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Keeping Secrets in Resource Aware Components

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Abstract

We present a powerful and flexible method for automatically checking the secrecy of values inside compo- nents. In our framework an attacker may monitor the external communication of a component, interact with it *and* monitor the components resource usage. We use an automata model of components in which each transition is tagged with resource usage information. We extend these automata to pass values and say that a value is kept secret if the observable behaviour of the automata is the same for all possible instantiations of that value. If a component leaks some, but not all of the information about its secret we use a notion of *secrecy degree* to quantify the worst-case leakage. We show how this secrecy degree can be automatically calculated, for values from a finite domain, using the *μ*CRL process algebraic verification toolset.

*Keywords:* Secrecy, Q-Automata, automatic checking, component-based systems, quality of service, *μ*CRL

# Introduction

Component-based software development allows programs to be reused, interchanged and even downloaded onto a running system. Sometimes the maker or user of a component would like to keep some of the data inside the component secret from other components on the same system. This goal is complicated as the potential attackers may be running on the same computer as the target component and so can monitor its resource usage. We develop a framework for automatically check- ing how well values inside a component are kept secret from an attacker that can communicate with the component *and* monitor its resource usage.

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Resource usage or Quality of Service (QoS) aspects of components concern non- functional properties such as availability, response time, memory usage, etc. Fol- lowing work on constraint semirings [[4](#_bookmark15),[13](#_bookmark24)], we propose a general framework for a range of trust and quality values, which we call a Q-algebra. These algebras define a framework for quality values that could be combined with many kinds of automata or calculi. With the aim of making our system suitable for the kinds of applications we expect to model and of making our system more easily understandable, we have chosen to base our work on automata. These provide a concrete, intuitively clear, model of computation, and a structural approach to the analysis of the behaviour of components and their composition.

Components will be represented by Q-automata [[10](#_bookmark21)]. These automata have an additional cost label on each transition to indicate the impact of taking that transition on the quality attributes of the system. Most automata models do not distinguish between the interleaving of two actions and their possible concurrent occurrence, however in the model proposed here it is possible that concurrent com- ponents can perform their actions simultaneously without having to synchronise (e.g., in a communication). Therefore, the resource usage of an application can be quite different depending on whether the smallest units of abstraction happen at the same time or one after the other. For instance, given two transitions, both of which “cost” a certain amount of bandwidth, measured in Kbit/s, running both at the same time will require the sum of the two individual costs, whereas running them one after the other will only cost the maximum of the two individual costs. Time costs on the other hand will sum sequentially, but not concurrently and we may choose to model memory allocation costs by summing them both concurrently and sequentially.

We extend Q-automata to pass names from a finite domain of values in a similar way as non-value passing process calculi are often extended to value passing versions,

c.f. [[20](#_bookmark30)]. We also define strong bisimulation as an equivalence relation for the (extended) Q-automata model that requires matching costs on transitions.

We define *Component Secrecy Degree* and *Variable Secrecy Degree* to measure how well a model of a component keeps its secrets from any attacker who can interact with the component and monitor its resource usages. We do not consider an attacker that can examine the source code of a component, we are interested in modelling attackers that are other components running on the same computer as the target and so they can only use the standard communication channels and monitor the resource usage of other components. A component has prefect secrecy if any two instances of that component, observed by the attacker, are bisimilar for any possible secret values. The degrees of secrecy give a measure of how much information about the components secrets are leaked. This is similar to the approach of [[11](#_bookmark22)] in measuring anonymity degrees. We use the *μ*CRL toolset [[5](#_bookmark16)] for performing state space reduction modulo bisimulation [[6](#_bookmark17)], which we use along with some purpose- built scripts to generate all possible cases of the model and to calculate degrees of secrecy.

Main contributions.

The contributions of this work include

* a resource aware automata model of components with secrets,
* a corresponding definition of secrecy and a method of checking it via bisimulation,
* a tool to automatically check our measures of secrecy (based on *μ*CRL).

Related work.

