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CONSOLIDATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS – UAE-SUDAN ICJ CASE

Product Purpose

This report outlines, in a consolidated format, all key recommendations provided in previous UAE-Sudan-related reports. The aim of such recommendations is to enact a change in the global perception of the UAE in the context of the ICJ case and allegations in Sudan. Following the roadmap outlined should reduce or degrade critical narratives, while reinforcing positive themes.

The overarching recommendations include:

- Engage in regional media outreach, including granting interviews and opinion articles catering to specific target audiences.
- Conduct a robust social media campaign, employing a multi-channel approach to share a variety of content formats that counters current critical narratives.
- Leverage influencers and credible voices to spread the positive narratives, including engaging UAE embassies to communicate with host country media.
- Implement a 24/7 rapid response team dedicated to monitoring Sudan content and respond
 to misinformation immediately may include establishing an independent fact-checking NGO
- Reduce critical narratives through technical methods, including shadow-banning, bot take downs, and community notes.
- Invest in cultural diplomacy that showcases the UAE's values of tolerance and peace
- Maintain strict due diligence on investments and partnerships in Colombia, given the accusations of Colombian mercenaries' involvement.
- Conduct scenario planning for future targeting incidents of other UAE-related controversies could emerge via investigative journalism, planning relevant responses.

The following table outlines the list of previous reports relating to Sudan, including a directory for the page numbers where the respective recommendations have been outlined both here, and in the original reports.

	Report Name	This report	Original report
1	20250321-UAE and Sudan Counter Narrative Plan.pdf	pg. 2-4	pg. 8-13
2	20250321-UAE and Sudan Counter Narrative Comparative Media Analysis.pdf	pg. 5-6	pg. 18-22
3	20250321-Tactical Report-US JStreet PAC.pdf	pg. 7-8	pg. 6-8
	20250317-Tactical Report-US Congress Arms Block-Update	pg. 7-8	pg. 3-4
4	20250322_Due Diligence Report_La Silla Vacia.pdf.html	pg. 9-10	pg. 4-5
5	20250322_Strategic Fusion Report – Who Benefits from Sudan's Case Against the UAE at the ICJ.pdf.html	pg. 11	pg. 17

This intelligence assessment provided by the Beacon Red Intelligence Fusion Centre is based on open source information, not classified information of any type. It is strongly recommended that readers confirm key information before making decisions based on this report. Beacon Red provides this report as advice exclusively to MoFA Public Diplomacy Office for Project Oryx (MDM Initiative). More detailed briefings and investigations are recommended to support operational and strategic decision making.





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1. UAE-Sudan Counter-Narrative Plan

A strategic, multi-faceted approach is recommended to countering the critical narratives against the UAE in the context of Sudan. *These recommendations are expanded on in pg.8-13 of the original report.*

Recommended Timeline

Timeframe	Recommended Actions to Take		
Immediate	Seize control of the narrative's direction during the critical initial aftermath.		
(0–1 month)	Roll out official statements and rebuttals		
	Deploy senior officials for interviews		
	Push an aggressive social media blitz		
	Engage embassies to communicate with host country media in Africa and Asia		
Short Term	Introduce and solidify the counter-narrative themes in the public domain.		
(2-3 months)	Execute planned op-eds, influencer collaborations, and regional media		
	placements		
	Deeper content		
	Host a high-profile press conference or panel.		
Medium Term	Normalize a balanced narrative and demonstrate tangible proof of the UAE's		
(4-6 months)	positive role.		
	Maintain regular communications, but pivot to showcasing outcomes		
	Continue engaging Sudan's neighbors and the AU		
	Begin subtle reputation repair in Western circles		
Long Term	Sustain and cement the UAE's rehabilitated image and be prepared for the ICJ		
(6+ months)	case's evolution.		
	Integration of the narrative campaign into broader public diplomacy.		
	Continue periodic updates on humanitarian aid		
	Leverage global events e.g., UAE's participation in UNGA or Expo		
	If the ICJ case progresses to substantive stages, mount a communications		
	push around legal victories or expert opinions favoring the UAE.		

