

Pruning for Robust Concept Erasing in Diffusion Models

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Abstract. Despite the impressive capabilities of generating images, text-to-image diffusion models are susceptible to producing undesirable outputs such as NSFW content and copyrighted artworks. To address this issue, recent studies have focused on fine-tuning model parameters to erase problematic concepts. However, existing methods exhibit a major flaw in *robustness*, as fine-tuned models often reproduce the undesirable outputs when faced with cleverly crafted prompts. This reveals a fundamental limitation in the current approaches and may raise risks for the deployment of diffusion models in the open world. To address this gap, we locate the concept-correlated neurons and find that these neurons show high sensitivity to adversarial prompts, thus could be deactivated when erasing and reactivated again under attacks. To improve the robustness, we introduce a new pruning-based strategy for concept erasing. Our method selectively prunes critical parameters associated with the concepts targeted for removal, thereby reducing the sensitivity of concept-related neurons. Our method can be easily integrated with existing concept-erasing techniques, offering a robust improvement against adversarial inputs. Experimental results show a significant enhancement in our model’s ability to resist adversarial inputs, achieving nearly a 40% improvement in erasing the NSFW content and a 30% improvement in erasing artwork style.

Keywords: Diffusion Models · Concept Erasing · Pruning · Robustness

1 Introduction

Text-to-image diffusion models [4, 30] have demonstrated remarkable abilities in creating high-quality images. These models can generate a variety of concepts, spanning natural landscapes, portraits, abstract compositions, and artistic renditions. Thus, they hold great potential in many real-world applications. Despite their powerful capabilities, these models, unfortunately, can be prompted to generate undesirable content, including copyrighted artworks and certain Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content, such as nude images. As such, these models have




Fig. 1: Left panel: semantic illustration of prior concept erasing methods (the top row) and our method (the bottom row). Right panel: concrete examples illustrate the vulnerability of prior concept-erasing methods and the robustness of our method.

raised significant concerns in the community, and there is an emerging desire to eliminate such undesirable content from diffusion models [10, 21, 29, 31, 41].

There have been several advances in preventing diffusion models from generating specific concepts. Retraining models with carefully filtered Internet datasets, although effective, is time-consuming and costly, especially with large datasets such as the 5 billion samples mentioned in [32]. Recent efforts have shifted towards post-processing techniques on already trained models. For example, [29] introduced an NSFW safety filter for sensitive prompt detection. However, its effectiveness is limited as even prompts with low toxicity can still generate inappropriate images [31], and bypassing this filter is not difficult [1]. To address this, concept erasing methods fine-tune diffusion models to remove unwanted content using techniques like negative guidance [10] or altering the conditional distribution towards another concept [11, 21].

Despite notable advancements in the field of concept erasing, fine-tuned diffusion models often exhibit a **lack of robustness**. In particular, recent studies [8, 41] have shown that concept trained to be erased can easily be regenerated through meticulously designed prompts, referred to as adversarial prompts. Consider the example shown in the first row of Fig. 1: although the model has been specifically adjusted to exclude the Van Gogh style from its outputs, it inadvertently reproduces images in the same style when faced with slightly modified, adversarial prompts. This reveals a fundamental weakness in current concept erasing methods: the embedded knowledge of the concept within the models could be hidden rather than forgotten. This vulnerability poses a significant risk when considering the deployment of diffusion models in real-world scenarios and urgently calls for innovative solutions. However, we are unaware of effective methods to improve the robustness performance yet.

With the above problem in mind, we first explore the question: why do existing fine-tuned diffusion models fail to be robust against adversarial prompts? As detailed in Sec. 3.2, our empirical findings suggest that the issue often stems from the so-called concept neurons which play a pivotal role in generating the

targeted concepts. Existing erasing techniques attempt to fine-tune model parameters to deactivate these concept neurons. However, we observe that adversaries can manipulate prompt inputs to reactivate these neurons, thus enabling the regeneration of supposedly erased content. Drawing inspiration from prior literature on neural network pruning [9, 13, 19], we realize that pruning model parameters to deactivate concept neurons is a beneficial strategy. This is because zeroing specific parameters can make the outputs associated with these weights unchanged, even if the adversary changes the text prompt inputs. However, the question arises: how can we select the critical parameters for pruning?

