Elliptic Curve Cryptography

an introduction which is entirely too short

by Giacomo Fenzi (ETH Zurich) on 6 January 2022

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- Power $\approx 70\%$ of TLS Exchanges
- Coolest post quantum cryptography proposal
- Fascinating mathematically

* Historical Notes

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- Mathematical Background

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- * Addition on Elliptic Curves

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- * Isogenies

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» Diophantine Equations

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or equivalently

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Often very hard, and in general undecidable! Let us see what we can do...

» One variable

$$a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \dots a_1 x + a = 0$$

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Quite easy! We can show that:

Theorem

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Let $\frac{p}{q} \in \mathbb{Q}$ be a solution of the above equation. Then q divides a_n and p divides a_0 .

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Let $\frac{p}{q} \in \mathbb{Q}$ be a solution of the above equation. Then q divides a_n and p divides a_0 .

Check the finite list of candidates.

Alternatively, solve numerically and find candidate of form $\frac{b}{a_n}$

» Linear and Quadratic

$$ax + by = c$$

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These are rational points on a conic.

- Given a rational point, all of them can be found geometrically
- Hasse principle allows us to test if a rational point exists

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What about:

$$ax^3 + bx^2y + cxy^2 + dy^3 + ex^2 + fxy + gy^2 + hx + iy + j = 0$$
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If the curve is non singular, and it has a rational point then the group of rational points is finitely generated

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Elliptic Curves \neq Ellipse

» Fields

Definition

A field K is set together with two operations $+,\cdot$ such that

- st K is an abelian group under + with identity 0
- * $K-\{0\}$ is an abelian group under multiplication with identity 1.
- * For every $a,b,c\in K$ we have that a(b+c)=ab+ac
- $* 0 \neq 1$

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Informally, we can add, subtract, multiply and divide non zero elements.

» Finite Fields

We are mostly interested in finite fields.:

Theorem

For every prime p, and every $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ there is an unique field of size p^n , which we denote by either $\mathbb{GF}(p^n)$ or \mathbb{F}_{p^n}

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If n=1, then $\mathbb{F}_p=\mathbb{Z}_p$, if not we can write them as

$$\mathbb{F}_{p^n} = \frac{\mathbb{F}_p[X]}{(f(x))}$$

where f(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n.

» Characteristic

For any field, $\operatorname{char}(\mathbb{F})$ is the least integer ℓ such that

$$\underbrace{1+\ldots 1}_{\ell \text{ times}} = 0,$$

or ∞ if no such integer exists. We have that $\operatorname{char}(\mathbb{F}_{p^n})=p$.

Let k, K be two fields. If there is an homomorphism $k \to K$, we can identify k with a subfield of K. In that case, K is a **field extension** of k which we denote by $k \subseteq K$.

» Field Extensions

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Given any field K we can construct the algebraic closure \overline{K} which is the smallest algebraically closed extension containing K. Some examples:

$$* \mathbb{Q} \subseteq \mathbb{R} \subseteq \mathbb{C}$$

$$* \ \mathbb{F}_p \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{p^3} \cdots \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$$

» Weierstrass Form

$$ax^{3} + bx^{2}y + cxy^{2} + dy^{3} + ex^{2} + fxy + gy^{2} + hx + iy + j = 0$$

4-Much easier to manage!

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$$\downarrow \operatorname{char}(K) \neq 2, 3$$

$$y^{2} = x^{3} + ax + b$$

Elliptic Curves

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» Elliptic Curves

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$$E(K) = \left\{ (x, y) \in K \times K \mid y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \right\} \cup \{\infty\}$$

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
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
Mathematicians are often interested with $E(\mathbb{Q}) \subseteq E(\mathbb{R}) \subseteq E(\mathbb{C})$ but we mostly consider the finite case.

» Elliptic curves




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


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$$y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1$$
 over \mathbb{Z}_{89}

» Some elliptic curves





More elliptic curves


$$y^2 = x^3 + -3x + 3$$
 $y^2 = x^3 + x$ $y^2 = x^3 - x$

$$u^2 - x^3 \perp x$$

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$$y^2 = x^3 - x$$

$$y^2 = x^3 + x^2$$

» Discriminant

Definition

Let $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ be an elliptic curve.

The **discriminant** of E is

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From now on, all curves are assumed non singular.

» j-invariant

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In fact, an isomorphism from a curve in short Weierstrass form must necessarily be:

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
$$(x,y) \mapsto (u^2x, u^3y)$$

for $u \in \overline{K}^*$ and this yields:

Theorem

Let E, E' be two elliptic curves over K. Then $E \cong E'$ over \overline{K} if and only if j(E) = j(E').

