

Elliptic Curve Cryptography

an introduction which is entirely too short

by Giacomo Fenzi (ETH Zurich)

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» Motivation

*'It is possible to write endlessly on elliptic curves.
(This is not a threat.)'*

Serge Lang

- * Elliptic curves are everywhere in cryptography
- * Power $\approx 70\%$ of TLS Exchanges
- * Coolest post quantum cryptography proposal
- * Fascinating mathematically

History	Background	Elliptic Curves	Conclusion	Resources
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» Outline

- * Historical Notes
- * Mathematical Background
- * Addition on Elliptic Curves
- * Discrete Logarithm and Diffie Hellman
- * Pairings
- * Isogenies

» Diophantine Equations

Historically originated in the context of solving Diophantine equations such as

$$X^n + Y^n = Z^n, \quad X, Y, Z \in \mathbb{Z}$$

or equivalently

$$x^n + y^n = 1, \quad x, y \in \mathbb{Q}$$

Often very hard, and in general undecidable¹!

Let us see what we can do...

¹In fact, already undecidable with 11 integers variables!

» One variable

$$a_n x^n + a_{n-1} x^{n-1} + \dots a_1 x + a = 0$$

Quite easy! We can show that:

Theorem

Let $\frac{p}{q} \in \mathbb{Q}$ be a solution of the above equation. Then q divides a_n and p divides a_0 .

Check the finite list of candidates.

Alternatively, solve numerically and find candidate of form $\frac{b}{a_n}$

» Linear and Quadratic

$$ax + by = c$$

Theorem

Has infinitely many rational solution. If $\gcd(a, b)$ does not divide c , then no integers solutions. Else, infinitely many.

$$ax^2 + bxy + cy^2 + dx + ey + f = 0$$

These are rational points on a conic.

- * Given a rational point, all of them can be found geometrically
- * Hasse principle allows us to test if a rational point exists

» Cubics

What about:

$$ax^3 + bx^2y + cxy^2 + dy^3 + ex^2 + fxy + gy^2 + hx + iy + j = 0 ?$$

This is the general form of an elliptic curve!

We have that

Theorem (Mordell)

If the curve is non singular, and it has a rational point then the group of rational points is finitely generated

But no equivalent of Hasse principle!

Elliptic Curves \neq Ellipse

» Fields

Definition

A field K is set together with two operations $+$, \cdot such that

- * K is an abelian group under $+$ with identity 0
- * $K - \{0\}$ is an abelian group under multiplication with identity 1.
- * For every $a, b, c \in K$ we have that

$$a(b + c) = ab + ac$$
- * $0 \neq 1$

Informally, we can add, subtract, multiply and divide non zero elements.

» Finite Fields

We are mostly interested in finite fields.:

Theorem

For every prime p , and every $n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ there is a unique field of size p^n , which we denote by either $\mathbb{GF}(p^n)$ or \mathbb{F}_{p^n}

If $n = 1$, then $\mathbb{F}_p = \mathbb{Z}_p$, if not we can write them as

$$\mathbb{F}_{p^n} = \frac{\mathbb{F}_p[X]}{(f(x))}$$

where $f(x)$ is an irreducible polynomial of degree n .

» Characteristic

For any field, $\text{char}(\mathbb{F})$ is the least integer² ℓ such that

$$\underbrace{1 + \dots + 1}_{\ell \text{ times}} = 0$$

We have that $\text{char}(\mathbb{F}_{p^n}) = p$.

²Or ∞ if no such integer exists

» Field Extensions

Let k, K be two fields. If there is an homomorphism $k \rightarrow K$, we can identify k with a subfield of K . In that case, K is a **field extension** of k which we denote by $k \subseteq K$.

Given any field K we can construct the algebraic closure \overline{K} which is the smallest algebraically closed extension containing K .

Some examples:

$$* \mathbb{Q} \subseteq \mathbb{R} \subseteq \mathbb{C}$$

$$* \mathbb{F}_p \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{p^3} \cdots \subseteq \overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$$

» Weierstrass Form

$$ax^3 + bx^2y + cxy^2 + dy^3 + ex^2 + fxy + gy^2 + hx + iy + j = 0$$

↓

$$y^2 + axy + by = x^3 + cx^2 + dx + e$$

↓

$\text{char}(K) \neq 2, 3$

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

Much easier to manage!