Weighted automata have a simple weight or cost on each transition and have been extensively studied since the early days of computer science [[14](#_bookmark25),[22](#_bookmark31)]. Our automata model differs from weighted automata by using a Q-algebra to provide the costs; this allows us to define a truly compositional model of the resource usage of components. Timed automata models label transitions with costs representing the time they take [[1](#_bookmark12)]. Priced or weighted timed automata [[2](#_bookmark13),[3](#_bookmark14)] model time using clocks and have costs on states and transitions. The cost of each transition is paid each time the transition is made whereas the costs of each state is paid once for each time unit the automata spends in that state. This provides an expressive model of costs and time that is, in many cases, undecidable [[8](#_bookmark19)]. Our model is also similar to some process calculi, such as CCS [[19](#_bookmark32)], one of the main differences, apart from the automata setting, is that we allow multisets of actions to happen at the same time. In the context of computer security, there are several papers on modelling re- source consumptions of different execution scenarios, [[9](#_bookmark20),[17](#_bookmark28)]. A conceptual difference between our work and these papers is that they mainly focus on measuring the re- sources consumed by the attacker in an attack, whereas we allow the attacker to measure the resources consumed by the target system, and possibly use it to launch an attack. In this respect, our work is close to the body of research on side channel

and timing attacks [[15](#_bookmark26),[18](#_bookmark29),[21](#_bookmark33)].

Structure of the paper.

In the next section we introduce our automata model and cost algebra. In Section [3](#_bookmark2) we extend these automata to pass values and define secrecy degrees for these values. Section [4](#_bookmark6) introduces our automatic tool to check secrecy. Finally Section [5](#_bookmark10) concludes the paper.

# Q-Automata: Modelling Resource Usage

Our model of resource aware components uses values from a *Q-algebra* to label the transitions of an automaton.

* 1. *Q-algebra*

To compute and analyse QoS values in a standard way, we develop a general frame- work as in the approach of De Nicola *et al.* [[13](#_bookmark24)]. First we recall the concept of a constraint semiring:

Definition 2.1 A *constraint semiring* is a structure *R* = (*C,* ⊕*,* ⊗*,* 0*,* 1) where *C* is a set, 0*,* 1 ∈ *C*, and ⊕ and ⊗ are binary operations on *C* such that:

* ⊕ is commutative, associative, idempotent and has identity 0
* ⊗ is associative and has identity 1
* ⊗ distributes over ⊕ and has 0 as an absorbing (zero) element

Note that for a constraint semiring (or *c-semiring*, for short) as above, the operation ⊕ induces a partial order ≤ on *C* defined by *a* ≤ *b* if and only if *a* ⊕ *b* = *b*. Moreover, two elements are comparable with respect to ≤ if and only if application of ⊕ to these elements yields one (the larger w.r.t. ≤) of the two. Actually, ⊕ always yields the least upper bound of the elements to which it is applied.

Constraint semirings can be used to compose QoS values with “addition” ⊕ to select among values and “multiplication” ⊗ to combine them. Given an action of cost *c*1 and another action with cost *c*2 then the cost of both actions together is *c*1 ⊗ *c*2, whereas ⊕ returns the least upper bound of *c*1 and *c*2. The 0 element, as the identity of ⊕, is the least possible cost value and the 1 element, as the identity of ⊗, is the neutral cost value.

A few examples:

* (shortest) time: (R+ ∪ {∞}*,* min*,* +*,* ∞*,* 0)
* bandwidth: (N ∪ {∞}*,* min*,* max*,* ∞*,* 0)
* data encrypted: ({true*,* false}*,* ∨*,* ∧*,* false*,* true)
* access control: (2*U ,* ∪*,* ∩*,* ∅*,U* ), where *U* is the set of all users and 2*U* is the powerset of *U* .

Constraint semirings work well when there is just one way to combine quality values. We may use these values to represent the cost of a method call, a sequence of reduction steps or the cost to execute an entire program. When dealing with a number of concurrent processes these steps may take place sequentially or in parallel and these two ways of combining actions might have very different overall results on the resource usage of the system. For instance, two processes that both require a certain number of CPU cycles per second will require a higher number of cycles per second when run at the same time than when run one after the other. We can model these different ways of combining values by adding a new multiplicative operator:

Definition 2.2 A *Q-algebra* is a structure *R* = (*C,* ⊕*,* ⊗*,* *,* 0*,* 1) such that *R*⊗ = (*C,* ⊕*,* ⊗*,* 0*,* 1) and *R* = (*C,* ⊕*,* *,* 0*,* 1) are c-semirings. *C* is called *the domain of R*.

