for a large proportion of all recommenders to attack the trust model and cause damage to it. The collusion attack scale (*AS*) is calculated as [(6)](#_bookmark4):

\* (*continued*)

Algorithm 2: Collusion Attack Algorithm

*10: endf or*

*11: f or i* = 1 *to n*

*12: if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*SS* ≤ *TR*

*andV* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* ≥ *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SSand V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SS* ≤ *maxVR*

*then mo*v*e*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FSf rom FS to SS*

*13: else if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*SS* ≤ *TR*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* < *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SSand V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*SS* ≥ *minVR*

*then mo*v*e* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FSf rom FS to SS*

*14: endelseif*

*15: endif*

*AS*(*CR*) = 1 — *RN*(*CS*)

*FN*(*CS*, *CR*)

(6)

*16: endf or*

*17: f or i* = 1 *to n*

where *RN*(*CS*) is the number of malicious recommenders in the collusion community and *FN*(*CS*, *CR*) is the number of malicious feedback items for all consumers in the collusion set (*CS*).

After that, the trust model will compute the attack target scale (*ATS*), which provides the malicious feedback rate for a specific consumer. The attack target scale (*ATS*) is calculated as [(7)](#_bookmark5):

*18: CAF*(*SRi*, *CR*) ← *FN*(*SRi*, *CR*)/*FN*(*SS*, *CR*)

*19: if CAF*(*SRi*, *CR*) ≥ *FL then mo*v*e SF*(*SRi*, *CR*) *to CS*

*20: else*

*21: mo*v*e SF*(*SRi*, *CR*) *to FS*

*22: endif*

*23: endf or*

*24: AS*(*CR*) ← 1 — *RN*(*CS*)/*FN*(*CS*, *CR*)

*ATS*(*CR*)= *FN*(*CS*, *CR*)

*FN*(*AFS*, *CR*)

(7)

*25: ATS*(*CR*) ← *FN*(*CS*, *CR*)/*FN*(*AFS*, *CR*)

*26: f or i* = 1 *ton*

Where the *FN*(*CS*, *CR*) is the feedback number that has been pro- vided from malicious recommenders. *FN*(*AFS*, *CR*) represents the feedback number that has been provided from all feedback sets

in same community, where the set of malicious recommenders is part of all recommenders who evaluated a specific consumer.

Finally, to measure the strength of all collusion attacks for a specific consumer, the trust model will compute the collusion attack strength (*CAS*) by taking the number of all attack scale from different communities. Collusion attack strength (*CAS*) is then cal- culated as [(8)](#_bookmark6):

*27: CAS*(*CR*) ← *FN*(*CSi*, *CR*)/*FN*(*AFSi*, *CR*)

*28: endf or*

*29: endprocedure*

We can examine the example of the collusion attack detailed below. The example will show how the collusion attack algorithm impacts the roles’ trust values. Let us assume the below matrix contains all feedback times.

*T*(*F*1) ··· *T*(*Fn* 1)*T*(*Fn*)

—

P*n FN CS CR* 0 1

B

*SP*1

*V* 1,1

··· *V* 1,*n*—1

*V* 1,*n*

( P*n*

C

*FN*(*AFS* , *CR*) (

*SP*2 *V* 2,1

··· *V* 2,*n*—1

*V* 2,*n*

*i*=1

*i*

*CAS CR*) = *i*=1 ( *i* , )

8)

P

.

.

CA

. .

To detect collusion groups, the trust model will use the collu-

sion attack algorithm below:

*n i*=1

*FS*(*CR*) =

### . B@ .

*SPn*

. . .

. .

···

*Vn*,*n*—1

*Vn*,*n*

*T*(*F*1) ··· *T*(*Fn*—1) *T*(*Fn*)

*Vn*,1

Algorithm 2: Collusion Attack Algorithm

*Input* : *FS*, *TC*, *VC*, *FL*;

*Output* : *SS*, *CS*, *AS*(*CR*), *ATS*(*CR*), *CAS*(*CR*);

0 1

*n i*=1

*FS*(*CR*) =

### *SP*1 04 : 22 ··· 05 : 09 14 : 22

. . . . . . .

*SP*2

04 : 50

··· 05 : 12

14 : 50

.

.