Steps to Countering Critical Sudan Narratives

- Regional Media Outreach Grant opinion articles, interviews, and exclusive access pieces
 to media outlets catering to specific target audiences, including Western policy makers, PanAfrican and Asian media, Think Tanks, and entities from the Global South.
- Social Media Campaign Launch a coordinated social media campaign using a dedicated hashtag (e.g. #UAEForSudanPeace), employing a multi-channel approach to share a variety of content formats, shared at high-traffic times
 - General Messaging Cadence: 15-20 daily posts across platforms. Peak posting times: 9-11am and 7-9pm GMT (matching 83% of critical content posting patterns)
 - Languages: Arabic (primary 68% of critical content), English (secondary 22%),
 French (tertiary 10%)
- Content Formats & Frequency Mix up content types to keep the narrative fresh and engaging. Short-form videos (1-2 minute clips), infographics and fact-sheets distilling key metrics, Op-eds and thought leadership pieces
- Influencer & Grassroots Engagement Identify and collaborate with influencers who carry credibility in target communities, such as respected journalists, academics, or pan-African youth influencers. In parallel, engage with humanitarian NGOs or diaspora leaders who have seen UAE's aid on the ground, as they can add authentic third-party validation of





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the UAE's positive role. Utilize UAE embassies to issue statements and engage with policymakers to clarify facts.

- Initial Capacity Building for 24/7 Rapid Response Establish narrative intelligence/ disinformation monitoring dedicated to Sudan content, including alerting and reporting thresholds. Assign a dedicated team to swiftly respond to misinformation on traditional and social media. Consider also setting up an independent fact-checking NGO.
- **Aggressive Deflection Campaign** Target top influencers attacking UAE by deploying community notes, asserting counter-messaging in comment responses, and reduce influence through technical methods such as shadow-banning, take-down requests, etc.

Strategic Counter-Narrative Messaging Framework

Highlight the following core themes in the immediate counter-narrative campaign:

- Humanitarian Leadership Portray the UAE as a compassionate leader aiding the Sudanese people. Highlight the UAE's substantial humanitarian engagement, exemplified by over \$600 million in humanitarian assistance provided to Sudan since 2023.
- Proactive Peace Advocacy Stress the UAE's role in seeking peace and stability in Sudan and the UAE's proactive diplomatic endeavors, including mediation efforts and advocacy for ceasefires.
- Global South Solidarity A clear articulation of Global South solidarity, emphasizing regional collaboration and peace-building. Frame the UAE as standing in solidarity with African and Asian nations in upholding stability and sovereignty.
- **Economic Partnerships** Remind audiences of the UAE's long-term investments in Sudan's stability and prosperity. Constructive economic initiatives, notably a \$6 billion infrastructure investment aimed at fostering Sudanese socioeconomic development.
- Rejection of Baseless Allegations Refute the harmful claims against the UAE by emphasizing the lack of direct evidence, while also highlighting the short fallings of the Sudanese government
- Negative/Deflection Messaging Reflect the narrative back onto the severe human rights violations the SAF have been accused of.

Priority Platforms and Target Audiences

It is recommended to utilize the following platforms, and focus on targeting the following audiences with the aforementioned messaging framework:

Platform	Reasons for Usage		
Twitter/X	• Measures 85.8% negative content, with critical content spreading rapidly due to retweets		
	User base includes an influential audience, making sentiment change here		
	disproportionately valuable.		
Instagram	 A favorable 62% positive basis of UAE-Sudan content, providing a receptive audience. 		
	Higher visibility potential for counter-narratives due to low critical posts on UAE-Sudan		
	context (62 critical posts vs 4,434 on Twitter)		
TikTok	 More supporting than critical content, the only major platform where this occurs. 		
	Highest engagement efficiency for supporting content, outperforming Twitter by 7.7x.		
	TikTok's algorithm favors content quality over account size.		
Facebook	• Significant content gap with 963 critical posts versus only 205 supporting posts.		
	Facebook dominates in Africa and Middle East markets, with groups allowing for precise		
	community targeting.		
Telegram	 Zero identified supporting content, 100% opportunity to introduce counter-narratives 		
	Less public scrutiny of messaging strategies compared to open platforms		





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Target Audience	Why
Western Policymakers	Influence diplomatic relations, arms sales, and sanctions.
AU and Arab League	that African countries are the most at risk from turning against the UAE
Sudanese Public	Winning over Sudanese civilians weakens the Sudanese government's
	anti-UAE propaganda
Humanitarian Organizations	Strengthens the argument that the UAE is focused on helping civilians
Global Business and	The Sudan war affects regional economic stability and trust in
Investment Leaders	institutions for investment.
Think Tanks and Policy	Can steer geopolitical analysis and discourse and they provide policy
Institutes	recommendations to governments and international bodies.
BRICS Countries	Significant diplomatic, economic, and security influence
G20 Countries	The UAE has strong economic and political ties with many G20 nations





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2. Comparative Media Strategy: UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan

The below recommendations are extant from a report focused specifically on comparing the UAE's media narrative and strategy amid the Sudan-ICJ allegations with how Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have shaped conflict narratives, geopolitical situations and legal claims. *These recommendations are expanded on in pg.18-22 of the original report.*

Immediate - Short-term (next 6-12 months)

A key takeaway is the importance of seizing the initiative in communications.