The operator is used to combine two values concurrently: *c*1 *c*2 is the cost of *c*1 and *c*2 at the same time. The ⊗ operator combines values sequentially: *c*1 ⊗ *c*2 is the cost of *c*1 followed by *c*2. Combining costs concurrently or sequentially will not affect the least or neutral cost elements so the two operations share their identities. As before, ⊕ is used to select between values. For example:

* (shortest) time: (R+ ∪ {∞}*,* min*,* +*,* max*,* ∞*,* 0)
* bandwidth: (N ∪ {∞}*,* min*,* max*,* +*,* ∞*,* 0)
  1. *Q-Automata*

In this section we introduce Q-automata. These consist of an initialised labelled transition system together with a (labelled) Q-algebra to specify the cost of each transition. Note that each transition is labelled with a multiset of actions as a representation of simultaneous and multiple occurrences of actions. A multiset over a set *X* is a function *m* : *X* → N and the set of all multisets over *X* is denoted by

M(*X*). For two multisets *m*1 and *m*2 over *X*, their sum *m*1 + *m*2 is the multiset over *X* defined by (*m*1 + *m*2)(*x*)= *m*1(*x*)+ *m*2(*x*).

Definition 2.3 A *Q-automaton* is a structure *P* = ⟨*S, t, A, R, T* ⟩ where:

* + - *S* is a finite set of *states*,
    - *t* ∈ *S* is its *initial state*,
    - *A* is a (finite) set of *action names*,
    - *R* = (*C,* ⊕*,* ⊗*,* *,* 0*,* 1) is a labelled QoS algebra with domain *C* of *costs*,
    - and *T* ⊆ *S* × M(*Act*) × *C* × *S* is the set of transitions.

The set of *actions* of *P* , written *Act*, is derived from the set of action names *A* in the following way: each name *a* ∈ *A* can occur as an *input* action (denoted *a*?), an *output* action (denoted *a*!) or as an internal action (also denoted by *a*). We thus obtain *AO* = {*a*! : *a* ∈ *A*}, the set of output actions of *P* , *AI* = {*a*? : *a* ∈ *A*}, the set of input actions of *P* , and *Aτ* = *A* the set of internal actions of *P* . The sets *AO*, *AI* , and *Aτ* are assumed to be pairwise disjoint. Finally, we let *Act* = *AO* ∪ *AI* ∪ *Aτ* .

The (finite) computations of Q-automata are defined in the standard way.

Definition 2.4 Let *P* be a Q-automaton specified as in Definition [2.3](#_bookmark0). A *computa- tion (of length n* ≥ 0*)* starting from a state *s*0 ∈ *S* is a sequence (*s*0*, m*1*, c*1*, s*1)*,... ,* (*sn*−1*, mn, cn, sn*) with (*si, mi, ci, si*+1) ∈ *T* for all 0 ≤ *i* ≤ *n* − 1. If *n* = 0, then the computation is the empty sequence.

Based on the Q-algebra and the costs of the transitions, we can compute the cost for each computation.

Definition 2.5 Let *γ* = (*s*0*, m*1*, c*1*, s*1)*,... ,* (*sn*−1*, mn, cn, sn*) be a computation as specified in Definition [2.4](#_bookmark1). Then the *cost of γ* is 1, if *n* = 0 and *c*1 ⊗ *...* ⊗ *cn* if *n* ≥ 1.

So, the cost of a computation (a sequence of transitions) is computed using the “sequential multiplication” operator ⊗. Note that to compare the costs of different computations, the additive (selection) operation ⊕ can be used since it yields the least upper bound of the given values. “Concurrent multiplication” is used when Q-automata collaborate in a composite automaton (their product). This product automaton has as its Q-algebra the product of the Q-algebras of its components. Its state space is the Cartesian product of the state spaces of its components and its transitions are combinations of the components’ transitions, as defined below.

In the formal definition of product automata, we use an auxiliary function *sync*, which in turn uses a relation ⇒ over pairs of multisets of actions such that the pair on the left equals the pair on right except one input on a name in one multiset

and one output on the same name in the other multiset have been removed and a communication on that name has been added.

Definition 2.6 Let *A* be a set of action names, *Act* be its associated set of ac-

tions as defined in Definition [2.3](#_bookmark0) and *m*1 and *m*2 be two multisets over *Act*. Then (*m*1*, m*2) ⇒ (*m*' *, m*' ) if either there exists an *a* ∈ *A* such that:

1 2

* *m*1(*a*?) ≥ 1 and *m*2(*a*!) ≥ 1
* *m*' (*a*)= *m*1(*a*)+1 and *m*' (*a*?) = *m*1(*a*?) − 1,

1 1

* *m*' (*a*!) = *m*2(*a*!) − 1,

2

* and *m*' (*b*)= *m*1(*b*) and *m*' (*b*)= *m*2(*b*) for all other actions *b* ∈ *Act*.

