	Running head: ANALYZING THE PRIVACY PARADOX	1
1	Analyzing the Privacy Paradox Using a Nationally Representative Three-Wave Panel Stud	dy

Abstract 2

The privacy paradox states that people's concerns about online privacy are unrelated to

their online sharing of personal information. On the basis of a representative sample of the

German population, which includes 1403 respondents interviewed at three waves separated

by 6 months, we investigate the privacy paradox from a longitudinal perspective. Using a

cross-lagged panel model with random intercepts, we differentiate between-person relations

from within-person effects. Results revealed that people who were more concerned about

their online privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information and had

substantially more negative attitudes toward information sharing (between-person level). 10

People who were more concerned than usual also shared slightly less information than 11

usual (within-person level). We found no long-term effects of privacy concerns on 12

information sharing or attitudes 6 months later. The results provide further evidence

against the privacy paradox, but more research is needed to better understand potential

causal relations.

Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy concerns, information sharing, longitudinal 16

analysis, structural equation modeling

Word count: 6414 18

Analyzing the Privacy Paradox Using a Nationally Representative Three-Wave Panel Study The privacy paradox states that the information disclosure of Internet users is 20 problematic: Although many people are concerned about their privacy online, they still 21 share plenty of personal information on the web (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags, 2003). The 22 privacy paradox is of considerable interest to society—it is discussed in newspapers (Frean, 23 2017), Wikipedia entries (Wikipedia, 2018), designated websites (New York Public Radio, 2018), books (Trepte and Reinecke, 2011), and top-tier academic journals (Acquisti et al., 2015). If the privacy paradox really exists, it should inspire worry: It would suggest that online behavior is irrational and that people are revealing too much of their personal information, which can cause various problems (e.g., Sevignani, 2016). Understanding why people disclose information online and whether or not this is paradoxical therefore represents an important challenge. 30 However, current research on the privacy paradox has one major limitation. To the 31 best of our knowledge, most empirical studies conducted so far have investigated the 32 privacy paradox from a between-person perspective. By employing empirical tests of relations between people (e.g., cross-sectional questionnaires analyzed with multiple regression or Pearson correlations), studies have analyzed whether people who are more 35 concerned than others also share less personal information than others. Although such a perspective is interesting and represents a viable first step, it cannot make informed claims 37 regarding causality. The privacy paradox, however, implies a causal perspective: Does a 38 person, if he or she becomes more concerned about online privacy, then also share less 39 personal information? This mismatch is problematic because although between-person relations are, except for some special cases, a necessary condition for causal within-person 41 effects, they are by no means a sufficient one. For example, it could be that the between-person relation is determined other third variables. Hence, as the next step in investigating the privacy paradox and to better understand the causal relation between

privacy concerns and information sharing, it is necessary to conduct studies with

within-person designs.

With this study we aim to answer four major questions. First, on a between-person level, how are concerns about online privacy related to the online sharing of personal information? Second, on a within-person level, does information sharing decrease when concerns increase? Third, what are the potential long-term effects? Are changes in concerns related to changes in information sharing 6 months later and/or vice versa? Fourth, what is the role of privacy attitudes, do they mediate the relation between privacy concerns and information sharing? To best answer and contextualize these questions, we first provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of the privacy paradox, after which we present the empirical results of a longitudinal panel study, which is representative of the German population.

56 A Brief History of the Privacy Paradox

Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) were among the first to argue that the online 57 disclosure of personal information is paradoxical. "Experiments reveal that very few individuals actually take any action to protect their personal information, even when doing so involves limited costs" (p.1). Three years later, Barnes (2006) discussed the behavior of young people on SNSs, popularizing the term privacy paradox. Barnes listed six aspects of online behavior that she considered to be particularly paradoxical: (a) illusion of privacy, (b) high quantity of information sharing, (c) attitude behavior discrepancy, (d) lack of privacy concerns, (e) lack of privacy literacy, and (f) fabrication of false information. Norberg et al. (2007) were one of the first to empirically analyze the privacy paradox explicitly. The study found a mismatch between concerns and behavior, which is aligned with several other experimental studies conducted at the time (Beresford et al., 2012; Hann et al., 2007; Huberman et al., 2005). 68 While there are various understandings and operationalizations of the privacy 69 paradox (Kokolakis, 2017), subsequent research focused on Barnes's third tenet, the 70 attitude-behavior discrepancy. Whereas some studies reported that privacy concerns were

