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Extending a Synthesis-Centric Model-Based Systems Engineering Framework with Stochastic Model Checking

J. Markovski[1](#_bookmark0)*,*[2](#_bookmark0) E.S. Estens Musa[3](#_bookmark0) M.A. Reniers[4](#_bookmark0)

*Department of Mechanical Engineering, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands*

**Abstract**

We propose to integrate performance evaluation with supervisory control synthesis to bring higher confidence in the control design. Supervisory control theory deals with automatic synthesis of supervisory controllers that ensure safe behavior of the supervised system, based on the models of the uncontrolled system and the (safety) control requirements. For the purpose of performance evaluation, we turn to stochastic model checking of continuous-time Markov chains, which requires an extension of the model of the uncontrolled system with Markovian delays. We cast our proposal as an extension of a model-based systems engineering framework that relies on supervisor synthesis. We treat the Markovian delays syntactically, exploiting their equivalent interleaving behavior with uniquely-named uncontrollable transitions. In this way, we can employ already available synthesis tools, while preserving the stochastic behavior. To this end, we develop model transformation tools to extract the underlying Markov process from the stochastic discrete-event model of the supervised system. We illustrate the approach by modeling a pipeless plant that employs automated guided vehicles instead of fixed piping in order to ensure greater flexibility of the plant. The control problem that we solve is safe high-level movement coordination of the vehicles, ensured by the supervisory controller. We show how to seamlessly introduce stochastic behavior in the supervised system and we evaluate several performance and reliability aspects of the plant. We implement the framework by interfacing two state- of-the-art tools: Supremica for supervisory controller synthesis and MRMC for Markovian model checking. To this end, we improve previous attempts by providing support for data-based observers, which greatly improve the modeling capabilities of the framework.

*Keywords:* supervisory control theory, performance evaluation, Markov processes

# Introduction

The constant increase of complexity of high-tech complex systems is taking its toll on the development of control software. Adaptations of traditional software devel- opment approaches that employ (re)design-(re)coding-testing loops have proven not

1 J. Markovski is supported by Dutch NWO project: ProThOS, no. 600.065.120.11N124.

2 Email: [j.markovski@tue.nl](mailto:j.markovski@tue.nl)

3 Email: [eestens@gmail.com](mailto:eestens@gmail.com)

4 Email: [m.a.reniers@tue.nl](mailto:m.a.reniers@tue.nl)

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entirely adequate to handle the challenge. Namely, the specifications of the control requirements that the software must implement frequently change during the de- sign process inducing a large number of (time-consuming) recoding iterations [[18](#_bookmark27)]. This issue becomes even more prominent as modern markets impose increasing de- mands for better quality, performance, safety, and ease of use, giving rise to (formal) approaches for generation of control software.

*Supervisory Control*

Supervisory control theory [[29](#_bookmark39),[6](#_bookmark16)] proposes a particular solution for control of discrete-event systems by investigating methodologies for automatic synthesis of models of supervisory controllers, referred to as *supervisors*. Supervisory controllers coordinate high-level system behavior by observing discrete(-event) system behav- ior, e.g., by receiving sensor signals from ongoing activities, making a decision on allowed activities, and sending back feedback to the system, guiding its safe exe- cution, e.g., by sending control signals to the hardware actuators. The supervisors are synthesized based on formal models of the uncontrolled hardware, referred to as *plant*, and the model of the *control requirements*. Thereafter, supervisory control software can be generated based on these models.

The observed activities of the system are modeled by means of discrete events, which are split into *controllable events*, which can be disabled by the supervisor in order to prevent unsafe or otherwise undesired behavior, and *uncontrollable events*, which the supervisor can only observe in order to make a correct control decision. Controllable events typically model activities like interaction with the actuators of the machine, whereas uncontrollable events model activities like observation of sensors or user interaction over which the system has no control.

The synchronization of the plant and a supervisor, referred to as *supervised plant*, models the supervisory control loop, i.e., the coupling of the unsupervised system and the controller. A standard assumption is that the controller reacts suffi- ciently fast on machine input, which enables the modeling of the supervisory control feedback loop as a pair of synchronizing processes [[29](#_bookmark39),[6](#_bookmark16)]. The supervisor can dis- able controllable events by not synchronizing with them, but it must always enable available uncontrollable events by synchronizing with them as the latter cannot be ignored. In addition, supervised plants must satisfy the control requirements, which model allowed or safe system behavior.

*Need for Performance and Reliability Evaluation*

The synthesized supervisors guarantee only safe functioning of the system as pre- scribed by the (safety) control requirements. In addition, they also typically ensure nonblocking behavior [[29](#_bookmark39),[6](#_bookmark16)], i.e., they prevent deadlock and livelock. In order to ensure the latter, the plant is augmented with so-called marked states, which model situations in which the system can successfully terminate its execution. It is re- quired that a marked state can be reached from each state of the system, thus offering an option for successful termination, which brings some level of confidence

in the system design.

In order to ascertain safety properties, the synthesis procedure may require elimi- nation of important states that denote desired progress of the system. This situation occurs when there exists a trace from such a state that may lead the execution of the system to unsafe situations. In most cases, the latter is not directly deducible from the control requirements and, moreover, it can only be observed during or following the synthesis procedure. If such a situation occurs, then either the control require- ments are too strict, or the model of the uncontrolled system is not sufficiently detailed or it is flawed, i.e., wrongful assumptions have been made. Moreover, in addition to the possible absence of progress properties, even if the system is vali- dated to perform functionally as intended, there are absolutely no guarantees about its performance or reliability. Therefore, in order to establish presence or absence of such performance or reliability properties, additional quantitative analysis must be performed.

