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On the Refinement of Atomic Actions

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Abstract

Inspired by the properties of the refinement development of the Mondex Electronic Purse, we view an atomic action as a family of transitions with a common before-state, and different after-states corresponding to different possible outcomes when the action is attempted. We view a protocol for an atomic action as a computation tree, each branch of which achieves in several steps, one of the outcomes of the atomic action. We show that in this picture, the protocol can be viewed as a relational refinement of the atomic action in a number of ways. Firstly, it yields a ‘big diagram’ simulation `a la ASM. Secondly, it yields a ‘small diagram’ simulation, in which the atomic action is synchronised with an individual step along each path through the protocol, and all the other steps of the path simulate skip. We show that provided each path through the protocol contains one step synchronised with the atomic action, the choice of synchronisation point can be made freely. We describe the relationship between such synchronisations and forward and backward simulations. We relate this theory to serialisations of system runs containing multiple transactions, and show how existing Mondex refinements embody the ideas developed.

*Keywords:* Atomic Actions, Protocols, Synchronisation, Forward and Backward Simulation, Refinement, Mondex.

# Introduction

The Mondex Electronic Purse was developed formally in the mid-1990s using Z refinement. It was one of the first developments to achieve an ITSEC E6

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security rating [[7](#_bookmark38)]. [3](#_bookmark1) Rather unusually for a commercial product, a sanitised version of the core of the formal development was made publicly available [[26](#_bookmark56)]. Since then it has been a fertile ground for formal methods researchers — the original, human-built proofs of the security properties have been subjected to re-examination by contemporary techniques, and have stood up extremely well to the fiercest tool-based scrutiny achievable today, the first such mechanical verification being [[24](#_bookmark55)].

The Mondex formal development featured a refinement proof from an atomic abstract model to a multi-step protocol at the concrete level. The principal component of this refinement proof was a backward simulation from abstract to concrete. At the time of the original development, the develop- ment team did try to construct a forward simulation, but were not successful. For a long time it was believed that a forward simulation refinement was im- possible. It is by now known that a forward simulation is entirely possible, and more than one has been constructed [[3](#_bookmark32),[22](#_bookmark53),[12](#_bookmark43)].

In this paper we explore the wider question regarding possible kinds of sim- ulation for the refinement of an atomic action into a multi-step protocol, in order to settle the matter in the general case. We do this in the simplest pos- sible relational framework in order to avoid complications that would distract from the main point.

In Mondex, the original refinement was done in a (1*,* 1) manner, i.e. single concrete steps were made to refine single abstract ones. Consequently, since overall, there are more concrete steps than abstract ones, many concrete steps had to refine skip. Of course, one advantage of the (1*,* 1) strategy is that, in the face of malevolent users or an unpredictable environment, the concrete protocol can be proved to refine the abstract atomic action, no matter how such a user might interrupt the intended playing out of the protocol — since every possible sequence of concrete steps that can be executed, corresponds to *some* abstract execution, even if it is one consisting entirely of skips.

In this, the original framework, the backward simulation correlated with an *early* synchronisation, i.e. the single non-trivial abstract step was (1*,* 1) matched with a step that occurred early in protocol runs. By contrast, the more recently discovered forward simulations correlate with a *late* synchronisa- tion, namely, the various possible non-trivial abstract steps are (1*,* 1) matched with steps that occur late in protocol runs.

Given the past uncertainty regarding forward and backward simulations in such contexts, our aim in this paper is to give a general treatment. In Section

3 Nowadays, national standards like ITSEC have been superseded by the ISO Common Criteria standard [[13](#_bookmark44)]. The highest ITSEC level, E6, corresponds to the highest Common Criteria level, EAL7.

1. we outline the operation of our motivating example, the Mondex Purse. In Section [3](#_bookmark5) we develop a theory of the refinement of a non-deterministic atomic action to a multi-step protocol. This explores the way that the single atomic action can be synchronised with an individual step of the protocol in a (1*,* 1) refinement, and we see that there are a large number of possibilities for this which we call synchronisation assignments (SAs). We see that SAs are related to the possible choices of forward or backward simulations, according to the manner in which abstract outcomes are related to the details of the SA. In Section [4](#_bookmark22) we relate the preceding theory of an isolated protocol run to the more global picture needed to embed protocol runs into system runs, and we explore serialisability and the 2-phase property. In the following Section [5](#_bookmark29) we apply the theory developed to the various refinements of Mondex available today. The final section concludes, and outlines extensions of the work needed to deal with not only some of the more obscure possibilities that Mondex allows, but also more general scenarios where the ‘protocol’ mental picture is appealing.

# Mondex: A Motivating Example

Fundamentally, Mondex is a *smartcard purse*. Since it is a *purse*, it contains real money, and since it is a *smartcard*, it contains the money in digital form. This money is designed to be transferable from purse to purse. As for real money, the intention is that such transfers are normally performed in exchange for some desired purpose such as the purchase of goods or services, but equally

—just as for real money— it is not the responsibility of the money itself to ensure that the transfer in which it engages is of a genuine nature. The only concern of money in general and of Mondex money in particular, is that it should be *unforgeable*.

The major objective of the original Mondex development was to develop a protocol for money transfer that ensured that:

1. Mondex money was unforgeable, even in the face of incomplete execution of the protocol or of malicious behaviour of the environment;
2. any full or partial run of the protocol is equivalent to either a success- ful money transfer, or a traceably (and thus recoverably) lost-in-transit money transfer, or a null action.

These two properties are what make Mondex credible in the face of customer requirements: the first property, unforgeability, gives confidence in the value of Mondex money; while the second property, atomicity, gives comprehensibil- ity when compared with the behaviour of conventional financial transactions. Fig. [1](#_bookmark3) shows the atomic abstraction that the Mondex protocol ensures, reflect-

ing the three possibilities given in (ii) above. In Fig. [1](#_bookmark3) the nodes are states, and the arrows are the different atomic actions that the concrete protocol refines.

•

*AbTransferOK*

*AbTransferLost*

*AbIgnore*

• •

•

Fig. 1. The Mondex atomic actions.

The essence of the Mondex concrete protocol is illustrated in Fig. [2](#_bookmark4) in activity diagram style. The source purse is the From purse while the destination purse is the To purse. The protocol begins with the two *Start* events (initiated from the environment as a result of the purses’ owners typing in appropriate instructions at the interface device (the wallet) into which the two purses have been inserted). These are the *StartTo* event, performed by the To purse, and *StartFrom* event, performed by the From purse, both of which take their respective purse from the idle state to a ‘busy’ state: the *epr* state (expecting payment request) for the From purse, and the *epv* state (expecting payment value) for the To purse. The *StartTo* event sends a *req* message to the From purse. Upon arrival of the *req* message, the From purse performs a *Req* event and dispatches the money in a *val* message to the To purse, itself passing into the *epa* (expecting payment acknowledgement) state. Upon arrival of the *val* message, the To purse performs a *Val* event and sends an *ack* message to the From purse, itself passing back into the idle state. Receipt of the *ack* message in the *Ack* event by the From purse completes the protocol, and the From purse too passes back into the idle state. Note that in Fig. [2](#_bookmark4), the nodes are now events, edges are states, and arrows are messages.

To *purse*

From *purse*

*idle*

*idle*



*StartTo*

*epv*

*Val*

*req*

*val*

*ack*

*Req*  *Ack*

*epr*

*epa*

*StartFrom*

*idle*

*idle*

Fig. 2. The Mondex concrete protocol.

The preceding described the workings of a successful run of the protocol. Be- yond that, all events after the *Start* events can be replaced by *Abort* events, corresponding to runs of the protocol that are unsuccessful for whatever rea- son. The fact that despite *Abort* events, the protocol still enjoys the unforge- ability and atomicity properties, is what makes Mondex non-trivial theoreti- cally. However, the details of how this comes about do not concern us in this

paper.