not significantly related to the disclosure of personal information (e.g., Gross and Acquisti, 72 2005; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008), which lends credence to the privacy paradox, a 73 different set of studies showed significant relations (e.g., Dienlin and Trepte, 2015; Heirman 74 et al., 2013; Walrave et al., 2012), which refutes the privacy paradox. 75 Notably, in a parallel line of research other studies have also analyzed the relation 76 between privacy concerns and information sharing. However, the term privacy paradox was 77 often not used explicitly. Instead, studies have referred to the so-called privacy calculus, 78 which states that the sharing of personal information online is affected by both the respective costs and the anticipated benefits (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999). By now, 80 several studies have found empirical support for the privacy calculus in various online 81 contexts (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Dienlin and Metzger, 2016; Krasnova et al., 2010). 82 Baruh et al. (2017) published the first empirical meta-analysis on the relations 83 between privacy concerns and various forms of social media use (e.g., information sharing or SNS usage). On the basis of 37 studies, Baruh et al. (2017) found a small and significant statistical relation between concerns about online privacy and online information sharing (r 86 = -.13, 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Another more recent meta analysis by Yu et al. (2020) also 87 finds a significant bivariate relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, albeit smaller (r = -.06, 95% CI [-.01, -.12]). There also exist several systematic literature 89 reviews on the privacy paradox (Barth and Jong, 2017; Gerber et al., 2018; Kokolakis, 90 2017). Kokolakis (2017) come to the conclusion that "the dichotomy between privacy 91 attitude and behaviour should not be considered a paradox anymore." (p. 130) However, 92 the authors also note that the privacy paradox is a "complex phenomenon that has not 93 been fully explained yet". Barth and Jong (2017) are more skeptical, and argue that "attempts to theoretically explain and practically solve the problem of the privacy paradox 95 are still scarce and we feel the subject deserves far more research attention" (p. 1052).

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Defining Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

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the general society through physical or psychological means [...]" (Westin, 1967: 7).
   Privacy captures aspects of both volitional control and social separateness (Bräunlich et
100
    al., 2020; Marwick and boyd, 2014). Several dimensions of privacy have been proposed. For
101
    example, it is possible to distinguish a vertical and a horizontal level (Masur, 2018).
102
    Whereas the vertical level captures privacy from authorities, institutions, or companies,
103
   horizontal privacy addresses privacy from peers, colleagues, or other people. When it comes
104
   to concerns in general, interestingly they do not seem to be established as a stand-alone
105
    theoretical concept in psychology (Colman, 2015). Lexically, concerns are defined as a
106
    "marked interest or regard usually arising through a personal tie or relationship" that also
107
   reflect an "uneasy state of blended interest, uncertainty, and apprehension"
108
    (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Concerns therefore represent both a latent motivation (or
   increased attention), a negatively valenced emotion (or affective condition), and are mostly
110
   implicit. As a theoretical construct, privacy concerns can hence be categorized as an
   affective motivational disposition. As such, there are many similarities with other concepts,
   including emotions (e.g., fear, anxiety), moods (e.g., dismay, fatigue), attitudes (risk
113
   perception, approval), values (e.g., autonomy, freedom), personality traits (e.g.,
114
   introversion, risk avoidance), and even physiological activation (e.g., attention, arousal).
115
    Taken together, concerns about online privacy represent how much an individual is
116
    motivated to focus on his or her control over a voluntary withdrawal from other people or
117
   societal institutions on the Internet, accompanied by an uneasy feeling that his or her
118
    privacy might be threatened.
119
         The online sharing of personal information, on the other hand, captures how much
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    person-related information people share when they use the Internet, including information
121
   about their age, sex, name, address, health, and finances. Information sharing can be
122
   differentiated from communication and self-disclosure. Communication is broad, because it
123
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Privacy is defined as the "[...] voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from

comprises all verbal and nonverbal information that is emitted (e.g., Watzlawick et al.,
2011). Self-disclosure is narrow, because it focuses on deliberate revelations about the true
self to others (e.g., Jourard, 1964). Information sharing is even more specific, because it
addresses only person-related information but ignores other types of self-disclosure such as
personal fears, values, or plans.

129 The Relation Between Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Currently, there is a lack of studies that explicitly analyze how behavior is affected by concerns in general. Fortunately, however, we know much about the behavioral effects of related concepts such as attitudes or fears, which all can affect behavior, sometimes profoundly (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010; Rogers, 1983). Emotions, perhaps the concept most closely related to concerns, have a particularly strong effect on behavior. By causing fight, flight, or freeze reactions, they are a primordial trigger of behavior and are considered to be an adaptive mechanism of evolved species (Dolan, 2002).

Also empirically, concerns have been shown to affect behavior. People more concerned about the environment show more environment-related behaviors (Bamberg, 2003). People more concerned about their appearance consume fewer calories (Hayes and Ross, 1987). People more concerned about their bodies engage in more physical exercise (Reel et al., 2007). Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that also concerns about online privacy should somehow reflect in the online sharing of personal information.