In this paper, we develop a differentiable pruning strategy that incorporates advances in existing concept-erasing methods. Specifically, we parameterize a mask for each parameter and define the training objective with a standard concept-erasing objective, such as ESD [10] and AC [21]. We then employ back-propagation to optimize the mask, allowing the concept erasing loss to determine which parameters should be pruned. Please refer to Fig. 1 for an illustration. Compared with previous methods, our method allows selectively enable or disable parameters. Our method serves as a plug-in technique that can be integrated with existing concept-erasing training objectives. The enhanced robustness of our proposed method, compared to previous approaches, has been empirically validated across three widely-used test environments: the erasure of nudity, styles, and objects, as detailed in Sec. 4. We find that our method achieves comparable or even superior performance in the concept erasing rate on test prompts and significantly improves the robustness performance on adversarial prompts, crafted by attack methods including UnlearnDiff [41] and P4D [8]. Furthermore, we empirically find that the sparsity of pruning is well controlled and our method does not sacrifice generation quality on other concepts. Moreover, it allows for recoverable erasing and storage-cheap: after training, only a lightweight binary mask needs to be additionally stored.

We summarize our contributions as follows:

- We provide an empirical analysis to reveal why concept-erased diffusion models may be vulnerable to certain adversarial attacks. This analysis could offer insights for improving the robustness of concept erasing in diffusion models.
- We develop a new concept-erasing paradigm based on pruning to improve the robustness of diffusion models. This paradigm is flexible to be easily applied to existing concept-erasing objectives.
- The experimental results show that our method significantly improve the robustness of diffusion models across three test beds while maintaining the ability to generate other standard concepts. We also empirically verify that our method effectively reduce the sensitivity of diffusion models, justifying the observed improvement in robustness.

2 Related Work

2.1 Concept erasing in diffusion models

The task of concept erasing, or generally the removal of undesirable image generation, is introduced in [10, 11, 21, 27, 29, 31]. There are two kinds of approaches:

inference-based and training-based. For the former, there is no need to update the model’s parameters. In this vein, [31] proposed designing a safety guidance to steer the generation in the opposite direction for unsafe prompts. [29] proposed applying an NSFW safety filter to detect sensitive prompts before generation. On the other hand, training-based approaches are believed to be safer as they aim to make the model forget undesirable knowledge within the parameters. To name a few, [10] explored the use of negative guidance in text-to-image diffusion models to reduce the conditional generation probability. [11, 21] demonstrated that modifying the conditional distribution of the target concept to that of another anchor concept also performs well. Note that a closed-form solution is available for [11] since its solves a linear regression problem by merely updating the linear projection layer in the cross-attention module.

Concept erasing in text-to-image diffusion models is similar to the concept of machine unlearning, which aims to remove the impact of certain data subsets from a trained model, as outlined in [6, 18, 23, 36]. While both processes share the goal of mitigating undesired influences, they differ in focus. Concept erasing specifically targets the modification of content in generated images, as highlighted in [10]. For example, if a model unintentionally learns an inappropriate concept (partly due to extrapolation) [7, 34], even in the absence of problematic data in the training set, concept erasing, rather than machine unlearning, is necessitated to address these issues.

2.2 Neural network pruning

Pruning [20] is a compression technique commonly used to remove redundant components (e.g., weights or neurons) in neural networks. It is effective in reducing the number of neural network parameters, thereby improving computational efficiency on edge devices [13]. Typically, pruning strategies are designed to preserve model performance [5, 9, 14, 17, 35, 40]. We are motivated by that pruned neural networks are sparse, which can reduce the correlation among dominant features and thereby enhance robustness. Previous studies [12, 19, 37, 38] have demonstrated that pruning is beneficial for adversarial robustness in machine learning, particularly in *classification* tasks. In contrast, our focus is on the robustness of concept *erasing* in generative models.