1 2

or if (*m*2*, m*1) ⇒ (*m*' *, m*' ) as above.

2 1

Let ⇒∗ be the reflexive, transitive closure of ⇒. Then

*sync*(*m*1*, m*2)= {*m*' + *m*' : for all *m*' *, m*' such that (*m*1*, m*2) ⇒∗ (*m*' *, m*' )}.

1 2 1 2 1 2

Thus *sync*(*m, m*') is the set of all multisets that can be obtained by adding *m*

and *m*' with any possible combination of communications between them. Note that

⇒∗ in particular allows the multisets not to communicate at all.

Definition 2.7 Let *P*1 = ⟨*S*1*, t*1*, A*1*, R, T*1⟩ and *P*2 = ⟨*S*2*, t*2*, A*2*, R, T*2⟩ be two Q- automata. Then their product, denoted by *P*1 ☒ *P*2, is the Q-automaton defined as *P*1 ☒ *P*2 = ⟨*S, t, A, R, T* ⟩ with

* *S* = *S*1 × *S*2,
* *t* = (*t*1*, t*2),
* *A* = *A*1 ∪ *A*2,
* *T* = *Tnew* ∪ *Tnew* ∪ *Tjoint* where:

1 2

* *Tnew* = {((*s, t*)*, m, c,* (*s*'*, t*)) : (*s, m, c, s*') ∈ *T*1 and *t* ∈ *S*2},

1

* *Tnew* = {((*s, t*)*, m, c,* (*s, t*')) : *s* ∈ *S*1 and (*t, m, c, t*') ∈ *T*2}, and

2

* *Tjoint* = {((*s, t*)*, m, c,* (*s*'*, t*')) : ∃(*s, m*1*, c*1*, s*') ∈ *T*1*,* (*t, m*2*, c*2*, t*') ∈ *T*2 such that *m* ∈ *sync*(*m*1*, m*2) and *c* = *c*1 *c*2}.

In some cases we may want to impose a more restrictive model of communi- cation on our automata, for instance we might want to require that only a single automaton can receive on a given channel or we might want to test our automata in the knowledge that no other automaton will ever be listening on some channel. We can do this by blocking all transitions that involve a given (internal, input, or output) action.

Definition 2.8 Let *P* = ⟨*S, t, A, R, T* ⟩ be a Q-automaton and let *α* ∈ *AO* ∪ *AI* ∪ *Aτ*

be an action of *P* . Then *P* \*α*, *the restriction of P with respect to α*, is the Q-

automaton ⟨*S, t, A, R, T* ' ⟩ with *T* ' = {(*s, m, c, s*') : (*s, m, c, s*') ∈ *TP* and *m*(*α*) =

*P P*

0}. We define *P* \∅ = *P* and *P* \ ({*α*}∪ *Y* )= (*P* \ *α*) \ *Y* .

# Secret Values

* 1. *Value Passing Q-automata*

This subsection provides the additional machinery that we need to define and test secret values. We extend Q-automata to pass names from an ordered, finite data domain of values. We add a finite set of variables *V* and a finite domain of values *D* to the definition of Q-automata. Our definitions can naturally be extended to cover cases where different variables have separate, yet finite, data domains. However, to keep the presentation simple, we confine to the single value domain case in this paper. Below, we use *x, y,...* to refer to variables, *d*1*, d*2*,...* are elements of the data domain and *n*1*, n*2*,...* refer to either a variables or an element of the domain.

Definition 3.1 An *extended Q-automata* is a structure *Pe* = ⟨*S, t, A, R, D, T* ⟩

where:

* *S* is a finite set of *states*,
* *t* ∈ *S* is its *initial state*,
* *A* is a (finite) set of *action names*,
* *R* = (*C,* ⊕*,* ⊗*,* *,* 0*,* 1) is a labelled QoS algebra with domain *C* of *costs*,
* *D* a finite domain of data values,
* and *T* ⊆ *S* × M(*Act*) × *C* × *S* is the set of transitions.

The set of *actions* of *P* , written *Act* , contains four types of actions: Input on a name from a segment of the domain *a*?(*x*)[*d*1*,... , d*2], output on a name *a*!(*n*1), internal action on a name *a*(*n*1), and conditionals on data values *if* (*n*1 = *n*2) as well as *if* (*n*1 /= *n*2). [1](#_bookmark3)

The input action *a*?(*x*) “binds” the variable *x*. We say that a variable is “free” in a multiset of actions if it is used in an output or in a conditional but is not bound by an input. Furthermore, we say that a variable is free from a given state if there exists a trace, starting at that state, in which the variable appears free before it is bound.