At the same time, there are some factors that likely diminish the relation. Most prominently, there is the so-called *attitude behavior gap* (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), which states that people sometimes act against their own attitudes. Evidently, not everyone concerned about their physical health exercises regularly. The explanation is simple: Other factors such as subjective norms and perceived behavioral control also determine behavior (Ajzen, 1985), which automatically reduces the impact of attitudes or concerns.

Specifically, two of the most influential factors that affect online information sharing are

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(a) strong subjective norms (Heirman et al., 2013) and (b) expected benefits (Krasnova et 150 al., 2010). In other words, users often prioritize social support, special offers, or improved 151 services, accepting that their privacy will be diminished. Trepte et al. (2014) listed several 152 factors that can additionally attenuate the relation: lack of strength of concerns, absence of 153 negative personal experiences, or situational constraints due to social desirability. In 154 conclusion, also in the context of the privacy paradox it not reasonable to expect a perfect 155 relation between attitudes and behaviors. However, we should still expect to find a relation 156 that is *small* or *moderate*. 157

There are also some methodological explanations as to why some studies did not 158 detect statistically significant relations. Researchers are always confronted with the 159 so-called *Duhem-Quine problem*, according to which it is impossible to test theories in 160 isolation, because empirical tests always rely on auxiliary assumptions (Dienes, 2008). In other words, if a psychological experiment fails, we do not know whether the theory is 162 wrong or the questionnaire subpar. This tenet is particularly relevant for the privacy 163 paradox: Detecting statistical significance for small effects—and, again, we should expect 164 to find small effects—is more challenging because it means that large samples are necessary 165 to guarantee sufficient statistical power. Precisely, in order to be capable of detecting a 166 correlation between privacy concerns and information sharing in 95% of all cases, which 167 Baruh et al. (2017) estimated to be r = -.13, we need a sample of N = 762 people. The 168 reality, however, looks different: In their meta-analysis, Baruh et al. (2017) reported a 169 median sample size of N=300, which can explain why several studies did not find 170 significant effects. 171

In conclusion, in line with prior research and the within-person rationales presented above, we expect to find a small significant relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, both on the between-person level and the within-person level.

¹ Statistical power describes the probability of statistically detecting an effect that exists empirically. Only with high statistical power is it possible to make valid claims about an effect's existence (Cohen, 1992).

Hypothesis 1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also be less likely to share personal information online than others.

Hypothesis 2: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also share less personal information online than they usually do.

179 Long-Term Perspective

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Although short-term effects are likely, it is still unclear whether long-term effects 180 exist as well. First, when analyzing potential long-term effects, it is important to choose an 181 interval that is both plausible and relevant. (It makes a large difference whether the effects 182 of alcohol consumption on driving performance are tested after say 1 minute, 1 hour, or 1 183 day.) One factor that determines an interval's optimal length is the stability of the 184 variables (Dormann and Griffin, 2015). Privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 185 predominantly trait-like constructs with high stabilities, which is why they necessitate 186 longer intervals. Other studies with comparable research questions have therefore used an 187 interval of 6 months (e.g., Valkenburg and Peter, 2009), which we adopt also in this study. 188 In general, we believe that it should be possible to find long-term effects. It has been 189 argued that privacy concerns affect privacy behavior in the long run (e.g., Heirman et al., 2013). The underlying theoretical mechanism could be that the emotional part of privacy 191 concerns causes (a) motivated information selection and (b) motivated information 192 processing, which is likely to change actual behavior (Nabi, 1999). Specifically, when 193 privacy concerns increase (e.g., because of experienced or witnessed privacy infringements), 194 people might begin reading more media articles on privacy issues and might also consume 195 these articles more carefully, which could prompt information sharing practices that are 196 more cautious. Also empirically, a study with 290 participants found small negative 197 longitudinal (between-person) relations between privacy concerns and self-disclosure 198 (Koohikamali et al., 2019). 199

At the same time, the adverse effect seems plausible as well, with two potential

outcomes. On the one hand, the long-term relation could be positive: If people start to 201 share more information online, they might become increasingly aware that their privacy is 202 at risk, thereby stirring concern (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). On the other hand, the 203 long-term relation might also be negative: When people share more personal information 204 online they might become accustomed to doing so, which potentially reduces concern (for 205 example, due to the mere exposure effect; Zajonc, 1968). Finally, there could also be no 206 long-term relation at all: People might have already become used to sharing information 207 online, which stifles further cognitive or emotional processing. This rationale is central to 208 so-called *privacy cynicism* (e.g., Hoffmann et al., 2016). 209

Research Question 1.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 1.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

14 The Role of Attitudes

It has been argued that privacy attitudes could bridge the gap between concerns and 215 information sharing (e.g., Dienlin and Trepte, 2015). In contrast to privacy concerns, privacy attitudes capture a more explicit, fluctuating cognitive appraisal (Tsay-Vogel et al., 217 2018). Although both variables are related to information disclosure, attitudes are likely the better predictor. This reasoning follows the rational choice paradigm (Simon, 1955), 219 which maintains that behavior is always at least partially influenced by convictions, 220 attitudes, and cost-benefit analyses. Also empirically, a study of 1,042 youths from 221 Belgium found that the relation between privacy attitudes and disclosure of personal 222 information was strong (r = .56), whereas the relation between privacy concerns and 223 disclosure was only moderate (r = -.29; Heirman et al., 2013). 224 Hypothesis 3.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than 225 others will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal 226

227 information than others.