3 Robust Concept Erasing

3.1 Preliminary

Text-to-image diffusion models [16, 27, 30] are probabilistic models capable of regenerating data after learning from observed data. A key component in diffusion models is a denoising network, denoted as ϵ_θ . This network is designed to process a noisy image input, predict the noise that was added, and subsequently remove this noise to restore the image to its clean version. It is important to note that the denoising process within these models is iterative, involving multiple steps to incrementally reduce noise. To train the denoising network effectively, noise, represented by ϵ , is intentionally introduced to these images. The network is

then trained to minimize the discrepancy between its predictions and the actual noise added:

$$\theta^* \leftarrow \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{x_t, c, t, \epsilon} \left[\|\epsilon_{\theta}(x_t, c, t) - \epsilon\|_2^2 \right],$$

where x_t is the noisy image inputted to the denoising network⁴, c is the associated text prompt for an image and t is the denoising timestep. The above loss function serves as an Evidence Lower Bound Objective (ELBO), which underpins the framework of generative models. We refer readers to [15, 26, 33] for details.

Diffusion models, trained on vast amounts of *unfiltered* Internet data [32], often acquire the capability to generate content that may include offensive imagery and copyrighted artworks. To mitigate these unintended consequences, the framework of **concept erasing** has been introduced in [10, 21]. In particular, this framework aims to fine-tune the diffusion model to disable its generation ability for concepts deemed undesirable or inappropriate. Concretely, existing methods update model parameter θ to override the prediction of the text prompt c (associated with the erased concept) to a new target y :

$$\min_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{x_t, c, t} \left[\|\epsilon_{\theta}(x_t, c, t) - y\|_2^2 \right]. \quad (1)$$

In this way, the probability of generating undesirable concepts are reduced in the denoising process. We explain how existing methods can be substantiated in the above framework.

- For the ESD (Erasing Stable Diffusion) [10], it uses the target value

$$y = \epsilon_{\theta^*}(x_t, c_{\text{null}}, t) - \eta[\epsilon_{\theta^*}(x_t, c, t) - \epsilon_{\theta^*}(x_t, c_{\text{null}}, t)], \quad (2)$$

where c is the null text for unconditioned generation and θ^* is the parameter for an non-erased diffusion model. Using the terminology from classifier-free guidance generation, this target value guides the generation in the opposite direction of the erased concept.

- Another erasing method is AC (Ablating Concept) [21], which uses the target value from the prediction of text prompt c^* for an anchor concept:

$$y = \text{stop_gradient}(\epsilon_{\theta}(x_t, c^*, t)). \quad (3)$$

This anchor concept is semantically similar to the erased concept but is removed with the target concept. For example, to erase "Grumpy Cat", c could be "A cute little Grumpy Cat" and c^* is "A cute little cat" correspondingly.

3.2 Vulnerability of Concept Erasing

Although the existing concept erasing methods are effective on test prompts, they are vulnerable to adversarial prompts [8, 41]; see examples in Fig. 1. It indicates that the supposed erasure of concepts is not complete but rather, these concepts remain hidden within the model's internal parameters. Such a scenario is unacceptable, as models might still pose safety risks upon their online deployment. We are yet to be unaware of effective solutions to this robustness issue.

⁴ In latent diffusion models [30], the input x_t should be a latent variable.




Fig. 2: Sensitivity score of concept and non-concept neurons when attacked. The results are obtained from the erased models for nudity, van gogh (style), and church (object).