For a broader discussion on ensuring correct functionality of the supervised sys- tem, we refer to [[22](#_bookmark32),[26](#_bookmark34)]. In the setting of this paper, we discuss the integration of performance evaluation in the model-based system engineering framework of [[25](#_bookmark35)]. We use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [[4](#_bookmark11)] for expressing performance require- ments and use the Markov Reward Model Checker (MRMC) [[14](#_bookmark24)] for establishing validity of these properties.

There is also related work, extending supervisory control with quantitative as- pects like probabilities [[17](#_bookmark28),[10](#_bookmark20),[28](#_bookmark36)] and stochastic delays [[15](#_bookmark25),[16](#_bookmark26)], in order to ascertain that extra performance or reliability requirements are met as well. Most of these approaches treat controllability and optimality at the same time. With respect to optimality, the supervisor must ensure optimal behavior with respect to a given set of performance measures. The problem of optimality has also been tackled in the field of performance evaluation, employing the wide-spread class of Markov decision processes [[13](#_bookmark23)]. The control problem is to schedule the control actions such that some performance measure is optimized. Stochastic games problem variants [[7](#_bookmark17)] and specifications of control strategies using probabilistic extensions of temporal logics [[2](#_bookmark12),[5](#_bookmark15),[8](#_bookmark18)] are also emerging in the formal methods community.

*Outline and Contributions*

Unlike other approaches, we treat the stochastic delays syntactically and we de- couple the synthesis procedure from ensuring optimality. We restrict to Markovian (exponentially-distributed) delays with which the plant is extended, since we employ the memoryless property to enable a syntactic compositional treatment. This ap- proach enables us to handle industrial systems, by employing state-of-the-art tools Supremica [[1](#_bookmark13)] for efficient supervisor synthesis and MRMC [[14](#_bookmark24)] for performance evaluation by means of stochastic model checking. The syntactical treatment of Markovian delays is enabled by the fact that uniquely-named uncontrollable events and Markovian delays have the same interleaving behavior [[25](#_bookmark35)]. Thus, (1) if we replace Markovian delays with uncontrollable events in the plant, ensuring unique- ness of labels, then (2) perform supervisor synthesis on the renamed plant, which

preserves the uncontrollable events, and finally, (3) rename back to the original Markovian delays to obtain the stochastic supervised plant, and extract the under- lying Markov process, we have a procedure for supervisor synthesis of stochastic discrete-event system and derivation of a performance model that can be fed to the stochastic model checker MRMC. Step (1) is performed manually for step (2) we employ Supremica, and for step (3) we develop a transformation tool referred to as Supremica2MRMC [[24](#_bookmark37)], which extends the algorithm of [[12](#_bookmark22)].

Extending our previous work [[25](#_bookmark35)], in the setting of this paper, we provide for data-based control requirements, relying on the process theory of [[23](#_bookmark33)]. To this end, we employ *data-based observers*, which provide additional data-based information to the supervisor, by observing important sequences of events in the plant. Observers are discrete-event processes that present an augmentation of the plant and that detect important states of the plant based on the history of observed events. In this way, this important information can be directly communicated to the supervisor and employed for supervision. The need for observers becomes evident when the plant is event-based, whereas the control requirements are more naturally expressed as state- or data-based properties. Note that the plant models only the unsupervised behavior of the system, so any additional information must be generated by the observers. To enable the use of data-based observations, we have to extend the translation tool Supremica2MRMC appropriately.

We illustrate the proposed framework on a case study involving coordination of movement of automated guided vehicles of a pipeless plant. Pipeless plants are an alternative to the traditional recipe-driven multipurpose batch plants, which replace the pipes with automated guided vehicles that carry containers [[19](#_bookmark29)]. We discuss the modeling process, the coordination requirements, the obtention of a performance model of the pipeless plant, and the process of formalization and verification of several performance properties.

# Synthesis-Centric Systems Engineering

For supervisor synthesis we rely on the tool Supremica [[1](#_bookmark13)] that employs extended fi- nite automata [[32](#_bookmark42)] to model the plant and the control requirements. Extended finite automata are extensions of finite nondeterministic automata with state labels, data assignments, and guarded transitions. We rely on data-based control requirements, where specific states of the system will be identified by the variable assignments. We employ two prominent forms of control requirements: state exclusion, which specifies which combination of states of the concurrent components of the plant are allowed, and state-transition exclusion, which specifies which events are allowed in a given observation of states. Ideally, we should be able to refer directly to states, employing the state labels, but the current release of the synthesis tool [[1](#_bookmark13)] does not yet support such requirements, so we rely on variables to identify states of interest.

