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1	Analyzing the Privacy Paradox Using a Nationally Representative Three-Wave Panel Stud	dy

2 Abstract

The privacy paradox states that people's concerns about online privacy are unrelated to

their online sharing of personal information. On the basis of a representative sample of the

5 German population, which includes 1403 respondents who were interviewed at three waves

6 separated by 6 months, we investigate the privacy paradox from a longitudinal perspective.

Using a cross-lagged panel model with random intercepts, we differentiate between-person

relations from within-person effects. Results revealed that people who were more concerned

about their online privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information and

10 had substantially more negative attitudes toward information sharing (between-person

level). People who were more concerned than usual also shared slightly less information

than usual (within-person level). We found no long-term effects of privacy concerns on

information sharing or attitudes 6 months later. The results provide further evidence

against the privacy paradox, but more research is needed to better understand the

variables' potential causal relations.

16 Keywords: privacy paradox, privacy concerns, information sharing, longitudinal

analysis, structural equation modeling

Word count: 6459

Analyzing the Privacy Paradox Using a Nationally Representative Three-Wave Panel Study The privacy paradox states that the information disclosure of Internet users is 20 problematic: Although many people are concerned about their privacy online, they still 21 share plenty of personal information on the web (e.g., Acquisti & Grossklags, 2003). The 22 privacy paradox is of considerable interest to society—it is discussed in newspapers (Frean, 23 2017), Wikipedia entries (Wikipedia, 2018), designated websites (New York Public Radio, 2018), books (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011), and top-tier academic journals (Acquisti, 25 Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). If the privacy paradox really exists, it should inspire worry: It would suggest that online behavior is irrational and that people are revealing too 27 much of their personal information, which can cause various problems (e.g., Sevignani, 2016). Understanding why people disclose information online and whether or not this is paradoxical therefore represents an important challenge. 30 However, current research on the privacy paradox has one major limitation. To the 31 best of our knowledge, most empirical studies conducted so far have investigated the 32 privacy paradox from a between-person perspective. By employing empirical tests of relations between people (e.g., cross-sectional questionnaires analyzed with multiple regression or Pearson correlations), studies have analyzed whether people who are more 35 concerned than others also share less personal information than others. Although such a perspective is interesting and represents a viable first step, it cannot make informed claims 37 regarding causality. The privacy paradox, however, implies a causal perspective: Does a 38 person, if he or she becomes more concerned about online privacy, then also share less 39 personal information? This mismatch is problematic because although between-person relations are, except for some special cases, a necessary condition for causal within-person 41 effects, they are by no means a sufficient one. For example, it could be that the between-person relation is determined other third variables. Hence, as the next step in investigating the privacy paradox and to better understand the causal relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, it is necessary to conduct studies with

within-person designs.

With this study we aim to answer four major questions. First, on a between-person level, how are concerns about online privacy related to the online sharing of personal information? Second, on a within-person level, does information sharing decrease when concerns increase? Third, what are the potential long-term effects? Are changes in concerns related to changes in information sharing 6 months later and/or vice versa? Fourth, what is the role of privacy attitudes, do they mediate the relation between privacy concerns and information sharing? To best answer and contextualize these questions, we first provide an in-depth theoretical analysis of the privacy paradox, after which we present the empirical results of a longitudinal panel study, which is representative of the German population.

56 A Brief History of the Privacy Paradox

Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) were among the first to argue that the online 57 disclosure of personal information is paradoxical. "Experiments reveal that very few individuals actually take any action to protect their personal information, even when doing so involves limited costs" (p.1). Three years later, Barnes (2006) discussed the behavior of young people on SNSs, popularizing the term privacy paradox. Barnes listed six aspects of online behavior that she considered to be particularly paradoxical: (a) illusion of privacy, (b) high quantity of information sharing, (c) attitude behavior discrepancy, (d) lack of privacy concerns, (e) lack of privacy literacy, and (f) fabrication of false information. Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) were one of the first to empirically analyze the privacy paradox explicitly. The study found a mismatch between concerns and behavior, which is aligned with several other experimental studies conducted at the time (Beresford, Kübler, 67 & Preibusch, 2012; Hann, Hui, Lee, & Png, 2007; Huberman, Adar, & Fine, 2005). 68 While there are various understandings and operationalizations of the privacy 69 paradox (Kokolakis, 2017), subsequent research focused on Barnes's third tenet, the 70 attitude-behavior discrepancy. Whereas some studies reported that privacy concerns were

