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Verifying a UMTS Protocol Using Spin and EASN

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Abstract

Next generation mobile protocols have become very complex and it is becoming increasingly difficult for standards bodies to be sure of the correctness of protocols during the standardization process. A convenient notation for specifying protocols and a means to analyze their behavior at a certain level of abstraction could be quite useful. Model-checking has turned out to be an efficient and relatively easy-to-use technique in the verification of formally described behaviors. However, there are two major drawbacks in using model-checking: one is state explosion (the behavior models of real-life programs tend to be extremely large); the other factor limiting industrial applicability of model checkers is their restricted input language. For instance, in the field of telecommunications, the standards define the data model of the protocols using the ASN.1 notation and it would be simpler if the verification models could directly be built using this ’native’ data definition language of telecommunication industry.

In this paper, we consider model checking the RLC protocol in the UMTS system that is seeing ongoing development as a third generation mobile communication system. We briefly describe EASN, a model checker wherein the behavior can be formally specified through a language based upon Promela for control structures but with data models from ASN.1. We discuss the verification problem for RLC and then discuss the results of using EASN on the verification problem and compare with Spin which also is the basis for the EASN realization.

As a side-effect of realizing EASN, we have been able to locate some intricate performance bugs in the Spin implementation. We believe that this type of “n-version” programming is necessary to increase confidence in model checkers.

*Keywords:* Model Checking, Spin, Promela, ASN.1, Telecommunication protocols, RLC, UMTS

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# Introduction

Testing and debugging concurrent and reactive programs, such as communica- tion protocols, is a tedious task, partly due to the nondeterminism caused by the computation environment. If a program is described in a formal language, then its behavior can be analysed by means of mathematical structures, such as a *reachability graph*, which describes all the possible computation sequences of the program.

If the correctness requirements of such a formally defined program are also specified using a mathematical notation, such as temporal logic [[12](#_bookmark16)], [[1](#_bookmark6)] or state automaton [[10](#_bookmark15)], an algorithm called *model-checker* [[2](#_bookmark7)] can be used to check whether the program honors its correctness requirements. The model- checker goes through every possible computation sequence of the program, thus it is said to be an *exhaustive* verification technique. Since all the possi- ble execution sequences are covered, model-checking gives total confidence of program correctness.

Model-checking has turned out to be an efficient and easy-to-use tech- nique in program verification. However, there is one major drawback in using exhaustive model-checking: behavior graphs of real-life programs, telecom- munication protocols for example, tend to be extremely large. In literature this problem is often referred to as *state explosion*. To alleviate this problem, many progressive steps have been taken during the past decade and efficient implementations of model checkers are already available. Spin is one such verification system [[4](#_bookmark9)].

Next generation protocols for mobile devices have become very complex and it is becoming increasingly difficult for standards bodies to be sure of the correctness of protocols during the standardization process. Thus it would be extremely beneficial if such techniques as model checking could be used in ensuring the correctness of the standards.

Typically the input languages, such as Promela (used with the model checker Spin), have a limited set of data structuring constructs. This can be a limiting factor in the larger scale industrial usage of such tools. ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation One) [[5](#_bookmark10)] is a widely used data definition language in telecommunication protocol specification. It would be helpful for the stan- dardization process if a model checker could be augmented with ASN.1 data modeling capabilities to check correctness of interim versions of a protocol be- fore establishing a standard. Verification engineers in the telecommunication

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industry would benefit from this ability to use ASN.1 data models directly in their verification efforts.

In this article we report on the application of the EASN model checker to the *Radio Link Control protocol* [[9](#_bookmark14)] of the UMTS, a standard of the third generation mobile communication systems [[11](#_bookmark17)].

This article is structured as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the Spin and EASN tools, and their relationship. In section 3 the RLC protocol is described. Section 4 explains how the protocol and its user environment are modeled, and discusses the results of the verification. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.

