Enhanced Processor Defence Against Physical and Software Threats by Securing DIFT Against Fault Injection Attacks

PhD Dissertation Defense

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- Introduction
 - Context
 - Motivations
 - Information Flow Tracking
 - Physical Attacks
 - Objectives
- 2 D-RI5CY Vulnerability Assessment
- 3 Proposed protections against FIAs
- Experimental results
- Conclusion and Perspectives
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 - Perspectives

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- 5 Conclusion and Perspectives


Context: Embedded Systems and IoT

Internet of Things (IoT)

- Wide range of application
- Fast growing market with rapid expansion of use
- Rely on sensors depending on their usage
- Collect and share data
- Manipulation of critical data
- Increasingly vulnerable to multiple threats







3 / 20

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Motivations: IoT Under Threats

Threats

- Software threats: malwares, memory overflow attacks, SQL injection, etc
- Network threats: DDoS, man-in-the-middle, jamming, etc
- Hardware threats: physical attacks such as reverse engineering, Side-Channel Attacks (SCA), Fault Injection Attacks (FIA)

Vulnerabilities on critical systems

Information Flow Tracking


■ Protection against software attacks (e.g.: buffer overflow, format string, SQL injections, ...) [1, 2]

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Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

Three steps


• Tag initialisation



Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

Three steps


- Tag initialisation
- Tag propagation



Dynamic Information Flow Tracking

Three steps

- Tag initialisation
- Tag propagation
- Tag check



6 / 20

Physical Attacks



Objectives of this PhD Thesis

Contributions

- ▶ Provide a robust security mechanism against software and hardware threats.
- Taking into account Fault Injection Attacks
- Propose lightweight countermeasures against FIA
- ► Take into account constraints, such as area and performance overhead

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D-RI5CY



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Introduction

Parity codes

Simple Parity

Hamming Code

SECDED

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- 4 Experimental results
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 - Conclusion
 - Perspectives

Conclusion

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Perspectives

Publications

Publications

William PENSEC (Lab-STICC)

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Thank you for your attention.







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References

20 / 20

References

- [1] Christopher Brant et al. "Challenges and Opportunities for Practical and Effective Dynamic Information Flow Tracking". In: ACM Computing Surveys 55.1 (Nov. 2021). ISSN: 0360-0300. DOI: 10.1145/3483790.
- [2] Wei Hu, Armaiti Ardeshiricham, and Ryan Kastner. "Hardware Information Flow Tracking". In: ACM Computing Surveys (2021). DOI: 10.1145/3447867.

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