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not significantly related to the disclosure of personal information (e.g., Gross & Acquisti,
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   2005; Taddicken, 2014; Tufekci, 2008), which lends credence to the privacy paradox, a
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   different set of studies showed significant relations (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Heirman,
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   Walrave, & Ponnet, 2013; Walrave, Vanwesenbeeck, & Heirman, 2012), which refutes the
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   privacy paradox.
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         Notably, in a parallel line of research other studies have also analyzed the relation
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   between privacy concerns and information sharing. However, the term privacy paradox was
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   often not used explicitly. Instead, studies have referred to the so-called privacy calculus,
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   which states that the sharing of personal information online is affected by both the
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   respective costs and the anticipated benefits (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). By now, several
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   studies have found empirical support for the privacy calculus in various online contexts
   (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva, &
   Hildebrand, 2010).
        Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017) published the first empirical meta-analysis on
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   the relations between privacy concerns and various forms of social media use (e.g.,
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   information sharing or SNS usage). On the basis of 37 studies, Baruh et al. (2017) found a
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   small and significant statistical relation between concerns about online privacy and online
   information sharing (r = -.13, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.07, -.18]). Another more recent meta analysis by
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   Yu, Li, He, Wang, and Jiao (2020) also finds a significant bivariate relation between
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   privacy concerns and information sharing, albeit smaller (r = -.06, 95\% CI [-.01, -.12]).
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   There also exist several systematic literature reviews on the privacy paradox (Barth &
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   Jong, 2017; Gerber, Gerber, & Volkamer, 2018; Kokolakis, 2017). Kokolakis (2017) come to
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   the conclusion that "the dichotomy between privacy attitude and behaviour should not be
   considered a paradox anymore." (p. 130) However, the authors also note that the privacy
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   paradox is a "complex phenomenon that has not been fully explained yet". Barth and Jong
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   (2017) are more skeptical, and argue that "attempts to theoretically explain and practically
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   solve the problem of the privacy paradox are still scarce and we feel the subject deserves
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99 far more research attention" (p. 1052).

Defining Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Privacy is defined as the "[...] voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a person from 101 the general society through physical or psychological means [...]" (Westin, 1967, p. 7). 102 Privacy captures aspects of both volitional control and social separateness (Bräunlich et 103 al., 2020; Marwick & boyd, 2014). Several dimensions of privacy have been proposed. For 104 example, it is possible to distinguish a vertical and a horizontal level (Masur, 2018). 105 Whereas the vertical level captures privacy from authorities, institutions, or companies, 106 horizontal privacy addresses privacy from peers, colleagues, or other people. When it comes 107 to concerns in general, interestingly they do not seem to be established as a stand-alone 108 theoretical concept in psychology (Colman, 2015). Lexically, concerns are defined as a 109 "marked interest or regard usually arising through a personal tie or relationship" that also 110 reflect an "uneasy state of blended interest, uncertainty, and apprehension" 111 (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Concerns therefore represent both a latent motivation (or 112 increased attention), a negatively valenced *emotion* (or affective condition), and are mostly 113 implicit. As a theoretical construct, privacy concerns can hence be categorized as an affective motivational disposition. As such, there are many similarities with other concepts, 115 including emotions (e.g., fear, anxiety), moods (e.g., dismay, fatigue), attitudes (risk 116 perception, approval), values (e.g., autonomy, freedom), personality traits (e.g., 117 introversion, risk avoidance), and even physiological activation (e.g., attention, arousal). 118 Taken together, concerns about online privacy represent how much an individual is 119 motivated to focus on his or her control over a voluntary withdrawal from other people or 120 societal institutions on the Internet, accompanied by an uneasy feeling that his or her 121 privacy might be threatened. 122 The online sharing of personal information, on the other hand, captures how much 123 person-related information people share when they use the Internet, including information 124

about their age, sex, name, address, health, and finances. Information sharing can be
differentiated from communication and self-disclosure. Communication is broad, because it
comprises all verbal and nonverbal information that is emitted (e.g., Watzlawick, Bavelas,
Jackson, & O'Hanlon, 2011). Self-disclosure is narrow, because it focuses on deliberate
revelations about the true self to others (e.g., Jourard, 1964). Information sharing is even
more specific, because it addresses only person-related information but ignores other types
of self-disclosure such as personal fears, values, or plans.

132 The Relation Between Privacy Concerns and Information Sharing

Currently, there is a lack of studies that explicitly analyze how behavior is affected by

concerns in general. Fortunately, however, we know much about the behavioral effects of

related concepts such as attitudes or fears, which all can affect behavior, sometimes

profoundly (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; Rogers, 1983). Emotions, perhaps the concept most

closely related to concerns, have a particularly strong effect on behavior. By causing fight,

flight, or freeze reactions, they are a primordial trigger of behavior and are considered to be

an adaptive mechanism of evolved species (Dolan, 2002).

Also empirically, concerns have been shown to affect behavior. People more concerned about the environment show more environment-related behaviors (Bamberg, 2003). People more concerned about their appearance consume fewer calories (Hayes & Ross, 1987). People more concerned about their bodies engage in more physical exercise (Reel et al., 2007). Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that also concerns about online privacy should somehow reflect in the online sharing of personal information.