Fig. 3: Visualization of concept neurons in the original stable diffusion (SD) and the edited SD by the ESD [10] method. Redder regions indicate higher activation values. As seen, concept neuron are activated original SD (first column) and deactivated in edited model (second column) with test prompts. However, with adversarial prompts, those neurons are re-activated (third column). The captions in the gray box indicate the specific locations of concept neurons in the diffusion models.

To gain insights for designing robust concept erasing approaches, we first explore why existing fine-tuned diffusion models are vulnerable to adversarial prompts. We hypothesize that the generation of a specific concept is correlated with a subset of neurons in diffusion models, which we refer to as **concept neurons** in this paper. Intuitively, when a prompt is input, some critical neurons are "activated", significantly leading the generation process. Existing erasing methods fine-tune parameters to "deactivate" such neurons to achieve removal in training data. However, these neurons might be "reactivated" when inputs are cleverly designed. We empirically validate the above intuitions in two steps:

- **(Step I):** We use a numerical criterion to identify concept neurons;
- **(Step II):** We validate concept neurons are sensitive to adversarial prompts.

Step I: Identify Concept Neurons. We identify concept neurons by examining the difference in neuron activation between the original model and a

modified version designed to erase the target concept. Neurons that exhibit the most significant changes in activation are identified as related to the concept. Specifically, provided text prompts c containing the concept to be erased, we measure the correlation of this concept to a neuron at the ℓ -th layer and i -th channel and t -th time step by:

$$\rho(\text{neuron}_{\ell,i,t}, \text{concept}) = \mathbb{E}_{x_t, c} \left[\left\| z_{\ell,i}^*(x_t, c, t) \right\|_1 - \left\| \tilde{z}_{\ell,i}(x_t, c, t) \right\|_1 \right], \quad (4)$$

where $z_{\ell,i}^* \in \mathbb{R}^{h_\ell \times w_\ell}$ and $\tilde{z}_{\ell,i} \in \mathbb{R}^{h_\ell \times w_\ell}$ denote the neuron values in a 2D plane of the original model and erased model (e.g., by ESD), respectively. A large value of ρ indicates that such a neuron changes a lot by existing concept erasing methods, and it could be viewed as a concept neuron. In our experiments, in each layer, we identify neurons with top-5 largest values as concept neurons.

Step II: Neuron Sensitivity Measurement. With the same notations as before, we assess the sensitivity of a neuron based on their value change when presented with an original prompt c versus an adversarial prompt c_{adv} :

$$\delta(\text{neuron}_{\ell,i,t}, \text{concept}) = \mathbb{E}_{x_t, c} \left[\left\| \tilde{z}_{\ell,i}(x_t, c, t) - \tilde{z}_{\ell,i}(x_t, c_{\text{adv}}, t) \right\|_1 \right]. \quad (5)$$

A large value of δ means this neuron is sensitive to the adversarial prompt.

We display the results of the above two steps in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In Fig. 2, we report the neuron sensitivity values δ , as described in Eq. (5), of concept and non-concept neurons in concept-erased models⁵. The results confirm our intuition: neurons that are important to the erased concept are sensitive to clearly crafted adversarial prompts. As such, they may be "reactivated" to regenerate the concept to be removed. To further verify this, we provide several concrete examples in Fig. 3. Specifically, we upsample the identified concept neurons via Eq. (4) to the same size as the generated images and overlap with them. Redder regions in the figure indicate higher activation in the concept neurons. We could observe that the erasing method, ESD, effectively deactivates such concept neurons, resulting in the disappearance of the undesired concept in the generated image (the second column). However, an adversarial attack reactivates these concept neurons, causing the undesired concept to reappear (the third column).