.

.

B@ CA

*SPn* 01 : 30 ··· 20 : 01 22 : 30

*1: procedure collusion attack*

The algorithm will compare all feedback time, starting with the

*2: TR* ← *T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *TC*

P

last feedback time *V*

*n*,*n*

. Let us assume the time range is two hours

*3: maxVR* ← *V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *VC*

*4: minVR* ← —*V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* × *VC*

*5: f or i* = 1 *to n* — 1

*6: if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* ≤ *TR*

*and V* (*F* , *CR*)*FS* ≥ *V* (*F* , *CR*)*FSand V F CR FS V F CR FS maxVR*

*n*

*i*

and all feedback is on same day. In this case, there are six feedback items in this time range, and the trust model will compare their values. Let us assume the following feedback values:

*V* (*F*1) ··· *V* (*Fn*—1)*V* (*Fn*) *SP*1 90% ··· 99% 98%

*SP*

92%

··· 95%

97%

0 1

P*n FS*(*CR*) = . B C

2

*SP*

*n*

( *n*,

) — ( *i*, ) ≤

*i*=1

### . @ A

61%

···

99%

82%

*7: else if T*(*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *T*(*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* ≤ *TR*

*then mo*v*e* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS f rom FS to SS*

*and V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* < *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FSand V* (*Fn*, *CR*)*FS* — *V* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS* ≥ *minVR*

*then mo*v*e* (*Fi*, *CR*)*FS f rom FS to SS*

*8: endelse if*

*9: endif*

In this case, the system will move the six feedback items to the suspected set (*SS*); then, the trust model will compute the collu- sion attack frequency for each recommender who has feedback in the suspected set (*SS*).

*CAF*(*SR*, *CR*) = *FN*(*SR*,*CR*)

*FN*(*SS*,*CR*)

*CAF*(*SR*, *CR*) = 3 = 50%

6

With the below condition, if the feedback limit *FL* = 10%, then *CA*1 *CA*2 ·· · *CAn*

*PI*2

*V* 2,1 *V* 2,2

··· *V* 2,*n*

.

the trust model will move these feedback items to the collusion

*PI*1 0 *V* 1,1 *V* 1,2

··· *V* 1,*n* 1

8< *if CAF* (*SR*, *CR*) ≥ *FL then move SF*(*SR*, *CR*)*to CS*

set (*CS*), or else will move the feedback to the (*FS*).

*Q* = .

.

### BB@ .

. . .

. . .

CCA

*else move SF* (*SR*, *CR*) *to FS*

.

*PIm Vm*,1 *Vm*,2 ··· *Vm*,*n*

: *end if*

* 1. *Sybil attacks*

According to Mahajan, Mahajan, Jadhav, and Kolate [[35]](#_bookmark40), a Sybil attack involves the emulation of multiple behaviors by a single entity [[36]](#_bookmark40), typically by multiple accounts using a single entity/ node. The multiple identities can be stolen or fake, or even obtained through a Sybil attack. Sybil attackers can use multiple entities to either damage or build the reputation of an online sys- tem by giving either negative or positive feedback, respectively. The literature will be systematically reviewed for the effectiveness of detecting reputation attacks so as to prevent Sybil Attacks.

To avoid this attack, we need to apply two kinds of attack detec- tion, multi-identity detection (*Mid*) and Sybil attack detection(*SA*). We have all users’ credentials in the trust identity registry, and by comparing all credentials attributes for all users we can avoid this attack, where *R* represents a list of identity records for all users’

primary identities *UP* = {*PI*1, *PI*2, ·· · , *PIm*} and the credentials attri-

butes for all users *UC* = {*CA*1, *CA*2, ··· , *CAn*}, *UM* is *UP* × *UC* matrix which contains the credentials (*CA*) of all users who are registered

where *PIm* represents the primary identities for all consumers (for example, the consumer’s user name) and *CAn* represents the credential’s attributes (the consumer’s IP address, passwords, com- puter name, etc.). *Q* (*CAn*) is the frequency of any credential attri- bute *CA* represented as similar for all consumers. If *Mid* is greater than or equal to *RL*, then the TMS will ignore all fake trust results that come from different accounts that have the same credential attribute (*CA*).