Below we define well-formed extended Q-automata.

Definition 3.2 An extended Q-automata *P* is *well-formed* if

* None of the multisets of actions, on the transitions, bind the same variable more than once.
* There are no free names from the start state.

From now on, we only consider well-formed extended Q-automata. We define the semantics of value passing automata by mapping them back into the non-value passing automata. We do this by mapping each combination of name and data value to a single name. For instance, the input action a?(x)[1,. . . ,4] would be mapped to four different input actions *a* 1?*,* ··· *,a* 4?, where each of these is a variable-free action in the basic system. To translate the “*if* ” condition, we test the values and

1 This can in principle be easily extended to any Boolean function as conditionals.

if the condition holds then we replace it with an empty transition otherwise we remove it.

We record the mappings from variables to values using a partial function *σ* :

*V* → *D*. An action *a*?(*x*)[*d*1*,* ··· *, dn*] and a partial function *σ* are *compatible* if *σ*(*x*) ∈ {*d*1*,* ··· *, dn*}, we write *a σ*(*x*)? for [*a*?(*x*)[*d*1*,* ··· *, dn*]]*σ*, when *σ* is compatible with the action. For example if *σ* = {(*x,* 4)}, then [*a*?(*x*)[1*,* ··· *,* 5]]*σ* is written as *a* 4?. We note that given a partial function *σ* that does not map *x* to a value, the smallest extensions of *σ* that are compatible with the action *a*?(*x*)[*d*1*,* ··· *, dn*] are *σ* ∪ {*x* '→ *d*1}*,... ,σ* ∪ {*x* '→ *dn*}.

For output actions [*a*]*σ* is obtained by simultaneously substituting all variables for their values and forming the matching single output name. For instance, given *a*!(*x*) and *σ* = {(*x,* 3)}, we have [*a*!(*x*)]*σ* = *a* 3!. We extend these definitions to multisets of actions in a natural way. Note that the well-formedness conditions mean that there is no conflict between variable names.

Definition 3.3 Given an extended Q-automaton *Pe* = ⟨*Se, te, Ae, Re, De, Te*⟩ we define its mapping to a basic Q-automata **[***Pe*]] = ⟨*S,* (*te,* ∅)*, Ae, Re,T* ⟩ as follows: Each state in *S* is a pair (*se, σ*), where *se* ∈ *Se* and *σ* : *V* → *D* is a partial function that assigns concrete values to members of *V* . We define *S* and *T* to be the smallest sets such that:

* (*te,* ∅) ∈ *S*
* For all (*s, σ*) ∈ *S* and for all (*s, m, c, s*') ∈ *Te*:
  + either there exists an “if” condition in *m* which is false using *σ*
  + or we remove the names bound by *m* from *σ* and define *S* to be the set of the smallest extensions of that substitution that are compatible with *m*, then for all *σ*' ∈ *S*:

((*s, σ*)*,* [*m*]*σ*' *, c,* (*s*'*, σ*'')) ∈ *T* and (*s*'*, σ*'') ∈ *S*

where *σ*'' equals *σ*' with all names that are not free from state *s*' removed.

The removal of the names from *σ*' ensures that irrelevant extensions to the substitution mapping do not lead to more states than are necessary.

A parameterised Q-automata *Pe*(*x*1*,... , xn*) is an extended Q-automata that has free variables in its computations, hence it is not well-formed. However, an instantiated *Pe*(*x*1*,... , xn*) with a mapping *σ*0 = {(*x*1*, d*1)*,* ··· *,* (*xn, dn*)} is well- formed and can be translated to a basic Q-automata **[***Pe*(*d*1*,... , dn*)]] with starting the procedure introduced in Definition [3.3](#_bookmark4) with the initial state (*t, σ*0), instead of (*t,* ∅).

* 1. *Hiding and Bisimulation*

We do not want the attacker to be able to observe the internal actions of any automaton, therefore we define a hiding operator that removes the names from the internal actions but leaves the transition and its costs.