## Extended Finite Automata

The set of data elements is given by D, where only finite integer and enumerated types are currently supported by the synthesis tool [[1](#_bookmark13)]. The set of data variables is denoted by V, and by X we denote data expressions involving standard arithmeti- cal operations [[1](#_bookmark13)] evaluated with respect to *eD*: X *→* D for *D ∈* DV. The guarded commands are given as Boolean formulas, where the logical operators are given by *{*!*,* &*, |,* =*>}*, denoting negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication, re- spectively, and the atomic propositions are formed by the predicates from the set

*{<,* ==*,* ! =*, >}*, denoting the relations smaller, equal, nonequal, and larger, respec- tively, between data variables and data elements. We use B to denote the obtained Boolean expressions, evaluated with respect to a given valuation *vD*: B *→ {*ff*,* tt*}* for *D ∈* DV, where ff denotes the logical value false, and tt denotes true. The set of event labels is given by E, whereas states are labeled by elements from the set S. An extended finite automaton *A* can be represented by a tuple *A* = (S*,* E*,* V*, −→, s*0*, v*0*,M* ), where *s*0 *∈* S is the initial state of the automaton, *v*0 *∈* DV is the initial assignment of the variables, and *M ⊆* S is the set of marked states.

*g*:*e*:*u j j*

The guarded labeled transition relation is represented as *l −→ l* , where *l, l ∈* S are

the locations, given by the state labels, *g ∈* B is the guard, *e ∈* E is the event label, and *u*: DV *→* XV is the variable update function. The underlying discrete-event model are standard finite automata in which the states are formed by the original state labels coupled with the variable assignments, whereas the labeled transition

is enabled if the guard is evaluated to true. In the resulting state, the variables are subsequently updated, as given by the operational rule

*g*:*e*:*u j*

*l −→ l , vd*(*g*)= tt *,*

(*l, d*) *−e→* (*lj, ed*(*u*(*d*)))

where the initial state of the automaton is given by (*s*0*, v*0).

Extended finite automata are coupled using the automata synchronous paral- lel composition of [[27](#_bookmark38)], which synchronizes on the events in the common alpha- bet of both automata, whereas it interleaves on the rest. To define the compo- sition, we need an auxiliary operation *ƒ|D*, which denotes the restriction of the function *ƒ* : *A → B* on the domain *D ⊆ A*. Suppose that we have two automata *A*1 = (S1*,* E1*,* V1*, −→*1*, s*10*, v*10*, M*1) and *A*2 = (S2*,* E2*,* V2*, −→*2*, s*20*, v*20*, M*2). Their

synchronous parallel composition is given by the automaton *A*1  *A*2 = (S1 *×*S2*,* E1 *∪*

E2*,* V1 *∪* V2*, −→,* (*s*10*, s*20)*, v*10 *∪ v*20*|*V2*\*V1 *, M*1 *× M*2), where *v*10*|*V1*∩*V2 = *v*20*|*V1*∩*V2 .

Now, suppose that *l*

*g*1:*e*1:*u*1 *j*

*g*2:*e*2:*u*2 *j*

1

(*l*1*, l*2) are given by:

*−→ l*1 and *l*2

*−→ l*2. Then, the available transitions of

*g*:*e*:*u j j*

* 1. (*l*1*, l*2) *−→* (*l*1*, l*2), if *e*1 = *e*2 = *e* and *u*1*|*V1*∩*V2 = *u*2*|*V1*∩*V2 , where *g* = *g*1&*g*2

and *u* = *u*1 *∪ u*2*|*V2*\*V1 .

*g*1:*e*1:*u*1 *j*

* 1. (*l*1*, l*2)

*−→* (*l*1*, l*2), if *e*1 *∈* E1 *\* E2.

*g*2:*e*2:*u*2 *j*

* 1. (*l*1*, l*2)

*−→* (*l*1*, l*2), if *e*2 *∈* E2 *\* E1.

The synchronous parallel composition forces synchronization of events on the com- mon alphabet, provided that the updating of the variables coincides, whereas it

allows interleaving for the other events. Synchronous parallel composition is both commutative and transitive.

## Model-Based Systems Engineering Framework

Our proposal for application of supervisory control theory in development of high-tech machines has been cast as a model-based systems engineering frame- work [[30](#_bookmark40),[26](#_bookmark34)]. Synthesis-centric model-based approaches to systems engineering en- able rapid prototyping as one can couple the models with (prototype) hardware components to evaluate the control requirements, before building and testing ex- pensive control software. Initially, the domain engineers make the desired system specification, and contrive it into a design together with the software engineers. The architectural design defines the modeling level of abstraction and control architec- ture resulting in informal specifications of the plant, and the model of the control requirements. For synthesis purposes, any continuous behavior must be abstracted from in the plant, resulting in a discrete-event model. In parallel, the control re- quirements are modeled, and together with the plant, serve as ingredients for the supervisor synthesis.

Following the supervisor synthesis, the control must be validated as meaningful, i.e., desired functionalities of the controlled plant must be preserved to ensure that the system and the control requirements have been correctly modeled. If validation fails, remodeling of the control requirements and the plant, or even complete revi- sion may prove necessary. Finally, the control software is generated automatically from the validated models, shifting the focus of software engineers from coding to modeling.

## Derivation of a Performance Model

We model stochastic behavior by means of Markovian (or exponentially-distri- buted) delays that are introduced orthogonally in the extended finite automata in the vein of the Interactive Markov chains of [[11](#_bookmark21)]. In such a stochastic extension, the Markovian delays are simply interleaved in the parallel composition, which pre- serves the stochastic behavior of the synchronization. Having in mind the definition of the synchronous parallel composition from above, if we treat Markovian delays as uniquely-named (uncontrollable) delays, then we preserve their interleaving be- havior [[25](#_bookmark35)]. To show that controllability is preserved as well, we have to extend the notion of controllability appropriately. This exercise has been done in [[25](#_bookmark35)], proving that the transformation does not alter the stochastic behavior of the supervised plant.