At the same time, there are some factors that likely diminish the relation. Most prominently, there is the so-called *attitude behavior gap* (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), which states that people sometimes act against their own attitudes. Evidently, not everyone concerned about their physical health exercises regularly. The explanation is simple: Other factors such as subjective norms and perceived behavioral control also determine behavior

(Ajzen, 1985), which automatically reduces the impact of attitudes or concerns. 151 Specifically, two of the most influential factors that affect online information sharing are 152 (a) strong subjective norms (Heirman et al., 2013) and (b) expected benefits (Krasnova et 153 al., 2010). In other words, users often prioritize social support, special offers, or improved 154 services, accepting that their privacy will be diminished. Trepte, Dienlin, and Reinecke 155 (2014) listed several factors that can additionally attenuate the relation: lack of strength of 156 concerns, absence of negative personal experiences, or situational constraints due to social 157 desirability. In conclusion, also in the context of the privacy paradox it not reasonable to 158 expect a perfect relation between attitudes and behaviors. However, we should still expect 159 to find a relation that is *small* or *moderate*. 160

There are also some methodological explanations as to why some studies did not 161 detect statistically significant relations. Researchers are always confronted with the so-called *Duhem-Quine problem*, according to which it is impossible to test theories in 163 isolation, because empirical tests always rely on auxiliary assumptions (Dienes, 2008). In 164 other words, if a psychological experiment fails, we do not know whether the theory is 165 wrong or the questionnaire subpar. This tenet is particularly relevant for the privacy 166 paradox: Detecting statistical significance for small effects—and, again, we should expect 167 to find small effects—is more challenging because it means that large samples are necessary 168 to guarantee sufficient statistical power. Precisely, in order to be capable of detecting a 169 correlation between privacy concerns and information sharing in 95% of all cases, which 170 Baruh et al. (2017) estimated to be r = -.13, we need a sample of N = 762 people. The 171 reality, however, looks different: In their meta-analysis, Baruh et al. (2017) reported a 172 median sample size of N=300, which can explain why several studies did not find 173 significant effects. 174

In conclusion, in line with prior research and the within-person rationales presented

¹ Statistical power describes the probability of statistically detecting an effect that exists empirically. Only with high statistical power is it possible to make valid claims about an effect's existence (Cohen, 1992).

above, we expect to find a small significant relation between privacy concerns and information sharing, both on the between-person level and the within-person level.

Hypothesis 1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also be less likely to share personal information online than others.

Hypothesis 2: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also share less personal information online than they usually do.

Long-Term Perspective

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Although short-term effects are likely, it is still unclear whether long-term effects 183 exist as well. First, when analyzing potential long-term effects, it is important to choose an 184 interval that is both plausible and relevant. (It makes a large difference whether the effects 185 of alcohol consumption on driving performance are tested after say 1 minute, 1 hour, or 1 186 day.) One factor that determines an interval's optimal length is the stability of the 187 variables (Dormann & Griffin, 2015). Privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 188 predominantly trait-like constructs with high stabilities, which is why they necessitate 189 longer intervals. Other studies with comparable research questions have therefore used an 190 interval of 6 months (e.g., Valkenburg & Peter, 2009), which we adopt also in this study. In general, we believe that it should be possible to find long-term effects. It has been 192 argued that privacy concerns affect privacy behavior in the long run (e.g., Heirman et al., 193 2013). The underlying theoretical mechanism could be that the emotional part of privacy 194 concerns causes (a) motivated information selection and (b) motivated information 195 processing, which is likely to change actual behavior (Nabi, 1999). Specifically, when 196 privacy concerns increase (e.g., because of experienced or witnessed privacy infringements), 197 people might begin reading more media articles on privacy issues and might also consume 198 these articles more carefully, which could prompt information sharing practices that are 199 more cautious. Also empirically, a study with 290 participants found small negative 200 longitudinal (between-person) relations between privacy concerns and self-disclosure 201

(Koohikamali, French, & Kim, 2019). 202

At the same time, the adverse effect seems plausible as well, with two potential 203 outcomes. On the one hand, the long-term relation could be positive: If people start to 204 share more information online, they might become increasingly aware that their privacy is 205 at risk, thereby stirring concern (Tsay-Vogel, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2018). On the other 206 hand, the long-term relation might also be negative: When people share more personal 207 information online they might become accustomed to doing so, which potentially reduces 208 concern (for example, due to the mere exposure effect; Zajonc, 1968). Finally, there could 209 also be no long-term relation at all: People might have already become used to sharing 210 information online, which stifles further cognitive or emotional processing. This rationale is 211 central to so-called privacy cynicism (e.g., Hoffmann, Lutz, & Ranzini, 2016). 212 Research Question 1.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect the online 213 sharing of personal information 6 months later? 214 Research Question 1.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information 215 affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

The Role of Attitudes 217

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It has been argued that privacy attitudes could bridge the gap between concerns and 218 information sharing (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015). In contrast to privacy concerns, privacy 219 attitudes capture a more explicit, fluctuating cognitive appraisal (Tsay-Vogel et al., 2018). 220 Although both variables are related to information disclosure, attitudes are likely the 221 better predictor. This reasoning follows the rational choice paradigm (Simon, 1955), which 222 maintains that behavior is always at least partially influenced by convictions, attitudes, 223 and cost-benefit analyses. Also empirically, a study of 1,042 youths from Belgium found 224 that the relation between privacy attitudes and disclosure of personal information was 225 strong (r = .56), whereas the relation between privacy concerns and disclosure was only 226 moderate (r = -.29; Heirman et al., 2013). 227

Hypothesis 3.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than others will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others.