Secondly, we need to use the time factor by calculating the number of identities |*Nid*(*t*)| within a specific time frame[*F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)] for all recommenders who send their feedback to the TMS. If there

is any change in the recommender’s behavior at a specific time, this situation indicates a Sybil attack. The TMS will calculate the percentage of occasional and periodic changes in the number of identities in the behavior of all identities (the identities for all rec- ommenders that provided feedback to any consumer). *SA* is calcu- lated as [(11)](#_bookmark7):

*C*(*t*) = |*Nid*(*F*(*t*)) × *SC*∫

*if Nid*(*L*(*t*)) > *Nid*(*F*(*t*)) + *C*(*t*) *then*

0 1

*id id*

X BB ( |*N* (*F*(*t*))|

in the TMS. The attacker will use the same credentials in various identity records, and the TMS will identify patterns in anonymous consumers’ credentials.

*t*=*n SA F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = *N* (*L*(*t*))—*N* (*F*(*t*))+*C*(*t*)

*id*

## *else do nothing*

*t* 1 @

=

CCA

# (11)

The TMS will detect this attack by calculating the value of multi-identity detection (*Mid* ) as the appearance times (*Q* ) of cre- dential attribute value (*CA*), where the value of the credential is shown by the credentials attribute divided by the number of all

records with the user’s identity (*Rid*). The frequency of any creden- tials attribute (*CA*) is represented by the number of similar creden- tials. (*Mid* ) is calculated as in [(9)](#_bookmark8):

X*t*=*n* *C*X*A*=*n Q* (*CAn*)!

where*C*(*t*) represents the identities curve, *SC* represents the Sybil attack curve, *Nid*(*F*(*t*)) represents the number of identities at the beginning of the time frame, and *Nid*(*L*(*t*)) represents the num- ber of identities at the end.

As an example, let us assume the number of identities at the beginning of the time frame *Nid*(*F*(*t*)) = 421 identities,

*Nid*(*L*(*t*)) = 487, and *SC* = 5%. Then, *SA*(*R*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) is calculated as

follows:

*C*(*t*) = |421 × 0.05∫ = 21

0 1

## *Mid* =

*t*=1

*CA*=1

*Rid*

(9)

*if* 487 > 421 + 21 *then*

487 — 421 + 21

C

To make the TMS ignore all fake trust results, we need to apply a

new procedure, where we identify the recommendation trust value at a previous time as *RT*(*F*(*t*)) and that at the present time as

*SA*(*F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) =

### B

P

*SA*(*F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = 10% *of identities number*

B *more than identities curve* C

*t*=*n*

421

*RT*(*L*(*t*)). The TMS will foil this attack by using the limit of a max-

*t*=1 *else do nothing*

### B C

imum number of records (*RL*) that has the same value of the cre- dential attribute; for example, if there are many records that have the same credential attribute registered within a specific time

BB@

CCA

frame, the TMS will check whether the number of these records is greater than *RL* and ignore all feedback that comes from these rec- ommenders. Finally, the change rate factor of the trust result

*RT*(*CR*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) measures the consumer trust value by taking into

consideration the behavior of all recommenders in a specific time, calculated as [(10)](#_bookmark9):

*RT*(*CR*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = (10)

*if Mid* ≥ *RL then RT*(*F*(*t*)) = *RT*(*F*(*t*))

*else RT*(*F*(*t*)) = *RT*(*L*(*t*))

We can examine the example of the Sybil attack detailed as follows:

*CA*1 *CA*2 ··· *CAn*

Finally, the trust model will compute the recommender impor-

tance value, which means SPs are often influential depending on their trustworthiness as recommenders and their experience *W*(*Ri*, *CR*) by adding a weight function of the exchange transaction

(*WEX* ) and exchange transaction value (*EX* ) in the final equation, which measures the value of the number of exchange transactions for any recommender with a specific consumer. Another two fac- tors will be associated in this equation to measure the impact of time (*t*) in the recommender interaction, where the last time the service provider interacted with a specific consumer *last*(*t*) is mul-

*i*

tiplied by a weight function for the last time (*WL*). The trust value of any consumer *RT*(*CR*) can be calculated as below, where the feedback value is *F*(*Ri*, *CR*) for all recommenders who have enough experience to give feedback. To eliminate the challenge of all

*PI*1 0 *V* 1,1 *V* 1,2

··· *V* 1,*n* 1

attacks from the posited trust model, we need to add the time fac-

*PI*2 *V* 2,1 *V* 2,2 ··· *V* 2,*n*

*M* =

### . B C

.