A further issue is that the Mondex protocol is *isolated*, i.e. once the protocol has commenced, the two purses take note only of the arrival of the next message expected in the playout of the protocol, and of calls to *Abort*, ignoring all other messages or calls from the environment and reserving the option of responding to such unexpected events by performing a self-initiated *Abort* whenever appropriate.

In this paper, rather than being concerned with *proving* that the atomicity and isolatedness properties are enjoyed by the protocol, we take properties such as these for granted, and instead, take an interest in simulation-theoretic properties —in a general sense, and for their own sake— of the refinement of an atomic action to a protocol with characteristics such as Mondex’s. The isolated property makes these simulation-theoretic properties particularly convenient to study.

# Isolated Atomic Actions and their Protocols

For both protocols and atomic actions, we will specify the transitions involved using a relational approach. The following statements summarise the assump- tions we make about this setup.

Assumptions 3.1

1. *Relations are represented by predicates whose variables take values in suit- able types.*
2. *Each relation used is deterministic, i.e. for each collection of values for the domain variables of the predicate representing the relation, there is a unique collection of values for the codomain variables that makes the relation true.*
3. *For each relation, for all values of domain and codomain variables that make the relation true, the domain values are reachable from an initial state.*
4. *Where nondeterminism (whether at the atomic or the protocol level) is needed, it is handled by having different relations for different outcomes. We assume nondeterminism is always ﬁnite.*
5. *Both protocols and atomic actions are represented by computation trees, in which each edge of the computation tree graph corresponds to a (pred- icate representing a) unique relation. All computation trees are assumed ﬁnite.*
6. *For both protocol and atomic action computation trees, the predicate-*

*labelled trees are interpreted within structures which are themselves forests. A choice of initial state for the ﬁrst step of an atomic or protocol computation tree, picks out a unique tree of the interpreting forest, called the valid subtree.*

Thus an atomic action will be specified by a finite collection of deterministic predicates *Atk*(*u, i, o, u*') *k* = 1 *.. .*, in which *u* and *u*' are (variables denot- ing) the before- and after- states of the atomic action, *i* and *o* are the input and output of the action (these may in fact denote sequences (or more com- plex structures) of input and output values corresponding to the finer grained events in the protocol, if convenient), and the index *k* distinguishes the dif- ferent deterministic outcomes for the same starting conditions. All together, the complete atomic specification of the protocol becomes:

*Atomic*(*u, i, o, u*') ≡ *At*1(*u, i, o, u*') ∨ *At*2(*u, i, o, u*') ∨ *...* where

(1)

(∀*u, i* • *Atk*(*u, i, o*1*, u*' ) ∧ *Atk*(*u, i, o*2*, u*' ) ⇒ *o*1 = *o*2 ∧ *u*' = *u*' ) (2)

1 2 1 2

At the protocol level, the individual steps are described by a collection of deterministic predicates *Stρ*(*v, j, p, v*') where *v* and *v*' are the before- and after- states of the step, *j* and *p* are the input and output of the step, and *ρ* is an identifier which uniquely identifies an edge in the graph of the protocol computation.

N. B. While the decision to represent atomic actions via shallow trees is a natural one, the decision to represent even multistep protocols via deeper trees has consequences that deserve to be spelled out. Protocols can often arrive at ‘essentially the same’ state via different paths, obtained eg. via interchanges of causally independent steps somewhere in the interior of the protocol. In our formulation, such ‘essentially the same’ states have to be regarded as different. So our protocol states can be understood as incorporating the full history of the protocol up to the given point. (Such history information is not only convenient here, but is in any case often needed in reasoning about protocols, since protocol properties frequently depend not only on knowing that the protocol has arrived at a certain point, but that certain other things must have necessarily happened prior to that point. Such facts can be trivially extracted from the full history, so our formulation may be regarded as a multipurpose canonical description, useful for things other than just the concerns of this paper. In the next section, we get the opportunity to project out such aspects of the protocol state as deserve to be regarded as unrealistic.)

Another aspect that should be discussed is I/O. At the atomic level, the I/O for the single step that takes place must inevitably concern the environ-

ment, since there is no internal structure to engage in internal communication. At the protocol level however, I/O can either be between the environment and the protocol, or be purely internal to the protocol. In the latter case, the only restriction is that messages must be produced before they can be consumed. There is of course the option of representing messages in flight within a suit- able state component —such a state component can model properties of the communication medium, eg. unreliablity— however we do not need to insist on this for the theory here.

(Forward) paths through the computation tree are described by compound predicates:

*FP ath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*, j*2*, p*2*, v*2*,... , vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) ≡

*Stα*(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1) ∧ *Stβ*(*v*1*, j*2*, p*2*, v*2) ∧ *...* ∧ *Stγ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) (3)

in which *vI* is a possible initial state of the protocol, *α* labels a possible first step of the protocol, *β* labels a possible successor step of the *α* step of the protocol, and so on. As ([3](#_bookmark7)) indicates, if a step has a successor, the before- state of the successor must match the after-state of its predecessor. The length of the sequence of labels in the subscript of *FP ath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ must match both the number of inputs and outputs, and be one less than the number of states, in the argument list.

Maximal paths arise in the obvious way:

*MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*.. .*) ≡ *FP ath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*.. .*)

∧ (⟨*α, β,..., γ*⟩ has no proper extension in the computation tree) (4)

From maximal and non-maximal paths, we can implicitly define a predicate *BPath* (backward paths) that describes extensions of non-maximal forward paths:

*MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ,δ,є...,ζ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*,... , jt, pt, vt, jt*+1*, pt*+1*, vt*+1 *... , vF* ) ≡

*FP ath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*,... , jt, pt, vt*)

∧ *BPath*⟨*δ,є...,ζ*⟩(*vt, jt*+1*, pt*+1*, vt*+1 *... , vF* ) (5)

In ([5](#_bookmark8)), *vF* is a possible final state of the protocol.

Finally, maximal paths give rise to the predicate *Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ), where *vF* is a possible final state of the protocol, [4](#_bookmark10) given by taking the disjunc- tion over all maximal paths, existentially quantifying all intermediate states, and repackaging the inputs and outputs into sequences:

4 Initial and final states of the protocol coincide exactly with the root and leaf states of the protocol computation tree.

*Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ) ≡

⎛ (∃ *j*1*, p*1*, v*1*, j*2*, p*2*, v*2*,... , vt*−1*, jt, pt* • ⎞

n maximal o ⎜

*MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*, j*2*, p*2*, v*2*,... , vt*−1*, jt, pt, vF* ) ⎟

⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ ⎝

∧ *js* = ⟨*j ,j ,...,j* ⟩∧ *ps* = ⟨*p ,p ,... ,p* ⟩) ⎠

The fact that the protocol implements the atomic action is captured by having a retrieve relation *R*(*u, v*) (which is required to be a function from protocol states *v* to atomic states *u*), and input and output relations *Input*(*i, js*) and *Output*(*o, ps*), such that the following ASM-style [[6](#_bookmark37)] ‘big-step’ proof obligation holds:

1

2

*t*

1

2

*t*

*Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ) ⇒

(∃ *uI, i, o, uF* •

*R*(*uI, vI*) ∧ *Input*(*i, js*) ∧ *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) ∧ *Output*(*o, ps*) ∧ *R*(*uF , vF* ))

We further require that the ‘big-step’ retrieve relation *R*(*u, v*) is ‘not too big,’

* 1. it concerns just the ‘states of interest’ for the overall protocol, i.e. the initial and terminal states:

*R*(*u, v*) ⇒ (∃ *js, ps, v*˜

* + - *Protocol*(*v, js, ps, v*˜) ∨ *Protocol*(*v*˜*, js, ps, v*))

(6)

Conditions ([4](#_bookmark9)) and ([6](#_bookmark11)) ensure that the hypotheses and conclusions of the big-step PO are valid exactly when the simulation predicate Σ:

Σ(*uI, i, o, uF , vI, js, ps, vF* ) ≡

*Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) ∧ *Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* )

∧ *R*(*uI, vI*) ∧ *Input*(*i, js*) ∧ *Output*(*o, ps*) ∧ *R*(*uF , vF* ) (7)

is true in the given types.