» Elliptic Curves

Definition

Let k be a field. An elliptic curve E over k (denoted by E/k) is given by

$$E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$


for $a, b \in k$.

For any extension $k \subseteq K$ we define


$$E(K) = \left\{ (x, y) \in K \times K \mid y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \right\} \cup \{\infty\}$$

Mathematicians are often interested with $E(\mathbb{Q}) \subseteq E(\mathbb{R}) \subseteq E(\mathbb{C})$ but we mostly consider the finite case.

» Elliptic curves




$$y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1 \text{ over } \mathbb{R}$$



$$y^2 = x^3 - 2x + 1 \text{ over } \mathbb{Z}_{89}$$


» Some elliptic curves




$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

» More elliptic curves



$$y^2 = x^3 + -3x + 3$$




$$y^2 = x^3 + x$$



$$y^2 = x^3 - x$$



$$y^2 = x^3 - x$$



$$y^2 = x^3 + x^2$$

» Discriminant

Definition

Let $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ be an elliptic curve.

The **discriminant** of E is

$$\Delta = -16(4a^3 + 27b^2)$$

A curve is **singular** if $\Delta = 0$.

Alternatively, let $E : y^2 = f(x)$, and let x_1, x_2, x_3 be the roots of f .

$$\Delta = (x_1 - x_2)^2(x_2 - x_3)^2(x_3 - x_1)^2$$

i.e. $\Delta = 0 \iff f$ has a repeated root.

From now on, all curves are assumed non singular.

» j -invariant

Definition

The j -invariant of E is

$$j(E) = -1728 \frac{(4A)^3}{\Delta}$$

In fact, an isomorphism from a curve in short Weierstrass form must necessarily be:

$$(x, y) \mapsto (u^2x, u^3y)$$


for $u \in \overline{K}^*$

and this yields:

Theorem

Let E, E' be two elliptic curves over K . Then $E \cong E'$ over \overline{K} if and only if $j(E) = j(E')$.

» The Group Law



» The Group Law: Formulae

Let $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ be an elliptic curve. Let

$P_i = (x_i, y_i) \in E(K)$.

Define

$$-P_0 = (x_0, -y_0)$$

Now, for $P_1 + P_2$:

- * If $x_1 = x_2$ and $y_1 = -y_2$, then $P_1 + P_2 = \infty$
- * If $P_1 = \infty$ then $P_1 + P_2 = P_2$, and viceversa.
- * Let $x_3 = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$, $y_3 = \lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$ where λ is:

$$\lambda = \begin{cases} \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}, & x_1 \neq x_2 \\ \frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This makes E into an abelian group with identity ∞

» Scalar multiplication

For $n > 0, P \in E$ we write $[n]P = \underbrace{P + \cdots + P}_{n \text{ times}}$. We then extend

the notation by letting $[0]P = \infty$ and $[-n]P = [n](-P)$.

We can compute $[n]P$ in $\Theta(\log n)$ group operations using double and add.

For $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ we define a map $[m] : E \rightarrow E$ accordingly, and write:

$$E[m] := \ker [m]$$

to be the m -torsion subgroup of E .

» Number of Points on a curve

Heuristically, we expect $\approx q + 1$ points

Theorem (Hasse)

Let E be an elliptic curve defined over \mathbb{F}_q .

$$|\#E(\mathbb{F}_q) - q - 1| \leq 2\sqrt{q}$$

Exact value can be efficiently found using Schoof's algorithm in $O((\log q)^8)$.

» Discrete Logarithm

Cryptography relies on hardness assumptions.

Definition

Let $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ be a p.p.t. algorithm that returns a group description $\mathbb{G} = (+, P, q)$, where $\mathbb{G} = \langle P \rangle$ and $q = \#\mathbb{G}$. For an attacker \mathcal{A} , define

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{dlp}}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathbb{G}, [k]P) = k \mid \begin{array}{l} \mathbb{G} \leftarrow \$ \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ k \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_q \end{array} \right]$$

We say that the **discrete logarithm assumption** hold with respect to Gen if, for every p.p.t. attacker \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{dlp}}(\cdot)$ is negligible.

» Related Assumptions

In practice, we make stronger assumptions, such as Computational Diffie Hellman and Decisional Diffie Hellman.