To enable performance evaluation and reliability analysis, we need to extract a performance model from the supervised plant that comprises all relevant stochas- tic information. To this end, we augment the model-based framework as shown in Fig. [1](#_bookmark1). The changes to the framework are in the synthesis and the post-synthesis (verification) phase. The modeler specifies the plant, renaming Markovian delays and recording the relation between the uncontrollable events and the Markovian de- lays in a file with extension .u2m. Following the supervisor synthesis, based on the

Discrete- Event *Supervisor*

Renamed Discrete-Event *Plant*

Derived Markov proces

Supremica2MRMC

Markov process derivation

Discrete-Event

*Supervised Plant*

Renamed

Markovian delays (.u2m)

Priority of events (.pri)

Supremica XML export

Model *Performance Requirements*

MRMC

Performance evaluation

Supremica

Supervisor synthesis

Model *Control Requirements*

Fig. 1. Extension of the systems engineering framework with stochastic model checking and the accompa- nying tools

(discrete-event) plant with Markovian delays renamed to uncontrollable events, we couple the plant with the supervisor and export the supervised renamed discrete- event plant from Supremica. This exported file is parsed and transformed into a Markov chain using the Supremica2MRMC tool [[24](#_bookmark37)]. The transformation ex- tends [[12](#_bookmark22)] to cater for state labels and data assignments.

We require the two additional input files, which specify the rates corresponding to the uniquely named uncontrollable delays, made during the modeling of the sys- tem, and the priority order of the controllable actions, which is employed to resolve internal nondeterminism and it is specified by the modeler. The priority of events is required as the supervised plant may contain labeled transitions and, in order to measure the performance of the plant, these labeled transitions must not introduce real nondeterministic choices [[11](#_bookmark21)]. In case such choices arise, the performance of the system is undefined. There are several acceptable options to resolve this issue: enrich the model with probabilistic choices that quantify the conflicting nondeter- ministic choices, alter the original model to eliminate them, or impose priorities on the action transitions. We chose to impose priorities on the events, obtaining directive supervision that optimizes the behavior of the supervised plant [[21](#_bookmark31)]. As the supervisor must not disable uncontrollable events, they are automatically given highest priority. For the rest, the priorities are specified by the modeler to be em- ployed in Supremica2MRMC for resolution of nondeterministic choice in order to derive a pure Markov process. Ideally, the most optimal priority of events should be deduced automatically, e.g., by computing optimal schedulers as it is done for Markov decision processes [[13](#_bookmark23)], but this work is beyond the scope of this paper, and we schedule it for future work.

Next, we demonstrate the proposed framework in a case study involving move- ment coordination of automated guided vehicles of a pipeless plant.

# Case Study: Pipeless Plant

Pipeless plants are employed in the chemical industries when there is need for great flexibility and scalability of production [[19](#_bookmark29)]. These plants are used to produce small amounts of high-value products, e.g., pharmaceutical or other fine chemical prod- ucts, which orders or recipes change frequently over time. The main characteristic of




Fig. 2. Layout of the pipeless plant (adapted from [[31](#_bookmark41)]).

pipeless plants is that the production materials are transferred internally by means of automated guided vehicles, instead of the traditional transportation with pipes or conveyor belts. This enables greater flexibility in the production as different processing steps corresponding to different properties of the containers at different processing stations can be executed in parallel.

In the setting of this paper, we model a prototype of a pipeless (paint) plant described in [[19](#_bookmark29),[20](#_bookmark30)]. The hardware prototype of this plant is depicted in Fig. [2](#_bookmark2) and it is currently being built by the Process Dynamics and Operations Group at the University of Dortmund, Germany. This pipeless plant comprises a storage of vessels, which are carried around using automated guided vehicles that bring the vessels to different filling and mixing stations. Filling stations can fill the vessels with colors they have at their disposal. Mixing stations blend the colors in the vessel by taking it from the vehicle and returning it when the mixing process finishes.

The control problem is to coordinate the movement of the vehicles such that all recipes, which state the colors that should be combined and mixed, are completed, without damaging the vehicles or the vessels, or pouring liquid outside of vessels. This problem has been partially addressed before by employing simulation and by modeling of hybrid properties of the movement of the vehicles [[20](#_bookmark30)]. In this paper, we consider high-level supervisory coordination of the movement of the vehicles, such that an arbitrary order of a set of given recipes, i.e., tasks that the vehicle should perform, is executed in order and without conflicts. We note that the vehicles have embedded control for safe acceleration/deceleration, collision avoidance, and docking [[20](#_bookmark30)], which makes the coordination problem relevant for supervisory control.

The basic layout of a paint manufacturing pipeless plant consists of a series of stations as depicted in Fig. [2](#_bookmark2). The stations are divided into five categories: generators, exits, filling stations, mixing stations, and waiting stations. We note

that generators, exits, and waiting stations are conceptual constructs that help us with the reasoning about the system. The generators and the exits are implemented as storage stations in the hardware, whereas a waiting station is a parking space for the vehicles. In the generators, an empty vessel is placed on the automated guided vehicle. Filling stations pour paint of particular color into the vessel that is carried by a vehicle. A filling station is capable of pouring more than one color. Mixing stations remove full vessels from vehicles, mix the paint inside them, and then place them again on a vehicle, which does not necessarily have to be the same vehicle that delivered the vessel. Finally, exit stations remove vessels whose paint has already been mixed from vehicles for storage.