- Engage Proactively and Shape the Narrative Early:
 - Launch a proactive media campaign that saturates traditional and social media with the UAE's perspective and positive contributions.
 - Press conferences or briefings to present the UAE's side with evidence
 - Release detailed statements to international outlets highlighting the UAE's extensive humanitarian aid to Sudan
 - Every news story about the ICJ case should include the UAE's rebuttal and context.
 - Show a willingness to address the allegations head-on, which builds credibility.
 - Avoid ceding the Global South narrative: craft messages that resonate with African and Asian audiences
- Leverage Influencers and Credible Voices:
 - The UAE should build a coalition of credible voices to speak on its behalf. Short-term, identify and brief friendly influencers
 - Influential individuals in Africa such as African Union dignitaries, prominent Sudanese community leaders abroad, or journalists from Pan-African publications – should be engaged.
 - On social media, the UAE should empower its diplomats and articulate citizens to be active
- Emphasize Transparency and Consistency
 - Short-term, acknowledging concerns in order to rebut them for instance, the UAE could say, "We understand Sudan's desperation given the atrocities, but the facts show the UAE is aiding Sudan, not harming it," and then provide evidence.
 - If there are any legitimate points (e.g. maybe UAE companies inadvertently sold dualuse equipment that ended up with RSF), address them transparently and explain corrective actions.
 - The UAE should deploy a unified message matrix highlighting:
 - UAE's humanitarian leadership
 - Commitment to Sudan's stability
 - Respect for international law and cooperation with investigations
 - The UAE's broader track record as a peaceful investor in Africa.

Short-Term Crisis Containment (6–12 months)

The UAE should implement a crisis communications task force dedicated to Sudan allegations. This team would monitor media 24/7, rapidly correct misinformation, and push out UAE's narrative. Key tactics include:

o **Rapid Response Rebuttals**: Respond to major critical pieces within hours with fact-based counter-statements or letters to the editor.





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- Highlight Common Ground & Humanitarian Focus: Steer the narrative towards the humanitarian crisis in Sudan
- Media Partnerships & Access: Partner with a major international media outlet for a field report showcasing the UAE's role.

Long-Term Reputation Management (Multi-year)

Beyond the immediate firefight, the UAE should embark on a sustained campaign to bolster its reputation and inoculate against future crises.

- Institutionalized Public Diplomacy: Establish dedicated programs or centers for engagement with media and civil society in key regions (Africa especially).
- Narrative of UAE as a Global South Partner: Proactively align the UAE's brand with Global South solidarity. This can be done by championing causes important to developing countries debt relief, climate adaptation funding (especially since UAE hosted COP28 in 2023, leverage that legacy), peacekeeping contributions, etc.
- Regular Transparency Initiatives: To combat skepticism, the UAE could implement periodic transparency steps in its foreign policy. For instance, annually publish a Foreign Aid and Security Report detailing where it provides military assistance or aid and under what guiding principles.
- Cultural and People-to-People Diplomacy: Invest in cultural diplomacy that showcases the UAE's values of tolerance and peace.



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3. US J Street PAC and Congress Members

The below recommendations are extant from previous reports on the topic of the US Congress Arms Block, and analysis of the J Street PAC and Congress Members advocating on UAE-Sudan activities. *These recommendations are expanded on in pg.3-4 and pg. 6-8 of the respective original reports*.