Definition 3.4 Given a Q-automata *P* (*→x*) = ⟨*S, t, A, R, T* ⟩ and a set of inter- nal names I, the automata that results from hiding these names is *P* (*→x*){I} =

⟨*S, t,* (*A*\I)*, R,T* '⟩ where:

*T* ' = {(*s, m*'*, c, s*') : (*s, m, c, s*') ∈ *T* and for all *a* ∈ I*. m*'(*a*)= *m*'(*a*!) = *m*(*a*?) = 0 and *m*(*b*)= *m*'(*b*) for all *b* /= *a* }

We define *strong bisimulation* for automata with costs as follows:

Definition 3.5 We say two Q-automata *P*1 = ⟨*S*1*, t*1*, A*1*, R*1*, T*1⟩ and *P*2 =

⟨*S*2*, t*2*, A*2*, R*2*, T*2⟩ are *bisimilar*, denoted by *P*1 ∼ *P*2, iff

* for all (*t*1*, m, c, s*1) ∈ *T*1, then there exists (*t*2*, m, c, s*2) ∈ *T*2 such that

⟨*S*1*, s*1*, A*1*, R*1*, T*1⟩ and ⟨*S*2*, s*2*, A*2*, R*2*, T*2⟩ are bisimilar.

* for all (*t*2*, m, c, s*2) ∈ *T*2, then there exists (*t*1*, m, c, s*1) ∈ *T*1 such that

⟨*S*2*, s*2*, A*2*, R*2*, T*2⟩ and ⟨*S*1*, s*1*, A*1*, R*1*, T*1⟩ are bisimilar.

Two extended automata are bisimilar if their mappings into the basic automata are also bisimilar. We note that this definition requires the names and the costs on an action to match, therefore if two automata perform the same actions at different costs they are not bisimilar.

The equivalence used in the verification of secrecy models the observation power of the intruder. We use bisimulation to equate processes; this is in contrast to some previous work that used trace equivalence for secrecy, e.g. see [[12](#_bookmark23)]. While it is often possible, in an asynchronous setting, to implement processes in such a way that an intruder cannot tell the difference between two processes that are trace equivalent but not bisimilar, there also exist reasonable implementations in which the intruder can tell the difference. For instance, the two processes *a.*(*b* + *c*) and *a.b* + *a.c* are trace equivalent but not bisimilar. A reasonable implementation of these processes might use sockets for communication, in which case the first process would listen on port “a” for a message and then listen on ports “b” and “c” and accept only the first message that arrives. The second process could be implemented by either listening on port “a” and then port “b” or listening on port “a” and then port “c”. All an intruder has to do to tell these processes apart is to send on port “a” and then on port “b”. If the intruder can connect on port “b” they learn nothing, however if they find that port “b” is not open then they know that they are dealing with the second process. In this sense, using bisimulation rather than trace equivalence is a conservative decision; while it is possible for processes that are trace equivalent, but not bisimilar, to be safe, we cannot guarantee that they do not reveal information to the intruder.

A second advantage of using bisimulation is that it can be much more efficient to check. The added restrictions on bisimilar processes mean that we can reject certain paths as not bisimilar long before we could detect that they are not trace equivalent. In the most extreme cases checking a particular pair of processes for trace equivalence can take exponential time while checking the same processes for bisimulation being linear time, e.g. see [[16](#_bookmark27)].

* 1. *Secrecy Degree*

We say that a variable *x* in the automata *P* (*x*) is kept secret if for any two possible values *d*1 and *d*2 for *x* it holds that *P* (*d*1){I} is bisimilar to *P* (*d*2){I} where I is the set of the internal names.

Different instantiations of an automaton are split into different equivalence classes whose members are all bisimilar. The Component Secrecy Degree measures the smallest of these classes. This represents the most that an attacker could de- duce about the automata’s secret (input) based on its communication and resource usage. Below, *→z* denotes a vector of *z* values.

Definition 3.6 [Component Secrecy Degree]

The component secrecy degree (csd) of an automata *P* (*→z*) with respect to a set of internal names I is:

*csd* = min | {*d→* : **[***P* (*d→* )]]{I} ∼ [[*P* (*d→* )]]{I} } |

2 1 2

*d→*1

The best possible Component Secrecy Degree would be |*D*|*n* where *n* is the size of *→z* and |*D*| is the size of the domain. So we will sometimes write the component secrecy degree as *csd* : |*D*|*n*.

In the case that only one of our inputs needs to be kept secret we use Variable Secrecy Degree:

Definition 3.7 [Variable Secrecy Degree]

The variable secrecy degree (vsd) for the *ith* variable of automata *P* (*→z*) with respect to a set of internal names I is:

*vsd* (*i*)= min | {*di* : ∃*d*1*,... , dn* [[*P* (*d*1*,... ,* d*i,... , dn*)]]{I} ∼ [[*P* (*d→*)]]{I} } |

*d→*

The Variable Secrecy Degree quantifies the secrecy of just one input value. The best possible Variable Secrecy Degree would be |*D*|. So we for the value secrecy degree will sometimes write *vsd* : |*D*|. Note that *csd* is in fact an upper bound on *vsd* values, i.e. ∀*i. vsd* (*i*) ≤ *csd* . This is because *csd* is the size of the smallest equivalence class whose members are indistinguishable for the attacker. Clearly, the number of different values that the *ith* variable may take in this class cannot be larger than the size of the class.