# Spin, EASN and their Relationship

Spin [[4](#_bookmark9)] is an effective model checking tool for asynchronous systems, espe- cially designed for communication protocols. The input language of Spin is called Promela (“Process Meta Language”). A protocol is modeled as a set of Promela processes which communicate with each other with channels or shared variables. The design of control constructs of Promela has been based upon those in SDL, a language that has been used to specify communication protocols since ’70s. Nondeterminism and guarded commands in Promela make it convenient to express behavior of communicating protocol entities.

The model checker Spin has many capabilities like deadlock detection, validating assertions, system invariants, detection of non-progress cycles and livelocks, and specifying Linear Temporal Logic (LTL in short) properties for model checking. Algorithms that effect substantial space and time savings, like bit-state hashing, on-the-fly model-checking and partial-order reduction have been incorporated into Spin. Hence, modifying the Spin system to handle ASN.1 has been the design goal of the EASN Project [[8](#_bookmark13)].

Spin has a simulator that randomly checks only a portion of the state space and also a (generated) validator that can attempt to exhaustively check the state space of the system or can use techniques like bit-state hashing to check a substantial portion of the state space with a fairly high level of assurance. The EASN system also has these components, and most of the reduction strategies in Spin, such as partial order reduction and bit-state hashing, are already supported by the current version of EASN.

Similar to Promela in Spin, the EASN Language is the input language for the EASN tool. The EASN language is designed as a convenient marriage of the ASN.1 notation for data-typing and control constructs of Promela. In case of conflicting features, the decisions were motivated from both ease and convenience of implementation & elegance of language design.

ASN.1 can be used to define the data-types and constant values in an application. Promela, however, is a complete language with a set of basic data types and typedef construct to help users compose data-types, and a set of control constructs that can be used to define the behavior of protocol entities. The EASN Language *replaces* all the data-typing capabilities of Promela with ASN.1. Hence, none of the data types of Promela are retained in EASN, except the *chan* construct. As ASN.1 has far more richer and expressive data types compared to Promela, EASN needs to overload the semantics of many of the operators of Promela, so as to support a natural set of operations on data. In addition, the EASN language also augments the set of operators as necessary. In brief,

EASN = Promela - {mtype, typedef, bit, byte, bool, short, int} + ASN.1

+ appropriately overloaded semantics of the existing operators + few new

operators.

In addition, due to the presence of the sub-typing mechanism in ASN.1, which allows users to define data types such as integers having just a limited set of possible values, model checking can be more effective since the amount of memory used in storing the system sates can be reduced and this naturally helps in fighting the state explosion.

Spin represents state quite efficiently but, for reasons of alignment, etc, allows padding and other extraneous matter in the state vector. Since EASN uses ASN.1 data models, it requires that all variables be as constrained as possible in the space of values that they can take through the use of sub- typing. For example, if an integer variable takes values from 8..15 only, it can be represented using 3 bits. Further, if there are two variables that are constrained to be between, say, 5..7 and 3..7, there are only 15 possibilities and both can be represented in only 4 bits instead of either 2+3 (5 bits) or worse 3+3 (6 bits). EASN, therefore, has a critical facility called the state compaction infrastructure that guarantees that the minimal number of bits is used in storing each system state.

# The RLC-protocol

*Universal Mobile Telecommunication System* (UMTS) is a third generation mobile telecommunication system using *WCDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access)* radio access technique. The new radio access technique re- quires major changes in the radio access network that consists of network elements and protocols participating in the data transmission using the radio interface. *RLC (Radio Link Control)* protocol is one of the new UMTS proto- cols. It is a layer 2 protocol, according to the OSI reference model, providing

**UE Node B RNC**

**L3** RRC / IP+Application

RRC / IP+Application

PDCP

PDCP

**L2**

RLC

RLC

MAC

MAC

**L1** WCDMA L1

Fig. 1. The UMTS protocol layers

Iub transmission

Iub transmission

WCDMA L1

WCDMA L1

reliable data transmission service to the upper layers over the unreliable radio interface. It uses the unreliable data transmission service provided by a lower layer, the *MAC (Medium Access Control)* protocol (see Figure [1](#_bookmark1)).