- * CHD: From $[x]P, [y]P$ compute $[xy]P$
- * DDH: Distinguish $(P, [x]P, [y]P, [xy]P)$ from $(P, [x]P, [y]P, [z]P)$

Pairings make DDH easy on elliptic curves!

$$\text{DDH} \leq_R \text{CDH} \leq_R {}^3\text{DLP}$$

Representation matters! $\mathbb{Z}_{p-1} \cong \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as groups but the discrete logarithm is trivial in the former, assumed hard in the latter.

³In fact equivalent in certain groups

» Why elliptic curves?

Assumption	Group	Best Algorithm	\approx Complexity
RSA	\mathbb{Z}_N	Number Field Sieve	$\exp(c^3 \sqrt{\log N})$
DLP	\mathbb{F}_p^*	Number Field Sieve	$\exp(c^3 \sqrt{\log p})$
DLP	$E(\mathbb{F}_p)$	Pollard Rho	\sqrt{p}

Best known attacks against ECC are generic attacks

- * Shorter key sizes (≈ 256 vs⁴ 3072 bits)
- * Faster computation⁵

⁴For 128 bits of security

⁵against other DLP schemes and private RSA ops

» EC Diffie Hellman Key Exchange

Let E be an elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_q . Let p be a large prime dividing $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ and P a point of order p .

Diffie Hellman

Alice

Bob

$$x \leftarrow \$\mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$y \leftarrow \$\mathbb{Z}_q$$

$$Q_A = [x]P$$

$$Q_B = [y]P$$

$$\xrightarrow{Q_A}$$

$$\xleftarrow{Q_B}$$

$$K = [x]Q_B$$

$$K = [y]Q_A$$

Correctness follows since:

$$K = [x]Q_B = [x][y]P = [xy]P = [y][x]P = [y]Q_A = K$$

» Easy Elliptic Curves


DLP is not equally hard on every curve!

- * Singular curves over \mathbb{F}_p . Equivalent to DLP in⁶ \mathbb{F}_p^* or \mathbb{F}_p^+
- * Curves and subgroups with small embedding degree. E.g. supersingular and anomalous curves
- * Curves that admit pairings to small finite fields.
- * Curves defined over \mathbb{F}_{p^k} for k with small factors. GHS Method, Diem's Analysis.

⁶Or in some small extension

» Pollard Rho

Collision search for $f : S \rightarrow S$. Let $x_0 \in S$, $x_n = f(x_{n-1})$.
 Expected $\sqrt{\pi \#S/2}$ calls to f , constant memory.



» Pollard Rho

Let G be a group of order N . We want to find k s.t. $[k]P = Q$.

Split $G = A \sqcup B \sqcup C$ with $\#A \approx \#B \approx \#C$.

Define

$$f(X) = \begin{cases} P + X, & X \in A \\ [2]X, & X \in B \\ Q + X, & X \in C \end{cases}$$

Let $X_0 = \infty$, then $X_i = [\alpha_i]P + [\beta_i]Q$ and we can track α_i, β_i . A collision $X_j = X_{j+\ell}$ with $\gcd(\beta_{j+\ell} - \beta_j, N) = 1$ allows us to solve the DLP with

$$k \equiv \frac{\alpha_j - \alpha_{j+\ell}}{\beta_{j+\ell} - \beta_j} \pmod{N}$$

» Pairings

Definition

Let \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T be two groups. A **pairing** is a map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ that is:

- * Non degenerate:

$$e(S, T) = 1 \quad \forall S \in \mathbb{G} \implies T = 0_{\mathbb{G}}$$

- * Bilinear:

$$e(S_1 + S_2, T) = e(S_1, T)e(S_2, T)$$

$$e(S, T_1 + T_2) = e(S, T_1)e(S, T_2)$$

- * Alternating:

$$e(T, T) = 1$$

» Weil Pairing

Every elliptic curve E over K admits an efficiently computable pairing

$$e_m : E[m] \times E[m] \rightarrow \mu_m$$

where μ_m is the group of m -th root of unity.

