#### UN BLOG DE



# Ukraine election 2019 polls Maldoc: analysis

4 de April de 2019 Por Lab52

From Lab52 at S2 Grupo, we have recently detected a malicious document titled "*Ukraine\_election\_2019\_polls.doc*". The document was uploaded to Virustotal on March 12nd, 2019 from Germany.

The title and uploading date is especially relevant in this case, because of the existing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the general elections at Ukraine.

# Ukraine election 2019 polls: Who is leading in the polls as Ukraine faces Russian THREAT?

UKRAINE will hold elections on March 31, as 44 <u>candidates</u> battle to win the presidential election race. But who is leading in the polls as Ukraine faces a "serious threat" from Russia?

The three front runners in the Ukraine election race include incumbent President Petro Poroshenko, opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko and comic actor Volodymyr Zelenskiy. The latest opinion poll, published on Monday, has puts Mr Zelenskiy in first place, with Mr Poroshenko second and Mr Tymoshenko third. Earlier polls also placed the 41-year-old comedian in first place.

The survey, which was carried out by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, showed Mr Zelenskiy had 15.4 percent of voter support.

The current President had 10.5 percent, while the opposition leader had eight percent.

#### Who is Volodymyr Zelenskiy?

Actor and comic Volodymyr Zelenskiy currently plays a teacher who is elected President of Ukraine in the television show Servant of the People.

Mr Zelenskiy has no political experience but is also a lawyer and businessman.

NBC News reported he does not hold rallies in order to gain supporters, but instead, he sells tickets to comedy gigs to share his policies and shares "behind the scenes campaign videos" on

Facebook and Youtube.

He has described himself as "very liberal" but if he is elected, he will have to tackled Ukraine's ongoing tensions with Russia.



Document content

Regarding that, the first round of the general elections of Ukrania (15 days before the document was uploaded) took place on March 31st, and the second round will be on April 21st. The result of the elections will have a definitive impact on the conflict between both countries.

To give the reader some geopolitical background, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began with the Crimea annexation (by the Russian Federation), and has lead to a second conflict due to the disruption of the "maritime order in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. While the exact content of Ukraine's claims is not publicly known, it is understood that IUkrainel include Russia's ongoing construction of a bridge across Kerch Strait and restrictions on passage of Ukrainian vessels through Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov I...J. Kerch Strait Bridge is intended to create a land connection between Crimea and Krasnodar region which, in light of Ukraine's blockade of Crimea, is crucial for supplies from Russia".

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The text in italics and the image above comes from this voelkerrechtsblog.org post and is authored by **Dmytro Koval** and **Valentin J. Schatz**!

There are three mainly candidates with high probabilities to win the elections: Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskiy. Each one has a specific way to approach the conflict, but the main positions are divided into looking for support from the European Union or get closer to the Russian Federation.

The content of the document is a real news coming from the conservative and liberal British Daily Express newspaper. European right-wind citizens tend to align against the Kremlin's international policies, what makes this document a good bait.

All the context and sophistication of the content of the document makes it to stand out from the generic campaigns of malware infections, fitting more into TTPs related to APT groups.

Regarding its malicious logic, it depends on macros, which are protected with a password in order to make its analysis more difficult:



# Password prompt

This is not a serious problem, since there are many tools that allows to extract them despite that. Once extracted, we see the function responsible for the execution of the threat:



# Malware execution function

The decrypted base64 text consists of a obfuscated Bash command that after several calls to CMD.exe, ends up loading a Powershell.exe with the final Payload.  Base64 encoded payload  The final Powershell.exe process runs as follows:	This function executes t	
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If we take a look, the powershell call has several mistakes in its parameters, in spite of which it is perfectly functional:

- WindowStyl -> WindowsStyle
- EexecutionPol -> ExecutionPolicy

Also, some extra parameters are truncated due to the use of a final "-", but after some iterations of de-obfuscation of the previous command in base64, we have been able to extract several elements that match a payload of a post-exploitation framework known as

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#### Partially deobfuscated payload

```
WorkingHours False
SlackChannel False #general
DefaultProfile True /admin/get.php,/news.php,/login/
process.php|Mozilla/5.0 (Windows
NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0;
rv:11.0) like Gecko
```

Default PowerShell Empire payload config

During its execution, the Powershell process constantly checks the "functiondiscoveryl.]net" domain through port 8443 using the HTTPS protocol.


```
26172 1064.059614 185.216.35.182
                                192.168.0.33
                                                       66 8443 + 49259 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Ler
                                                       54 8443 → 49259 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=158 Win=30336 Len=0
917 8443 → 49259 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=158 Win=30336 I
  26175 1064.192045
                185, 216, 35, 182
                                192,168,0,33
  26176 1064.204190
                                192.168.0.33
                185.216.35.182
                                               TCP
  26178 1064.337439
                185, 216, 35, 182
                                192,168,0,33
                                               TCP
                                                      113 8443 → 49259 [PSH, ACK] Seq=864 Ack=484 Win=31366
54 8443 → 49259 [ACK] Seq=923 Ack=766 Win=32512 Len=
 26192 1064.730185
                185.216.35.182
                                192.168.0.33
                                               TCP
 26194 1065.203702
                185.216.35.182
                                192.168.0.33
                                               TCP
                                                       144 8443 → 49259 [PSH, ACK] Seq=923 Ack=766 Win=32512

■ Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 70) · ukranianos.

. . . . . 0
         ..U....US0...
 1902011059057
        ..U....US0.."0
*.H..
```

# C2 traffic

Looking for the hash of the document in Virustotal, we see the following comment, which suggests that it may be a dropper of the group APT28 or Hades.



"Suspected Sofacy or Hades Activity Focuses on Upcoming Ukraine Elections"

The truth is that in addition to the pattern of infection and the subject of the document (already exploited earlier by this group in their malicious documents), within the macros of this document we see that the names of functions and their use of WMI coincide with another recent document with hash "8cccdce85beca7b7dc805a7fo48fcd1bc8f7614dd7e13c2986a9fa5dfbbbbdfg", which the researcher @VK\_intel suggests may be part of the APT28 toolset. In that case, the threat that was embedded was a dll and much more clearly attributed to this group:

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These are some examples of functions with the same name inside the Macros on both documents and their use of WMI:

```
Private Function DecodeBase64(base64) As Byte()

Const decodeTable = "ABCDEFGHIJKLNNOPQRSTUVNXYZabcdefghijklmnopq" 2 Dim XXPL, ONde

rstuvxxyz@123456789+/" 3 Set XXPL = CreateObject("Msxm12.DOMDocument.3.0")

If 0 <> Len(base64) Mod 4 Then 4 Set ONDE = XXPL.CreateElement("base64")
```

#### Base64decode on both documents

```
Private Sub Execute()
Dis matical serving
Dis stilene as long
Dis matical as gray
Dis
```

## Execute function + WMI logic on both document

Name IOC

Ukraine\_election\_2019\_polls.doc 8a35b6ecdf43f42dbf1e77235d6017faa70d9c68930bdc891d984a89di

URL functiondiscoveryl.lnet:8443/admin/get.php

**IP** 185.216.35[.]182

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