3.3 Pruning for Robust Concept Erasing

The above analysis highlights the sensitivity of concept neurons to adversarial prompts. To mitigate this sensitivity, directly pruning the identified concept neurons might seem like a natural solution. However, we refrain from doing so due to safety and simplicity concerns. To explain why existing erasing methods are fragile, we introduced a empirical technique in the previous section to identify neurons *correlated* with target concept. However, it does not guarantee they are *exclusively correlated* with a single concept, as a neuron may be associated with multiple relevant concepts, e.g, some neurons control general concepts such as color or materials [2]. Therefore, we provide a safer and more automatic

⁵ For computational simplicity, we visualize results by using an intermediate timestep $t = 25$. Similar results are observed for other timesteps; please refer to the Appendix.

approach to reduce the sensitivity of concept neurons, pruning within the larger parameter space rather than the neuron space. Intuitively, neurons are influenced by parameters and inputs, pruning critical parameters could sever the pathways that lead to the reactivation of the erased neurons and inhibit the regeneration of the concept.

A central question is to decide which parameters to prune? We incorporate recent advances in existing concept-erasing methods, and use the standard erasing objective to guide where to prune. For the parameter θ^* of the original diffusion model, we introduce a trainable mask $M_{\text{hard}} \in \{0, 1\}^p$ in the same dimension with $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^p$:

$$\min_{M_{\text{hard}} \in \{0, 1\}^p} \mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}} = \mathbb{E}_{x_t, c, t} \left[\|\tilde{\epsilon}_{\theta^* \odot M_{\text{hard}}} (x_t, c, t) - y\|_2^2 \right], \quad (6)$$

where \odot means element-wise multiplication. The masks are applied to parameters (weights and biases) in convolution and linear layers to selectively enable or disable the connections within these layers. Our formulation is flexible and can be integrated with different erasing objectives mentioned in Section 3.1.

Practical Algorithms. The problem in Eq. (6) involves discrete optimization, which is usually hard to solve. One good strategy is to convert it to a continuous optimization problem and employs optimizes such as AdamW [25]. We explore one of such ideas below and leave other designs in the future work.

We parameterize the hard mask M_{hard} to be soft via the sigmoid function:

$$M_{\text{soft}}(m) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\eta \cdot m)} \in [0, 1]^p$$

where $\eta > 0$ is a fixed temperature coefficient (usually $\eta = 10$) controlling the slope of the sigmoid function, and $m \in \mathbb{R}^p$ is the trainable parameter to be optimized with same dimension as θ^* . Then we solve the following continuous optimization problem $\min_m \mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}}(\theta^* \odot M_{\text{soft}})$ with gradient descent:

$$m_k \leftarrow m_k - \alpha_k \nabla_m \mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}}(\theta^* \odot M_{\text{soft}})$$

Here $\alpha_k > 0$ is the learning rate at iteration k . In practice, to stabilize training, a good initialization for the trainable parameter m is to be 1. Once the optimization is done, we obtain the hard mask by discretization: $M_{\text{hard}} \leftarrow \mathbb{I}(M_{\text{soft}} > \sigma)$, where the threshold parameter σ is usually set to 0.5. and the indicator function \mathbb{I} is applied element-wise. We outline the implementation in Alg. 1. In our experiments, we explore our concept by implementing loss erasure techniques in both ESD and AC. The algorithms developed from this approach are respectively named P-ESD and P-AC.

Technically speaking, our method can be viewed as a kind of differentiable pruning strategy [22, 28]. As discussed in Sec. 2.2, our approach and motivation are different from classical pruning strategies, which aim to prune "less important" parameters while preserving the acquired abilities. In contrast, our framework requires to prune critical parameters associated the concept for removal.

Algorithm 1 Pruning for Concept Erasing

Input: concepts for erasing; diffusion model parameter θ^* ; erasing loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}}$

- 1: Initialize $m_0 \in \mathbb{R}^p$ to be **1**
- 2: **for** iteration $k = 0, 1, 2, \dots, K$ **do**
- 3: $m_k \leftarrow m_k - \alpha_k \nabla_{m_k} \mathcal{L}_{\text{erase}}(\theta^* \odot M_{\text{soft}})$
- 4: **end for**
- 5: Obtain the hard mask $M_{\text{hard}} \leftarrow \mathbb{I}(M_{\text{soft}} > \sigma)$