RLC protocol was standardized in March 2000 by *3GPP*, an international standardization forum consisting of manufacturers, operators, authorities etc. interested in regulation and development of the third generation systems. The specification [[9](#_bookmark14)] defines several services, functions and procedures for the pro- tocol.

RLC provides to the upper layers several services related to data trans- fer. According to the specification [[9](#_bookmark14)], the protocol performs RLC connection establishment and release, transmits data in transparent, unacknowledged or acknowledged mode, allows setting of QoS (Quality of Service) dynamically during data transfer and notifies the upper layer of unrecoverable protocol errors. In this paper, we concentrate on the verification of the *reliable data transfer service in acknowledged mode*. The acknowledged data transfer ser- vice transmits upper layer *PDUs (Protocol Data Unit)* and guarantees delivery to the peer entity.

The acknowledged data transfer mode has the following characteristics [[9](#_bookmark14)]:

* Error-free delivery: The receiving RLC entity delivers only error-free *SDUs*

(*Service Data Unit*, upper layer PDUs) to the upper layer.

* Unique delivery: RLC delivers each SDU only once to the receiving upper layer by detecting duplicates.
* In-sequence delivery: RLC provides support for in-order delivery of SDUs, i.e., RLC delivers SDUs to the receiving upper layer entity in the same order as the transmitting upper layer entity submits them to RLC.
* Out-of-sequence delivery: Alternatively to the in-sequence delivery, it is possible to let the receiving RLC entity deliver SDUs to the upper layer in a different order than delivered to it on the transmitting side.
* Ciphering: This service is not yet defined in the specification.
* SDUs that do not fit in a RLC-layer PDU should be segmented and again reassembled at the other end of the protocol.

There are several alternative *ARQ (Automatic Repeat reQuest)* schemes to choose from. We study *stop-and-wait*, perhaps the simplest one, for our verification model. Each SDU of the RRC layer above (which shall from this on be alternatively called the user) has to be acknowledged before a new one is accepted from the user, and in case RLC is unable to deliver the SDU according to the requirements, it notifies the transmitting upper layer entity. For simplicity, we leave out the segmentation and re-assembly procedures.

The size of the user data, i.e. the size of a RLC *SDU (Service Data Unit)*, is assumed to be exactly the same as the size of the data field in a RLC PDU. Along with segmentation, concatenation and padding functionalities can also be left out for simplicity. Since ciphering is not precisely defined in the standard, we have also left it out from our model.

The specification defines some parameters for the configuration message used by the upper layer to establish and release a RLC connection. Parameters are used to configure the RLC protocol entity to the appropriate mode and to define parameter values used in ciphering and segmentation. Because we have only one functional mode in our model and no ciphering or segmentation at all, the parameters are left out from configuration messages.

Connection establishment phase in RLC consists of receiving only a single *conﬁguration request* message from the upper layer. After initialization, the protocol is ready for the data transmission phase. We assume that the con- nection is established (i.e. the corresponding message is received) at the same time at both ends of the protocol. This is how the protocol is specified, since at first, the MAC and RRC protocols (see Figure [1](#_bookmark1)) establish the physical link and after that the RRC-layer sets up the RLC-connection. Thus, this protocol is structured quite differently compared to the protocols in the OSI- stack, where typically the layer *n* − 1 connection needs to be set up before the

connection at level *n* can be established.