It is degenerate on cyclic subgroups of $E[m]$, so use modified Weil pairing

$$\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle : E[m] \times E[m] \rightarrow \mu_m$$

$$\langle P, Q \rangle = e_m(S, \phi(Q))$$

For $\phi : E \rightarrow E$ a distortion map⁷

⁷If it exists

» BLS Signatures

Let \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T be cyclic groups of prime order p . Let P be a generator of \mathbb{G} , and e a non degenerate pairing. Also, let $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$	$\text{Sign}(sk, m)$
$x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$	$Q \leftarrow H(m)$
$pk := [x]P$	$\sigma \leftarrow [x]Q$
$sk := x$	return σ
return (pk, sk)	
$\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma)$	
return $e(\sigma, P) \stackrel{?}{=} e(H(m), [x]P)$	

Correctness by:

$$e(\sigma, P) = e([x]Q, P) = e(Q, P)^x = e(Q, [x]P) = e(H(m), [x]P)$$

» Post Quantum

- * Discrete logarithms, RSA, and pairings broken by Shor's algorithm
- * Can we recover?
- * Yes, lattices, codes, multilinear maps...
- * **Isogenies!**

» Isogenies

“Nice maps” between elliptic curves.

Definition

Let E_1, E_2 be elliptic curves. An **isogeny** is a morphism

$$\phi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$$

with $\phi(\infty) = \infty$. If $\phi(E_1) \neq \{\infty\}$, E_1 is **isogenous** to E_2 .

For example, the curves $y^2 = x^3 + x$ and $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 3$ are isogenous over \mathbb{F}_{71} via the isogeny

$$(x, y) \mapsto \left(\frac{x^3 - 4x^2 + 30x - 12}{(x - 2)^2}, y \cdot \frac{x^3 - 6x^2 - 14x + 35}{(x - 2)^3} \right)$$

» Properties of isogenies

- * Each isogeny is also a group homomorphism
- * The map $[m] : E \rightarrow E$ is an isogeny
- * You can compose isogenies
- * Each isogeny has a degree, and it is multiplicative
 $\deg(\phi \circ \psi) = \deg(\phi) \deg(\psi)$
- * Each isogeny $\phi : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ has a unique dual $\hat{\phi} : E_2 \rightarrow E_1$ such that

$$\phi \circ \hat{\phi} = [\deg(\phi)]$$

- * An isogeny between two Weierstrass curves has the form

$$(x, y) \mapsto \left(\frac{f}{h^2}(x), y \cdot \frac{g}{h^3}(x) \right)$$

» Separable and Inseparable Isogenies

Definition

Let $E/k : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, with $\text{char}(k) = p$. Define $E^{(p^r)} : y^2 = x^3 + a^{p^r}x + b^{p^r}$. The map:

$$\pi : E \rightarrow E^{(p^r)}, (x, y) \mapsto (x^{p^r}, y^{p^r})$$

is the (p^r) -**Frobenius isogeny**.

Note if $k = \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ then $E^{(p^r)} = E$

If an isogeny factors through a Frobenius isogeny it is inseparable. If it is a Frobenius followed by an isomorphism, it is purely inseparable.

We are mostly concerned with the separable case.

» Kernel and Velu

Theorem

There is a one to one correspondence between finite subgroups of elliptic curves and separable isogenies from that curve, up to post-composition with isomorphisms

$$\text{kernels} \longleftrightarrow \text{isogenies}$$

Let E/k , with k a finite field. For any subgroup $H \leq E$ we can find an isogeny with kernel H in $\Theta(\#H)$ using Velu's formulas. We denote the target of that isogeny by E/H

» Supersingular Curves

Definition

A curve E defined over K with $\text{char}(K) = p$ is **supersingular** if $[p]$ is purely inseparable and $j(E) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$. A curve that is not supersingular is **ordinary**

- * Something something order in a quaternion algebra?
- * There are $\approx \lfloor \frac{p}{12} \rfloor$ supersingular curves over \mathbb{F}_{p^n} .
- * A supersingular curve has $p + 1$ points.
- * Insecure for DLP
- * Secure for CSSI (later)!

» Isogeny Problems

It is easy to find out if two curves are isogenous

Theorem

Two curves E_1, E_2 over a finite field k are isogenous over k if and only if $\#E_1(k) = \#E_2(k)$.



Finding the isogeny is dramatically harder:

Definition

The **computational supersingular isogeny problem** is as follows: Given two supersingular elliptic curves E, E' , find an isogeny between them.