Output: The pruned weight $\theta^* \odot M_{\text{hard}}$

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setups

Compared methods: Following the literature in [10, 11, 21, 31], we choose Stable Diffusion v1.4 [30] as the base model. We compare the proposed method with the following widely-used baselines for concept erasing: ESD (Erased Stable Diffusion) [10], AC(Ablating concepts) [21], UCE (Unified Concept Editing) [11], and FMN (Forget Me Not) [39]. We integrate our pruning method with ESD and AC, denoted P-ESD and P-AC. For P-ESD, adhering to ESD’s setup, the negative guidance scale is 1, we prune only the unconditional layers (non-cross-attention layers) when erasing nudity and objects, and only the conditional layers (cross-attention layers) when erasing style. For P-AC, in alignment with AC’s strategy, we prune whole weights when erasing nudity and only cross-attention layer when erasing style. The temperature coefficient η in the sigmoid function is 10, and the threshold σ to discretize the soft mask is set to 0.5.

Evaluation criterion: We consider the task of concept erasing in three scenarios: erasing nudity, artist styles, and objects, which are also used in prior work. To evaluate the performance, we use the erased model to generate images on test prompts containing the target concept text prompts and then ask a classifier to tell whether a concept exists on the generated images. Thus, we introduce the criterion called **Concept Erasure Rate (CER)**, which indicates the rate at which the diffusion model successfully erases a specified concept from its generated images. A higher rates means better performance in achieving concept erasure. To evaluate the robustness performance, attack methods against concept erasing are used to find adversarial prompts. We also calculate the concept erasure rate during these attacks.

Attack methods: In all three scenarios, we implement two recently proposed attack methods: P4D [8] and UnlearnDiff [41], which use a local search method to find an adversarial prompt for concept regeneration. The prepended prompt perturbation is set as 5 tokens for erasing nudity, and 3 tokens for erasing style and object. For each prompt, we conduct 10 attacks on samples drawn from 10 timesteps, selected at intervals of 5 steps across 50 diffusion steps. Details of attack configuration is provided in the Appendix.

Table 1: Concept erasure rate for erasing nudity.

| | FMN | UCE | AC | ESD | P-AC | P-ESD |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| <i>Test Prompts</i> | 0.11 | 0.60 | 0.63 | 0.80 | 0.83 | 0.95 |
| <i>Adversarial Prompts:</i> | | | | | | |
| UnlearnDiff | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.86 |
| P4D | 0.01 | 0.13 | 0.26 | 0.39 | 0.42 | 0.82 |

Table 2: Detected nudity number in each category on I2P dataset.

| | SD | UCE | AC | P-AC | ESD | P-ESD |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-------|
| EXPOSED_ARMPITS | 216 | 81 | 69 | 58 | 55 | 7 |
| EXPOSED_BELLY | 167 | 52 | 54 | 24 | 21 | 1 |
| EXPOSED_BUTTOCKS | 50 | 15 | 5 | 13 | 8 | 3 |
| EXPOSED_FEET | 41 | 16 | 18 | 7 | 17 | 4 |
| EXPOSED_BREAST_FEMALE | 289 | 56 | 66 | 32 | 19 | 0 |
| EXPOSED_GENITALIA_FEMALE | 21 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| EXPOSED_BREAST_MALE | 28 | 13 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| EXPOSED_GENITALIA_MALE | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Total | 817 | 242 | 227 | 140 | 122 | 19 |

4.2 Erasing Nudity

We evaluate the performance on erasing nudity using the test prompts same as [41], which are derived from the "sexual" category of the I2P dataset [31] with a nudity score exceeding 0.75. We then use NudeNet [3] to detect whether the image contains nudity. We report the average concept erase rate over these test prompts in Tab. 1. Quite interestingly, we find that our method only improves the concept erasing rate on test prompts but also the adversarial prompts. Note that the concept erasing on adversarial prompts are challenging: the performance of all methods we tested dropped on adversarial prompts compared to that with normal test prompts. Nevertheless, we find that our P-ESD is still robust among baselines. In Fig. 4, we present concrete examples of attack results which our method remains robust to the attack. These results demonstrate that our proposed method serves as an effective strategy for enhancing the robustness of concept erasing in the nudity task. In Tab. 2, we also test the detected nudity number on the whole I2P dataset containing 4703 test prompts. Particularly, P-ESD deduces the detected nudity to 19, significantly lower than existing methods.