Hypothesis 3.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than others will also share more information online than others.

Hypothesis 4.1: People who are more concerned about their online privacy than they usually are will also hold a less positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually do.

Hypothesis 4.2: People with a more positive attitude toward the online sharing of personal information than they usually have will also share more information online than they usually do.

Concerning the potential long-term relations of privacy attitudes, we are confronted
with the same situation mentioned above. Because we are not aware of research on
long-term relations, several scenarios seem plausible. Attitudes could either have long-term
relations or not, and information sharing could either foster privacy attitudes or diminish
them.

Research Question 2.1: Do changes in concerns about online privacy affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 2.2: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect concerns about online privacy 6 months later?

Research Question 3.1: Do changes in attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information affect the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

Research Question 3.2: Do changes in the online sharing of personal information affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 6 months later?

252 Method

33 Statistics

We follow the recommendation by Lakens, Adolfi, et al. (2018) and first justify the 254 choice of our alpha level. We determined adequate error margins by considering the 255 potential implications of both false positive and false negative findings (i.e., alpha and beta 256 errors): On the one hand, if we committed an alpha error, we would wrongfully conclude that people's concerns and behaviors are consistent. Communicating such a false result to the public might unjustly reassure people when they should be more alert. On the other 259 hand, if we committed a beta error, we would wrongfully conclude that individuals behave 260 paradoxically. Communicating such a false result would unjustly accuse people of 261 implausible behavior, potentially causing unnecessary distress or reactance. We consider 262 both errors to be equally detrimental. Hence, we chose balanced error rates, setting a 263 maximum error rate of 5% for both alpha and beta. As the smallest effect size of interest 264 (SESOI; Lakens et al., 2018), we chose to consider effects that are at least small (i.e., 265 standardized coefficients above $\beta = .10$; Cohen, 1992) as able to offer empirical support for 266 our theoretical hypotheses. Significantly smaller effects were not considered able to offer 267 support. The six hypotheses were tested with a one-tailed approach and the six research 268 questions with a two-tailed approach. On the basis of the balanced alpha-beta approach 269 with a maximum error probability of 5%, a desired power of 95%, and an SESOI of β 270 .10, we calculated a minimum sample size of 1,293 respondents. Given the final sample size 271 of 1,403 respondents (see below), alpha and beta errors were balanced for our hypotheses 272 (research questions) when we used a critical alpha of 3% (4.20%), resulting in a power of 97% (95.80%) to detect small effects. 274 The data were analyzed using of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model 275 (RI-CLPM, Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015). For a visualization, see Figure 1. Note that in contrast to regular cross-lagged panel models (CLPMs), RI-CLPMs can separate 277 between-person variance from within-person variance. We used factor scores as observed




Figure 1. Visual representation of the estimated random-intercept cross-lagged panel model (RI-CLPM).

variables to represent the variables' latent structure more closely. We tested H1, H3.1, and H3.2 by correlating the random intercepts, which represent the respondents' individual 280 mean scores across all three waves. We tested H2, H4.1, and H4.2 by correlating the 281 respondents' within-person variance at T1, which captures their specific deviation at T1 282 from their overall score. We tested all research questions by regressing variables on all other measures obtained 6 months earlier. Given that we had three points of measurement, this resulted in two estimates for each research question. As we did not assume 285 longitudinal effects to differ across time, they were constrained to be equal across all waves, 286 which produces one single general measure of each effect instead of two time-specific ones. 287 (We later tested this assumption empirically. As expected, the model with constrained 288 effects did not show significantly reduced model fit, $\chi^2(9) = .114$, p = 14.25, which 289 supports that effects did not change over time.) Fit was assessed according to the common 290 criteria as described by Kline (2016). The final model fit the data well, $\chi^2(15) = 25.18$, p =291 .048, cfi = 1.00, rmsea = .02, 90% CI [< .01, .04], srmr = .01. 292

For the analyses, we used R (Version 3.6.1; R Core Team, 2018) and the R-packages 293 GGally (Version 1.4.0; Schloerke et al., 2018), qqplot2 (Version 3.2.1; Wickham, 2016), 294 lavaan (Version 0.6.5; Rosseel, 2012), MissMech (Version 1.0.2; Jamshidian, Jalal, & 295 Jansen, 2014), MVN (Version 5.8; Korkmaz, Goksuluk, & Zararsiz, 2014), psych (Version 296 1.9.12.31; Revelle, 2018), pwr (Version 1.2.2; Champely, 2018), semTools (Version 0.5.2; 297 Jorgensen et al., 2018), and sistats (Version 0.17.9; Lüdecke, 2019). The code, additional 298 analyses, and a reproducible version of this manuscript can be found on the manuscript's 299 companion website at https://xmtra.github.io/privacy-paradox/. 300