» Isogeny Graphs

Look something like this! We focus on the second



» Isogeny Graphs

Let p, ℓ be a primes.

Definition

The ℓ -**supersingular isogeny graph** has as:


- * Vertices: Supersingular Elliptic curves over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$
- * Edges: Separable isogenies from $E \rightarrow E'$

Both up to isomorphisms (i.e. vertices are j -invariants)

- * We can represent vertices as elements of \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
- * Graph is directed
- * Graph has good mixing properties
- * Can walk in the graph with Velu's method
- * Most vertices have degree $\ell + 1$


» **SIDH ($p = 2^4 3^3 - 1$)**

Alice's pk




» **SIDH ($p = 2^4 3^3 - 1$)**

Bob's pk




» **SIDH ($p = 2^4 3^3 - 1$)**

Alice's pk



» SIDH ($p = 2^4 3^3 - 1$)

Alice's pk



» SIDH

Picture to keep in mind:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 E & \xrightarrow{\phi_A} & E/\langle A \rangle \\
 \phi_B \downarrow & & \downarrow \phi'_B \\
 E/\langle B \rangle & \xrightarrow{\phi'_A} & E/\langle A, B \rangle
 \end{array}$$

Details will follow

» SIDH

Parties select $p = 2^{e_A}3^{e_B} - 1$ prime, a supersingular starting curve $E/\overline{\mathbb{F}}_{p^2}$, four points P_A, P_B, Q_A, Q_B s.t.

$$\langle P_A, Q_A \rangle = E[2^{e_A}], \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E[3^{e_B}].$$

- * Alice, Bob sample $n_A \leftarrow \$\mathbb{Z}_{2^{e_A}}, n_B \leftarrow \$\mathbb{Z}_{3^{e_B}}$, and compute $S_X = P_X + [n_X]Q_X$
- * Alice computes the 2^{e_A} isogeny $\phi_A : E \rightarrow E/\langle S_A \rangle = E_A$
- * Bob computes the 3^{e_B} isogeny $\phi_B : E \rightarrow E/\langle S_B \rangle = E_B$
- * The public keys are $\text{pk}_X = (E_X, P'_X = \phi_X(P_X), Q'_X = \phi_X(Q_X))$
- * Alice computes $S'_A = P'_B + [n_A]Q'_B$, and an isogeny $\phi'_A : E_B \rightarrow E/\langle S'_A \rangle = E_{AB}$
- * Bob computes $S'_B = P'_A + [n_B]Q'_A$, and an isogeny $\phi'_B : E_A \rightarrow E/\langle S'_B \rangle = E_{BA}$
- * The final secret is $j(E_{AB}) = j(E_{BA})$

» SIDH and SIKE

- * SIDH is vulnerable to active attacks
- * SIKE uses the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to fix this
- * SIKE in the Alternate Candidates of Round 3 of the NIST PQC competition
- * Very short keys
- * Currently a bit on the slow side
- * Best known attack is classical

» Security

Best attack is on CSSI problem.

Suppose we want to find an ℓ^a -isogeny between $E_0 \rightarrow E_1$, both supersingular over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. Let $k \approx a/2$ and

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_{i,k} &:= \left\{ H \leq E_i[\ell^k] \mid H \text{ cyclic}, |H| = \ell^k \right\} \\
 S &:= (\{0\} \times S_{0,k}) \sqcup (\{1\} \times S_{1,k}) \\
 g : S &\rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{p^2}, (i, H) \mapsto j(E_i/H)
 \end{aligned}$$

A collision $g(0, H) = g(1, H')$ will solve CSSI. To enable Pollard-Rho style methods, let $h : \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \rightarrow S$ be a hash function, and let:

$$f : S \rightarrow S, f := h \circ g$$

» Security

h maps a set $\approx p/12$ to S which has size $\approx p^{1/4}$ so introduces a lot of collisions.

To find a ‘golden’ one we use the van Oorschot Wiener (vOW) algorithm.

