Enhanced Processor Defence Against Physical and Software Threats by Securing DIFT Against Fault Injection Attacks

PhD Dissertation Defense

William PENSEC

Université Bretagne Sud, UMR 6285, Lab-STICC, Lorient, France

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Outline

- Introduction
- D-RI5CY Vulnerability Assessment
- Proposed protections against FIAs
- Experimental results
- **6** Conclusion and Perspectives

Outline

- Introduction
 - Context
 - Motivations
 - Software threats: Information Flow Tracking
 - Hardware threats: Physical Attacks
 - Issue
 - Objectives
- D-RI5CY Vulnerability Assessment
- 3 Proposed protections against FIAs

- 4 Experimental results
- Conclusion and Perspectives

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
Context: Embedded Systems and IoT

Internet of Things (IoT)

- Wide range of application
- Fast growing market with exponential usage
- Rely on sensors depending on their use
- Collect and share data
- Manipulation of critical data
- Increasingly vulnerable to multiple threats







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Motivations: IoT Under Threats



- Software threats: malwares, memory overflow attacks, SQL injection, etc
- Network threats: DDoS, Man-In-The-Middle, jamming, etc.
- Hardware threats: physical attacks such as reverse engineering, Side-Channel Attacks (SCA), Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)

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


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
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- Security mechanism
- Protection against software attacks (e.g.: buffer overflow, format string, SQL injections, ...) [1, 2]
- Static or Dynamic
- Software, Hardware or Hybrid
- Hardware DIFT: off-core, off-loading core, in-core


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
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Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

Three steps


- Tag initialisation
- Tag propagation
- Tag check



Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

Three steps


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Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

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
Hardware threats: Physical Attacks

- Reverse Engineering: process of information retrieval from a product by analysing and understanding the design, functionality, and operation of existing hardware
- Side-Channel Attacks: exploit information leakages on the circuit behaviour
- Fault Injection Attacks: involve deliberately introducing one or more fault(s) into the system to observe its behaviour and identify potential vulnerabilities.

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
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How can we maintain maximum protection against software attacks in the presence of physical attacks?

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Objectives of this PhD Thesis

Contributions

- ▶ Provide a robust security mechanism against software and hardware threats.
- Take into account Fault Injection Attacks
- Propose lightweight countermeasures against FIA
- ▶ Take into account constraints, such as area and performance overhead

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D-RI5CY

Vulnerability Assessment

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Introduction

Parity codes

Simple Parity

Hamming Code

SECDED

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 - Conclusion
 - Perspectives

Conclusion

Perspectives

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Publications

Publications

International peer-reviewed conferences

- William Pensec, Vianney Lapôtre, and Guy Gogniat. 2023. Another Break in the Wall: Harnessing Fault Injection Attacks to Penetrate Software Fortresses. In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Security and Privacy of Sensing Systems (SensorsS&P), 2023. [3]
- William Pensec, Francesco Regazzoni, Vianney Lapôtre, and Guy Gogniat. Defending the Citadel: Fault Injection Attacks Against Dynamic Information Flow Tracking and Related Countermeasures. 2024 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI), 2024, pp. 180-185. [4]
- William Pensec, Vianney Lapôtre, and Guy Gogniat. Scripting the Unpredictable: Automate Fault Injection in RTL Simulation for Vulnerability Assessment. 2024 27th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD), 2024. [5]

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Thank you for your attention.







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- [1] Christopher Brant et al. "Challenges and Opportunities for Practical and Effective Dynamic Information Flow Tracking". In: ACM Computing Surveys 55.1 (Nov. 2021). ISSN: 0360-0300. DOI: 10.1145/3483790.
- [2] Wei Hu, Armaiti Ardeshiricham, and Ryan Kastner. "Hardware Information Flow Tracking". In: ACM Computing Surveys (2021). DOI: 10.1145/3447867.
- [3] William Pensec, Vianney Lapôtre, and Guy Gogniat. "Another Break in the Wall: Harnessing Fault Injection Attacks to Penetrate Software Fortresses". In: Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Security and Privacy of Sensing Systems. SensorsS&P. Istanbul, Turkiye: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, pp. 8–14. DOI: 10.1145/3628356.3630116.
- [4] William PENSEC et al. "Defending the Citadel: Fault Injection Attacks Against Dynamic Information Flow Tracking and Related Countermeasures". In: 2024 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). Knoxville, United States, July 2024, pp. 180–185. DOI: 10.1109/ISVLSI61997.2024.00042.
- [5] William Pensec, Vianney Lapotre, and Gogniat Guy. "Scripting the Unpredictable: Automate Fault Injection in RTL Simulation for Vulnerability Assessment". In: 27th Euromicro Conference Series on Digital System Design (DSD). Sorbonne University. Paris, France, Aug. 2024. URL: https://hal.science/hal-04683084.
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