.

.

.

@

A

.

*PIm*

*Vm*,1

*Vm*,2

···

*Vm*,*n*

tor [(12)](#_bookmark10).

*W*(*R* , *CR*) = P*n*

*i*

*i*=1

*where WEX* + *WL* = 100

(*EXi* ×*W*

*EX* +*Li* (*t*)×*WL* )

100

8< *if W*(*Ri*, *CR*) ≥ *II then RT*(*CR*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = 1 *i*

*NR*

P *F*(*R* ,*CR*)

*n*

:

# (12)

## *else do nothing*

As an example, consider the interaction importance *II* = 0.80,

*W*(*Ri*, *CR*) = {0.88, 0.72, 0.90, 0.96}, and recommender feedback is

*F*(*Ri*, *CR*) = {0.90, 0.89, 0.30, 0.67}. With this scenario, the con- sumer trust value is calculated as below.

100

*W*(*Ri*, *CR*) = P*n*

*i*=1

(0.91×80+0.77×20) = 0.88

*if* 0.88 ≥ 0.70 *then RT*(*CR*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = 0.90+0.30+0.67 = 0.62 *or* 62%

3

Algorithm 3: Sybil Attacks Algorithm

*Input* : *RL*, *WEX* , *WL*;

*Output* : *RT*;

*1: procedure Sybil Attacks*

*2: f or t* = 1 *ton*

*3: f or CA* = 1 *ton*

*4: Mid* ← *Q* (*CAn*)/*Rid*

*5: if Mid* ≥ *RL then RT*(*F*(*t*)) = *RT*(*F*(*t*))

*6: else*

*7: RT*(*F*(*t*)) = *RT*(*L*(*t*))

*8: end if*

*9: end f or*

*10: endf or*

*11: C*(*t*) = |*Nid*(*F*(*t*)) × *SC*∫

*12: f or t* = 1 *ton*

*13: if Nid*(*L*(*t*)) > *Nid*(*F*(*t*)) + *C*(*t*) *then*

*SA*(*F*(*t*), *L*(*t*))

← (*Nid*(*L*(*t*))

—*Nid*(*F*(*t*)) + *C*(*t*))

/|*Nid*(*F*(*t*))|

*14: endif*

*15: endf or*

*16: f or i* = 1 *to n*

*17: f or t* = 1 *to n*

*18: W*(*Ri*, *CR*) = *EXi* × *WEX* + *Li*(*t*) × *WL* /100

*19: if W*(*Ri*, *CR*) ≥ *II then RT*(*CR*, *F*(*t*), *L*(*t*)) = *F*(*Ri*, *CR*)*SP*/*NR*

*20: end if*

*21: endf or*

*22: endf or*

*23: end procedure*

1. Proposed framework architecture

This section provides an analysis of the different components of the trust model and the role it plays in ensuring that the system works effectively. [Fig. 1](#_bookmark11) illustrates the proposed system architecture.

TMS will be the component of the proposed design that evalu- ates the extent to which providers of the cloud services are willing to depend on the consumers of the cloud services. It will also be entitled to the provision of certain cloud services as promised by the cloud service providers. The trust management system is com- posed of various subsections entitled with different tasks, all of which are aimed at ensuring the security and the privacy of the data in the cloud storage systems. It evaluates the rules that are determined within the level of trust depending on feedback from service providers. There is a need to specify the identity of the user and track the activities of this entity for easy tracking of unautho- rized consumers or attackers and issuance of proof of any form of data leakage. Through the TMS, the accounts of registered as well as recognized consumers are updated and all the incidents in

Fig. 1. Trust model system architecture.

which a consumer is involved are also determined. This component will also oversee the authorization of whoever uploads the feed- back into the system. It is capable of identifying invalid feedback as well as discarding such invalid feedback from the system.

Trust Management System (TMS): This adds to the layers of the trust model, whose main aim is to make the entire system operate effectively and securely. The trust management system is com- posed of various subsections as elaborated below.