We may use restriction to test conditions on automata. For instance if we have a booking agent component that may make purchases on our behalf, then we could check that it does not leak our credit card number without making a purchase by checking the variable secrecy degree for the credit card number in the automata restricted on the *purchase* action.

We conjecture that the secrecy degrees are fully compositional properties, i.e. for any automata *P* (*→x*){I} and *PA*, the secrecy degrees of *P* (*→x*){I} × *PA* are not less than the corresponding secrecy degrees of *P* (*→x*). Similarly, the secrecy degrees of *P* (*→x*){I} \ *Aα*, where *Aα* denotes a set of restricted actions, is not less than those of *P* (*→x*){I}. This means that we can quickly build up quite complex models and check combinations of systems. We leave a formal treatment of this conjecture as



p1

p2

pn

. . . . .

P(p1)

P(p2)

P(pn)

. . . . .



p1 p2

. . . .

pn

Fig. 1. Checking Secrecy Using State Space Reduction

future work.

# Automatically Checking Secrecy in *μ*CRL

Our definitions of secrecy require us to check bisimulations between every possible pair of automata inputs. Doing this by hand would not be easy, therefore we develop a tool to do this for us.

The user specifies an extended Q-automata, the finite domain of its variables, and the names that need to be restricted and the internal names. Our scripts generate all possible basic Q-automata for all possible variable values, and also hide and restrict the names. We then test all the possible bisimulations in one go via “state space reduction modulo bisimulation”, see [[7](#_bookmark18)].

We illustrate our method in Figure [1](#_bookmark5). We make use of this to test an automaton *P* (*→x*) by generating one large automaton that has one transition from the start state for each possible input value, and these transitions go to a sub automata that behave as *P* would on that input. More formally:

Given an extended automata *P* (*→x*), a domain of variables {*d*1*,... , dn*} and a set of internal names I, we generate all corresponding basic Q-automata for all possible inputs: **[***P* (*d*1)]]{I} = ⟨*S*1*, t*1*, A*1*, R, T*1⟩*,* ··· *,* [[*P* (*dn*)]]{I} = ⟨*Sn, tn, An, R, Tn*⟩. We then generate an automaton that branches to each of these automata from a start state: *P* = ⟨*S, t*'*, A, R,T* ⟩ where:

* *S* = *S*1 ∪ *...* ∪ *Sn* ∪ {*t*'}
* *A* = *A*1 ∪ *...* ∪ *An* ∪ {*i* :1 ≤ *i* ≤ *n*}
* *T* = *T*1 ∪ *...* ∪ *Tn* ∪ {(*t*'*, i,* 1*, ti*): 1 ≤ *i* ≤ *n*}

This automaton is illustrated on the left of Figure [1](#_bookmark5). We perform state space reduction modulo bisimulation on this large automaton. [2](#_bookmark7) If a number of values the *P* (*x*) automata are bisimilar then the state space reduction will produce an automaton that takes the initial transition with the value labels to the same state. If the result is a system in which all of the initial transitions go to the same state, as illustrated on the right of Figure [1](#_bookmark5), we know that *P* (*x*) is bisimilar for all values of *x*, i.e. we have perfect secrecy. If the transitions go to a number of distinct states

2 State space reduction modulo bisimulation reduces an automaton to a smaller automaton that is bisimilar.




Fig. 2. An Example Extended Q-Automaton

then the attacker can learn something about the input.

We can measure how much the attacker learns using our secrecy degree, which we can read off from the simplified automaton. If we look at the set of labels on the transitions that go to the same state after simplification as equivalence classes then the component secrecy degree is the size of the smallest class. To find the variable secrecy degree it is necessary to look at each of the equivalence classes in turn and find the one that has the smallest number of possible values for the given variable. This smallest number of possible different values is the variable secrecy degree.