Hypothesis 3.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others will also share more information online than others.

Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually do.

Hypothesis 4.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually have will also share more information online than they usually do.

Concerning the potential long-term relations of privacy attitudes, we are confronted
with the same situation mentioned above. Because we are not aware of research on
long-term relations, several scenarios seem plausible. Attitudes could either have long-term
relations or not, and information sharing could either foster privacy attitudes or diminish
them.

Research Question 2.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 2.2: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

Research Question 3.1: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 3.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

249 Method

250 Statistics

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We follow the recommendation by Lakens, Adolfi, et al. (2018) and first justify the choice of our alpha level. We determined adequate error margins by considering the

potential implications of both false positive and false negative findings (i.e., alpha and beta 253 errors): On the one hand, if we committed an alpha error, we would wrongfully conclude 254 that people's concerns and behaviors are consistent. Communicating such a false result to 255 the public might unjustly reassure people when they should be more alert. On the other 256 hand, if we committed a beta error, we would wrongfully conclude that individuals behave 257 paradoxically. Communicating such a false result would unjustly accuse people of 258 implausible behavior, potentially causing unnecessary distress or reactance. We consider 259 both errors to be equally detrimental. Hence, we chose balanced error rates, setting a 260 maximum error rate of 5% for both alpha and beta. As the smallest effect size of interest 261 (SESOI; Lakens, Scheel, et al., 2018), we chose to consider effects that are at least small 262 (i.e., standardized coefficients above $\beta = .10$; Cohen, 1992) as able to offer empirical 263 support for our theoretical hypotheses. Significantly smaller effects were not considered able to offer support. The six hypotheses were tested with a one-tailed approach and the 265 six research questions with a two-tailed approach. On the basis of the balanced alpha-beta 266 approach with a maximum error probability of 5%, a desired power of 95%, and an SESOI 267 of $\beta = .10$, we calculated a minimum sample size of 1,293 respondents. Given the final 268 sample size of 1,403 respondents (see below), alpha and beta errors were balanced for our 269 hypotheses (research questions) when we used a critical alpha of 3\% (4.20\%), resulting in a 270 power of 97% (95.80%) to detect small effects. 271 The data were analyzed using of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model 272 (RI-CLPM, Hamaker et al., 2015). For a visualization, see Figure 1. Note that in contrast 273 to regular cross-lagged panel models (CLPMs), RI-CLPMs can separate between-person 274 variance from within-person variance. We used factor scores as observed variables to 275 represent the variables' latent structure more closely. We tested H1, H3.1, and H3.2 by 276 correlating the random intercepts, which represent the respondents' individual mean scores 277 across all three waves. We tested H2, H4.1, and H4.2 by correlating the respondents' 278 within-person variance at T1, which captures their specific deviation at T1 from their 279




Figure 1. Visual representation of the estimated random-intercept cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM).

overall score. We tested all research questions by regressing variables on all other measures 280 obtained 6 months earlier. Given that we had three points of measurement, this resulted in 281 two estimates for each research question. As we did not assume longitudinal effects to 282 differ across time, they were constrained to be equal across all waves, which produces one 283 single general measure of each effect instead of two time-specific ones. (We later tested this assumption empirically. As expected, the model with constrained effects did not show significantly reduced model fit, $\chi^2(9) = .114$, p = 14.25, which supports that effects did not 286 change over time.) Fit was assessed according to the common criteria as described by Kline 287 (2016). The final model fit the data well, $\chi^2(15) = 25.18$, p = .048, cfi = 1.00, rmsea = .02, 288 90% CI [< .01, .04], srmr = .01.289 For the analyses, we used R (Version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2018) and the R-packages 290 GGally (Version 1.4.0; Schloerke et al., 2018), qqplot2 (Version 3.2.1; Wickham, 2016), 291 lavaan (Version 0.6.5; Rosseel, 2012), MissMech (Version 1.0.2; Jamshidian et al., 2014), 292 MVN (Version 5.8; Korkmaz et al., 2014), psych (Version 1.9.12.31; Revelle, 2018), pwr 293