Now that we have connected together the atomic and finegrained descrip- tions of the protocol, our aim is to develop a general way of seeing how *some individual step* of a maximal path may be viewed as refining the atomic ac- tion, and the consequences of such a view. First we develop some technical machinery in the shape of past and future oriented retrieve relations. Then we introduce synchronisation assignments, which delimit exactly how the choices of individual step within the protocol computation tree may be made. Finally we explore the consequences of these choices for proving the refinement via forward and backward simulation.

From these ingredients we get the ‘past oriented’ retrieve relation *RP* :

*RP* (*uI, vt*) ≡ (∃ *vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*,... , jt, pt,* ⟨*α, β,..., γ*⟩ •

*R*(*uI, vI*) ∧ *FP ath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*,... , jt, pt, vt*)) (8) and the ‘future oriented’ retrieve relation *RF* :

*RF* (*uF , vt*) ≡ (∃ *jt*+1*, pt*+1*, vt*+1 *... , vF ,* ⟨*δ,ϵ... ,ζ*⟩ •

*BPath*⟨*δ,є...,ζ*⟩(*vt, jt*+1*, pt*+1*, vt*+1 *... , vF* ) ∧ *R*(*uF , vF* )) (9) It is easy to show the following:

Proposition 3.2

*RP* (*uI, vt*) ∧ *RF* (*uF , vt*) ⇒ (∃ *i, o* • *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )) (10)

*RP* (*uI, vt*) ⇒ (∃ *i, o, uF* • *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) ∧ *RF* (*uF , vt*)) (11)

*RF* (*uF , vt*) ⇒ (∃ *uI, i,o* • *RP* (*uI, vt*) ∧ *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )) (12) The proofs are similar to the proofs of the more interesting following result: Theorem 3.3

*RP* (*uI, vt*−1) ∧ *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) ∧ *RF* (*uF , vt*) ⇒ (∃ *i, o, jsP , jsF , psP , psF*

* + - * *Input*(*i, jsP*::⟨*jt*⟩::*jsF* ) ∧ *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )

∧ *Output*(*o, psP*::⟨*pt*⟩::*psF* )) (13)

*RP* (*uI, vt*−1) ∧ *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) ⇒ (∃ *i, o, uF , jsP , jsF , psP , psF*

* + - * *RF* (*uF , vt*) ∧ *Input*(*i, jsP*::⟨*jt*⟩::*jsF* ) ∧ *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )

∧ *Output*(*o, psP*::⟨*pt*⟩::*psF* )) (14)

*Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) ∧ *RF* (*uF , vt*) ⇒ (∃ *uI, i, o, jsP , jsF , psP , psF*

* + - * *RP* (*uI, vt*) ∧ *Input*(*i, jsP*::⟨*jt*⟩::*jsF* ) ∧ *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )

∧ *Output*(*o, psP*::⟨*pt*⟩::*psF* )) (15)

Proof. For ([13](#_bookmark13)), from *RP* (*uI, vt*−1) we know that there is a path through the computation tree from an initial *vI* to *vt*−1, satisfying ([3](#_bookmark7)), and such that *R*(*uI, vI*) holds. Evidently *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) extends that path. From *RF* (*uF , vt*) we know that there is a completion of this path to a maximal path from *vI* to some final *vF* . This maximal path enables us to derive *R*(*uF , vF* ), and provides the witnessing *jsP , jsF , psP , psF* so that with *jt, pt* we can assemble *js* = *jsP* ::⟨*jt*⟩::*jsF* and *ps* = *psP* ::⟨*pt*⟩::*psF* , and then assert *Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ).

Since we have *Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ), we can apply ([4](#_bookmark9)). The conclusions

of ([4](#_bookmark9)) yield *R*(*u*˜*, vI*) for some *u*˜; and since *R* is functional, we must have

*uI* = *u*˜. The conclusions of ([4](#_bookmark9)) also yield *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, u*˜') and *R*(*u*˜'*, vF* )

for some

*u*˜'. Again, since *R* is functional, we must have *uF* =

*u*˜'. From

*Protocol*(*vI, js, ps, vF* ) we can also deduce *Input*(*i, js*) and *Output*(*o, ps*).

For ([14](#_bookmark14)), the argument is similar except that we do not have to use the functional nature of *R* to argue *uF* = *u*˜', since *uF* is existentially quantified in the conclusion.

For ([15](#_bookmark15)), we note first that by Assumptions [3.1](#_bookmark6).(iii), *vt* is reachable from some initial *vI*. We use this to assert a *uI* such that *RP* (*uI, vt*) holds, after which we argue as for case ([13](#_bookmark13)). We are done.

Proposition [3.3](#_bookmark12) is a crucial observation, since it enables an arbitrary protocol step *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) to be singled out and made to correspond with a suit- able abstract one *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ). For such a *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) step, let Outcomes(*Stρ, uI*) (with *vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt* understood) be given by:

Outcomes(*Stρ, uI*)=

{*uF* | (∃ *vF* • *RP* (*uI, vt*−1) ∧ *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) ∧ *RF* (*uF , vt*))} (16) and OD(*Stρ, uI*) (outcome determinism of *Stρ*, given *uI*) be given by:

OD(*Stρ, uI*)= | Outcomes(*Stρ, uI*) | (17)

If OD(*Stρ, uI*)= 1 we say that *Stρ* is outcome deterministic at *uI* (*Stρ* is OD at *uI*), whereas if OD(*Stρ, uI*) *>* 1 we say that *Stρ* is outcome nondeterministic at *uI* (*Stρ* is ON at *uI*).

Definition 3.4 Given an initial *vI*, a synchronisation assignment (SA(*vI*)) for the relevant valid subtree of a protocol computation tree is a subset of its steps, such that for each maximal path through the valid subtree from *vI*, exactly one of its steps is in SA(*vI* ). Steps in SA(*vI*) are called SA steps.

Fig. [3](#_bookmark16) shows a synchronisation assignment. The many-level computation tree at the bottom has thickened arrows which are the elements of the SA. The atomic action is at the top and plays no specific part in the SA itself. Dashed arrows show the functional big-step retrieve relation *R*, while the dotted lines show some pieces from the *RP* and *RF* relations, for convenience below.

Definition 3.5 Given a protocol computation tree, an intial state *vI* for the protocol, the atomic intial state *uI* such that *R*(*uI, vI*) holds, and a synchro- nisation assignment for the valid subtree determined by *vI*, the steps of the valid subtree are classified as follows:

*R*



•

•

• •

*R*

*RP*

*RF*

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Fig. 3. A synchronisation assignment for a computation tree. The elements of the synchronisation assignment are shown bold.

1. If a step is in the SA and is OD at *uI*, it is said to be an outcome deterministic forward synchronisation (ODFS) step.
2. If a step is in the SA and is ON at *uI*, it is said to be an outcome nondeterministic forward synchronisation (ONFS) step.
3. If a step is an immediate or later successor of an ONFS step, it is a backward skip (BS) step.
4. Every step not covered by (i)-(iii) is a forward skip (FS) step.