One may conjecture that the superior performance in concept erasing is greatly hurt by pruning the image generation ability. To examine the image generation ability in terms of the fidelity (FID) score on 30K prompts from the COCO dataset. We aim to compare the change before pruning and after pruning. The results are displayed in Tab. 4. We see that our method does not sacrifice

Table 3: Concept erasure rate for erasing style.

| | UCE | AC | ESD | P-AC | P-ESD |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| <i>Test Prompts</i> | 0.28 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.80 | 1.00 |
| <i>Adversarial Prompts:</i> | | | | | |
| UnlearnDiff | 0.04 | 0.42 | 0.52 | 0.62 | 0.90 |
| P4D | 0.06 | 0.46 | 0.56 | 0.62 | 0.86 |

Table 4: FID comparison

| | |
|--------|-------------|
| SD | 14.64 |
| nudity | ESD 14.32 |
| | P-ESD 13.60 |
| style | ESD 15.01 |
| | P-ESD 15.08 |

Table 5: Concept erasing rate for erasing objects.

| | Tench | | | | Parachute | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | FMN | UCE | ESD | P-ESD | FMN | UCE | ESD | P-ESD |
| <i>Test Prompts</i> | 0.64 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.48 | 0.98 | 0.94 | <u>0.96</u> |
| <i>Adversarial Prompts:</i> | | | | | | | | |
| UnlearnDiff | 0.12 | 0.96 | 0.78 | <u>0.92</u> | 0.02 | 0.84 | 0.64 | <u>0.80</u> |
| P4D | 0.14 | 0.92 | 0.86 | 0.98 | 0.08 | 0.90 | <u>0.82</u> | 0.74 |
| | Church | | | | Garbage Truck | | | |
| | FMN | UCE | ESD | P-ESD | FMN | UCE | ESD | P-ESD |
| <i>Test Prompts</i> | 0.48 | 0.94 | 0.86 | <u>0.88</u> | 0.54 | <u>0.98</u> | <u>0.98</u> | 1.00 |
| <i>Adversarial Prompts:</i> | | | | | | | | |
| UnlearnDiff | 0.12 | 0.74 | 0.58 | <u>0.64</u> | 0.08 | 0.84 | 0.90 | <u>0.86</u> |
| P4D | 0.16 | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.68 | 0.04 | <u>0.88</u> | 0.82 | 0.94 |

the quality of generated contents. This is also reflected in the example images provided.

4.3 Erasing Style

In this section, we consider to remove the artist style, a more abstract concept, from diffusion models. Following [41], we choose to examine the effectiveness of various methods in erasing the "Van Gogh" style from diffusion model. There are 50 test prompts. The success of concept erasing is evaluated using a style classifier to check if the "Van Gogh" style is among the top-3 predictions for images generated by the model after concept erasing has been applied. We report the results in Tab. 3. Among the existing methods, ESD emerges as the most effective aimed at erasing style. The introduction of pruning further enhances the robustness, significantly increasing the concept erasure rates under attacks. We also compare the generation quality in Tab. 4, as seen, with a notable improvement in concept erasure, P-ESD has similar generation quality on COCO 30k prompts as ESD.