* 1. *Example*

We illustrate the details of our method with a simple example. Figure [2](#_bookmark8) shows an extended Q-automaton that two “choices” parameters (numbers between 1 and 3, which are different) and a credit card number parameter (either cc1 or cc2). It then inputs a number on the channel *ch* that represents what the environment is offering. If this number matches one of the two choices, the component reports the offer back to its owner on a private channel (this is an internal action) and if the owner confirms, it releases the credit card number. In order to automatically check our extended Q-automata we write them in Aldebaran like format:

(0,"ch?(x)[1,2,3]",16,1) (1,"if (x=1stchoice)",-16,2)

(1,"if (x=/=1stchoice)",-16,3) (3,"if (x=2ndchoice)",-8,2)

(3,"if (x=/=2ndchoice)",-8,4) (4,"fail",0,0)

(2,"offer",2,5) (5,"comfirm",-2,6) (6,"ch!<cc>",0,0)

The first thing we can check is that the credit card number is kept secret unless the owner confirms its release. So we test the automata restricted on the *conﬁrm* action hoping to find that the credit card number does not then affect the behaviour

[[ P(cc1,1,2) ]]/{comfirm}=



{ch\_1?}

16k {ch\_2?} 16k

{ch\_3?} 16k

{}

−16k

{}

−8k

{}

−8k

{fail} 0k

{offer } 2k

{}

−8k

{}

−8k

{offer } 2k

Fig. 3. An Basic Q-Automaton Example

of the automaton. To test this secrecy we need to translate the restricted automata into a basic Q-automaton, this is done for the inputs cc1,1,2 in Figure [3](#_bookmark9).

By replacing the multiset of actions with an ordered list of actions and appending the costs to this list we can write down these basic automata in the Aldebaran like format. For instance, the automata in Figure [3](#_bookmark9) would be written as:

(0,"ch\_1\_16k?",1) (0,"ch\_2\_16k?",2)

(0,"ch\_3\_16k?",3) (1,"-16k",4)

(2,"-8k",5) (3,"-8k",6)

(4,"offer\_2k",7) (5,"-8k",8)

(6,"-8k",9) (8,"offer\_2k",10)

(9,"fail\_0k",0)

We have written a Perl script that, given a value passing Q-automaton and information on the domains of its variables, generates the large automaton that includes all possible inputs, as described in Section [4](#_bookmark6), we then use *μ*CRL toolset to perform state space reduction modulo strong bisimulation. Finally another script reads off our secrecy values by looking at all the transitions from the start state in the reduced version of the automaton.

When analysing the example in Figure [2](#_bookmark8) we find that, as expected, the credit card value is kept secret (*vsd*(1) = 2 : 2) however we also find that the choices are not secret at all (*vsd*(2) = *vsd*(3) = 1 : 3). On closer inspection we can see that the first and second choices can be distinguished by the way in which memory is deallocated. If the environment provides the component’s first choice then the component will stop its search and deallocate 16k in one go, whereas if the environment offers the 2nd choice value then the component will deallocate 8k followed by another 8k.

It is up to the user of our tools to decide if leaking information about a particular variable is a problem or not. In this case we may restore some secrecy to the choices by deallocating the memory in the same way for each choice, as done in Figure




Fig. 4. An Example Extended Q-Automaton That Hides the Choices

[4](#_bookmark11). For this automata our tools tell us that *vsd*(1) = 2 : 2*, vsd*(2) = 2 : 3 and *vsd*(3) = 2 : 3. While this is not perfect secrecy, these increased secrecy degrees show that the attacker cannot learn which value was the first choice and which was the second.

# Conclusion

We have presented a method for automatically checking the secrecy of values inside components, even when the attacker can monitor resource usage. We base our framework on Q-automata and Q-algebras to provide a simple model of components and a wide range of possible costs. We use scripts and *μ*CRL to automatically calculate our measures of secrecy degree from an automaton.

This work forms part of the analysis methods developed within the Trust4All project. This is an ITEA project aimed at developing a programming environment for “trusted” components that will come with information on their resource us- age. The methods and tools presented here will be used to check real components developed as part of this project.

We are currently developing an Eclipse based graphical user interface to make building the automata models easier. Figures [2](#_bookmark8) and [4](#_bookmark11) are in fact screen shots of our editor. We will integrate our scripts for running *μ*CRL and calculating the security values into this framework and make it publicly available. We are also interested in looking at more flexible ways of matching costed transitions. One possibility might be to use an approximate bisimulation to allow a margin of error when matching transitions. Another direction might be to define a bisimulation that allows a number of transitions in one system to be matched by another number of transitions in the other system. For instance, when modelling time we could allow

two sequential five-second transitions to look the same as one ten-second transition.

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