

# Beyond the Gold Standard: Critiques, Alternatives & The Future

Final Lecture: Econometrics of Policy Evaluation (EPE)

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## Part I: The “Gold Standard” & Its Discontents

# The Promise of the Randomistas

**The Goal:** Clean identification of Causal Effects.

**The Method:** Randomization eliminates selection bias

$$E(Y(0)|D = 1) = E(Y(0)|D = 0)$$

*“RCTs shifted economics closer to medicine.” — Banerjee  
& Duflo*

**But...** is “What Works” enough?

- ▶ **Internal Validity:** High (We know it worked *here*).
- ▶ **External Validity:** Unknown (Will it work *there*?).
- ▶ **Mechanism:** “Black Box” (We don't know *why*).

# The Critique: Deaton & Cartwright (2018)

**Main arguments:** RCTs act as a “Black Box.” They give us an unbiased estimate of an average effect, but they often fail to deliver the generalizability beyond the experimental sample – which is so needed for policy.

- ▶ RCTs require assumptions beyond “random assignment”:
  - ▶ Sample representativeness
  - ▶ No interference between units
  - ▶ Treatment conditions mimic policy context
- ▶ Violations might lead to two problems
- 1. **The Scaling Problem:** A small NGO pilot  $\neq$  a national government policy.

# The Critique: Deaton & Cartwright (2018)

## 2. The “Why” Problem:

- ▶ Results tell what worked there and then, not why or if it works elsewhere
- ▶ Without a model of **behaviour**, we cannot predict how the policy interacts with local norms or institutions.

*“Randomization does not equalize everything. . . it only equalizes things **in expectation**.”*

*“RCTs help answer “what works” but can fail at answering “why it works” or “how it will work in a new environment.”*


# The Critique: Heckman & Smith (1995)

This is the foundational critique that every evaluator must know.

1. **Substitution Bias:** The control group isn't doing "nothing." They are finding the **next best alternative**. The RCT measures the **incremental** benefit, not the **total** benefit.
2. **General Equilibrium Effects:** If you train 100 people, they get jobs. If you train 1,000,000 people, you might just lower wages or displace other workers.
3. **Randomization Bias:** The sites that **agree** to be randomized are "special" (e.g., better managed, more innovative).

# Visualizing the “Average” Trap

Why ATE (Average Treatment Effect) is dangerous for policy.



## Part II: Theory & Structure



# Heckman & Pinto (2022): Structural Causal Analysis

- ▶ Heckman & Pinto (2022) argue:
  - ▶ Policy questions often require models of behavior and mechanisms
  - ▶ Econometric approaches (structural models) embed theory into counterfactuals
  - ▶ This allows simulation of outcomes in new contexts – something RCTs alone cannot do
- ▶ Structural inference helps:
  - ▶ Analyze distributional effects
  - ▶ Consider equilibrium responses
  - ▶ Forecast impacts under new conditions

# Unpacking the Mechanism: Heckman & Pinto (2022)

- ▶ How do we fix the “Black Box”? **Structural Causal Models.**
- ▶ Instead of just  $D \rightarrow Y$ , we model the **agent's choice**:

$$Y = f(X, \theta) \quad (\text{Outcome Function})$$

$$D = 1[V(Z) > C] \quad (\text{Choice Function})$$

- ▶ **Why do this?** If we know the parameters  $\theta$  (e.g., price elasticity, risk aversion), we can simulate the policy in a **new** country or context without running a new RCT.

# The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE)

**Reference:** Heckman & Vytlacil (2005)


The effect of a policy depends on **who selects into it**.

- ▶ **MTE:** The treatment effect for people **indifferent** between participating and not participating.
- ▶ **The Insight:** People who gain the most often participate first. As you expand the program (scale up), you start pulling in people with lower gains (diminishing returns).

# Interactive Concept: The MTE Curve

Imagine a **Home Insulation Subsidy**.

1. **High Gainers:** People with drafty houses (join immediately).
2. **Low Gainers:** People with new houses (only join if subsidy is huge).



## Part III: Labour Application


# When “Control” is contaminated

- ▶ A key assumption of RCTs is **SUTVA** (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption): **My outcome depends only on my treatment.**
- ▶ Where this fails:
  - ▶ **Vaccines:** If I get vaccinated, you (control) are safer. (Positive Spillover).
  - ▶ **Job Training:** If I get trained, I take the job you (control) wanted. (Negative Displacement).
- ▶ **Example:** Crépon et al. (2013) on Labour Markets in France.
  - ▶ Found that job placement assistance helped **participants** but hurt **non-participants** by stealing their slots. Net effect was zero.