We make several assumptions about the model, the most important ones being: there are no physical barriers that prevent vehicles from arriving or leaving a par- ticular station, which is handled by the embedded control of the vehicle; vehicles are equipped with sensors and an independent control that prevents collisions with other vehicles, and they can independently reach a prescribed location in the sys- tem; only one vehicle can be accommodated at each station at a given time, with the exception of the waiting station, which can accommodate as many as necessary; once a vehicle has been instructed to go to a station, we cannot cancel the command or send it to another station before it reaches the designated station; the recipes contain predetermined order of colors that should be poured and the paint must be mixed for the recipe to be successfully completed; and the production procedure is considered as completed once the recipe sequence has been completed, there are no vessels present at the mixing stations, and all vehicles are empty and they are parked at a waiting station.

The pipeless plant that is modeled and analyzed in this case study consists of one generator, one exit, one waiting station, one mixing station, two filling stations, one of which can pour red or blue paint, and the other one can pour red or yellow paint, and two automated guided vehicles. We consider two recipes, one requiring red, blue, and yellow paint to be poured in that order, and another one requiring only red paint to be poured. For the performance evaluation metrics, we consider the sequence of recipes that first requires recipe one and, then, recipe two.

## Modeling of the Plant and the Data-Based Observers

In order to obtain the plant, it is first necessary to establish what signals can be received by the controller from the system, what signals it can send to the actuators and what events are used to mark internal state changes. The signal names are given in sans serif font, whereas we specify the parameters using roman font. We overview the important signals that are communicated in the system. Indication that a particular vehicle has reached a particular station is given by the uncontrollable events reach*−station−*ag*N* , where *station* is the name of the station and *N* is the number of the vehicle. Indication that a particular filling station has finished pouring paint is given by the uncontrollable events filled*−*f*M* where *M* represents the number of the filling station. Instruction for a particular filling station to pour a particular color is given by the controllable events fill*−color −*f*M* ,

where *M* is the number of the filling station and *color* is the color that should be poured. Instruction for the mixing or exit station to grab a vessel is given by the controllable events grab*−*m and grab*−*e, respectively. Instruction for the mixing station or generator to place a vessel is given by the controllable events place*−*m and place*−*g, respectively. Instruction for a particular vehicle to go to a particular station is given by the controllable events tr*−station−*ag*N* , where *station* is the name of the destination and *N* is the number of the vehicle. Indication that a particular color is registered for a particular recipe is denoted by the uncontrollable events r*J−color* , where *color* is the name of the color and *J* is the number of the recipe. Indication that a particular recipe is completed is given by the uncontrollable events r*J−*finished for recipe *J* . Indication that recipe *J* has been assigned to vehicle *N* is denoted by ri*−*r*J−*ag*N* .

We depict extended finite automata graphically, where state labels are given adjacent to the states, and event labels possibly have associated guards and variable updates below them. The uncontrollable events that represent stochastic delays have labels that begin with stoc. We note that for the sake of clarity of presentation and page limit, we do not discuss the whole model, but only several important aspects. The complete model and the tools are available from [[9](#_bookmark19),[24](#_bookmark37)].

F2\_ag1f

reach\_f2\_agN

tr\_m\_agN

M\_ag1

sAN=6 sAN=0

Fig. 3. Partial model of the automated guided vehicle



sAN=0

sAN=3

stoc\_f12f2 p\_agN==4

stoc\_w2f2 p\_agN==1

stoc\_g2f2 p\_agN==5

stoc\_e2m stoc\_w2m

p\_agN==2 p\_agN==1

stoc\_f12m p\_agN==4

stoc\_f22m

p\_agN==6

Stat\_ag1

tr\_f2\_agN

F2\_ag1

reach\_m\_agN

M\_ag1f

We depict a partial model of the automated guided vehicle in Fig. [3](#_bookmark3). The initial state is marked with an incoming arrow, whereas marked states have a gray background. The models specifies that a particular station can be reached by a vehicle, only if it has been sent to that station by the coordinator. For example, the controllable event tr *m* ag*N* commands vehicle *N* to the mixing station. The vehicle responds by the uncontrollable sensing event reach *m* ag*N* when it has reached the station. The uncontrollable events that can occur in between denote Markovian delays that represent the average time to travel to the mixing station, based on the current location of the vehicle. Since the vehicle does not carry information about its current location, the use of an observer is mandated. To identify the location of the vehicle, we employ the observer depicted in Fig. [4](#_bookmark4).

The variable p*−*ag*N* codes the location of the vehicle, where value 1 denotes the waiting station, 2 denotes exit, 3 denotes the mixing station, 4 specifies the first filling station, 5 specifies the generator, and 6 specifies the second filling station. Now, by conveniently observing the location of the vehicle, we employ the assigned value of the location variable p*−*ag*N* in the guard of the uncontrollable transitions that model Markovian delays in order to determines the correct delay. This is coded

reach\_g\_agN p\_agN=5

reach\_f1\_agN p\_agN=4

Op



reach\_m\_agN p\_agN=3

reach\_f2\_agN

p\_agN=6

reach\_w\_agN p\_agN=1

reach\_e\_agN p\_agN=2

Fig. 4. Position data-based observer of the automated guided vehicle

in the uncontrollable events labeled stoc*−origin*2*destination*, which denote that amount of time need to travel from *origin* to *destination*. For example, stoc*−w* 2*f2* is associated with rate 1, whereas stoc*−w* 2*m* is associated with rate 1*.*15, denoting that the waiting station is closer to the mixing station than to the second filling station. We model the movement of the vehicle with respect to other stations similarly to its movement to the mixing station. In Fig. [3](#_bookmark3), we additionally show the movement to the second filling station.