Central Repository: This assumes the role of interaction store, mainly operating to store all types of trust records and interaction histories generated by interacting tasks and roles for later utiliza- tion by the trust decision engine in the evaluation of the tasks and roles values.

Role Behavior Analyzer: This serves to analyze the functions and roles associated with minimum levels of trust regulations in relation to shared resources. Its role is to evaluate rules that are determined within the level of trust depending on the feedback that arises from service providers in the central repository. The role behavior analyzer entity links the roles in order to collect informa- tion concerning them and report any form of leakage if it arises. This entity fills the need to specify the identity of the user and track the activities undertaken for easy tracking of unauthorized consumers or attackers and issuance of proof of any form of data leakage. The role behavior analyzer also updates the accounts of registered as well as recognized consumers and assesses all of the incidents in which a consumer is involved.

Task Behavior Analyzer: This is responsible for analyzing tasks and functions concerning minimum trust level regulations upon accessing shared resources. It evaluates tasks determined within the trust level according to the feedback from owners through computing trust value and stores this value in the central reposi- tory. It listens to channels to collect information, the two channels in this case, including reports from the tasks regarding leakage of data and reports from the role behavior analyzer to identify the histories of the consumers regarding the stored data. The task behavior analyzer needs to specify identifying consumers and tracking the tasks performed. It can easily track attackers or unau- thorized consumers and issues proof of any data leakage. It will also update registered and recognized consumers’ accounts and determine whether a consumer account has been involved in the incident.

Feedback Collector: This is an agent tasked with the collection of feedback from the service owners to the repository headquarters before it is automatically allocated. Consumers’ trustworthiness is represented by the feedback on tasks and roles. For the purposes of security, the collector of roles and task feedback protects its integ- rity. This component serves the purpose of ensuring the authoriza- tion of whoever uploads the feedback into that system. It is capable of identifying invalid feedback as well as discarding such invalid feedback from the system. Furthermore, the collector of feedback gathers information concerning data assignments on tasks and roles before updating it to the central repository on the nature of the assignment.

Trust Decision Engine: This is a component that evaluates and determines the value of trust of the data owners, the roles, and the task entities. It gathers every form of information concerning the interaction histories that arise from the repository center and a particular consumer’s trust values output before making a deci- sion on the nature of the response required by the system.

1. Simulation results




Fig. 3. Penalties of on–off attack and trust decline.

The trust model will compute the Interaction Trust value for malicious consumers by applying the penalties of malicious behav- ior. [Fig. 4](#_bookmark13) and [Fig. 5](#_bookmark15) show the impact of new feedback on the value

We built a C#.net Windows Forms application to compare our architecture with several related works. In this section, we will evaluate through experiments the ability of the trust model to withstand reputation attacks. The TMS will compute penalties of an on–off attack by using two conditions. The first conditions, if the interaction importance greater than or equal to the *PCO*2 , where *PCO*2 represents the limit of a minimum of the interactions with the greatest value. The second condition if the feedback value (*F*) is less than interaction importance (*II*) then the trust model will com- pute the penalty of on–off attack (*PO*2 ). If the feedback (*F*) of the recommender is less than the interaction importance (*II*) then

the trust model will compute the trust decline penalty (*PTD*). [Fig. 2](#_bookmark14) shows the impact of the penalty of on–off attack and trust decline in the interaction trust values [Table 1](#_bookmark16).

of interaction trust consumers.

(*IT*) for malicious consumers and trusted





Fig. 2. Penalties of on–off attack and trust decline.

We tested big data to check the standard NIST metrics before and after adding the penalties to equations [(1)](#_bookmark1), [(2)](#_bookmark2), and [(3)](#_bookmark3) to check the five security functions. As we see in [Fig. 3](#_bookmark12), due to the differ- ences between these three equations, attacks will occur if the penalties are not added. The impact on the trust value of users should be significant in the event of malicious behaviors in impor- tant transactions.

Fig. 4. Interaction trust values for 100 trusted consumers.





Fig. 5. Interaction trust values for 100 malicious consumers.