» The Group Law



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- * Let $x_3 = \lambda^2 x_1 x_2$, $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 x_3) y_1$ where λ is:

$$\lambda = \begin{cases} \frac{y_2-y_1}{x_2-x_1}, \ x_1 \neq x_2\\ \frac{3x_1^2+a}{2y_1}, \ \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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Elliptic Curves

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This makes E into an abelian group with identity ∞

Scalar multiplication

For $n > 0, P \in E$ we write $[n]P = \underbrace{P + \cdots + P}$. We then extend n times the notation by letting $[0]P = \infty$ and [-n]P = [n](-P).

Elliptic Curves 00000000000

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For $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ we define a map $[m]: E \to E$ accordingly, and write:

$$E[m] := \ker[m]$$

to be the m-torsion subgroup of E.

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» Number of Points on a curve

Heuristically, we expect $\approx q+1$ points

Let E be an elliptic curve defined over \mathbb{F}_q .

$$|\#E(\mathbb{F}_q) - q - 1| \le 2\sqrt{q}$$

Exact value can be efficiently found using Schoof's algorithm in $O((\log q)^8).$

Conclusion

Resource 0 00000

» Discrete Logarithm

Cryptography relies on hardness assumptions.

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Definition

Let $\mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ be a p.p.t. algorithm that returns a group description $\mathbb{G}=(+,P,q)$, where $\mathbb{G}=\langle P\rangle$ and $q=\#\mathbb{G}$. For an attacker \mathcal{A} , define

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dlp}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(1^{\lambda}, \mathbb{G}, [k]P \right) = k \, \middle| \, \begin{array}{c} \mathbb{G} \leftarrow \$ \, \mathrm{Gen}(1^{\lambda}) \\ k \leftarrow \$ \, \mathbb{Z}_q \end{array} \right]$$

We say that the **discrete logarithm assumption** hold with respect to Gen if, for every p.p.t. attacker \mathcal{A} , $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dlp}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\cdot)$ is negligible.

Related Assumptions

In practice, we make stronger assumptions, such as Computational Diffie Hellman and Decisional Diffie Hellman.

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Elliptic Curves

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Representation matters! $\mathbb{Z}_{p-1} \cong \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as groups but the discrete logarithm is trivial in the former, assumed hard in the latter.

» Why elliptic curves?

Assum	ption	Group	Best Algorithm	\approx Complexity
RS	Д	\mathbb{Z}_N	Number Field Sieve	$\exp(c^3\sqrt{\log N})$
DL	Р	\mathbb{F}_p^*	Number Field Sieve	$\exp(c^3\sqrt{\log p})$
DL	Р	$E(\mathbb{F}_p)$	Pollard Rho	\sqrt{p}

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Best known attacks against ECC are generic attacks

- * Shorter keysizes (≈ 256 vs 3072 bits)
- * Faster computation

» EC Diffie Hellman Key Exchange

Let E be an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_q . Let p be a large prime dividing $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ and P a point of order p.

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Diffie Hellman

Alice	Bob	
$x \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_q$	$y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$	
$Q_A = [x]P$	$Q_B = [y]P$	
$\frac{Q}{}$	\xrightarrow{A}	
$\stackrel{Q_B}{\leftarrow}$		
$K = [x]Q_B$	$K = [y]Q_A$	

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$\xrightarrow{Q_A}$		
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Correctness follows since:

$$K = [x]Q_B = [x][y]P = [xy]P = [y][x]P = [y]Q_A = K$$



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Curves and subgroups with small embedding degree. E.g. supersingular and anomalous curves

Easy Elliptic Curves

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- Singular curves over \mathbb{F}_p . Equivalent to DLP in \mathbb{F}_p^* or \mathbb{F}_p^+
- Curves and subgroups with small embedding degree. E.g. supersingular and anomalous curves
- * Curves that admit pairings to small finite fields.

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
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- * Curves and subgroups with small embedding degree. E.g. supersingular and anomalous curves
- * Curves that admit pairings to small finite fields.
- * Curves defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^k} for k with small factors. GHS Method, Diem's Analysis.

Collision search for $f: S \to S$. Let $x_0 \in S$, $x_n = f(x_{n-1})$.