*placed\_m*

Wait\_m



Place\_m\_inter sMS=1

sMS=2

Grabbing\_m

stoc\_placing\_m

sMS=8

stoc\_grabbing\_m sMS=5

g\_m

Grab\_

place\_m sMS=6

*grabbed\_m*

sMS=7

Waitb\_m Grabbed m

grab\_m

Placin

m\_inter

stoc\_mixing\_m

sMS=4

Mixind\_m

mix\_m sMS=3

Fig. 5. Model of a mixing station

Next, we show the model of the mixing station, depicted in Fig. [5](#_bookmark5). The station is initially empty and it is ready to grab a vessel. Then it can mix its contents and when it is finished, it can place the vessel on an available vehicle and return to its initial state. The variable ”sMS” tracks the current state of this automaton. The uncontrollable delays stoc*−*grabbing*−*m, stoc*−*mixing*−*m, and stoc*−*placing*−*m denote the average time of grabbing a vessel, mixing its contents, and placing it to the next available vehicle, respectively. We note that we do not require feedback when the mixing process is finished, as this is not a synchronizing event, as it is the case with grabbed m and placed m.

We depict the model of a filling station in Fig. [6](#_bookmark6). The station pours the corre- sponding only after being instructed by the coordinator. The uncontrollable event stoc*−*filling *color−*f*M* , captures the average time needed to fill the color *color* at the filling station *M* . The state of the filling station is followed by the variable sFS*M*

filled\_fM



fill\_red\_fM

ProcBlue\_f1

sFS1=1 sFS1=3

ProcRed\_f1i

stoch\_filling\_blue\_fM

NoFill\_f1

stoch\_filling\_red\_fM

ProcBlue\_f1i

fill\_blue\_fM

filled\_fM

ProcRed\_f1

sFS1=2 sFS1=1

Fig. 6. Model of a filling station

for the filling station *M* .

Cl1\_r1

r1\_red



ri\_r1\_ag1 ri\_r1\_ag2

r1\_red

Bng\_r1

Cl2\_r1

r1\_blue

r1\_finished

fill\_yellow\_f2



r2\_red reg=0

reg=3

Reg0

fill\_red\_f2

r1\_yellow

Reg2r Reg2y

End\_r1 r1\_yellow

Cl3\_r1

reg=1

reg=0

a) b)

Fig. 7. a)Model of a recipe requiring the colors red, blue, and yellow to be mixed; b) Observer registering the colors that have already been filled;

The model of the recipe indicates that after the recipe has been assigned to an automated guided vehicle, events ri r1 ag*N* assigning recipe 1 to vehicle *N* , a particular sequence of color registries has to be followed for that particular recipe, as depicted in Fig. [7](#_bookmark7)a). A color registry, given by the events r1 *color* for the color *color* for recipe 1 in Fig. [7](#_bookmark7)b), is a generated event from an observer that waits for the corresponding color to be poured into the vessel from any available filling station that provided that color.

ri\_r1\_ag1



Mp

grab\_m

sRC=2

r2\_finished

sRC=1

r1\_finished

sRC=1

ri\_r2\_ag1



ri\_r1\_ag2

ri\_r2\_ag2

Mi Init R1 R2

a) b)

Fig. 8. a) Observer for the recipe completion; b) Recipe sequence to be carried out

We also introduce an observer for recipe completion, depicted in Fig. [8](#_bookmark8)a), which indicates that recipes can only be considered complete once the mixing station grabs the corresponding vessel for mixing. Recipes are specified as sequences as shown in Fig. [8](#_bookmark8)b), where the events in the sequence specify which vehicles are capable of

carrying out the specific recipe. This models the situation where different vehicles are more suitable for different recipes, e.g., some vehicles can carry heavier vessels or have specific safety features. We note that marked states ascertain that the supervisory controller completes each recipe successfully and the recipe sequence is carried out completely.

## Control Requirements

We have multiple coordination constraints that we must ascertain over the plant. Most of the constraints are safety properties, whereas several can also be treated as progress properties. In total we have 22 informal movement coordination con- straints, which are specified in the model [[24](#_bookmark37)]. Here, we discuss several characteristic coordination constraints, in order to illustrate the process of formalization of con- trol requirements. We note that the other constraints are modeled in an analogous manner, and most of them make use of the data observers as they typically refer to locations and activities that can be performed at a specific location.

tr\_f1\_agN p\_agN!=4

t p

tr\_f1\_agN tr\_e\_agN tr\_g\_agN tr\_m\_agN tr\_w\_agN

N tr\_f2\_agN

r\_g\_agN

\_agN!=5

tr\_f2\_ag p\_agN!=

Req1s

tr\_w\_agN tr\_e\_agN

6 (p\_agN!=4 | sFS1==1) & (p\_agN!=6 | sFS2==1)

tr\_f1\_ag1 p\_ag2!=4 & sA2!=4

tr\_g\_ag1

p\_ag2!=5 & sA2!=5 tr\_m\_ag1 p\_ag2!=3 & sA2!=3

Req21s

p\_agN!=1

p\_agN!=2



Req2s

tr\_f2\_ag1 p\_ag2!=6 & sA2!=6

tr\_e\_ag1

p\_ag2!=2 & sA2!=2

a) b) c)