The data transfer procedure is initiated when an SDU is received from the upper layer. For each SDU, the RLC protocol entity creates a corresponding PDU. The SDU is placed into the data field of the PDU with the appropriate sequence number in the PDU header. A timer for the PDU transmission is set right after sending the PDU to the MAC layer that takes care of accessing the radio interface. No further requests are accepted from the user before the data transfer procedure for the previous one is completed. The data transfer procedure terminates either when the transmitting side receives an acknowl- edgment for the PDU or, in an abnormal case, after sending a notification of a protocol error to the user. In the normal case, the transmitter receives the

acknowledgment for the PDU before the maximum count of retransmissions. A retransmission is triggered, usually, by the PDU transmission timer expi- ration. The PDU transmission timer is reset when the acknowledgment with the appropriate sequence number is received. Acknowledgments with other sequence numbers are ignored.

After receiving a PDU, the RLC protocol entity in the receiving side re- moves the header and delivers the SDU to the upper layer. After sending the corresponding acknowledgment to the MAC, it updates the sequence num- ber. The transmitting side updates the sequence number after receiving the acknowledgment.

In the abnormal case where the sender’s PDU transmission timer expires, and the predefined maximum count of retransmissions for the PDU has already been reached, *the reset procedure* is executed. Its purpose is to resynchronize data transfer and bring the protocol back into a consistent state. The trans- mitting side sends the reset message and sets a timer. The receiving side acknowledges the message and updates the sequence number to a predefined initial value. In the transmitting side the sequence number is updated to the same initial value right after receiving the acknowledgment for the reset mes- sage. A maximum count of retransmissions is defined for the reset messages also. In case of a reset, the user entity is notified. If the reset procedure is successful, a *recoverable error* is reported; otherwise, an *unrecoverable error* is reported. It is then up to the user to decide how to continue. Disconnec- tion phase, which is always initiated by the user entity consists of receiving a disconnect message from the upper layer. For the same reason as for the connection establishment, the disconnection also takes place approximately simultaneously on both the transmitting and receiving sides. Both per con- nection protocol entities terminate on receiving disconnection request, and new entities will be generated for the next connection.

# Formal Modeling and Verification

Having informally described the RLC protocol, we now present the principles of modeling of the protocol and its environment. In order to compare the capabilities of the EASN system, we did the modeling and verification for both EASN and Spin.

The MAC-layer below the RLC-protocol provides an unreliable transfer for delivery of RLC-level PDUs. Hence, we modeled MAC as two unreliable FIFO-queues, one in each direction. When giving a PDU to MAC, it makes a nondeterministic decision whether to deliver the message further (putting it on the queue) or dropping it. However, we assumed that the MAC does

not duplicate or corrupt the packets. Actually the corruption of a packet is similar with respect to RLC as the dropping of a packet since the error correction procedures below the RLC layer detect and reject the corrupted messages.

For a new RLC-connection, a fresh logical channel is allocated for it in the MAC-layer. In our model, when the the RRC-layer sets up a RLC-connection, it first dynamically creates a MAC-connection and then the two RLC entities at both ends of the protocol, one of which is the sender entity and the other is the receiver entity. So, in our model the RRC layer is modeled as two static entities that then dynamically create the layers below.

As described in the previous section, the connection establishment takes place at both ends of RLC at about the same time. In our model, this is handled by the use of an ’oracle’ that commands both RRC entities to open a RLC connection. Actually, it is the oracle that creates the underlying MAC- layer, passing its handle to the RRC-entities. RRC-entities then create the RLC-entities and pass them the MAC-handle which they use for connection.

The oracle is also used to model the fact that the RRC entities could decide to terminate the RLC-connection at any point of time. If the sending RRC is terminating the RLC-connection, this information is delivered to the receiving RRC through the oracle.

In the real UMTS stack, the actual communication between the RRC- entities happens through a separate MAC connection. We use the direct synchronization of using an oracle as an intermediary in order to simplify the model. So, the oracle has a dual role in our model: it is the means of control communication between the RRC-layers, and incorporates control from the upper level application protocol to decide when an RLC connection should be created or terminated.