When using m processors and w memory cells, time complexity⁸ is

$$\frac{2.5}{m} \sqrt{\#S^3/w} = O(p^{3/8})$$

⁸In terms of ℓ^k -isogeny computations

» Conclusion

- * Elliptic curves are pretty damn cool
- * We only scratched the surface!
- * ECDH base of most of the web's key exchanges
- * BLS Pairing based signatures both efficient and secure
- * SIKE leverages isogenies for post quantum security

» Resources

- 0 J.H. Silverman, J.T. Tate, Rational Points on Elliptic Curves
- 1 .H. Silverman, The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves⁹
- 2 D.A. Cox, Primes of the form $x^2 + ny^2$
- 3,4 L. Panny, notes: [intro] [isogenies problems]
- 5 C. Costello, Supersingular isogeny key exchange for beginners
- 6 R. Granger, A. Joux, Computing Discrete Logarithms [5.2, 5.3]
- 7 P. Aluffi, Algebra: Chapter 0
- 8 S. Galbraith, Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography

⁹The bible

» Detailed References & Credits

- * Historical Notes follow mostly [0, Introduction]
- * Origin of the name elliptic can be found [here]
- * Fields discussed in [7, III.1.14, VII]
- * Weierstrass form in [1, III.1]
- * Definition of elliptic curve [1, III.2.2, III.3] or [0, 2.2]
- * Elliptic curves diagram from [iacr] and curves from [1, Fig 3.1, 3.2]
- * Discriminant, j -invariant formula from [1, III.1]
- * Discriminant interpretation [0, 2.3]
- * Isomorphism form [1, III.3.1b]
- * Theorem j -invariance [1, III.1.4b]

» Detailed References & Credits

- * Group Law diagram [0, Fig 1.16]
- * Formulae [1, III.2.3]
- * Scalar multiplication notation [1, III.2]
- * Multiplication isogeny [1, III.4.1]
- * Double and add [1, XI.1]
- * Torsion subgroup [1, III.4]
- * Hasse's theorem [1, V.1.1]
- * Schoof's algorithm [1, XI.3]
- * DLP and related assumption [8. III.13]
- * Partial Equivalence of CHD and DLP in [Maurer] [Fifield]

» Detailed References & Credits

- * Representation example expanded in [6, 5.3.1]
- * Complexity estimates from [0, 4.5] and [1, XI.4]
- * Diffie Hellman from [everywhere?]
- * Singular curves are bad [0, 3.15] and [1, III.2.5] and [6, 5.3.3]
- * Small Embedding degree ECDLP [1, XI.6] and [6, 5.2.2]
- * Supersingular curves breaking ECDLP [1, XI.6.4] and [6, 5.2.2]
- * Anomalous curves breaking ECDLP [1, XI.6.5] and [6, 5.2.2] and [6, 5.3.3]
- * Descent methods in [6, 5.2.2]
- * Pollard Rho description [1, XI.5.3-5.4]
- * Pairings adapted from [1, III.8.1]
- * Weil Pairing computation [1, XI.8]
- * Modified Weil Pairing and Distorsion map [1, XI.7]

» Detailed References & Credits

- * BLS Signatures [1, XI.7.4]
- * Isogeny definition [1, III.4]
- * Isogeny Example from [3, 2.1]
- * Isogeny properties (summary) [3, 2.1]
- * Isogeny and Group Hom. [1, III.4.8]
- * Isogeny composition, degree and multiplicativity [1, III.4]
- * Dual Isogeny [1, III.6]
- * Frobenius isogeny and separability [3, 2.1.2]
- * Kernels and Velu [3, 2.2] and [1, III.4.12]
- * Supersingular curves [1, V.3.1]
- * Number of curves [1, V.4.1c]
- * Points of supersingular curve [3, 1.8]

» Detailed References & Credits

- * Isogenous with same number of points [1, Ex. 5.4]
- * Graphs from L. Panny's [lekenpraatje]
- * Vertices as elements of \mathbb{F}_{p^2} from [1, V.3.1]
- * Good mixing properties from [CGL06]
- * SIDH diagrams and description from [5]
- * SIKE [sike]
- * vOW function from [4, 3.1] and [ACV+18]
- * vOW description [4, 3.2] and [vOW98]

» Further Reading

- * Attacks on SIDH [torsion] [GPST]
- * Mathematics of Isogeny Based Cryptography [deFeo17]
- * vOW attack estimation [vOW98] [ACV+18] [CLN+19] [LWS20]
- * Verifiable Delay Functions from Isogenies and Pairings [dFMPS19]
- * Delfs-Galbraith attack [DG16] [SCS21]