This definition shows that every path through the protocol computation tree can be described by the following regular expression:

*FS*∗ ; ( *ODFS* ; *FS* ∗ + *ONFS* ; *BS*∗ ) (18)

Our aim is to show that when given a big-diagram refinement of an atomic action to a protocol of the kind we have described, if we wish to break the big-diagram refinement down into a collection of small-diagram refinements of zero or one atomic action steps to individual steps of the protocol, one can always use forward simulation reasoning, except for the BS steps. In fact one can use forward simulation reasoning for all steps except *branching BS steps* (a term explained below), though it comes at a price. Likewise, we have the option of using backward simulation reasoning for *all* steps if we so wish. We discuss these points later.

Definition 3.6 Assume given an abstract operation *AOp*(*u, i, o, u*'), a con- crete *COp*(*v, j, p, v*'), and retrieve, input and output relations, *R*1(*u, v*), *In*1(*i, j*) and *Out*1(*o, p*). Then *AOp* forward simulates *COp* iff:

*R*1(*u, v*) ∧ *COp*(*v, j, p, v*')

⇒ (∃ *i, o, u*' • *In*1(*i, j*) ∧ *AOp*(*u, i, o, u*') ∧ *Out*1(*o, p*) ∧ *R*1(*u*'*, v*'))

(19)

And *AOp* backward simulates *COp* iff:

*COp*(*v, j, p, v*') ∧ *R*1(*u*'*, v*')

⇒ (∃ *u, i, o* • *R*1(*u, v*) ∧ *In*1(*i, j*) ∧ *AOp*(*u, i, o, u*') ∧ *Out*1(*o, p*))

(20)

In both cases, *In*1(*i, j*) and/or *Out*1(*o, p*) can be omitted where there is no input and/or output from *AOp* and/or *COp*, as applicable.

Theorem 3.7 *Let there be a big-step reﬁnement of an atomic action Atomic to a protocol Protocol, given by a retrieve relation R and input and output relations Input and Output, so that (*[*4*](#_bookmark9)*) holds. Let vI be a ﬁxed initial state such that R*(*uI, vI*) *holds, and let SA*(*vI*) *be a synchronisation assignment for the valid subtree rooted at vI. Then the reﬁnement of Atomic to Protocol can be decomposed into single step simulations such that:*

1. *If an FS step occurs before an SA step, it is forward simulated by the identity operation on uI.*
2. *If an FS step occurs after an SA step, it is forward simulated by the identity operation on uF , where uF is some outcome of Atomic.*
3. *If Stρ is an SA step, it is forward simulated by Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) *for every uF in Outcomes*(*Stρ, uI*)*.*
4. *Every BS step is backward simulated by the identity operation on some*

*uF .*

Proof. We start by defining *R*1, which is:

*R*1(*u, v*) ≡ (∃ a maximal path from some initial *v*˜*I*, and

((*v* precedes an SA step along this path, and *RP* (*u, v*) holds), ∨

(*v* follows an SA step along this path, and *RF* (*u, v*) holds)))

Also we must define the single step input and output relations *In*1 and *Out*1; these however are only needed for the SA steps themselves.

*In*1(*i, j*) ≡ (∃ an SA step *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, j, pt, vt*)*, jsB, jsF* •

*Input*(*i, jsP*::⟨*j*⟩::*jsF* )) (21)

*Out*1(*o, p*) ≡ (∃ an SA step *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, p, vt*)*, psB, psF* •

*Output*(*o, psP*::⟨*p*⟩::*psF* )) (22)

Proving the simulation claims in (i)-(iv) is now rather simple. For (i), (ii) and (iv), since either *RP* or *RF* (with the same atomic state) holds for both the before and after states of the FS or BS step, and noting that there is no I/O for these steps, the simulation condition ([19](#_bookmark17)) or ([20](#_bookmark18)) is readily seen to hold.

For (iii), let *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) be an SA step. We know that *RP* (*uI, vt*−1) holds for *uI, vt*−1, hence *R*1(*uI, vt*−1) is true, giving the hypotheses of ([19](#_bookmark17)). So we must show that the conclusions of ([19](#_bookmark17)) hold. For any *uF* in Outcomes(*Stρ, uI*), we know that *Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) holds. Also we know that *RF* (*uF , vt*) holds, so *R*1(*uF , vt*) holds. Since *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) occurs on a maximal path from *vI* to *vF* , the totality of inputs along the path, both *jsP* before *jt*, and *jsF* after *jt*, will witness that *Input*(*i, jsP*::⟨*jt*⟩::*jsF* ) holds, giving *In*1(*i, jt*) as required. The reasoning for outputs is similar. So we have all the conclusions of ([19](#_bookmark17)), thus completing the proof.

Since at both abstract and protocol levels, the transpose of the step relation is a partial function, backward simulation is always aligned with a decrease of nondeterminism in both abstract and protocol transition functions. Therefore we get the following (cf. [[17](#_bookmark45)]).

Corollary 3.8 *Under the assumptions of Theorem* [*3.7*](#_bookmark19)*, one can always use single step backward simulations throughout.*

We also have the following.

Corollary 3.9 *Under the assumptions of Theorem* [*3.7*](#_bookmark19)*, suppose there are no BS steps (i.e. all SA steps are OD). Then single step forward simulations can be used throughout.*

Obviously, choosing the SA as the last step of each maximal path through the protocol satisfies the hypotheses of Corollary [3.9](#_bookmark20).

Corollary 3.10 *Let vF be a ﬁnal state accessible from vI such that (*[*4*](#_bookmark9)*) holds for this choice of vI, vF (and suitable other quantities). Let Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *be the SA*(*vI* ) *step along the (unique) path from vI to vF , MPath*(*vI,... , vF* )*. Then the simulation of MPath*(*vI,... , vF* ) *by Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) *can be de- composed as follows:*

1. *If Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *is an ODFS step, the whole of the simulation of MPath*(*vI,... , vF* ) *may be established by inductively forward simulating each step of MPath*(*vI,... , vF* ) *from vI, such that:*
   1. *predecessors of Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *are forward simulated by the iden- tity operation on uI,*
   2. *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *is forward simulated by Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) *where*

*uF is the unique element of Outcomes*(*Stρ, uI*)*,*

* 1. *successors of Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *are forward simulated by the identity operation on uF .*

1. *If Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *is an ONFS step, the simulation of*

*MPath*(*vI,... , vF* )) *may be established by inductively forward sim-*

*ulating the steps of FP ath*(*vI,... , vt*) *from vI up to and including Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*)*, and inductively backward simulating the steps of BPath*(*vt,... , vF* ) *from vF up to vt, such that:*

* 1. *predecessors of Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *are forward simulated by the iden- tity operation on uI,*
  2. *Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *is forward simulated by Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* )*, for each uF in Outcomes*(*Stρ, uI*)*, establishing RF* (*uF , vt*)*,*
  3. *successors of Stρ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) *are backward simulated from vF by the identity operation on uF , establishing RF* (*uF , vt*)*.*

Why is the above theorem useful? We can give a couple of reasons.

Firstly, it is illuminative. One can be convinced of the correctness of a protocol with respect to an atomic action, without having the details of a refinement already worked out. In such a situation, it may not be clear how to synchronise the atomic action with the lower level description. Theorem

[3.7](#_bookmark19) shows that one can choose this synchronisation relatively freely, within the parameters of allowable synchronisation assignments.

Secondly, once having chosen a synchronisation, it is much easier to write down the ‘big-step’ retrieve relation and associated input and output relations, than to discover the more finegrained single step ones. Theorem [3.7](#_bookmark19) shows that with the big-step retrieve relation fixed, the single step ones, *RP* and *RF* may simply be *calculated*. Their generic form needs to be instantiated with the details of the protocol and big-step retrieve relation, and then one must eliminate as many existential quantifiers as possible in order to arrive at a closed form. Making clear that there *is* such a strategy to follow is a considerable improvement over the hit-and-miss approach one would otherwise need, especially when combined with uncertainty regarding synchronisation.