To avoid collusion attacks, the TMS will compute the collusion attack frequency (*CAF*), where the value of feedback frequency is directly proportional to the feedback collusion and inversely pro- portional to the feedback’s credibility. The frequency of feedback depends on the number of recommender feedback items and the number of all feedback items in the suspected set (*SS*).



[Fig. 6](#_bookmark17) shows the feedback frequency of seven suspected recom- menders. We can see that five suspected recommenders have feed- back frequency greater than the feedback limit (*FL*), which means the TMS will move the feedback of these recommenders to the col- lusion set (*CS*), or else the trust model will move the suspected feedback by a specific recommender to a specific consumer to the feedback set (*FS*).

Fig. 8. Attack target scale.(*ATS*)




Fig. 6. Collusion attack frequency.

To measure the size of the collusion set (*CS*) where the mali- cious recommenders in a recommender’s community must com- prise a large proportion of all recommenders to attack and cause damage to the trust model, as we see in [Fig. 7](#_bookmark20) the trust model will compute the attack scale (*AS*), which represents the size of attack scale for different collusion sets.

Table 1

Collusion attacks frequency.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *FN*(*SRi*, *CR*) | 6 | 21 | 32 | 12 | 36 | 1 | 18 |
| *FN*(*SS*, *CR*) | 126 | 126 | 126 | 126 | 126 | 126 | 126 |
| *CAF*(*SRi*, *CR*) | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.10 | 0.29 | 0.01 | 0.14 |

[Fig. 9](#_bookmark18) shows the value of the collusion attack strength (*CAS*) by calculating the rate of all malicious feedback from different com- munities for a specific consumer.




Fig. 9. Collusion attack strength.(*CAS*)

1. Discussion

Every model of trust management service is endangered by some security threats. These threats may either elevate the reputa- tion of a certain unit with malicious intentions or entirely ruin it. In order to build a robust, secure, and accurate trust model system,



Fig. 7. Attack scale.(*AS*)

[Fig. 8](#_bookmark16) shows the value of the attack target scale (*ATS*), which provides the malicious feedback rate from one collusion set (*CS*) for a specific consumer.

Table 2

Comparison of security and accuracy.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Addressed Metrics | [[12]](#_bookmark21) | [[30]](#_bookmark35) | [[37]](#_bookmark40) | [[38]](#_bookmark41) | [[39]](#_bookmark41) | OURS |
| Interaction Importance | ✗ | U | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | U |
| On/off Attack | ✗ | U | U | U | ✗ | U |
| Trust Decline | U | U | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | U |
| Recommender importance | ✗ | U | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | U |
| Collusion Attack | U | U | U | ✗ | U | U |
| Collusion Attack Frequency | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | U | U |
| Sybil Attack | U | U | U | ✗ | ✗ | U |

we focus on all reputation attacks of cloud computing by applying different criteria to avoid these attacks. [Table 2](#_bookmark19) shows the compar- ison between our proposed TMS with those given in related works.

* 1. *Future work*

The issue of cloud service trust has attracted many researchers, but there are still many concerns that must be addressed. In future work, we will introduce additional criteria that increase the secu- rity of the trust model. In addition, we will seek other types of rep- utation attacks that threaten the security of the cloud computing environment and propose solutions to avoid these attacks.

1. Conclusion

Authorization issues concerning access to cloud computing storage are of serious concern when there are a large number of consumers using the big data of cloud computing for sensitive data. Such concerns can be properly attended to through the integration of control models with trust models as an improved security strategy for decentralized systems. We can draw the con- clusion that cloud computing threats may either elevate the repu- tation of a unit with malicious intentions or entirely ruin it. This paper focuses on ensuring the security of cloud storage systems by building a trust model system to avoid reputation attacks of cloud services, effectively protecting cloud services through effi- cient detection of malicious as well as unbecoming behaviors by applying trust algorithms tailored to prevent on–off, collusion, and Sybil attacks, where each trust algorithm contains different criteria to avoid reputation attacks. Overall, our results demon- strate a robust ability to uphold the security of cloud service con- sumers. Their association with trust management services may involve highly sensitive data, so assurance of trust management services is crucial owing to cloud services’ dynamic nature. Our solution offers reliable solutions to avoid reputation attacks and makes for very accurate consumer trust values by taking interac- tion importance into consideration.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing finan- cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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