Fig. 9. Control requirements a), b), c), respectively

Coordination constraint a): “A vehicle cannot be instructed to go to a station it is already at.” is an example of a progress constraint, since it does not contribute to safe behavior of the system, but only eliminates useless commands issued by the coordinator. To specify this control requirement we require the current position of the vehicle, so it is necessary to use the information registered by the position observer of Fig. [4](#_bookmark4). The requirement expresses that the events tr *station* ag*N* are blocked at the station *station*, identified by the variable p*−*ag*N* = *station*. Fig. [9](#_bookmark9)a) depicts this control requirement as specified in Supremica [[1](#_bookmark13)]. The control require- ments are typically specified as self loops labeled by the corresponding events that are guarded by an expression that models the control requirement based on the variable assignments. Thus, for example, we can issue a command to vehicle *N* to go to the waiting station by employing the event tr *w* ag*N* , only if the location variable p*−*ag*N* does not have value 1, which means that the vehicle is not already at the waiting station.

Coordination constraint b): “A vehicle cannot go to another station while it is being filled with paint.” is a safety requirement that prevents the material from being spilt outside the vessel. This requirement is depicted in Fig [9](#_bookmark9)b) and it is modeled by blocking events of the type tr*−station−*ag*N* , when ”p*−*ag*N* = *J* ”, i.e.,

the vehicle is at filling station *J* , whereas the observer of the filling process is not in state NoFill f*J* that denotes that the filling process has terminated.

Coordination constraint c): “A vehicle cannot be commanded to move to a station, if another vehicle is already instructed or located at the same station, except for the waiting station.” is a safety requirement that prevents vehicles from colliding at stations while docking. IN Fig. [9](#_bookmark9)c) we show the model of this requirement for the vehicle 1 with respect to vehicle 2. The requirement is ascertained by blocking events tr*−station−*ag1 that instruct vehicle 1 to transfer to station *station*, while vehicle 2 is already at or moving toward the same station, which is detected by checking the values assigned to the variables p*−*ag2 and sA2.

## Performance Evaluation by Stochastic Model Checking

After having modeled the plant and the control requirements, we synthesize a supervisor, as outlined in Fig. [1](#_bookmark1). Then, we process the supervised plant in which the stochastic events are renamed back from uncontrollable events, and we de- rive the underlying continuous-time Markov chain by employing the tool Suprem- ica2MRMC [[24](#_bookmark37)]. The resulting Markov process has state labels, which correspond to the state labels of the original extended finite automata models made in Suprem- ica. In addition, we add the data-based observations to the Markov process as state labels of the form *Variable* = *Value*. Having derived the performance model, we proceed with modeling several performance requirements and verifying them using the Markov model checker MRMC [[14](#_bookmark24)].

## Continuous Stochastic Logic

To specify the performance requirements, we employ Continuous Stochastic Logic [[3](#_bookmark14)], which is completely supported by Markov model checker MRMC for continuous-time Markov chains. Here we present only a part of the logic for the needs of this paper. The logic syntax is split to state formulas and path formulas. State formulas are employed to identify states by their propositional labels or prob- ability measures, whereas path formulas identify states that satisfy time-bounded or unbounded properties over sequences of reachable states. Both types of formu- las can be coupled with probability measures to verify performance or reliability properties. State formulas SF have the following MRMC syntax [[14](#_bookmark24)]:

SF ::= tt *|* ff *|* L *|* !SF *|* SF && SF *|* SF *||* SF *|* P*{◦* p*}*[PF] *|* S*{◦* p*}*[SF]*,*

where tt denotes the constant true, ff denotes the constant false, L *∈* S is an atomic propositional symbol, ! denotes negation, && denotes conjunction, *||* denotes disjunction, *◦∈ {<, ≤,* =*, ≥, >}*, and p *∈* [0*,* 1].

The probability measure operator P*{◦* p*}*[PF] identifies states on paths that sat- isfy PF and meet the probability constraint *◦* p. The steady-state probability mea- sure operator S*{◦* p*}*[SF] checks if the steady-state probability for being in states that fulfill SF meets the probability constraint *◦* p. These operators result in a state formulas that can be nested to make up complex path formulas [[3](#_bookmark14)]. Path formulas

PF can combine state formulas using the until operator, which may be bounded for a specific time interval:

PF ::= SFU SF *|* SF U[r*,* r] SF*,*

where *r ∈* R and *r ≥* 0. The until operator identifies paths that comprise states that satisfy the left state formula until they reach an end state that satisfies the right state formula in the given time interval for the bounded variant and for any time interval for the unbounded variant.

## Modeling of Performance Requirements

We developed a method for domain engineers in industry that are not experi- enced in formulating properties in temporal logics in order to aid them with the formulation of performance requirements starting from the informal specification to expressions in CSL. We depict the method in Fig. [10](#_bookmark10). The first step is to state the outcome of the requirements explicitly. Thereafter, the relevant properties of this outcome should be identified. These properties must be expressed in terms of state or trajectories present in the system. States are identified by their state labels, or by the data observations made by the modeler.