The theorem also provokes the following considerations.

One can replace some backward simulation by forward simulation. Given a

synchronisation assignment, a branching BS step is a BS step *Stθ*(*vs,... , v*' )

*s,*1

for which there is another BS step *Stφ*(*vs,... , v*'

*s,*2

*s,*1

) (with *v*'

'

*s,*2

/= *v*

) such that

the abstract outcomes *uF,*1*, uF,*2 corresponding to the completions of the paths

from *v*'

*s,*1

*s,*2

and *v*'

are different, *uF,*1 /= *uF,*2. [5](#_bookmark21) In such a case, one *cannot* make

a forward simulation inference succeed.

To see this, suppose the first hypothesis of ([19](#_bookmark17)) is made true by *R*1(*uF,*1*, vs*),

and the second hypothesis is made true by *Stφ*(*vs,... , v*'

*s,*2

). Then the first

hypothesis demands that *uF* be chosen to be *uF,*1, while the second hypothesis demands that *uF* be chosen to be *uF,*2, a contradiction. This is the standard

5 Since we speak of a BS step, there must be such *uF,*1 /= *uF,*2, as the nondeterminism in

*Atomic*(*uI, i, o, uF* ) has been resolved earlier than at this BS step.

backward simulation counterexample.

In Fig. [3](#_bookmark16), the SA element along the upper thread of the computation tree is an ONFS step, since it can reach two concrete final states that retrieve to two different abstract outcomes. Accordingly, the two BS steps immedi- ately following it (and the two following the topmost of them along the upper thread) are branching BS steps, since they too can individually reach different concrete final states that retrieve to the two different abstract outcomes. With the dotted lines depicting *RF* , it is easy to see that these steps illustrate what we have just discussed.

However, if a BS step is *not* branching, i.e. there is only one protocol

successor state *v*' to *vs*, then the preceding problem cannot arise since the

*s*

unique successor cannot force a distinction between the choices for *uF* . So for nonbranching BS steps, a forward simulation inference will succeed. However, it comes at a price. If a forward simulating BS step immediately follows a backward simulating BS step, the *R*1(*uF , v*) value at the *v* state that they share, occurs as a hypothesis in both the backward PO ([20](#_bookmark18)) and the forward PO ([19](#_bookmark17)). It thus remains as an unproved assumption in the overall single-step verification of the big-step refinement. As such it allows the verification to succeed vacuously. For this reason we phrased Theorem [3.7](#_bookmark19).(ii) as two induc- tive processes that meet in the middle, since it is much better to verify some *R*1(*uF , v*) twice independently, than to leave some other *R*1(*uF , v*) unproved, thus undermining the whole verification.

Lastly, Theorem [3.7](#_bookmark19) offers a different strategy for addressing global cor- rectness (see the next section). Normally, to prove a protocol such as the one we have been considering globally correct, one chooses either forward or backward simulation, establishes that each protocol step refines some atomic option or skip, and this then extends to an inductive proof for global execu- tions as a whole. With Theorem [3.7](#_bookmark19), we can envisage a different approach. We first study the ‘big-step’ refinement of atomic action to protocol, deter- mining the protocol computation tree and the big-step retrieve relation. Next we choose a suitable synchronisation assignment. Next we determine which combination of forward and backward simulations are appropriate for the syn- chronisation assignment. Next we calculate the necessary single step retrieve relation, breaking down the big-step refinement into single step refinements. Finally, we determine how runs of the protocol can interleave to make global executions. This alternative approach separates concerns, and in cases where a complex protocol is concerned, may offer some advantages. In any event, the mere awareness of the possibility of such an approach may make the more monlithic standard approach more tractable, since it can show that certain subgoals of the standard approach are achievable in advance. It is to such

matters that we now turn.

# Interleaving Individual Protocol Runs

Thus far, although using language such as ‘protocol,’ in reality we have only discussed some properties of computation trees. In genuine protocols, various agents interact by performing events and sending/receiving messages etc. We must connect our theory to this world.

The basic idea is that the previous section should be understood as de- scribing (the various possibilities for) a single isolated protocol run, performed by however many agents would be appropriate in practice, with the protocol state recording the full history of the protocol so far (regardless of whether such knowledge is obtainable in principle by the individual agents), and ignoring the rest of the universe. The latter not only regarding other agents/activities in the rest of the universe, but also regarding what the agents of the single pro- tocol run might do both before and after the run itself. So the previous section described an idealised *pattern* or *template* for what collections of agents might do over some period of time towards the achievement of some goal described in principle by the atomic action that the protocol implements.

Patterns or templates are normally made to correspond with what happens in the real world by some process of matching, and that is the basis of our approach too. Since we have remarked that our protocol states can include unrealistically detailed history information, our matching process must include a projection mechanism to allow the unrealistic parts to be forgotten. In such a scenario, protocol states that were previously distinct can be matched to the same system state, destroying the previously assumed tree property of the valid subtrees that interpret the protocol. But this is OK. At the system level, we do not need the backward reachability properties that trees guarantee.

Definition 4.1 A *system* consists of a number of *agents*, *Aa, Ab,...* each with its agent state subspace *Wa, Wb,.. .*. The system state space is *W* = *Wa* × *Wb* × So agent *Aa*’s instantaneous state is some *wa* ∈ *Wa*, and the system’s

instantaneous state is *w* ≡ (*wa, wb,.* ).

Each agent is a transition system, i.e. the agent can move between different elements of its state space in discrete steps, leaving the state of every other agent unaffected. The enabledness of any agent’s transitions is independent of the state of any other agent. Each step can also consume input and produce output, and the I/O policy described in the previous section applies again: i.e. I/O may either be with the environment, or it may be internal to the system and any internal message that is consumed must earlier have been produced. The transitions are described by a predicate *SyA* similar to *St* in the pre-

vious section, where the subscript ‘*A*’ refers to the agent performing the step. The transitions of the system as a whole are the interleaved agent transitions of the system’s agents.

Definition 4.2 Let *S* be a system with agents *Aa, Ab,.. .*. The sequence

T ≡ ⟨*wI,* (*k*1*, A*1*, q*1)*, w*1*,* (*k*2*, A*2*, q*2)*, w*2*,.. .*⟩ is a run of the system iff:

1. *wI* is an initial state of the system,
2. *A*1 is the agent that performs the first step,
3. *k*1 is the input consumed by *A*1 during the first step,
4. *q*1 is the output produced by *A*1 during the first step,
5. *w*1 is the result state of the first step,
6. the change of state *wI* → *w*1 involves change to the state space *W*1 of *A*1

only; the state spaces of agents other than *A*1 remain unchanged,

1. *...* and analogously for subsequent system transitions.

Definition 4.3 Let *Protocol* be a protocol in the sense of the previous sec- tion. An agent decomposition for the protocol is a decomposition of the proto- col state space *V* into a cartesian product of agent subspaces *V* = *V*1 ×*V*2 ×*.. .*, such that each step of the protocol modifies at most one component in the product, leaving the other components unaltered.

The decomposition into agent subspaces just described, represents the fact that an instantiation of a protocol is normally executed by a number of agents inside a real system. However a real agent in a real system can play many roles during the running of the system, including acting out different roles in different instances of the same protocol at different times. So we need to distinguish the various agent roles in a protocol definition from the different instantiations of these during system runs. The next definition introduces the technical machinery for this.

