

Modelling the psychological representation underlying perceptual and cognitive tasks

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An introduction

I am a cognitive neuroscientist studying **attention and working memory** – the systems responsible for selecting and maintaining information in mind for ongoing perception and cognition.

Clap when you notice the change



An introduction

I am a cognitive neuroscientist studying **attention and working memory** – the systems responsible for selecting and maintaining information in mind for ongoing perception and cognition.

One key feature of this system is that it is **capacity-limited**. Measuring the capacity limits of visual attention and working memory requires an understanding of how information is **represented** in working memory.

Research directions in my lab

1. Examining how **the concept of representation** is used across philosophers, mathematical psychologists, *in vivo* neuroscientists, and *in silico* neuroscientists.
2. Using machine learning to decode the working memory representation from neuroimaging activity
3. Building formal cognitive models of working memory using psychophysical and other experimental data

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The representation in classic cognitive models


Classic formal models of cognition would derive the psychological representation using multidimensional scaling (MDS) of similarity judgments

- Collect similarity ratings for pairs of items in the stimulus set
- Reduce those ratings into a representation that best preserves the distance between the items; the closer the items, the more similar.

The representation in classic cognitive models


This is the MDS representation for **birds**.

The distances between the birds reflect their psychological similarity; the closer, the more similar.



The representation in classic cognitive models

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
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
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
For example, say **ducks** are susceptible to Reinholf disease... one is likely to think **geese** are also susceptible.



The representation in classic cognitive models

Formal models use these distances to predict behaviour (such as induction and generalisation).

For example, say **ducks** are susceptible to Reinholf disease... but less likely to think **eagles** are also susceptible.




The representation in classic cognitive models

For historical reasons, the similarity-based MDS-representation has been considered the **psychological representation** underlying cognition.

Many cognitive modelers focus on the operations that occur on the representation, rather than explain the representation itself.

Two classes of visual working memory models

Most visual working memory models assume **the physical stimulus space** as the representation that cognitive mechanisms operate upon.




Models assume the physical space, such as this colour wheel



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
Memory operationalised in terms of absolute error on colour wheel



The representation in visual working memory

A recent model (the TCC model; Schurgin et al., 2020) argued that working memory is best modelled in terms of **psychological similarity**.


Similarity-based MDS-representation of colours



The representation in visual working memory

They made the point that confusability would not be captured on the physical stimulus space.

For example, **orange** is more similar to **pink** than **green**, despite being the same distance in absolute degrees.



The representation in visual working memory

Recent work has found that adjustments for psychological similarity do not improve model fits for visual working memory performance.

But there remain issues with assuming the physical stimulus space or the similarity-based space to build cognitive models.

Thus, the question remains – **what is the representation underlying visual working memory?**


Our modeling approach

We took a Bayesian generative modeling approach – we built a **Thurstonian model** that fits for the underlying representation.

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Let's say we're asking for pairwise similarity ratings.




In our model, the participant takes one sample from a representation – a Gaussian distribution centred on the true latent value of that item.

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
Let's say we're asking for pairwise similarity ratings.



Then the distance is used to make a similarity judgment.


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
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The participant makes a similarity ratings on each trial for different pairs of stimuli.

Our modeling approach

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We use the observed similarity ratings to infer the latent representation of those items.




Our modeling approach

In brief, we used Bayesian MCMC methods to recover the latent representation underlying three cognitive tasks using oriented lines. The data comes from an open dataset (Tomic and Bays, 2024).

Our modeling approach



Our model had uninformed priors for the representation – the center of the distributions for each item, and the width of the Gaussian distributions.




The samples determined the response on the specific task.

Ask me later or check out the preprint if you are interested in more model details.


The cognitive tasks




Similarity comparison



The cognitive tasks



The cognitive tasks



Our modeling goal



Our goal was to recover the latent representations of the orientation stimuli in the three cognitive tasks.

Note that the latent representation is recovered from the task data itself in our models, not outsourced to MDS with similarity judgments.

Similarity comparison

The orientation angle of the line stimulus


The mental representation of the line orientation



Similarity comparison

The representation does not match the physical stimulus space – it is not exactly a diagonal line.


Clear deviations where close to vertical lines appear more vertical, and close to horizontal lines appear more horizontal.



Perceptual reproduction

The representation is very close to the physical stimulus space, but there are noticeable deviations.


Lines that are not quite horizontal or not quite vertical are slightly biased away from the cardinal directions. This is the opposite to the similarity comparison.



Memory reproduction

The representation is similar to the perceptual reproduction task but with larger deviations.

Lines are represented more towards the oblique directions than they actually are.




Conclusions


Similarity comparisons and both reproduction tasks **do not share the same cognitive representation.**

Therefore, psychological similarity cannot be assumed to be the basis for working memory.

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


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Conclusions

The cognitive representation for memory reproduction does not match the physical stimulus space. Therefore, models **should not assume the physical stimulus space** when modelling working memory performance.




Conclusions

Cognitive researchers ought not to assume the cognitive representation can be recovered using MDS of similarity-based judgments.

We advocate for our modeling approach that fits the cognitive representation **jointly with** the theorised mechanisms underlying the tasks.

Thank you!


Preprint



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