Response to Allegations by US Congress Members

- Avoid direct acknowledgment of specific allegations regarding Sudan
- Maintain a position of denying involvement in Sudan's conflict
- Characterize claims as politically motivated actions by "the genocidal Sudanese government"
- Indirectly frame the situation as "cynical manipulation of the UN and the Democrats in the U.S."
- Use ridicule as a tactic to diminish the credibility of accusations

Holding Statement Core Message

- Positive and Non-confrontational Approach
- Emphasize the UAE's "warm and enduring relationship with the United States, built on decades of strategic cooperation, shared values, and mutual respect"
- Highlight the billions of dollars in UAE investments in U.S. industries, including real estate, tech, and energy
- Highlight that the UAE-U.S. partnership has "flourished across multiple administrations, reflecting a long history of strong bipartisan support"
- Stress the UAE's appreciation for "sustained commitment from American leaders across the political spectrum"
- Focus on joint efforts to "promote regional security, economic prosperity, and cultural exchange"
- Reinforce commitment to "strengthening this vital alliance, working hand in hand with the United States"
- Position the UAE as forward-looking and solution-oriented

Possible Unofficial Campaign Actions

Republican Alignment Strategy

The exploration of J Street PAC and its links to George Soros, as well as the fact that this is so far a Democratic party agenda aligns to the extant recommendation that this conversation could be affected by framing it as a "Soros backed Democrat plan to meddle in yet another conflict."

- Create and amplify visual content showing UAE leadership with Trump.
- Deploy surrogates and unaffiliated accounts to emphasize Republican majorities in both houses.
- Highlight the relationship between UAE leadership and embassy (Yousef Al Otaibia) and key Republican figures
- Distribute and amplify images and quotes from Senator Rubio's visits to UAE
- Arrange Yousef Al Otaibia's congressional visits with accompanying photography team to amplify in the coming week.
 - o Implement a coordinated social media campaign showcasing bipartisan relationships.

Note - Ben-Am has been vocal in criticizing Israeli settlement policies and the treatment of Palestinians. Conservatives often label him as "anti-Israel" or insufficiently supportive of Israel's





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security and sovereignty, accusing him of indirectly supporting Palestinian or anti-Israel agendas. Singling out Palestinian-*supportive* political figures such as Ben-Am or Sarah Jacobs in a way that may highlight their stance, or the stance of J Street PAC as one that has demonstrably been against aggressors in conflicts, may marry Sudan and Palestine as "victims together" in a wider narrative. This could align the Sudan conflict and the UAE, to the Israel-Palestine conflict in a way that may contradict current UAE policy.

Counter-Narrative Campaign

- Launch a targeted negative campaign focusing on the Sudanese government and SAF execute through affiliated entities with plausible deniability. This will allow for criticism of the named political figures as supporting an "aggressor" in a conflict that does not have a clear delineation between "victim" and "aggressor".
- Employ diplomatic backchannels to signal to the U.S. that blocking arms sales to the UAE could push the country closer to strategic U.S. competitors.
- Direct these messages specifically at Washington DC policymakers and media.

Positive Reinforcement Campaign

- Develop an unofficial campaign portraying the UAE as "U.S.' all-weather friends through thick and thin".
- Emphasize joint efforts in "fighting terror and extremism together," highlight collaborative security initiatives and partnerships.
- Leverage affiliated entities to push these messages without direct attribution to UAE government.

Implementation Timeline		
Immediate Actions	Begin visual content creation showing UAE-Trump connections	
(Within 48 Hours)	Initiate coordination of Yousef Al Otaibia's congressional schedule for the coming week	
	Activate surrogate network for initial messaging deployment	
Short-Term Actions (1 Week)	Execute Yousef Al Otaibia's congressional visit with full media documentation	
	Deploy first wave of counter-narrative content targeting Sudanese government	
	Begin amplification of Rubio-UAE relationship content	
Sustained Efforts	stained Efforts • Maintain consistent positive messaging about UAE-U.S. partnership	
(Ongoing)	Continue surrogate amplification of bipartisan relationships	
	Regularly refresh content highlighting joint security initiative	





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4. Due Diligence Report – La Silla Vacia (LSV)

The below recommendations are extant from a due diligence report outlining if the UAE has entered into commercial, financial, or strategic relationships with entities or individuals who are actively undermining the UAE's interests, specifically LSV and Juanita León García. *These recommendations are expanded on in pg.4-5 of the original report.*

While there are no direct ties between the UAE and LSV or its founder, Juanita León García, an indirect financial connection exists through overlapping ownership and sponsorship relationships. UAE capital is indirectly connected to LSV's operations, by way of Abu Dhabi's International Holding Company (IHC). This indirect connection does not imply any intent by the UAE to support LSV or influence its editorial activities. However, it heightens reputational and narrative risk.