Definition 4.4 Let *Atomic,Protocol,...* (with all the attendant ma- chinery) be a protocol implementing an atomic action in the sense of the previous section. We say that system run T instanti- ates *Protocol* iff there is a maximal path through the protocol *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1*, j*2*, p*2*, v*2*,... , vF* −1*, jF , pF , vF* ) and there are two maps: *τA* and *τS* such that:

1. the signature of *τA* is *τA* : *V* → *W* , and *τA* decomposes into a carte- sian product of disjoint maps *τA,l* : *Vl* → *Wal* from each of the agent components of *V* to distinct agent subspaces of *W* ,
2. *τS* is an injective map from the steps of the maximal path *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩

to steps of T ,

1. *τS* is order preserving, i.e. if *Stβ* precedes *Stγ* in *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩, then

*τS*(*Stβ*) precedes *τS*(*Stγ*) in T ,

1. for each protocol step *Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) in the domain of *τS*, if *Vl* is the agent component of *V* modified during the step, then *τA,l*(*Vl*) is the agent subspace modified during the step *τS*(*Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*)),
2. for each protocol step *Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) in the domain of *τS*, if *τS*(*Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*)) = *SyAl* (*ws*−1*, ks, qs, ws*), then *τA,l*(*vt*−1) = *ws*−1, *jt* = *ks*, *pt* = *qs*, *τA,l*(*vt*)= *ws*.
3. if protocol step *Stβ* modifies *Vl* and protocol step *Stγ* is the next protocol step along *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ that modifies *Vl*, then no step of T between *τS*(*Stβ*) and *τS*(*Stγ*) modifies *τA*(*Vl*).

When we want to emphasise the details, we say that system run T instan- tiates *Protocol* via *τ* ≡ (*τA, τS*) at step *τS*(*Stα*(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1)) of T , where *Stα*(*vI, j*1*, p*1*, v*1) is the initial step in *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩.

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Fig. 4. An atomic action, a protocol which implements it, and a system run containing an instance of a maximal path through the protocol. The steps of the instance are shown bold.

In Fig. [4](#_bookmark24) we show how a particular maximal path, *M* say, through the protocol illustrated in Fig. [3](#_bookmark16), might be mapped, via an instatiation function *τ* , to a selection of steps in a system run. The system state in the run is now ‘real world’ state, eschewing the maximal knowledge that the idealised protocol formulation allows. In between the steps of *τ* (*M*), other protocols are being instatiated by other agents, though without interfering with the state of *τ* (*M*), by Definition [4.4](#_bookmark23).(iv).

Definition 4.5 Let *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ be a maximal path in *Protocol*. Step

*Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) of *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ is a first use of agent subspace *Vl* iff: it modifies *Vl*, and no earlier step of *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ modifies *Vl*. Similarly *Stβ*(*vt*−1*, jt, pt, vt*) is a last use of *Vl* iff: it modifies *Vl*, and no later step of *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ modifies *Vl*. We say that *Protocol* is 2-phase (2P) along *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ iff all first uses of all agent subspaces of *Protocol* precede any last use of any agent subspace of *Protocol* along *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩.

Definition 4.6 Let *SyA*(*ws*−1*, ks, qs, ws*) and *SyB*(*ws, ks*+1*, qs*+1*, ws*+1) be two successive steps of a run T of the system. We say that *SyA*(*.. .*) and *SyB*(*.. .*) can be commuted iff there is a state *w*˜*s* such that *SyA*(*w*˜*s, ks, qs, ws*+1) and *SyB*(*ws*−1*, ks*+1*, qs*+1*, w*˜*s*) are valid steps of the system, and the pair *SyA*(*ws*−1*, ks, qs, ws*); *SyB*(*ws, ks*+1*, qs*+1*, ws*+1) can be replaced in T by *SyB*(*ws*−1*, ks*+1*, qs*+1*, w*˜*s*); *SyA*(*w*˜*s, ks, qs, ws*+1), yielding T ', where T ' is a valid run.

Lemma 4.7 *If SyA*(*.. .*) *and SyB*(*.. .*) *as in Deﬁnition* [*4.6*](#_bookmark25)*, are two successive steps performed by two different agents, then, provided both inputs are available in state ws*−1*, SyA*(*.. .*) *and SyB*(*.. .*) *can be commuted.*

Proof. Since *SyA*(*.. .*) and *SyB*(*.. .*) are performed by different agents, the two agent subspaces modified by these steps are disjoint, so the changes of state can be swapped, easily yielding the state *w*˜*s* required by Definition [4.6](#_bookmark25). If both inputs are available in state *ws*−1, then the *SyB*(*.. .*) is enabled in state *ws*−1 and can be performed first. Since the input to *SyA*(*.. .*) is not removed by doing *SyB*(*.. .*), *SyA*(*.. .*) can follow *SyB*(*.. .*). That this generates a valid run is now straightforward.

Since our formulation of a protocol does not consider the protocol’s context, the only way that a protocol, as formulated in Section [3](#_bookmark5), can interact with the rest of the universe is via I/O with the environment. In the system context, this leads to a distinction within the internal system messages, between mes- sages that are produced and consumed by the same protocol instance (which should thus correspond to internal communications of the protocol itself), and those which are produced and consumed by different protocol instances (which should thus correspond to communications with the environment in the protocol model). (System level communications with the environment must of course also correspond with protocol communications with the en- vironment.) Since inter-protocol communications must comply with normal causality considerations, these communications must fit well with the 2-phase property for protocol state components. The next definition introduces the needed technicalities.

Definition 4.8 Suppose given a maximal path *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩ of a protocol,

which is 2P. An external dependency definition (XDD) for them is, a pair of sets (*IDS, ODS*) of (not necessarily disjoint) steps. *IDS* is the input dependency set, and *ODS* is the output dependency set. A protocol is XDD- normal iff:

1. all *IDS* steps occur no later than any *ODS* step along *MPath*⟨*α,β,...,γ*⟩,
2. the producer of every input of every protocol step other than an *IDS*

step is some other step of the same protocol,

1. the consumer of every output of every protocol step other than an *ODS*

step is some other step of the same protocol,

1. each *IDS* step occurs no later than any last use of the state,
2. each *ODS* step occurs no earlier than any first use of the state.

Definition 4.9 An instantiation of a 2P XDD-normal protocol is called a transaction.

Theorem 4.10 *Let* T0 *be a run of a system which consists entirely of the steps of transactions of a family of protocols.* [6](#_bookmark28) *Then there is a serialisation* T∞ *of* T0*, generated by commuting adjacent steps, in which each instantiation occurs as a contiguous series of steps.*

Proof. Consider the directed graph *Dep*0 whose nodes are the transactions of T0, and whose edges are given by: *τ*1 → *τ*2 iff:

1. an output of an *ODS* step of *τ*1 is an input of an *IDS* step of *τ*2,
2. an agent subspace *Vl* is used by both *τ*1 and *τ*2, but *τ*1’s modifications of

*Vl* occur earlier in T0 than *τ*2’s.

Claim [4.10](#_bookmark27).1 *Dep*0 is acyclic.

*Proof of Claim.* Let *V* be the state space of a transaction *τ* . Since the last first use of *V* precedes the first last use of *V* in *τ* , and all all *IDS* steps precede all *ODS* steps in *τ* , by Definition [4.8](#_bookmark26).(iv)-(v), we can deduce that there is a step in *τ* (which we will call the pivot), that precedes neither the last first use of *V* nor any *IDS* step, and simultaneously follows neither the first last use of *V* nor any *ODS* step (there are four cases). We identify each transaction in T0 with (some choice for) its pivot. Since steps are interleaved, there is a total order on the transactions, inherited from that on their pivots.