(Version 1.2.2; Champely, 2018), sem Tools (Version 0.5.2; Jorgensen et al., 2018), and 294 sistats (Version 0.17.9; Lüdecke, 2019). The code, additional analyses, and a reproducible 295 version of this manuscript can be found on the manuscript's companion website at 296 https://xmtra.github.io/privacy-paradox/. 297

Procedure and Respondents 298

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This study is part of a large-scale project which investigates the development of 299 privacy and self-disclosure, including several other variables. Other publications linked to 300 the project can be accessed at [link blinded during review]. The data come from a 301 longitudinal paper-and-pencil questionnaire study, in which a representative sample of the 302 German population (16 years and older) was surveyed on overall five occasions. The data 303 can be downloaded from [link blinded during review]. 304 The first three waves were collected from May 2014 to May 2015, with intervals of 6 305 months each. The last two waves were collected on May 2016 and May 2017, and had an 306 interval of one year. Because we hypothesized the effects to take place across half a year, 307 the last two waves were not included in the analyses presented here. First, a sample of 14,714 potential respondents was drawn from a representative omnibus survey in Germany (ADM master sample), using a random last-two-digit dialing procedure. In this CATI 310 screening, 5,286 respondents agreed to participate in all following waves. Wave 1 was 311 completed by 3,278 respondents (response rate: 38%), Wave 2 by 2,448 respondents 312 (attrition rate: 25%), and Wave 3 by 2,021 respondents (attrition rate: 17%). We filtered 313 respondents who never used the Internet at all waves, answered fewer than 50% of the 314 items in each scale for at least one wave, provided inconsistent birth-dates across 315 measurements, or did not report sociodemographic variables. The final sample consisted of 316 n = 1,403 respondents. 317 In the final sample, the rate of missing data was 5.40%. Visual inspection of the 318 missing value patterns as well as the non-parametric test by Jamshidian et al. (2014)

suggested that all missing values could be considered missing at random (p = .514).

Therefore, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation was conducted using all
available data. The average age was 54 years (SD = 15 years), and 49% were male. About
39% reported that they had graduated from college.

324 Measures

We tested the factorial validity of all measures using confirmatory factor analysis 325 (CFA). Each CFA included the items from all three waves. For each item, factor loadings 326 were constrained to be equal across waves. Constrained and unconstrained models were 327 compared using χ^2 differences tests. All results were nonsignificant, suggesting longitudinal 328 factorial invariance. The measures showed good composite reliability in all three waves. 329 Graphical displays of the variables' distributions showed that privacy concerns were skewed 330 to the left, privacy attitudes were normally distributed, and information sharing was 331 skewed to the right (Figure 2, diagonal). We calculated intra-class correlation coefficients 332 to quantify how much variance in the variables' factor scores could be attributed to 333 between-person differences. An English translation of the original German items can be 334 found in the OSM. 335

Concerns about online privacy. Privacy concerns were measured as a 336 second-order factor. Three items captured the vertical dimension (e.g., "How concerned are 337 you that institutions or intelligence services collect and analyze data that you disclosed on 338 the Internet?"), and three items captured the horizontal dimension (e.g., "How concerned 339 are you that people that you do not know might obtain information about you because of 340 you online activities?"). Respondents rated all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not 341 at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned). The means were $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,\,M_{\rm t3}=$ 342 3.59, and the standard deviations $SD_{t1} = 0.88$, $SD_{t2} = 0.89$, and $SD_{t3} = 0.90$. The 343 two-dimensional model fit the data well, $\chi^2(118) = 661.17$, p < .001, cfi = .97, rmsea = .06, 344 90% CI [.05, .06], srmr = .04. The reliability was high ($\omega_{\rm t1} = .95, \, \omega_{\rm t2} = .96, \, \omega_{\rm t3} = .97$). 345

Overall, 73.85% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons.

The online sharing of personal information. To measure respondent's level of 347 information disclosure, they were asked how often they disclosed 10 different pieces of 348 information on the Internet. The exact question was: "How often do you disclose the 349 following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" Each item was answered on a 350 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Factor analyses suggested a second-order 351 factor structure with five first-order factors of two items each. The first first-order factor 352 subsumed financial and medical information, the second first and last name, the third place 353 of residence and street (including house number), the fourth email address and phone 354 number, and the fifth information about education and current job. The means were $M_{\rm t1}$ 355 = 2.12, $M_{\rm t2}$ = 2.13, $M_{\rm t3}$ = 2.10, and the standard deviations $SD_{\rm t1}$ = 0.66, $SD_{\rm t2}$ = 0.64, 356 and $SD_{t3} = 0.61$. The model fit the data adequately, $\chi^2(375) = 2527.69$, p < .001, cfi = 357 .95, rmsea = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .06. The reliability was high ($\omega_{\rm t1}$ = .91, $\omega_{\rm t2}$ = .92, $\omega_{\rm t3}$ = .91). Overall, 64.29% of the measure's variance was explained by differences 359 between persons. 360

Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents' 361 attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were captured with 10 items that 362 measured the general appraisal of disclosing the same 10 pieces of information. Adhering to 363 the principle of compatibility (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010), the items were parallel to those 364 of the actual disclosure scale. Specifically, we asked: "Do you think that it is sensible to 365 disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" The scale ranged 366 from 1 (not at all sensible) to 5 (very sensible). The means were $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,$ 367 $M_{\rm t3}=3.59$, and the standard deviations $SD_{\rm t1}=0.88$, $SD_{\rm t2}=0.89$, and $SD_{\rm t3}=0.90$. The 368 second-order model with five first-order factors showed an adequate model fit, $\chi^2(375) =$ 369 2683.43, p < .001, cfi = .93, rmsea = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .08. The reliability was 370 high ($\omega_{\rm t1} = .88$, $\omega_{\rm t2} = .89$, $\omega_{\rm t3} = .87$). Overall, 59.19% of the measure's variance was 371 explained by differences between persons. 372

Results

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In a first descriptive step, we analyzed the variables' bivariate relations. All variables
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   associated with the hypotheses showed correlations that were in line with our theoretical
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   rationales (Figure 2, above the diagonal).
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         Hypothesis 1 predicted that people reporting higher concerns about online privacy
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    than others would also be less likely to share personal information online than others.
378
    Results revealed that the random intercepts of the two variables were significantly
379
   correlated (\beta = -.09, b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.01], z = -2.57, p = .005). Hence,
380
   respondents who—on average across all three waves—were more concerned about their
381
   privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information online. The effect was
382
   small. When looking at the standardized effect's confidence interval (i.e., \beta = -.09, 95% CI
383
    [-.15, -.02]), it was not significantly smaller than our SESOI of beta = .10. Thus,
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   Hypothesis 1 was supported.
385
         Hypothesis 2 proposed that if people perceived more concerns about their online
386
   privacy than they usually do, they would also share less personal information online than
387
   they usually do. Results revealed a small significant correlation (\beta = -.10, b = -0.02, 95%
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   CI [-0.03, > -0.01], z = -2.37, p = .009), suggesting that if respondents were more
389
   concerned about their online privacy at T1 than usual, they also shared less personal
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   information online at T1 than usual. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 2.
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         With Research Question 1.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relation of concerns about
392
    online privacy and the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. No significant
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   lagged effect across 6 months was found (\beta = .01, b = 0.01, 95\% CI [-0.05, 0.07], z = 0.41,
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   p = .683). With Research Question 1.2, we investigated the longitudinal relation of the
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   online sharing of personal information and concerns about online privacy 6 months later,
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   again revealing no significant effect (\beta = -.03, b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.04], z = -0.80, p
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    = .422).
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Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that people who perceived more privacy concerns than

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


Figure 2. Results of the bivariate relations. Above the diagonal: zero-order correlation matrix; diagonal: density plots for each variable; below the diagonal: bivariate scatter plots for zero-order correlations. Solid regression lines represent linear regressions, dashed regression lines represent quadratic regressions. Calculated with the variables' latent factor scores.

- 400 others would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal
- 401 information than others. The results revealed a medium-sized negative correlation between
- the two variables on the between-person level ($\beta = -.31$, b = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.08], z

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= -8.46, p < .001). Thus, people who—on average across all three waves—reported being
403
   more concerned about their online privacy relative to the rest of the sample, were also
404
   substantially more likely to hold a more negative attitude toward the online sharing of
405
   personal information. The results therefore supported Hypothesis 3.1. Hypothesis 3.2
406
   stated that people who held more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal
407
   information than others would also share more personal information online than others.
408
    Results showed a very strong between-person correlation between the two variables (\beta =
409
    .66, b = 0.15, 95\% CI [0.13, 0.17], z = 15.12, p < .001). In other words, when averaged
410
   across all three waves, if people had more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of
411
   personal information than others, they were much more likely to actually share personal
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   information online. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 3.2.
413
         Hypothesis 4.1 proposed that people who perceived more privacy concerns than usual
414
   would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information
415
   than usual. The results did not reveal a significant effect (\beta = -.06, b = -0.01, 95% CI
416
   [-0.03, < 0.01], z = -1.38, p = .084). Hypothesis 4.2 proposed that people who held more
417
    positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual would also
418
   share more personal information online than usual. Results showed a moderate
419
   within-person correlation between the two variables (\beta = .15, b = 0.03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05],
420
    z = 4.01, p < .001), which indicates that when respondents had more positive attitudes at
421
   T1 than usual, they also shared more personal information than usual. In conclusion, the
422
   results supported Hypothesis 4.2.
423
         With Research Question 2.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relations of concerns about
424
   online privacy and positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. No
425
   significant effect was found (\beta = -.02, b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06], z = -0.47, p = .641).
426
   Regarding Research Question 2.2, again no significant longitudinal relations emerged
427
   between privacy attitudes and privacy concerns 6 months later (\beta < .01, b < 0.01, 95\% CI
428
    [-0.06, 0.06], z = 0.06, p = .951).
429
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Research Question 3.1 asked whether changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information would affect changes in personal information sharing 6 months later. No significant effect was found ($\beta > -.01$, b > -0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.05], z = -0.07, p = .947). Next, Research Question 3.2 asked whether changes in the online sharing of personal information would affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. Again, no significant effect was found ($\beta = .04$, b = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.11], z = 1.15, p = .249).

