

Cryptography and Embedded Systems Security, Xiaolu Hou, Jakub Breier, ISBN: 978-3-031-62205-2, Springer Nature, 2024.
published version

The author's copy with errors corrected can be found in the following link:

Location	Original	Change																														
Page 9, Algorithm 1.1, lines 2-4	<hr/> <hr/> <p>Input: $m, n // m, n \in \mathbb{Z}, m \neq 0$ Output: $\gcd(m, n)$</p> <pre> 1 while $m \neq 0$ do 2 $r = n \% m //$ remainder of n divided by m 3 $n = m$ 4 $m = r$ 5 return r </pre> <hr/>	<hr/> <hr/> <p>Input: $m, n // m, n \in \mathbb{Z}, m \neq 0$ Output: $\gcd(m, n)$</p> <pre> 1 while $m \neq 0$ do 2 $r = m$ 3 $m = n \% m //$ remainder of n divided by m 4 $n = r$ 5 return n </pre> <hr/>																														
Page 18, first paragraph below Definition 1.2.12	By definition, for any $a \in F$, there exists $b \in F$ such that ...	By definition, for any $a \in F$, $a \neq 0$, there exists $b \in F$ such that ...																														
Page 20, Example 1.2.24	$f(1 \oplus 0) = f(1) = a, f(1) + f(0) = a + b = a$	$f(1 \oplus 0) = f(1) = b, f(1) + f(0) = b + a = b$																														
Page 49, Theorem 1.5.1	of $\deg(f(x)) \geq 1$	if $\deg(f(x)) \geq 1$																														
Page 51, Example 1.5.6	$\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(f(x)) = \{1, x, x + 1\}$ <p>...</p> $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(g(x)) = \{1, x, x + 1\}$	$\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(f(x)) = \{0, 1, x, x + 1\}$ <p>...</p> $\mathbb{F}_2[x]/(g(x)) = \{0, 1, x, x + 1\}$																														
Page 106 Table 2.2 (b)	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>\acute{A}</td><td>11000001</td><td>C1</td></tr> <tr> <td>\ddot{A}</td><td>11000100</td><td>C4</td></tr> <tr> <td>\acute{I}</td><td>11001101</td><td>CD</td></tr> <tr> <td>\times</td><td>11010111</td><td>D7</td></tr> <tr> <td>\div</td><td>11110111</td><td>F7</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	\acute{A}	11000001	C1	\ddot{A}	11000100	C4	\acute{I}	11001101	CD	\times	11010111	D7	\div	11110111	F7	<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>\acute{A}</td><td>1100001110000001</td><td>C381</td></tr> <tr> <td>\ddot{A}</td><td>1100001110000100</td><td>C384</td></tr> <tr> <td>\acute{I}</td><td>1100001110001101</td><td>C38D</td></tr> <tr> <td>\times</td><td>1100001110010111</td><td>C397</td></tr> <tr> <td>\div</td><td>1100001110110111</td><td>C3B7</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	\acute{A}	1100001110000001	C381	\ddot{A}	1100001110000100	C384	\acute{I}	1100001110001101	C38D	\times	1100001110010111	C397	\div	1100001110110111	C3B7
\acute{A}	11000001	C1																														
\ddot{A}	11000100	C4																														
\acute{I}	11001101	CD																														
\times	11010111	D7																														
\div	11110111	F7																														
\acute{A}	1100001110000001	C381																														
\ddot{A}	1100001110000100	C384																														
\acute{I}	1100001110001101	C38D																														
\times	1100001110010111	C397																														
\div	1100001110110111	C3B7																														
Page 133	When $\omega_1 = \omega_2$...the Sbox is a ω_1 -bit Sbox	When $\omega_1 = \omega_2$...the Sbox is an ω_1 -bit Sbox																														
Page 139, RSA security	Nevertheless, post-quantum public key cryptosystems are being proposed (see e.g. [HPS98, BS08]) to protect communications after a quantum computer is built.	Nevertheless, post-quantum public key cryptosystems are being proposed (see e.g. [HPS98, BS08]) to protect communications after a sufficiently strong quantum computer is built.																														
Page 160, Example 3.2.4 last sentence	Then $\varphi_0(\mathbf{x}) = 0$.	Then $\varphi_0(0) = 0$.																														
Page 209, last paragraph of Section 4.1.1	Similar to SPA, the attack does not require statistical analysis of the traces, only visual inspection is enough.	The sentence should be removed																														