# Simulating Spillovers in R

Imagine a village where treating one person affects their neighbors.

## The SUTVA Problem: Network Spillovers



A control unit (Grey) connected to Blue units gets a 'Spillover Boost'

## Part IV: Energy & Environmental Applications



# Why Are RCTs Rare in Energy Policy?

- ▶ Energy policy often involves:
  - ▶ Large-scale regulatory changes
  - ▶ Infrastructure and macroeconomic feedback
  - ▶ Equilibrium effects
- ▶ **Example:**
  - ▶ Policy impacts are negotiated, contingent, and interact with market institutions – not neatly randomized

# The External Validity Puzzle: Energy Efficiency

**Case Study:** Allcott (2015) – Site Selection Bias.

- ▶ **The RCT:** Opower Home Energy Reports (nudges to save energy).
- ▶ **The Result:** Initial RCTs showed huge savings.
- ▶ **The Reality:** The first utility companies to sign up were “Green Superstars.”
- ▶ **The Drop:** As the program expanded to normal utilities, the effect size dropped by ~50%.

**Lesson:** We need a model of *site selection* to predict the national impact.

# Structural Models in Action: Transport

**Case Study:** Bento et al. (2009) – Gas Taxes.

- ▶ **Problem:** You cannot randomize a national gas tax.
- ▶ **Solution:** Estimate a structural model of vehicle choice (demand elasticities).
- ▶ **Findings:**
  - ▶ Flat gas tax = Regressive (hurts poor).
  - ▶ **Revenue Recycling:** If you return the revenue via lump-sum transfers, the policy becomes **Progressive**.
- ▶ **Only a structural model with general equilibrium could find this.**

## Part V: The Future (Cheer up!)

# Where do we go from here?

The “War” (Randomistas vs. Structuralists) is over. The “Synthesis” has begun.

1. **Theory-Driven Experiments:** Design RCTs specifically to test a parameter (e.g., “What is the price elasticity of solar adoption?”), not just a program.
2. **Transportability:** Using formal logic (Pearl, Bareinboim) to re-weight RCT results for new populations.
3. **Machine Learning:** Not just for prediction, but for **Heterogeneity**.

# The Synthesis (RCT + Structural Models)

**Reference:** Duflo et al (2012) – Getting Teachers to Come to School.


- ▶ This paper represents the “Best of Both Worlds.”
  - ▶ **The Problem:** Teacher absenteeism in India (42% rate).
  - ▶ **The RCT:** Randomly assigned schools to have cameras + financial incentives.
    - ▶ Teachers were required to take pictures with class at the start and end of school day to document attendance.
    - ▶ **Pay Structure:** Rs 500 base. If you work  $> 10$  days, you get Rs 50 per extra day.
    - ▶ **The Result:** Absenteeism fell by 21 percentage points. Test scores rose by 0.17 SD.

# The Synthesis

- ▶ **So why did they need a Structural Model?**
  - ▶ Because the pay scheme was **non-linear**.
  - ▶ Working on Day 1 pays Rs 0 directly... **but** it moves you closer to the “Bonus Zone” (Day 11+) → latent variable.
  - ▶ A “Reduced Form” regression cannot capture this **Dynamic Option Value**.

# Visualizing Total Compensation

- **The Structural Insight (Option Value):** Teachers are forward-looking. They work on Days 1-10 not for immediate cash, but to “unlock” the upward-sloping part of the compensation curve later in the month. A simple regression misses this dynamic mechanism.





# The Payoff

- ▶ **The Policy Payoff:**

- ▶ Using the model, they simulated **counterfactual** payment schemes (e.g., Linear Pay vs. Convex Pay).
- ▶ They found the RCT scheme was efficient, but could be tweaked to save costs while maintaining attendance.
- ▶ **An RCT alone could never tell you that.**

# The New Frontier: Causal Machine Learning

- ▶ We used to run one regression for the ATE.
- ▶ Now, we use **Causal Forests** to find  $\tau(i)$  (The effect for person  $i$ ).