We show that *Dep*0 can be interpreted in the set of pivots, and that each edge in the interpretation is oriented towards the future, yielding the acyclic-

6 So there is a set of maximal paths through a set of 2P XDD-normal protocols, and a set of instantiations of them in T0, and the set of steps of T0 is the disjoint union of these instantiations

ity of *Dep*0 immediately. For a *Dep*0 edge of type (i), note that it is oriented towards the future by straightforwards causality. So pretending that the req- uisite message was sent during the producing transaction’s pivot step, and pretending that it arrived during the consuming transaction’s pivot step can increase its time of flight, but not change its orientation towards the future. For a *Dep*0 edge of type (ii), since the pivot steps are contained within the uses of transactions’ state, and these are oriented towards the future by (ii), the orientation is preserved in the interpretation. We have our claim. We serialise T0 stage by stage. At each stage there are serialised and un- serialised transactions. We call the boundary between the serialised and un- serialised transactions the horizon. So at the beginning there are no serialised transactions, and the horizon lies just before the first step of T0. At the *n*’th stage, which starts with T*n*, whose unserialised transactions comprise *Depn* (a subgraph of *Dep*0), we choose an unserialised transaction which is a root of *Depn*, and we serialise it, whereupon its steps —in contiguous sequence— are both appended to the serialised part, and removed from the unserialised part of the partly serialised run, moving the horizon to just beyond the newly serialised steps, and yielding T*n*+1 and *Depn*+1. If T0 is infinite, then the se- rialisation process continues forever, and every finite prefix of T0 has all its steps eventually included in the serialised part. If T0 is finite, the process stops

when the last transaction of T0 has been serialised.

*Stage n*: A root transaction *τn* of *Depn* is chosen. By assumption, all transactions on which *τn* is dependent, whether through the state space, or via *τn*’s *IDS* messages, have been serialised, i.e. their steps lie beyond the horizon. So any step of T*n* that lies between the horizon and *τn*’s first step neither uses any state used by *τn*’s first step, nor produces a message consumed by *τn*’s first step. So there is no obstacle to commuting the first step of *τn* towards the past until it it arrives immediately after the horizon. Similarly the dependencies for the second step lie either beyond the horizon, or arise from the first step, so the second step of *τn* can be commuted towards the past until it arrives immediately after the first. The process continues until the last step of *τn* has been commuted until it arrives immediately after its predecessor. This yields T*n*+1. Transaction *τn* is removed from *Depn*, yielding *Depn*+1, and the horizon is moved to just after *τn*’s last step. *End Stage n*.

The preceding amounts to a sketch of a relatively standard 2-phase serialisa- tion proof process [[4](#_bookmark35),[10](#_bookmark41),[5](#_bookmark36),[28](#_bookmark59)]. And once the run has been serialised, it is clear that each transaction of the serialised run is a refinement of its corresponding atomic action via a retrieve function that forgets the part of the system state not relevant to the transaction.

# Mondex and its Refinements

In this section we reflect on the Mondex protocol, and the extent to which its refinement possibilities correspond to the preceding theory. There are a number of points to be borne in mind.

First of all, our theory has been couched in terms of single transitions (which is less cluttered), whereas Mondex is couched in terms of Z *operations* [[25](#_bookmark57),[8](#_bookmark39),[14](#_bookmark46)]. Thus when we say below that such and such an operation is syn- chronised with such and such an atomic action, we are refering in bulk to all the transitions of the operation being suitably synchronised with appropriate instatiations of the atomic action.

Secondly, we will restrict our attention to runs of the protocol which com- mence with the two *Start* operations, *StartFrom* and *StartTo*, in either order, (returning to other possibilities at the end of this section). Refering to Fig. [2](#_bookmark4), this means that after the two *Start* operations, the protocol, which is hence- forth serial (as is obvious from the causal dependencies of the *req*, *val* and *ack* messages), executes some prefix of the *Req* -*Val* -*Ack* sequence of operations. If it does not complete that sequence, each purse that still has elements of the *Req* -*Val* -*Ack* sequence left to do, performs an *Abort* operation (replacing the first such unperformed *Req* -*Val* -*Ack* operation left on that purse’s agenda), completing the protocol abnormally. Note however that unlike the *Req* -*Val* - *Ack* operations which are causally constrained by the *req*, *val*, *ack* messages, *Abort* operations are not causally constrained and can occur at any time. Ev- ery variation in the order of performing the protocol’s operations when *Abort* events are involved, causes a branching of the computation tree structure, and leads overall, to quite a complex protocol computation tree.

* 1. *The Original Mondex Reﬁnement [*[*26*](#_bookmark56)*]*

In [[26](#_bookmark56)], the refinement is constructed to synchronise with the atomic descrip- tion as early as possible, given the assumptions above. Thus the atomic action is synchronised with the *Req* operation, which refines both *AbTransferOK* and *AbTransferLost*. Since the protocol still has plenty of opportunity to fail af- ter the *Req* operation, the *Req* operation itself does not fix the outcome, so the refinement, achieved on the basis of a global inductive proof, has to be a backward one. We can visualise to some extent the substructure of Fig. [3](#_bookmark16) that forces a backward simulation (refered to at the end of Section [3](#_bookmark5)), from Fig. [2](#_bookmark4), if we add an edge from *Req* to an *Abort*, as an alternative to the mes- sage towards *Val*, since the two abstract outcomes are already available at the end of the *Req* operation. Furthermore, since for a failing transaction the protocol has already angelically chosen to refine *AbTransferLost*, the *Abort*

operation(s) which actually signal the failure at the protocol level all refine

*AbIgnore* (which is Mondex-speak for an abstract skip).

* 1. *The Reﬁnement of Banach et al. [*[*3*](#_bookmark32)*]*

In [[3](#_bookmark32)], amongst other things, a synchronisation with the atomic description that occured late was sought, in order to try to get a forward simulation. [7](#_bookmark30) The natural operation to refine *AbTransferOK* to is *Val*, since that is the moment that the money safely arrives at the recipient. However, if the refinement of *AbTransferOK* is ‘obvious,’ then the refinement of *AbTransferLost* is less so. The subtlety lies within the *Abort* operation. The deeper structure of the Mondex protocol implies that if only one *Abort* occurs in a transaction, it is harmless, and such an *Abort* can refine *AbIgnore*. Only if two *Abort* operations occur for a transaction, each while its respective purse is in a critical state, has the transaction failed non-trivially, whereupon the transaction needs to refine *AbTransferLost*. This leads to the decomposition of the *Abort* operation into cases, depending on the precise role of the operation in the transaction. In the formalism of this paper, the *Abort* operation of Mondex corresponds to a collection of events which occur at different places in the computation tree of the protocol, and are thus distinguishable.

The case analysis is interesting. The distinction between benign and non- benign instances of *Abort* is made on the basis of a purse’s local state (specif- ically, on whether the purse is in state *epv* or *epa* (non-benign), or in some other state (benign)). However, since two *Abort*s make one *AbTransferLost*, we can only refine *AbTransferLost* to one of the pair — and it has to be the second of the pair, since if only one *Abort* in a critical state happens, then it turns out to be benign nonetheless. In [[3](#_bookmark32)] *non-local* state information is used to distinguish the first non-benign *Abort* from the second, and the first is then made to refine *AbIgnore* while the second refines *AbTransferLost*.

* 1. *The Reﬁnement of Schellhorn et al. [*[*22*](#_bookmark53)*]*

[[22](#_bookmark53)] is the second mechanized verification of Mondex using the the KIV the- orem prover [[19](#_bookmark50)]. While the first [[24](#_bookmark55)] used the original backward simulation and data refinement, the second uses abstract state machines (ASMs, [[11](#_bookmark42)], [[6](#_bookmark37)]) together with ASM refinement and generalized forward simulations ([[20](#_bookmark51)]).