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Let $X_0 = \infty$, then $X_i = [\alpha_i]P + [\beta_i]Q$ and we can track α_i, β_i . A collision $X_i = X_{i+\ell}$ with $gcd(\beta_{i+\ell} - \beta_i, N) = 1$ allows us to solve the DLP with

$$k \equiv \frac{\alpha_j - \alpha_{j+\ell}}{\beta_{j+\ell} - \beta_j} \pmod{N}$$

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* Alternating:

$$e(T,T)=1$$

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Every elliptic curve E over K admits an efficiently computable pairing

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 $\langle P, Q \rangle = e_m(S, \phi(Q))$

For $\phi: E \to E$ a distorsion map

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Correctness by:

$$e(\sigma, P) = e([x]Q, P) = e(Q, P)^x = e(Q, [x]P) = e(H(m), [x]P)$$

» Post Quantum

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- Isogenies!

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Definition

Let E_1, E_2 be elliptic curves. An **isogeny** is a morphism

$$\phi: E_1 \to E_2$$

with $\phi(\infty) = \infty$. If $\phi(E_1) \neq {\infty}$, E_1 is **isogenous** to E_2 .

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For example, the curves $y^2=x^3+x$ and $y^2=x^3-3x+3$ are isogenous over \mathbb{F}_{71} via the isogeny

$$(x,y) \mapsto \left(\frac{x^3 - 4x^2 + 30x - 12}{(x-2)^2}, y \cdot \frac{x^3 - 6x^2 - 14x + 35}{(x-2)^3}\right)$$

Properties of isogenies

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* An isogeny between two Weierstrass curves has the form

$$(x,y) \mapsto \left(\frac{f}{h^2}(x), y \cdot \frac{g}{h^3}(x)\right)$$

Separable and Inseparable Isogenies

Elliptic Curves

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Let $E/k: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, with char(k) = p. Define $E^{(p^r)}: u^2 = x^3 + a^{p^r}x + b^{p^r}$. The map:

$$\pi: E \to E^{(p^r)}, (x, y) \mapsto \left(x^{p^r}, y^{p^r}\right)$$

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If an isogeny factors trough a Frobenius isogeny it is inseparable. If it is a Frobenius followed by an isomorphisms, it is purely inseparable. We are mostly concerned with the separable case.

» Kernel and Velu

There is a one to one correspondence between finite subgroups of elliptic curves and separable isogenies from that curve, up to post-compostion with isomorphisms

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 $kernels \longleftrightarrow isogenies$

Let E/k, with k a finite field. For any subgroup $H \leq E$ we can find an isogeny with kernel H in $\Theta(\#H)$ using Velu's formulas. We denote the target of that isogeny by E/H

Computing large degree isogenies

* Velu's formula are too slow for large degree


4- Take $H \cong \mathbb{Z}_{\ell^k}$. Set $\ker \psi_i = [\ell^{k-i}](\psi_{i-1} \circ \cdots \circ \psi_1)(H)$. Then $\deg(\psi_i) = \ell$ and

$$E \xrightarrow{\psi_1} E_1 \xrightarrow{\psi_2} \cdots \xrightarrow{\psi_{k-1}} E_{k-1} \xrightarrow{\psi_k} E/H$$

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
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» Supersingular Curves

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
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
Finding the isogeny is dramatically harder:

Definition

The computational supersingular isogeny problem is as follows: Given two supersingular elliptic curves E,E^\prime , find an isogeny between them.

Look something like this! We focus on the second





Let p, ℓ be a primes.

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
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 - Most vertices have degree $\ell+1$


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Alice's pk



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
Bob's pk



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
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


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Picture to keep in mind:



Details will follow

Parties select $p = 2^{e_A}3^{e_B} - 1$ prime,

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- * Alice computes the 2^{e_A} isogeny $\phi_A: E \to E/\langle S_A \rangle = E_A$

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Elliptic Curves

- $\langle P_A, Q_A \rangle = E[2^{e_A}], \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E[3^{e_B}].$
 - * Alice, Bob sample $n_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^e A}$, $n_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{3^e B}$, and compute $S_X = P_X + [n_X]Q_X$
 - * Alice computes the 2^{e_A} isogeny $\phi_A: E \to E/\langle S_A \rangle = E_A$
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SIDH

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- * Bob computes the 3^{e_B} isogeny $\phi_B: E \to E/\langle S_B \rangle = E_B$
- * The public keys are $\operatorname{pk}_{X} = (E_{X}, P'_{Y} = \phi_{X}(P_{X}), Q'_{X} = \phi_{X}(Q_{X}))$