## Why? Precision.

- ▶ Instead of subsidizing everyone, subsidize only those with high **MTE**.
- ▶ Instead of a blanket training program, target those with the highest predicted gain.

# A Simulation of the Future

Imagine we have 2,000 households. Who should get the solar subsidy?



# Take-aways

- ▶ **Respect the Gold Standard**, but don't worship it. RCTs are a tool, not a religion.
- ▶ **Embrace Theory.** Data without a model is just noise. Use structural thinking to understand mechanisms.
- ▶ **Data + Models is the Way.** As in other areas of Economics.
- ▶ **Think Distributionally.** ATE is dead. Long live heterogeneity.
- ▶ **Be Optimistic.** With big data, Causal ML, and structural integration, we are entering a golden age of evidence-based policy.

# References

## Key Debates & Foundations

- ▶ **Heckman, J. J., & Smith, J. A. (1995).** Assessing the Case for Social Experiments. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(2), 85–110.
  - ▶ *The classic critique on substitution bias and randomization bias.*
- ▶ **Heckman, J. J., & Vytlačil, E. (2005).** Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and Econometric Policy Evaluation. *Econometrica*, 73(3), 669–738.
  - ▶ *The formal derivation of the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE).*
- ▶ **Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S. P. (2012).** Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School. *American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1241–1278.
  - ▶ *The seminal paper combining RCTs with a structural model.*
- ▶ **Deaton, A., & Cartwright, N. (2018).** Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials. *Social Science & Medicine*, 210, 2–21.
  - ▶ *The philosopher/economist critique on mechanisms and external validity.*

# References

## Key Debates & Foundations cont'd

- ▶ **Heckman, J. J., & Pinto, R. (2022).** The Econometric Model for Causal Policy Analysis. *Annual Review of Economics*, 14, 893-923.
  - ▶ *A modern synthesis of structural modeling and causality.*

# References

## Applied Examples

- ▶ **Allcott, H. (2015).** Site Selection Bias in Program Evaluation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(3), 1117–1165.
  - ▶ *Demonstrates why “scaling up” fails using Opower energy data.*
- ▶ **Bento, A. M., Goulder, L. H., Jacobsen, M. R., & von Haefen, R. H. (2009).** Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Increased US Gasoline Taxes. *American Economic Review*, 99(3), 667-99.
  - ▶ *Uses structural models to design revenue recycling mechanisms.*
- ▶ **Crépon, B., Duflo, E., Gurgand, M., Rathelot, R., & Zamora, P. (2013).** Do Labor Market Policies have Displacement Effects? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), 531–580.
  - ▶ *The landmark RCT that explicitly measured spillovers.*

# References

## Applied Examples cont'd

- ▶ **Athey, S., & Wager, S. (2018).** Estimation and Inference of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects using Random Forests. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 113(523), 1228-1242.
  - ▶ *A key paper on Causal Forests and ML in econometrics.*



# Appendix

# Decision Trees: The Building Block

**Definition:** A **Decision Tree** is an algorithm that splits a population into smaller, more homogeneous groups based on input characteristics (covariates).


- ▶ **Root Node:** The starting point (the entire population).
- ▶ **Splitting Rule:** A question (e.g., “Is Income  $>$  \$50k?”) that divides data to best separate outcomes.
- ▶ **Leaf Node:** The final grouping where a prediction is made.

# Decision Trees: Toy Example

## Toy Example: Loan Approval Algorithm

- **Logic:** If Income is High, you are approved. If Income is Low, we check your Credit Score.

Visualizing a Decision Tree



# Causal Trees: Algorithm

**The Logic:** Standard trees split to minimize prediction error of  $Y$ . Causal trees split to **maximize the difference in treatment effects** ( $\tau$ ) between leaves.

## Algorithm in Plain English:

1. **Honesty (Splitting):** Divide data into Set A (to build the tree) and Set B (to estimate effects).
2. **Search:** Find the variable (e.g., Age) that creates the biggest gap in treatment effects between the “Left” node and “Right” node.
3. **Estimate:** Calculate the effect in the final leaf using the held-out Set B.

**Toy Simulation (R Code):** Imagine a drug that *only* works for people under 40.

# Causal Trees: Visualizing Heterogeneity

## Toy Example: Visualizing Heterogeneity

A Causal Tree would strictly split at Age 40 to separate these two worlds.