The refinement, like [[3](#_bookmark32)], synchronizes successful transfers by having *Val*

7 Looking forward to some extent to the specific results of this paper —which show that the essentials of a protocol can be understood by discussing the protagonists in isolation— the discussion in [[3](#_bookmark32)] was restricted to a world of just two purses, a single From purse and a single To purse.

implement *AbTransferOK*. But it chooses to synchronize failed transfers at the earliest point possible. This gives two cases for the *Req* operation, which is the point where the From purse sends money. In the first, the To purse is still ready to receive the money, in which case *Req* implements *AbIgnore*. But if the To purse has already aborted then the second case applies, and *Req* implements *AbTransferLost*. [8](#_bookmark31) Instead of having two cases (as in [[3](#_bookmark32)]) in which the *Abort* operation implements *AbTransferLost*, the design of [[22](#_bookmark53)] leaves only one: the case where the To purse aborts in *epv* after money has been sent.

The different choices for the synchronisation points was one motivation for us to study the general possibilities here. Another one was to provide a general formalization of using past and future simulation relations (*RP* and *RF* ). Instances of such relations with a schematic encoding into Dynamic Logic are not only used in the case study [[22](#_bookmark53)] but also in earlier work. Future simulation relations occur in the correctness proof of ASM refinement [[20](#_bookmark51)]. Past simulation relations are used in coupled refinement [[9](#_bookmark40)] as noted in [[21](#_bookmark52)].

* 1. *The Reﬁnements of Haxthausen, George et al. [*[*12*](#_bookmark43)*]*

The two refinements of [[12](#_bookmark43)] use the RAISE specification language [[27](#_bookmark58)]. They are another mechanized verification of Mondex using the theorem prover PVS [[18](#_bookmark47)]. This case study is slightly out of scope of our theory, since it does not start with atomic actions, but with a two step protocol: the first step (called *TransferLeft* ) is a send operation, which nondeterministically chooses between a success and failure, and we call the two cases *SendOK* and *SendFail*. After *SendOK*, there are again two possibilities: receiving may succeed or fail. For symmetry, we call these operations *ReceiveOK* and *ReceiveFail*, [[12](#_bookmark43)] calls them *TransferRight* and *Abort*. Already, the splitting of transactions at the abstract level into send and receive, allows us to keep the balances of abstract and concrete level in perfect synchrony, as is required by RAISE refinement. The two refinements implement *TransferLeft* with *Req* and *ReceiveOK* with *Val*.

To compare the synchronisation points with our proofs, we have to add an additional refinement of the original abstract Mondex level to the abstract RAISE level. The refinement would have to implement *AbTransferOK* by the sequence *SendOK* ;*ReceiveOK*. *AbTransferLost* would be implemented by both *SendFail* and *SendOK* ;*ReceiveFail*. Because *SendOK* is ON, a forward simulation proof would have to synchronize with the last operation of every sequence. Composing the resulting simulation relation with the existing re-

8 This differs from [[3](#_bookmark32)], where the *Abort* of the From purse that is bound to happen in this situation implements *AbTransferLost*.

finements, we find that the synchronization is the one used in [[22](#_bookmark53)].

* 1. *The reﬁnements of Butler and Yadav*

These refinements develop a Mondex-like money transfer protocol using the B4free tool [[2](#_bookmark33)]. They will be published as a contribution to [[15](#_bookmark48)]. In accordance to the Event-B [[1](#_bookmark34)] methodology, the protocol is developed in many small, but easily mechanically provable refinement steps, the simulations being forward simulations. The strategy decomposes the abstract events to facilitate separate refinement of distinct pieces to distinct protocol level operations. Aside from that, it is similar to that of [[3](#_bookmark32)] in that failing transfers are refined by *Abort*s. Note that with the exception of the original (backward) one, the preceding refinements are all forward simulations when viewed at the individual proto- col instance level (cf. Corollary [3.9](#_bookmark20)). As such, and particularly when they are based on (1*,* 1) refinements, they all readily extend to forward simulation re- finements of full system runs — just as the original (1*,* 1) backward simulation

readily extended to a backward simulation refinement for full system runs.

* 1. *Other Possibilities*

Our general theory shows that even more possibilities than have been discussed above are actually possible. For example, the refinement of [[3](#_bookmark32)] could have chosen to refine *AbTransferOK* to *Ack* instead of *Val*, since *Val* occurs as the last operation of a successful transaction. However, since in general there is a possibility that a transaction succeeds but that the *ack* message is lost, causing the *Ack* operation to be replaced by an *Abort* (which as it turns out is harmless), we infer that in such a refinement there would be a case in which *AbTransferOK* would have to be refined by *Abort*!

An alternative to the preceding is to synchronise right at the beginning, with the first (or second) *Start* event — and there are plenty of hybrid cases, combining aspects from several of the described or suggested refinements aris- ing from the rich structure of the protocol computation tree. We leave the curious reader to work out such scenarios for him- or her- self.

* 1. *The Non-2-Phase Fragments*

In discussing the preceding refinements, we have always assumed that the two *Start* operations are performed first. But it could happen that one purse *Start*s and immediately afterwards *Abort*s, before the second purse has *Start*ed. This spoils the 2P property since the first purse has relinquished its use of its local state before the second purse has claimed its first use. In such a case, either

purse may engage in other transactions, changing the local state, after the first purse’s *Abort* and before the second purse’s *Start*.

A remaining possibility is that only one purse *Start*s, and the other purse merely *Abort*s, or does nothing. In such a case, even if the other purse’s *Abort* happens after the (inevitable) *Abort* of the first purse, it is arguable that the protocol is nevertheless 2P, since the other purse’s use of its state amounts to no more than skip. Even if one does not accept this argument, it is evident that the breakdown of the 2P property is rather mild.

Dealing formally with such situations requires an extension of our theory. Note though, that even if these situations are not serialisable via the standard 2P technique, the fact that we have (1*,* 1) refinements of the protocol, guar- antees nonetheless that these ‘rogue’ interleavings preserve atomic semantics.

# Conclusions and Further Work

In the preceding sections we took the Mondex Electronic Purse —a prime example of a protocol enacted between a number of parties that was designed to achieve the effect of an atomic action— and we looked for a generalisation. We developed a refinement framework based on seeing both the atomic action and protocol as computation trees, and saw that we could choose the way that the atomic action was synchronised with the protocol in a ‘small diagram’ refinement relatively freely. The properties of the choice, in particular how potential abstract outcomes were related to synchronisation points, was closely related to the prospects for forward and backward simulation at the small diagram level.

We then embedded this formulation of an isolated protocol run in a frame- work enabling different runs of perhaps different protocols to be interleaved in a natural way. When combined with a fairly standard 2-phase property, these system runs could be serialised, showing that the atomicity abstraction survives.

We then confronted the theory with various refinements for Mondex that have been created in the recent past, and showed that the flexibility regarding synchronisation points was well borne out in these various refinements.

However, although the majority of ‘normal’ Mondex transactions (includ- ing not only successful ones, but also ones that fail in a ‘normal’ kind of way) are 2-phase —and the modification of the protocol suggested by Schellhorn et al. in [[22](#_bookmark53)] in order to design out the possibility of a certain kind of denial of service attack is 2-phase in its entirety— the original Mondex protocol has some (in practice rare, but in theory interesting) non-2-phase parts. A more sophisticated theory is required to handle those situations.

Besides these issues, Mondex is what we called an isolated protocol. That is to say, once the protocol has commenced, the parties engaging in it are fixed, and no intrusion by other agents is contemplated. (In practice, the Mondex purse’s local state determines how much notice is taken of which messages from which agents.) Thus it is natural to ask how the theory develops for protocols having state that is genuinely shared between a number of agents, including cases where the number is not necessarily determined at the start of the proto- col. Such extensions will also allow the direct modelling of more sophisticated behaviour by the I/O environment than we have contemplated in this paper. (To capture, using the techniques of this paper, I/O behaviour more subtle than the simple delivery of messages injected into the environment, one would have to regard the environment as an agent in its own right, participating in an esential way in protocols.) These directions will be investigated in future work.

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