Recommendations to safeguard against any such risk include:

- 1. Maintain Clear Separation Between Existing Investments and Media Sponsorship. MoFA leadership is recommended to engage with IHC leadership and provide guidance on deliberate separation between the Grupo Nutresa/IHC venture and the Grupo SURA/LSV sponsorship.
 - a) It is recommended that IHC be provided guidance to communicate to partners like Gilinski that while it supports the core investment, it does not seek to be involved in or credited for peripheral projects such as media sponsorship.
- Leverage MoFA Influence to Expedite Complete Divestment from Grupo SURA. The 2023
 Nutresa deal included an agreement for IHC/Gilinski to exit their stakes in Grupo SURA2. MoFA
 could leverage this to encourage IHC to fully divest any remaining SURA shares once contractual
 obligations are met, and avoid re-entering SURA's equity in the future if not strategically
 essential.
- 3. Maintain Strict Due Diligence on Investments and Partnerships in Colombia. MoFA is recommended to engage with leadership of UAE sovereign funds (like Mubadala, ADIA, IHC.) and significant private investors who hold positions within government, and release specific guidance directing entities to integrate a check for media affiliations in their due diligence when evaluating Colombian ventures.
 - a) If considering acquiring or partnering with a Colombian company, a mandatory check on whether the organizations have ownership links to media/journalists that are hostile to UAE.
 - b) As part of due diligence screening before any major deal, Emirati investors should be advised to conduct a background screen on key shareholders for ties to García or LSV.
 - c) In general, it is recommended to provide guidance to avoid investing in or partnering with entities known to fund LSV. This is especially relevant if, in future, Quala S.A. (the León family's company) becomes an investment target.
- 4. Protect Against Unintentional Funding via Third Parties. No evidence of direct funding exists; therefore, no immediate action can be taken to halt such activities. However, MoFA can be proactive in engaging with UAE commercial entities to ensure that no inadvertent sponsorship of LSV activities occurs in the future.
 - a) It is recommended that MoFA establishes formal guidelines for UAE enterprises operating in Colombia with directives such as focusing sponsorships towards neutral or pro-UAE initiatives.





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- b) MoFA could engage with leadership of nationally recognized entities such as DP World, Etisalat, Khalifa University etc., to do internal reviews of any conferences and university programs that LSV is also sponsoring or participating in.
- c) If a situation arises where it is disclosed that a UAE entity is indirectly contributing to LSV, it is recommended to encourage a discreet redirection of those funds rather than a public dispute, which can give LSV ammunition for further adverse reporting.
- 5. **Proactive Narrative Monitoring of LSV**. It is recommended to utilize the MDM initiative to monitor LSV and associated networks. Early detection will allow the UAE to prepare a response.
 - a) While LSV is independent, they do incorporate responses (as shown by including MoFA comments in their Sudan mercenary report). Providing a timely comment or clarifying information could either dissuade a false angle or at least ensure the UAE's stance is fairly represented.
 - b) The UAE Embassy in Bogotá could designate a media liaison to interact with outlets like LSV. This requires active development of a Colombia specific strategic communications plan, monitoring and coordination between the Public Diplomacy Office on behalf of the MDM initiative, to the UAE Embassy in Bogotá.
- 6. **Scenario Planning for Future Targeting Incidents.** It is strongly recommended to run simulations anticipating what other UAE-related controversies could emerge via investigative journalism and plan responses.
 - a) One approach is to conduct an internal risk assessment of any areas where its interaction with Colombia could be seen negatively if exposed; conduct a wargame/simulation and then develop a communications strategy.
- 7. **Monitor Third-Party Funding to LSV for Changes.** Other state actors such as Turkiye, Qatar and Iran are always watching for UAE missteps and opportunities to exploit existing challenges.





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5. ICJ Case - Who Benefits?

The below recommendations are extant from a report that contextualized and identified triggering events that led to the ICJ case against the UAE, including the potential geopolitical actors who may benefit from it. *These recommendations can be found on pg.17 of the original report.*

While many of the potential legal remedies and diplomatic engagements are already actively in process by MoFA and other entities, the following recommendations may enhance current activities:

- Targeted Economic Engagement Undertake a systematic review of all existing and planned investments in high-risk African states (Sudan, Mali, Libya, Somalia, Djibouti). Immediately prioritize low-risk humanitarian and development projects while freezing controversial highprofile projects that risk amplifying neo-colonial narratives (such as strategic ports or extractive industry investments).
- 'Localization' and Capacity Building Effort: Significantly invest in projects that directly
 empower local communities and visibly demonstrate direct benefits to African populations.
 Initiatives should focus on employment generation, local business partnerships, and tangible
 infrastructure improvements, explicitly distancing UAE involvement from perceptions of
 resource extraction or military influence.