CSL has a restricted syntax: if the performance requirement considers reacha- bility of states, or percentage of time spent in a state, then this can be expressed. However, combinations or complex path information, are currently not supported by MRMC. For a more detailed treatment of this topic we refer to [[9](#_bookmark19)]. As not everything can be expressed directly, there several possibilities to be explored: the interpretation of the properties is incorrect, the original statement is not precisely specified or it is not possible to express the desired property using the available no- tation. In the first two cases, the performance requirement must be specified more precisely, and these are considered modeling errors. However, it happens that the notation of CSL is not sufficiently expressive for the task at hand. In some cases, it might be possible to make a compromise and weaken the original statement to obtain some useful information from the performance evaluation, but in general, it is necessary to attempt another approach. By applying this procedure, we specify several performance requirements of interest.

Performance requirement a): “What is the probability that the entire process will take less than 60 time units to complete?”. For this requirement the acceptable probability bound is greater than 0*.*9. Thus, we have to verify whether a marked state can be reached within 60 time units with probability greater than 0*.*9. Such a state is identified by the following values of the corresponding observation variables *p−ag*1 = 1, *p−ag*2 = 1, *ld−ag*1 = 0, and *ld−ag*2 = 0, whereas the mixing station has to be in the state labeled *Wait−m*. The corresponding statement is given by

P*{ >*= 0.9 *}*[ tt U[ 0,60 ) (p*−*ag1 == 1 && p*−*ag2 == 1 && ld*−*ag1 == 0 && ld*−*ag2 == 0 && Wait*−*m ) ].

Performance requirement b): “What is the probability that the paint for the

first recipe is poured before the paint for the second recipe?”. For this requirements the acceptable probability bound should be greater than 0*.*95. Thus, we verify

Layer 1: Informal statement of performance quality

What does the system do?

What is the outcome/output of the system?

What are the relevant properties of the outcome/ output that should be measured?

How can they be measured?

What are the acceptable bounds on those measures?

Layer 2: Statement on performance quality in terms of states and trajectories

What are the states of the system?

What atomic propositions are valid in each of the states? What are the trajectories of states that illustrate the process performed by the system?

How is the quality of the outcome/output associated with a particular state or set of states? (e.g. it depends on how frequently a particular state is visited, or on percentage of time spent) How is it associated with a particular trajectory or set of trajectories? (e.g. it depends on how often the system strays from a trajectory, or on how long it takes to complete it)

no

Can it be expressed in terms of the probability of a state being in a trajectory or the percentage of time spent in a certain state?

Layer 3: Statement on performance quality in CSL notation

yes

Can this expression be formulated using CSL operators?

yes no

Result

Performance analysis unviable

Performance analysis viable

Fig. 10. Method for modeling performance requirements using CSL

whether the probability that the vehicle to which the first recipe has been assigned will reach a mixing station before a vehicle to which the second recipe has been assigned is greater than 0*.*95. This can be modeled by observing trajectories in which *recipe−ag*1 == 2 and *p−ag*1 == 3 is not valid at the same time and *recipe−ag*2 == 2 and *p−ag*2 == 3 are not valid at the same time, until a state is reached where *recipe−ag*1 == 1 and *p−ag*1 == 3 are valid or *recipe−ag*2 == 1 and *p−ag*2 ==3 are valid. The corresponding statement using CSL is given by

P*{ >*= 0.95 *}*[ (!( recipe*−*ag1 == 2 && p*−*ag1 == 3 ) &&

!( recipe*−*ag2 == 2 && p*−*ag2 == 3 ) ) U ( ( recipe*−*ag1 == 1 && p*−*ag1 == 3 ) 

( recipe*−*ag2 == 1 && p*−*ag2 == 3 ) ) ].

Performance requirement c): “What is the probability of a loaded vehicle to reside in a waiting station at least once before the process is completed?”. For this requirement the acceptable bound on probability is smaller than 0*.*1. To express this property, we check whether the probability of residing a state where *p−ag*1 == 1 and *ld−ag*1 == 1 are valid or *p−ag*2 == 1 and *ld−ag*2 == 1 are valid is smaller than 0*.*1, which is given by

P*{ <*= 0.1 *}*[ tt U ( ( p*−*ag1 == 1 && ld*−*ag1 == 1 ) 

( p*−*ag2 == 1 && ld*−*ag2 == 1 ) ) ]

The verification of the properties with our set of exponential rates showed that requirement a) is met with computed probability of 0*.*98, whereas requirements b) and c) were not met, with probabilities 0*.*29 and 1, respectively.

# Concluding Remarks

Traditionally, only safety concerns are considered during the design of supervi- sory controllers. To improve the design process and make it less iterative, it is important to consider the performance of the system as well. We presented an integration of supervisory control with performance evaluation that allows verifi- cation whether given performance requirements are met by the control design. To this end, the discrete-event model of the system is extended with Markovian de- lays. Additionally, data-based observers are introduced as a way of improving the safety requirement design, allowing for greater flexibility and simplicity in modeling. The performance was evaluated by means of Markov model checking, for which we develop a methodology for modeling performance in terms of stochastic temporal logics. The proposed framework was demonstrated on a case involving movement coordination of automated guided vehicles that transfer production materials in a pipeless plant.

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