The structure of the model is depicted in the Figure [2](#_bookmark2), where the static entities are drawn with solid line and the dynamic ones with dashed line. The oracle and its signals are drawn with dotted line.

Each separate protocol entity is modeled as a EASN-process. The behavior of RLC sender and RLC receiver processes are sketched in extended state automaton form in the Figure [3](#_bookmark3) and [4](#_bookmark4). In both the processes, a reception of the disconnecting message from the above layer causes an immediate termination, that is left out from the automata descriptions. In the figures, transitions are

specified in guarded command fashion, e.g., *fromrc*?*CR* ⇒ *ab* := 1 means that when receiving a *CR* message from user, the value of *ab* is set to 1. MAC

layer is specified with two separate unreliable FIFO-buffers, one from sending RLC entity to receiving entity and one for the other direction.

Full specification in both EASN and Promela format can be located at

*connect / disconnect*

Oracle

*connect / disconnect*

*creation*

RLC−reciever

RLC−sender

RNC\_RRC

UE\_RRC

mac layer

Fig. 2. Structure of the specification

from\_rrc?CR from\_rrc?DT(sdu) idle ready

ab=1 cnt=0

to && cnt<MAX

−>cnt++

num==ab

−>ab++

num!=ab

−>cnt++

to\_mac!data(sdu,ab)

from\_mac?resetack

−>to\_rrc!statusRE; ab=1

from\_mac?ack(num)

sending

cnt==MAX

−>cnt=0

to&&cnt==MAX

−>to\_rrc!statusUE; ab=1

to&&cnt==MAX

−>cnt=0

to\_mac!reset to && cnt<MAX

−>cnt++

reset

Fig. 3. RLC sender

idle

from\_rrc?CR

−> exp=1



ready

to\_mac!resetAck

−> exp =1 from\_mac?reset

num==exp

−> exp++

num!=exp

from\_mac?data(sdu,num)

−> to\_mac!ack(num)

Fig. 4. RLC receiver

<http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mluukkai/easn/>.

One specific interesting point in the modeling has been the usage of dy- namic process creation and passing channel identifiers of the dynamically cre-

ated processes; these two features are supported by both Spin and EASN. In this aspect this model differs from the previous two reported in [[6](#_bookmark11)], [[3](#_bookmark8)] that used labeled transition system specifications and a static structure where the same RLC and MAC components are reused for the subsequent connections. The model of the RLC-protocol here follows the one defined in the standard closely, since in reality different MAC-connections do not share logical chan- nels.

The actual way of modeling the dynamic aspects is the following:

* 1. At the start, three processes are created: the oracle, sending user and the receiving user.
  2. Before starting a RLC-connection, the oracle creates a MAC-entity.
  3. The MAC entity defines four local communication channels, two for both of the peer RLCs, and passes the channel identifiers to the oracle.
  4. The oracle then passes the channel identifiers to the RRC entities which then start a RLC-connection setup.
  5. Both the RRC entities then create RLC-entities, passing the correspond- ing MAC-channel identifiers to the created processes.
  6. At the time of disconnection, both the RLC-entities and the MAC en- tity terminate. During the termination, the channels between MAC and RLCs also vanish, since those were locally defined in the process that modeled MAC.
  7. For the next RLC-connection, oracle starts all over again.

The above modeling is possible due to the capability of the Promela or EASN modeling languages to dynamically create processes and pass channel identifiers between the processes. From the verification point of view, it is also important that the terminated protocol instances do not have any effect on the current state components of the systems. That is actually the case if termination happens as in our model, where it is ensured that old entities have terminated before new ones are generated.

Properties to be Proved and Verification Technique

have any effect on the behavior of the protocol, a deadlock possibility should exist after sending a list of *n* SDUs, each consisting of just a number

0. So, if we are able to show that the protocol does not deadlock for any possible list of sent SDUs containing zeros, the protocol is free of deadlocks in a general case where SDUs of any content are sent.