Table 1 presents an overview of all results.

437

438 Discussion

Most research on the privacy paradox suggests a significant small effect of privacy
concerns on the online sharing of personal information (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017). However,
whereas the theoretical premise of the privacy paradox addresses a within-person effect,
most empirical studies have analyzed only between-person relations. On the basis of a
representative sample of the German population, from which three waves of data separated
by 6 months were collected, we hence analyzed the privacy paradox by differentiating
general between-person relations, short-term within-person relations, as well as long-term
within-person effects. Together, this approach allows for informed inferences about the
variables' causal relationship.

The results of the between-person analyses showed that people who were more 448 concerned about their privacy than others were slightly less likely to share personal 449 information. In addition, people who were more concerned about their privacy than others 450 also held substantially more negative attitudes toward disclosing personal information 451 online. Notably, we found a very strong between-person correlation between attitudes 452 toward information sharing and actual information sharing, which shows that typical 453 online disclosure can be predicted precisely by a person's attitude. Taken together, the 454 cross-sectional results are in line with the extant literature: The between-person correlation 455

Table 1

Parameter Estimates Obtained in the Random-Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model

		95% CI			
Effect	b	11	ul	beta	p
Between-person correlations across all waves					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	09	.005
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.11	-0.14	-0.08	31	< .001
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.15	0.13	0.17	.66	< .001
Within-person correlations at T1					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.02	-0.03	> -0.01	10	.009
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.01	-0.03	< 0.01	06	.084
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.03	0.02	0.05	.15	< .001
Within-person effects across 6 months					
Privacy concern -> information sharing	0.01	-0.05	0.07	.01	.683
Information sharing -> privacy concern	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	03	.422
Privacy concern -> positive attitude	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	02	.641
Positive attitude -> privacy concern	< 0.01	-0.06	0.06	< .01	.951
Positive attitude -> information sharing	> -0.01	-0.06	0.05	>01	.947
Information sharing -> positive attitude	0.04	-0.03	0.11	.04	.249

Note. The between-person correlations represent interpersonal relations. For example, results showed that people who were more concerned than others, averaged across all three waves, also shared less information than others. The within-person parameters reflect how intrapersonal changes in one variable are related to intra-personal changes in another. For example, results showed that if a person was more concerned at T1 than usual, they also shared less information than usual.

of privacy concerns and information sharing found in this study (i.e., $\beta = -.08$) fall within the 95% confidence interval of the effect reported by Baruh et al. (2017) (i.e., r = -.13, 95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Note that the between-person correlations reported here represent averaged measurements across three waves, which makes the findings more robust than typical one-shot measures. In conclusion, this study suggests that the privacy paradox does not exist on a between-person level. The differences between people with regard to their online

between-person level. The differences between people with regard to their online information sharing behavior can be explained by differences in their privacy concerns to a small extent, and by differences in their privacy attitudes to a large extent. The more specific we become, the better we can explain online behavior: Whereas privacy concerns are related only weakly to online information sharing (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017), more specific risks perceptions are related to behavior more closely (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Yu et al., 2020), whereas behavioral attitudes are the best predictors (Dienlin and Trepte, 2015).

The within-person results showed that when a person's privacy concerns increased,
the same person also shared slightly less information online than usual. Moreover, people
who developed more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information
than usual, also shared substantially more personal information online. Together, changes
in concerns and attitudes are therefore related to changes in behavior, which speaks against
the privacy paradox also on the within-person level.

We did not find any long-term effects, however. Changes in both privacy concerns 475 and attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information were not related to any 476 meaningful changes in the online sharing of personal information 6 months later (and vice 477 versa). As an explanation, it might be the case that changes in privacy concern affect 478 information sharing more immediately. To test this assumption, we would need studies 479 with shorter intervals (Keijsers, 2016). Moreover, given that the directions of most 480 longitudinal relations were in line with the between-person and within-person relations, 481 longitudinal effects might indeed take place, but only that they are very small. Of course, 482

it could also be that longterm longitudinal effects do not exist.