301 Procedure and Respondents

This study is part of a large-scale project which investigates the development of privacy and self-disclosure, including several other variables. Other publications linked to the project can be accessed at [link blinded during review]. The data come from a longitudinal paper-and-pencil questionnaire study, in which a representative sample of the German population (16 years and older) was surveyed on overall five occasions. The data can be downloaded from [link blinded during review].

The first three waves were collected from May 2014 to May 2015, with intervals of 6 months each. The last two waves were collected on May 2016 and May 2017, and had an interval of one year. Because we hypothesized the effects to take place across half a year, 310 the last two waves were not included in the analyses presented here. First, a sample of 311 14,714 potential respondents was drawn from a representative omnibus survey in Germany 312 (ADM master sample), using a random last-two-digit dialing procedure. In this CATI 313 screening, 5,286 respondents agreed to participate in all following waves. Wave 1 was 314 completed by 3,278 respondents (response rate: 38%), Wave 2 by 2,448 respondents 315 (attrition rate: 25%), and Wave 3 by 2,021 respondents (attrition rate: 17%). We filtered 316 respondents who never used the Internet at all waves, answered fewer than 50% of the 317 items in each scale for at least one wave, provided inconsistent birth-dates across 318

measurements, or did not report sociodemographic variables. The final sample consisted of n=1,403 respondents.

In the final sample, the rate of missing data was 5.40%. Visual inspection of the missing value patterns as well as the non-parametric test by Jamshidian et al. (2014) suggested that all missing values could be considered missing at random (p = .514). Therefore, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation was conducted using all available data. The average age was 54 years (SD = 15 years), and 49% were male. About 39% reported that they had graduated from college.

327 Measures

We tested the factorial validity of all measures using confirmatory factor analysis 328 (CFA). Each CFA included the items from all three waves. For each item, factor loadings 329 were constrained to be equal across waves. Constrained and unconstrained models were 330 compared using χ^2 differences tests. All results were nonsignificant, suggesting longitudinal 331 factorial invariance. The measures showed good composite reliability in all three waves. 332 Graphical displays of the variables' distributions showed that privacy concerns were skewed 333 to the left, privacy attitudes were normally distributed, and information sharing was skewed to the right (Figure 2, diagonal). We calculated intra-class correlation coefficients 335 to quantify how much variance in the variables' factor scores could be attributed to 336 between-person differences. An English translation of the original German items can be 337 found in the OSM. 338

Concerns about online privacy. Privacy concerns were measured as a second-order factor. Three items captured the vertical dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that institutions or intelligence services collect and analyze data that you disclosed on the Internet?"), and three items captured the horizontal dimension (e.g., "How concerned are you that people that you do not know might obtain information about you because of you online activities?"). Respondents rated all items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not

at all concerned) to 5 (very concerned). The means were $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,\,M_{\rm t3}=$

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3.59, and the standard deviations SD_{\rm t1}=0.88,\,SD_{\rm t2}=0.89, and SD_{\rm t3}=0.90. The
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    two-dimensional model fit the data well, \chi^2(118) = 661.17, p < .001, cfi = .97, rmsea = .06,
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   90% CI [.05, .06], srmr = .04. The reliability was high (\omega_{t1} = .95, \omega_{t2} = .96, \omega_{t3} = .97).
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    Overall, 73.85% of the measure's variance was explained by differences between persons.
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          The online sharing of personal information. To measure respondent's level of
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    information disclosure, they were asked how often they disclosed 10 different pieces of
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    information on the Internet. The exact question was: "How often do you disclose the
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    following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" Each item was answered on a
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    5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily). Factor analyses suggested a second-order
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    factor structure with five first-order factors of two items each. The first first-order factor
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    subsumed financial and medical information, the second first and last name, the third place
    of residence and street (including house number), the fourth email address and phone
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    number, and the fifth information about education and current job. The means were M_{\rm t1}
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    = 2.12, M_{\rm t2} = 2.13, M_{\rm t3} = 2.10, and the standard deviations SD_{\rm t1} = 0.66, SD_{\rm t2} = 0.64,
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   and SD_{\rm t3}=0.61. The model fit the data adequately, \chi^2(375)=2527.69,\ p<.001, cfi =
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    .95, rmsea = .06, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .06. The reliability was high (\omega_{\rm t1} = .91, \omega_{\rm t2} =
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    .92, \omega_{\rm t3} = .91). Overall, 64.29% of the measure's variance was explained by differences
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    between persons.
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          Attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. Respondents'
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    attitudes toward disclosing personal information online were captured with 10 items that
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    measured the general appraisal of disclosing the same 10 pieces of information. Adhering to
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    the principle of compatibility (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), the items were parallel to those of
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    the actual disclosure scale. Specifically, we asked: "Do you think that it is sensible to
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disclose the following pieces of information online (i.e., on the Internet)?" The scale ranged

from 1 (not at all sensible) to 5 (very sensible). The means were $M_{\rm t1}=3.67,\,M_{\rm t2}=3.62,$