Parties select $p=2^{e_A}3^{e_B}-1$ prime, a supersingular starting curve $E/\overline{\mathbb{F}}_{p^2}$, four points P_A,P_B,Q_A,Q_B s.t. $\langle P_A,Q_A\rangle=E[2^{e_A}],\langle P_B,Q_B\rangle=E[3^{e_B}].$

- * Alice, Bob sample $n_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^{e_A}}, n_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{3^{e_B}}$, and compute $S_X = P_X + [n_X]Q_X$
- * Alice computes the 2^{e_A} isogeny $\phi_A: E \to E/\langle S_A \rangle = E_A$
- * Bob computes the 3^{e_B} isogeny $\phi_B: E \to E/\langle S_B \rangle = E_B$
- * The public keys are $\operatorname{pk}_X = (E_X, P_Y' = \phi_X(P_X), Q_X' = \phi_X(Q_X))$
- * Alice computes $S_A'=P_B'+[n_A]Q_B'$, and an isogeny $\phi_A':E_B\to E/\langle S_A'\rangle=E_{AB}$

Parties select $p=2^{e_A}3^{e_B}-1$ prime, a supersingular starting curve $E/\overline{\mathbb{F}}_{p^2}$, four points P_A,P_B,Q_A,Q_B s.t. $\langle P_A,Q_A\rangle=E[2^{e_A}],\langle P_B,Q_B\rangle=E[3^{e_B}].$

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- * The public keys are $\operatorname{pk}_X = (E_X, P_X' = \phi_X(P_X), Q_X' = \phi_X(Q_X))$
- * Alice computes $S_A' = P_B' + [n_A]Q_B'$, and an isogeny $\phi_A': E_B \to E/\langle S_A' \rangle = E_{AB}$
- * Bob computes $S_B' = P_A' + [n_B]Q_A'$, and an isogeny $\phi_B' : E_A \to E/\langle S_B' \rangle = E_{BA}$

SIDH

Parties select $p = 2^{e_A}3^{e_B} - 1$ prime, a supersingular starting curve E/\mathbb{F}_{n^2} , four points P_A, P_B, Q_A, Q_B s.t.

Elliptic Curves

$$\langle P_A, Q_A \rangle = E[2^{e_A}], \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E[3^{e_B}].$$

- * Alice, Bob sample $n_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^e A}$, $n_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{3^e B}$, and compute $S_X = P_X + [n_X]Q_X$
- * Alice computes the 2^{e_A} isogeny $\phi_A: E \to E/\langle S_A \rangle = E_A$
- * Bob computes the 3^{e_B} isogeny $\phi_B: E \to E/\langle S_B \rangle = E_B$
- * The public keys are

$$\operatorname{pk}_X = (E_X, P_X' = \phi_X(P_X), Q_X' = \phi_X(Q_X))$$

- * Alice computes $S'_A = P'_B + [n_A]Q'_B$, and an isogeny $\phi'_A: E_B \to E/\langle S'_A \rangle = E_{AB}$
- * Bob computes $S'_{B} = P'_{A} + [n_{B}]Q'_{A}$, and an isogeny $\phi_B': E_A \to E/\langle S_B' \rangle = E_{BA}$
- * The final secret is $j(E_{AB}) = j(E_{BA})$

» SIDH and SIKE

* SIDH is vulnerable to active attacks

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- * SIKE uses the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to fix this
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- * SIKE in the Alternate Candidates of Round 3 of the NIST PQC competion
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- * Currently a bit on the slow side
- * Best known attack is classical

Best attack is on CSSI problem.

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» Security

Best attack is on CSSI problem. Suppose we want to find an ℓ^a -isogeny between $E_0\to E_1$, both supersingular over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. Let $k\approx a/2$ and

$$S_{i,k} := \left\{ H \le E_i[\ell^k] \mid H \text{ cyclic}, |H| = \ell^k \right\}$$

$$S := (\{0\} \times S_{0,k}) \sqcup (\{1\} \times S_{1,k})$$

$$g : S \to \mathbb{F}_{p^2}, \ (i,H) \mapsto j(E_i/H)$$

Security

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$$g : S \to \mathbb{F}_{p^2}, \ (i,H) \mapsto j(E_i/H)$$

A collision g(0, H) = g(1, H') will solve CSSI. To enable Pollard-Rho style methods, let $h: \mathbb{F}_{n^2} \to S$ be a hash function, and let:

$$f: S \to S, f := h \circ g$$

h maps a set $\approx p/12$ to S which has size $\approx p^{1/4}$ so introduces a lot of collisions.