Detection of message duplication Let us assume that it is possible that protocol duplicates the *i*:th SDU when sending a list *s*1*, s*2*,... , sn* of

sdu = 0

torlc!DataReq(sdu)

fromrlc?DataAck sdu = 1

torlc!DataReq(sdu)

fromrlc?DataAck fromrlc?DataAck

Fig. 5. RRC sender entity for verification of in-sequence delivery



SDUs. So, the receiving user would be given SDUs *s*1*,... , si, si,... sn*. The contents of the SDUs do not have any effect on the behavior of the protocol. Thus in case of sending the list of SDUs 0*i*−110*n*−*i* (first 0 repeatedly *i* − 1

times, then 1 and finally *n* − *i* times 1), the SDU consisting of the value 1

would be delivered to the receiving user twice. So, if we are able to show that

the protocol delivers exactly one SDU having content of 1 for any possible list of SDUs sent of the form 0*i*10*j*, the protocol in general does not duplicate SDUs when SDUs of any content are being sent.

In-sequence delivery of messages Let us assume that it is possible that the protocol could change the order in which *i*:th and *i* + 1:th SDUs are delivered when sending a list *s*1*, s*2*,... , sn* of SDUs. So, the receiving user would be given SDUs *s*1*,... , si*+1*, si,... sn*. Since the contents of the SDUs do not have any effect on the behavior of the protocol, in case of sending the list of SDUs 0*i*1*n*−*i*, the first SDU consisting of 1 would be delivered before the last one consisting of 0. So, if we are able to show that the protocol delivers all the SDUs consisting of 0 before any consisting of 1 for all possible lists of sent SDUs of the form 0*i*1*j*, the SDUs are received in the same order in which they were sent for a general case where SDUs of any content are being sent.

The verification itself was conducted by modeling the RRC sender entity in such a way that it sends the required type of SDUs, and in the RRC receiver we then checked that the received SDU stream is of right type. As an example, a fraction of the RRC sender for the in-sequence delivery verification is shown in the Figure [5](#_bookmark5). So, first it sends SDUs with 0 as content and then, nondeterministically at some point of time, it begins sending SDUs with 1 as content. In this way, the reachability graph will contain executions where every list of SDUs of the type 0*i*1*j* is considered.

Results of Verification

We verified successfully all the properties of interest with several different values for the maximum number of retransmissions. The tables below summa- rizes some of the performance measures of the verification both for EASN and for Spin when verifying an equivalent model of RLC protocol. The measure- ments listed are depth of the DFS-search, size of the state vector (in bytes), number of states and transitions, usage of memory (in Mega-Bytes), and time. The results are reported separately for the various verification options which

are (see [[4](#_bookmark9)] for a more specific description for the various options):

* *Noreduce*, meaning that the default optimizations in the size of the stored state vector are turned off,
* *Bitstate*, Holzmann’s bit-state hashing method for approximating the set of reached states, and
* *Collapse*, Wolper’s hash compact method for approximating the set of reached states.

Table 1

The deadlock detection

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Options | depth | State  Vec size | States  Stored | States  Matched | Transi  tions | Total  Mem. (MB) | Time  (real) (m:s) | Tool |
| NoReduce | 3307 | 52 | 116042 | 193407 | 309449 | 8.515 | 0:6.666 | Easn |
|  | 3307 | 152 | 116042 | 193407 | 309449 | 10.870 | 0:2.065 | Spin |
|  | 1646 | 52 | 54928 | 38812 | 93740 | 5.215 | 0:2.115 | Easn |
| 1646 | 152 | 54928 | 38812 | 93740 | 6.239 | 0:0.663 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 3307 | 0 | 115601 | 192508 | 308109 | 1.129 | 0:4.383 | Easn |
| BitState | 3311 | 152 | 115747 | 192800 | 308547 | 1.129 | 0:1.420 | Spin |
| BitState | 1638 | 0 | 54805 | 38703 | 93508 | 1.813 | 0:1.446 | Easn |
|  | 1538 | 152 | 54709 | 38555 | 93264 | 1.813 | 0:0.476 | Spin |
| Collapse | 1646 | 28 | 54928 | 38812 | 93740 | 4.703 | 1:54.781 | Easn |
|  | 1684 | 152 | 55195 | 38876 | 94071 | 5.318 | 0:0.920 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 3307 | 28 | 116042 | 193407 | 309449 | 7.695 | 7:34.387 | Easn |
| Collapse | 3345 | 152 | 116327 | 193517 | 309844 | 9.129 | 0:2.917 | Spin |