 $M_{\rm t3}=3.59,$ and the standard deviations $SD_{\rm t1}=0.88,$ $SD_{\rm t2}=0.89,$ and $SD_{\rm t3}=0.90.$ The

second-order model with five first-order factors showed an adequate model fit, $\chi^2(375) =$ 372 2683.43, p < .001, cfi = .93, rmsea = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], srmr = .08. The reliability was 373 high ($\omega_{\rm t1} = .88$, $\omega_{\rm t2} = .89$, $\omega_{\rm t3} = .87$). Overall, 59.19% of the measure's variance was 374 explained by differences between persons. 375

Results 376

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In a first descriptive step, we analyzed the variables' bivariate relations. All variables 377 associated with the hypotheses showed correlations that were in line with our theoretical 378 rationales (Figure 2, above the diagonal). 370 Hypothesis 1 predicted that people reporting higher concerns about online privacy 380 than others would also be less likely to share personal information online than others. 381 Results revealed that the random intercepts of the two variables were significantly 382 correlated ($\beta =$ -.09, b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, -0.01], z = -2.57, p = .005). Hence, 383 respondents who—on average across all three waves—were more concerned about their 384 privacy than others also shared slightly less personal information online. The effect was 385 small. When looking at the standardized effect's confidence interval (i.e., $\beta = -.09$, 95% CI [-.15, -.02]), it was not significantly smaller than our SESOI of beta = .10. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Hypothesis 2 proposed that if people perceived more concerns about their online 389 privacy than they usually do, they would also share less personal information online than 390 they usually do. Results revealed a small significant correlation ($\beta = -.10, b = -0.02, 95\%$ 391 CI [-0.03, > -0.01], z = -2.37, p = .009), suggesting that if respondents were more 392 concerned about their online privacy at T1 than usual, they also shared less personal 393 information online at T1 than usual. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 2. 394 With Research Question 1.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relation of concerns about 395 online privacy and the online sharing of personal information 6 months later. No significant 396 lagged effect across 6 months was found ($\beta = .01, b = 0.01, 95\%$ CI [-0.05, 0.07], z = 0.41,




Figure 2. Results of the bivariate relations. Above the diagonal: zero-order correlation matrix; diagonal: density plots for each variable; below the diagonal: bivariate scatter plots for zero-order correlations. Solid regression lines represent linear regressions, dashed regression lines represent quadratic regressions. Calculated with the variables' latent factor scores.

p = .683). With Research Question 1.2, we investigated the longitudinal relation of the online sharing of personal information and concerns about online privacy 6 months later, again revealing no significant effect ($\beta = -.03$, b = -0.03, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.04], z = -0.80, p = -0.80

Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that people who perceived more privacy concerns than

= .422).

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others would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 403 information than others. The results revealed a medium-sized negative correlation between 404 the two variables on the between-person level ($\beta = -.31$, b = -0.11, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.08], z 405 = -8.46, p < .001). Thus, people who—on average across all three waves—reported being 406 more concerned about their online privacy relative to the rest of the sample, were also 407 substantially more likely to hold a more negative attitude toward the online sharing of 408 personal information. The results therefore supported Hypothesis 3.1. Hypothesis 3.2 409 stated that people who held more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 410 information than others would also share more personal information online than others. 411 Results showed a very strong between-person correlation between the two variables ($\beta =$.66, b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.13, 0.17], z = 15.12, p < .001). In other words, when averaged 413 across all three waves, if people had more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of 414 personal information than others, they were much more likely to actually share personal 415 information online. In conclusion, the results supported Hypothesis 3.2. 416 Hypothesis 4.1 proposed that people who perceived more privacy concerns than usual 417 would also hold more negative attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information 418 than usual. The results did not reveal a significant effect ($\beta=$ -.06, b= -0.01, 95% CI 419 [-0.03, < 0.01], z = -1.38, p = .084). Hypothesis 4.2 proposed that people who held more 420 positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information than usual would also 421 share more personal information online than usual. Results showed a moderate 422 within-person correlation between the two variables ($\beta = .15$, b = 0.03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.05], 423 z = 4.01, p < .001), which indicates that when respondents had more positive attitudes at 424 T1 than usual, they also shared more personal information than usual. In conclusion, the 425 results supported Hypothesis 4.2. 426