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h maps a set $\approx p/12$ to S which has size $\approx p^{1/4}$ so introduces a lot of collisions. To find a 'golden' one we use the van Oorschot Wiener (vOW) algorithm. When using m processors and w memory cells, time complexity is

$$\frac{2.5}{m} \sqrt{\#S^3/w} \cdot t = O(p^{3/8})$$

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- * We only scratched the surface!
- * ECDH base of most of the web's key exchanges
- * BLS Pairing based signatures both efficient and secure
- * SIKE leverages isogenies for post quantum security

» Resources

- 0 J.H. Silverman, J.T. Tate, Rational Points on Elliptic Curves
- 1 .H. Silverman, The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves¹
- 2 D.A. Cox, Primes of the form $x^2 + ny^2$
- 3,4 L. Panny, notes: [intro] [isogenies problems]
 - 5 C. Costello, Supersingular isogeny key exchange for beginners
 - 6 R. Granger, A. Joux, Computing Discrete Logarithms [5.2, 5.3]
 - 7 P. Aluffi, Algebra: Chapter 0
 - 8 S. Galbraith, Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography

¹The bible

- * Historical Notes follow mostly [0, Introduction]
- * Origin of the name elliptic can be found [here]
- * Fields discussed in [7, III.1.14, VII]
- * Weierstrass form in [1, III.1]
- * Definition of elliptic curve [1, III.2.2, III.3] or [0, 2.2]
- * Elliptic curves diagram from [iacr] and curves from [1, Fig 3.1, 3.2]
- * Discriminant, j-invariant formula from [1, III.1]
- * Discriminant interpretation [0, 2.3]
- * Isomorphism form [1, III.3.1b]
- * Theorem j-invariance [1, III.1.4b]

- * Group Law diagram [0, Fig 1.16]
- * Formulae [1, III.2.3]
- * Scalar multiplication notation [1, III.2]
- * Multiplication isogeny [1, III.4.1]
- * Double and add [1, XI.1]
- * Torsion subgroup [1, III.4]
- * Hasse's theorem [1, V.1.1]
- * Schoof's algorithm [1, XI.3]
- * DLP and related assumption [8. III.13]
- * Partial Equivalence of CHD and DLP in [Maurer] [Fifield]

» Detailed References & Credits

- * Representation example expanded in [6, 5.3.1]
- * Complexity estimates from [0, 4.5] and [1, XI.4]
- * Diffie Hellman from [everywhere?]
- \ast Singular curves are bad [0, 3.15] and [1, III.2.5] and [6, 5.3.3]
- * Small Embedding degree ECDLP [1, XI.6] and [6, 5.2.2]
- * Supersingular curves breaking ECDLP [1, XI.6.4] and [6, 5.2.2]
- * Anomalous curves breaking ECDLP [1, XI.6.5] and [6, 5.2.2] and [6, 5.3.3]
- * Descent methods in [6, 5.2.2]
- * Pollard Rho description [1, XI.5.3-5.4]
- * Pairings adapted from [1, III.8.1]
- * Weil Pairing computation [1, XI.8]
- * Modified Weil Pairing and Distorsion map [1, XI.7]

- * BLS Signatures [1, XI.7.4]
- * Isogeny definition [1, III.4]
- * Isogeny Example from [3, 2.1]
- * Isogeny properties (summary) [3, 2.1]
- * Isogeny and Group Hom. [1, III.4.8]
- * Isogeny composition, degree and multiplicativity [1, III.4]
- * Dual Isogeny [1, III.6]
- * Frobenius isogeny and separability [3, 2.1.2]
- * Kernels and Velu [3, 2.2] and [1, III.4.12]
- * Supersingular curves [1, V.3.1]
- * Number of curves [1, V.4.1c]
- * Points of supersingular curve [3, 1.8]

- Isogenous with same number of points [1, Ex. 5.4]
- Graphs from L. Panny's [lekenpraatje]
- Vertices as elements of \mathbb{F}_{n^2} from [1, V.3.1]
- Good mixing properties from [CGL06]
- SIDH diagrams and description from [5]
- SIKE [sike]
- * vOW function from [4, 3.1] and [ACV+18]
- vOW description [4, 3.2] and [vOW98]

- Attacks on SIDH [torsion] [GPST]
- Mathematics of Isogeny Based Cryptography [deFeo17]
- * vOW attack estimation [vOW98] [ACV+18] [CLN+19] [LWS20]
- * Verifiable Delay Functions from Isogenies and Pairings [dFMPS19]
- Delfs-Galbraith attack [DG16] [SCS21]