484 Limitations

Some of the effect sizes reported in this study are potentially not large enough to 485 refute the privacy paradox completely. On the one hand, they could be a manifestation of 486 the so-called "crud factor" (Meehl, 1990: 204), which states that all psychosocial measures 487 are related to one another to some extent. On the other hand, other factors such as 488 expected benefits might play a more important role (Dienlin and Metzger, 2016). In 489 conclusion, although our results suggest that privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 490 correlated with information sharing, the importance of privacy concerns should not be 491 exaggerated. The effects could be larger, and other variables play a role as well. 492 In this study we measured information sharing using self-reports. However, 493 self-reports of frequent and routine behaviors are often imprecise and unreliable (Scharkow, 494 2016). This represents a profound limitation of our study. Whenever possible, future 495 studies should aim to collect objective observations of behavior. 496 Finally, please note that the hypotheses presented in this study were not formally 497 preregistered. At the time when the study was conceived in 2014, we were not yet aware of the importance of preregistration.

500 Future Research

Evidence of within-person longitudinal effects is still missing. Although we found significant within-person correlations at T1, they were absent across the 6-month intervals. Together, this suggests that longitudinal effects might exist, but that they take place on a different time interval. Future research could hence probe different intervals. For theoretical reasons (e.g., due to availability heuristics), it is plausible to use short intervals; for statistical reasons (e.g., because of the high stability of privacy concerns), it would also make sense to test longer intervals (Dormann and Griffin, 2015).

Although we argue that in most circumstances privacy concerns and behavior should correlate modestly, the exact extent depends on a many boundary conditions. Future research should hence explicitly analyze different contexts and situations. Building on Kokolakis (2017), we suggest to analyze the following boundary conditions:

- Context (e.g., professional, social, commercial, or health-related);
- Situation (e.g., new, habitualized, or unexpected);
- Mood (e.g., positive vs. negative);
- Extent of control (high vs. low);

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- Type of information processing applied (implicit, heuristic, or peripheral vs. explicit, analytic, or central);
- Existence of bias (e.g., overconfidence, optimism, comparative optimism, or hyperbolic discounting);
- Type of information (e.g., sensitive vs. superficial, biographic, or person-related);
 - Benefit immediacy and risk diffusion (high vs. low).

Specifically, we encourage analyzing privacy behaviors also from a situational perspective, accounting for temporal needs, interpersonal perceptions, contextual cues, or characteristics of communication channels (Masur, 2018). For example, whereas general levels of information sharing are likely best explained by using privacy concerns, situational information sharing might be best explained by using privacy heuristics (Sundar et al., 2013).

Next to these theory-related boundary conditions there are also methodological ones:

- Analysis design (e.g., theoretical, experimental, questionnaire-based, interview-based, or anecdotal);
- Quality of measurement (high vs. low; low quality less likely to detect statistical significance);
 - Sample size (small vs. large; small samples less likely to detect statistical significance);

- Statistical analysis (e.g., SEM vs. Regression; analyses without error control less 534 likely to find statistical significance); 535
 - Operationalization (e.g., concerns vs. risk perceptions vs. behavioral attitudes; the more specific, the stronger the relation).

We emphasize that when analyzing the privacy paradox we are likely dealing with 538 small effects (Baruh et al., 2017). Hence, to detect these small effects reliably we need large 539 samples. This is often not the case (Baruh et al., 2017). In conclusion, it is crucial to use 540 statistical designs that allow for sufficient statistical power. 541

Conclusion 542

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Being able to show that online behaviors are not paradoxical can be socially relevant. 543 Consider the similar case of fear appeals and protective behavior, where there is also only a 544 small correlation (Witte and Allen, 2000). However, fear appeals are used in public 545 campaigns nonetheless, oftentimes to much success (Wakefield et al., 2010). Likewise, 546 proclaiming that the online sharing of personal information is not paradoxical and that 547 concerns about online privacy matter, could lead to more cautious and reflective behavior. 548 It is probably no coincidence that the General Data Protection Regulation, which 549 strengthens the privacy rights of consumers, was passed in Europe, where privacy concerns 550 are particularly pronounced (European Commission, 2015). In sum, this study showed that when people were more concerned about their privacy, they also shared a little less personal information about themselves online. If 553 respondents considered sharing personal information to be insensible, they disclosed 554 substantially less information. Together, these findings do not support the existence of a 555 privacy paradox, at least in this particular context and operationalization. No evidence of

long-term effects was found, however. Further research is needed to understand the

potential causal interplay of concerns, attitudes, and behavior.

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