With Research Question 2.1, we analyzed the longitudinal relations of concerns about

online privacy and positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information. No 428 significant effect was found ($\beta =$ -.02, b = -0.02, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06], z = -0.47, p = .641). 429 Regarding Research Question 2.2, again no significant longitudinal relations emerged 430 between privacy attitudes and privacy concerns 6 months later ($\beta < .01, b < 0.01, 95\%$ CI 431 [-0.06, 0.06], z = 0.06, p = .951).432 Research Question 3.1 asked whether changes in attitudes toward the online sharing 433 of personal information would affect changes in personal information sharing 6 months 434 later. No significant effect was found ($\beta >$ -.01, b > -0.01, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.05], z = -0.07, p =435 = .947). Next, Research Question 3.2 asked whether changes in the online sharing of 436 personal information would affect attitudes toward the online sharing of personal 437 information 6 months later. Again, no significant effect was found ($\beta = .04$, b = 0.04, 95% 438 CI [-0.03, 0.11], z = 1.15, p = .249).Table 1 presents an overview of all results. 440

Discussion

Most research on the privacy paradox suggests a significant small effect of privacy 442 concerns on the online sharing of personal information (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017). However, whereas the theoretical premise of the privacy paradox addresses a within-person effect, most empirical studies have analyzed only between-person relations. On the basis of a 445 representative sample of the German population, from which three waves of data separated 446 by 6 months were collected, we hence analyzed the privacy paradox by differentiating 447 general between-person relations, short-term within-person relations, as well as long-term 448 within-person effects. Together, this approach allows for informed inferences about the 449 variables' causal relationship. 450 The results of the between-person analyses showed that people who were more 451 concerned about their privacy than others were slightly less likely to share personal 452 information. In addition, people who were more concerned about their privacy than others 453

Table 1

Parameter Estimates Obtained in the Random-Intercept Cross-Lagged Panel Model

		95% CI			
Effect	b	11	ul	beta	p
Between-person correlations across all waves					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	09	.005
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.11	-0.14	-0.08	31	< .001
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.15	0.13	0.17	.66	< .001
Within-person correlations at T1					
Privacy concern <-> information sharing	-0.02	-0.03	> -0.01	10	.009
Privacy concern <-> positive attitude	-0.01	-0.03	< 0.01	06	.084
Positive attitude <-> information sharing	0.03	0.02	0.05	.15	< .001
Within-person effects across 6 months					
Privacy concern -> information sharing	0.01	-0.05	0.07	.01	.683
Information sharing -> privacy concern	-0.03	-0.09	0.04	03	.422
Privacy concern -> positive attitude	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	02	.641
Positive attitude -> privacy concern	< 0.01	-0.06	0.06	< .01	.951
Positive attitude -> information sharing	> -0.01	-0.06	0.05	>01	.947
Information sharing -> positive attitude	0.04	-0.03	0.11	.04	.249

Note. The between-person correlations represent interpersonal relations. For example, results showed that people who were more concerned than others, averaged across all three waves, also shared less information than others. The within-person parameters reflect how intrapersonal changes in one variable are related to intra-personal changes in another. For example, results showed that if a person was more concerned at T1 than usual, they also shared less information than usual.

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also held substantially more negative attitudes toward disclosing personal information
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   online. Notably, we found a very strong between-person correlation between attitudes
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    toward information sharing and actual information sharing, which shows that typical
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   online disclosure can be predicted precisely by a person's attitude. Taken together, the
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    cross-sectional results are in line with the extant literature: The between-person correlation
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   of privacy concerns and information sharing found in this study (i.e., \beta = -.08) fall within
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    the 95% confidence interval of the effect reported by Baruh et al. (2017) (i.e., r = -.13,
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   95% CI [-.07, -.18]). Note that the between-person correlations reported here represent
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   averaged measurements across three waves, which makes the findings more robust than
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   typical one-shot measures.
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         In conclusion, this study suggests that the privacy paradox does not exist on a
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   between-person level. The differences between people with regard to their online
   information sharing behavior can be explained by differences in their privacy concerns to a
   small extent, and by differences in their privacy attitudes to a large extent. The more
   specific we become, the better we can explain online behavior: Whereas privacy concerns
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   are related only weakly to online information sharing (e.g., Baruh et al., 2017), more
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   specific risks perceptions are related to behavior more closely (e.g., Bol et al., 2018; Yu et
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   al., 2020), whereas behavioral attitudes are the best predictors (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015).
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         The within-person results showed that when a person's privacy concerns increased,
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    the same person also shared slightly less information online than usual. Moreover, people
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    who developed more positive attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information
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    than usual, also shared substantially more personal information online. Together, changes
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   in concerns and attitudes are therefore related to changes in behavior, which speaks against
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    the privacy paradox also on the within-person level.
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         We did not find any long-term effects, however. Changes in both privacy concerns
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   and attitudes toward the online sharing of personal information were not related to any
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   meaningful changes in the online sharing of personal information 6 months later (and vice
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versa). As an explanation, it might be the case that changes in privacy concern affect information sharing more immediately. To test this assumption, we would need studies with shorter intervals (Keijsers, 2016). Moreover, given that the directions of most longitudinal relations were in line with the between-person and within-person relations, longitudinal effects might indeed take place, but only that they are very small. Of course, it could also be that longterm longitudinal effects do not exist.