As can be seen from the tables, EASN uses at most the same amount memory that Spin uses, but as the sizes of the verification models grow, EASN performs increasingly better than Spin, on memory-usage. We have noticed upward of 20% better memory performance from EASN, over Spin. The price it has to pay is the increased run-times.

In crafting EASN from Spin, certain portions of the Spin source that have to do with encoding of *state* and its management have been completely re- written for EASN, thereby making it possible to see improvements in its mem- ory performance. This approach was consciously chosen, rather than simply translate ASN.1 types to appropriate Promela-types. The fact that this new code-component in EASN has not evolved as well, or for as long as the code from Spin that it replaces into EASN, shows (rather clearly) in its run-times. EASN employs Integer-Arithmetic for its computation of the hash-value corresponding to its representation of the reached-state of the system, through the use of the GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Package. Spin, on the other

Table 2

Detection of message duplication

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Options | depth | State  Vec size | States  Stored | States  Matched | Transi  tions | Total  Mem. (MB) | Time  (real) (m:s) | Tool |
| NoReduce | 1231 | 52 | 301314 | 649312 | 950626 | 19.677 | 0:16.673 | Easn |
|  | 1231 | 156 | 301314 | 649312 | 950626 | 26.742 | 0:5.849 | Spin |
|  | 673 | 52 | 61164 | 36835 | 97999 | 5.522 | 0:2.225 | Easn |
| 673 | 156 | 61164 | 36835 | 97999 | 6.956 | 0:0.736 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 1231 | 0 | 299023 | 644079 | 943102 | 1.129 | 0:10.693 | Easn |
| BitState | 1231 | 156 | 298021 | 642265 | 940286 | 1.129 | 0:3.777 | Spin |
| BitState | 673 | 0 | 61136 | 36828 | 97964 | 1.813 | 0:1.517 | Easn |
|  | 673 | 156 | 61002 | 36731 | 97733 | 1.813 | 0:0.492 | Spin |
| Collapse | 673 | 28 | 61164 | 36835 | 97999 | 4.908 | 2:7.880 | Easn |
|  | 673 | 156 | 62380 | 37016 | 99396 | 5.830 | 0:0.956 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 1231 | 28 | 301314 | 649312 | 950626 | 17.424 | 61:2.117 | Easn |
| Collapse | 1231 | 156 | 302530 | 649493 | 952023 | 22.441 | 0:8.552 | Spin |