487 Limitations

Some of the effect sizes reported in this study are potentially not large enough to 488 refute the privacy paradox completely. On the one hand, they could be a manifestation of the so-called "crud factor" (Meehl, 1990, p. 204), which states that all psychosocial measures are related to one another to some extent. On the other hand, other factors such 491 as expected benefits might play a more important role (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016). In 492 conclusion, although our results suggest that privacy concerns and privacy attitudes are 493 correlated with information sharing, the importance of privacy concerns should not be 494 exaggerated. The effects could be larger, and other variables play a role as well. 495 In this study we measured information sharing using self-reports. However, 496 self-reports of frequent and routine behaviors are often imprecise and unreliable (Scharkow, 497 2016). This represents a profound limitation of our study. Whenever possible, future 498 studies should aim to collect objective observations of behavior. 490 Finally, please note that the hypotheses presented in this study were not formally 500 preregistered. At the time when the study was conceived in 2014, we were not yet aware of 501 the importance of preregistration. 502

503 Future Research

Evidence of within-person longitudinal effects is still missing. Although we found significant within-person correlations at T1, they were absent across the 6-month intervals. Together, this suggests that longitudinal effects might exist, but that they take place on a

different time interval. Future research could hence probe different intervals. For theoretical reasons (e.g., due to availability heuristics), it is plausible to use short intervals; for statistical reasons (e.g., because of the high stability of privacy concerns), it would also make sense to test longer intervals (Dormann & Griffin, 2015).

Although we argue that in most circumstances privacy concerns and behavior should correlate modestly, the exact extent depends on a many boundary conditions. Future research should hence explicitly analyze different contexts and situations. Building on Kokolakis (2017), we suggest to analyze the following boundary conditions:

- Context (e.g., professional, social, commercial, or health-related);
- Situation (e.g., new, habitualized, or unexpected);
- Mood (e.g., positive vs. negative);
- Extent of control (high vs. low);

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- Type of information processing applied (implicit, heuristic, or peripheral vs. explicit, analytic, or central);
- Existence of bias (e.g., overconfidence, optimism, comparative optimism, or hyperbolic discounting);
- Type of information (e.g., sensitive vs. superficial, biographic, or person-related);
 - Benefit immediacy and risk diffusion (high vs. low).

Specifically, we encourage analyzing privacy behaviors also from a situational perspective, accounting for temporal needs, interpersonal perceptions, contextual cues, or characteristics of communication channels (Masur, 2018). For example, whereas general levels of information sharing are likely best explained by using privacy concerns, situational information sharing might be best explained by using privacy heuristics (Sundar, Kang, Wu, Gu, & Zhang, 2013).

Next to these theory-related boundary conditions there are also methodological ones:

• Analysis design (e.g., theoretical, experimental, questionnaire-based, interview-based,

- or anecdotal); 533
- Quality of measurement (high vs. low; low quality less likely to detect statistical 534 significance); 535
- Sample size (small vs. large; small samples less likely to detect statistical significance); 536
- Statistical analysis (e.g., SEM vs. Regression; analyses without error control less 537 likely to find statistical significance); 538
 - Operationalization (e.g., concerns vs. risk perceptions vs. behavioral attitudes; the more specific, the stronger the relation).

We emphasize that when analyzing the privacy paradox we are likely dealing with 541 small effects (Baruh et al., 2017). Hence, to detect these small effects reliably we need large 542 samples. This is often not the case (Baruh et al., 2017). In conclusion, it is crucial to use 543 statistical designs that allow for sufficient statistical power.

Conclusion 545

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Being able to show that online behaviors are not paradoxical can be socially relevant. 546 Consider the similar case of fear appeals and protective behavior, where there is also only a 547 small correlation (Witte & Allen, 2000). However, fear appeals are used in public 548 campaigns nonetheless, oftentimes to much success (Wakefield, Loken, & Hornik, 2010). Likewise, proclaiming that the online sharing of personal information is not paradoxical and that concerns about online privacy matter, could lead to more cautious and reflective behavior. It is probably no coincidence that the General Data Protection Regulation, 552 which strengthens the privacy rights of consumers, was passed in Europe, where privacy 553 concerns are particularly pronounced (European Commission, 2015). 554 In sum, this study showed that when people were more concerned about their 555 privacy, they also shared a little less personal information about themselves online. If 556 respondents considered sharing personal information to be insensible, they disclosed 557 substantially less information. Together, these findings do not support the existence of a

privacy paradox, at least in this particular context and operationalization. No evidence of

- 560 long-term effects was found, however. Further research is needed to understand the
- potential causal interplay of concerns, attitudes, and behavior.

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