Table 3

In-sequence delivery of messages

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Options | depth | State  Vec size | States  Stored | States  Matched | Transi  tions | Total  Mem. (MB) | Time  (real) (m:s) | Tool |
| NoReduce | 1232 | 52 | 242596 | 529114 | 771710 | 16.092 | 0:13.773 | Easn |
|  | 1232 | 156 | 242596 | 529114 | 771710 | 21.929 | 0:4.648 | Spin |
|  | 674 | 52 | 48022 | 28983 | 77005 | 4.703 | 0:1.741 | Easn |
| 674 | 156 | 48022 | 28983 | 77005 | 5.830 | 0:0.536 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 1258 | 0 | 241163 | 525797 | 766960 | 1.129 | 0:8.868 | Easn |
| BitState | 1232 | 156 | 236052 | 515455 | 751507 | 1.129 | 0:2.985 | Spin |
| BitState | 674 | 0 | 48005 | 28975 | 76980 | 1.813 | 0:1.208 | Easn |
|  | 674 | 156 | 47969 | 28955 | 76924 | 1.813 | 0:0.395 | Spin |
| Collapse | 674 | 28 | 48022 | 28983 | 77005 | 4.294 | 1:19.238 | Easn |
|  | 674 | 156 | 48918 | 29117 | 78035 | 4.908 | 0:0.759 | Spin |
| NoReduce | 1232 | 28 | 242596 | 529114 | 771710 | 14.352 | 36:56.357 | Easn |
| Collapse | 1232 | 156 | 243492 | 529248 | 772740 | 18.345 | 0:6.868 | Spin |

hand, employs Polynomial-Arithmetic for the same purpose. While Polyno- mial arithmetic can be faster than multi-precision integer arithmetic, the lat- ter allows EASN to compute hash-values *incrementally*. In the accompanying tables, notice that EASN reports a state-vector size of 0 bytes, for the *Bit- State* runs as against non-zero values reported by Spin. For these runs, Spin firstly represents the reached-state of the system in a contiguous byte-array, and then computes two integer indexes based upon that, into a bit-array, and

sets the bits at the two indexes per reached state. EASN, through its use of incremental computation for the two indexes (from those corresponding to the state that the system was in prior to evolving into its current state), does not require to represent the reached-state explicitly. Refer [[7](#_bookmark12)] for a complete discussion of the various design decisions, and their rationale, as well as the related implementation aspects of EASN.

Even though this RLC case-study is not a large one, we have observed that EASN simplifies the formal specification of large telecommunication protocols or systems, since it involves one (manual translation) step less (as against when using Spin), of having to model the ASN.1 data through the use of Promela types.

“N-version” Programming: SPIN and EASN systems

Since the code base of EASN is derived from Spin system with changes in the state vector representation and handling (an important and critical part of the model checker), any discrepancy in the number of states, etc. in the two systems can be explored to determine the underlying causes. Such an effort has revealed the following anomalies in the Spin system when working with the RLC model presented here.

* When using rendezvous channels, the compression mask was not completely restored on backward moves during the search. The correctness of the search was not affected, but the number of reached states became larger than necessary. This has been fixed in Spin 3.4.6 (29 March 2001).
* In the s-hash function, the computed hash value would incorrectly also examine up to 3 extraneous bytes of the state vector argument. This some- times led to the re-exploring of some states.

# Conclusions

In this article verification of the UMTS Radio link control protocol [[9](#_bookmark14)] has been considered. This protocol implements several modes of operation. For the verification, we selected the *reliable data transfer service in the acknowledged mode*. The protocol was modeled and verified using Spin, and EASN [[7](#_bookmark12)], our Spin [[4](#_bookmark9)] based model checker for telecommunication systems. In EASN, the data aspects of the protocol are modeled with ASN.1 [[5](#_bookmark10)] while the control structures are the same as that of Promela (Spin’s input language). In order to compare EASN’s performance with that of Spin, we ran the verification in both the systems. The data obtained from verification indicated that with increase in the running time, EASN can manage with less memory than Spin.

The more complex data-types, and data-structures of EASN contribute to its increased run-times.

We have already reported verification of some aspects of the RLC protocol in [[6](#_bookmark11)] where we verified the simplified version of the protocol, one where the disconnection phase was not considered. In the earlier work we used labeled transition system based modeling of the protocol. Within that framework, dynamic creation of processes used here is not easy, so despite our earlier model lacks the disconnection phase, it is slightly more complex than the one we developed here. Furthermore, the dynamic aspect of the modeling describes the ’reality’ more closely, so we believe it to be an extremely useful feature of both Spin and EASN systems.

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