4.4 Erasing Objects

In Table 5, we report the concept erasing performance across various objects, including "tench", "parachute", "church", and "garbage truck", which are re-




Fig. 4: Visualization examples. The black boxes in the first two rows are added by the authors to hide NSFW content for publication. The symbol \checkmark represents successful concept erasure, and \times indicates a failure in concept erasure.

ported in [10] to be the top-4 hardest classes to be erased within the Imagenette subset. For each object class, we use the 50 prompts from [41] generated by ChatGPT. It is observed that among the existing methods, UCE demonstrates as a strong baseline and outperforms FMN and ESD. However, by integrating pruning into ESD, P-ESD exhibits enhanced performance over ESD on adversarial prompts and competes favorably with UCE. This indicates that our pruning-based approach exhibit greater robustness than fine-tuning when optimizing the same erasing objective.

4.5 Analysis of the Proposed Method

Sensitivity analysis. To explain the improved robustness, we compare the sensitivity score of fine-tuning-based and pruning-based erasing methods, ESD and P-ESD. Fig. 5 compares the sensitivity score of concept neurons in ESD and P-ESD when erasing nudity, style (van gogh), and object (church). We compute over 5 timesteps, selected at intervals of 10 steps across 50 diffusion steps. We




Fig. 5: Sensitivity score comparison of concept neurons between ESD and P-ESD.




Fig. 6: (a) Compare prune after erasing, prune before erasing and prune with erasing. (b-c) Percent to pruned weights of each layer type.

could observe that ESD consistently decrease the sensitivity score throughout the denoising process, which explain the improved robustness. We could also notice the phenomenon that the sensitivity scores tend to rise with an increase in steps, this may be due to the sensitivity accumulation over the denoising process.

Why pruning with erasing? We further analyze which pruning approach best enhances concept erasing. Three methods are compared based on when pruning are conducted for removing nudity:

- Prune before erasing (Pre-Prune): [24] suggests pruning before unlearning improves the robustness in classification tasks, we apply this to generative tasks with Stable Diffusion. Initially, we globally prune 10% of pre-trained weights by magnitude. During the erasing phase, these pruned weights are fixed (no gradient), and the remaining weights are fine-tuned using ESD.
- Prune with Erasing: This method corresponds to our proposed P-ESD, which involves pruning directly during the erasing process, optimizing the model specifically for erasing objective. The final pruned ratio is 0.0012%.
- Prune after Erasing (Post-Prune): This combines concept erasing and pruning by firstly erasing using the standard ESD method, followed by a global pruning of the model by magnitude. The prune rate is set to 10%.

Table 6: Compare neuron pruning (NP-ESD) and parameter pruning (P-ESD).

| | | ESD | NP-ESD | P-ESD |
|----------------------|---------------------|-------|--------|--------------|
| Concept Erasing Rate | test prompts | 0.60 | 0.87 | 0.95 |
| | adversarial prompts | 0.40 | 0.56 | 0.86 |
| FID | | 14.32 | 17.31 | 13.60 |

In Fig. 6, we compare three pruning strategies against ESD without pruning. All methods improve on test and adversarial prompts, highlighting the role of neural network sparsity in robust concept erasing. P-ESD stands out as the most effective strategy, with the least pruned weights. This could be due to the fact that pruning aware of the erasing objective could achieve localized robustness for the erased concept, while generic pruning aimed at merely increasing the network’s sparsity may leads to a widespread reduction in neuron sensitivity.

Analysis on pruned weights. For P-ESD, the final pruning ratios in the above erasing tasks are consistently at the level of 1×10^{-5} . To analysis which parameters are mostly pruned. In Fig. 6(b-c), we illustrate the percentage of pruned weight of relative to the total pruned weights in each layer, when pruning the unconditional layers for erasing tench (b) and the conditional layers for erasing style (c). It is observed that when pruning the unconditional layers, the majority of pruned weights are in the attention layers, including the input/output projection layers and feedforward layer. When pruning conditional layers, the mostly pruned weights are found in the cross-attention value matrix, this is because value matrix of cross attention layer plays a crucial role in determining which parts of the texture information are been leveraged to generate the visual content.

Concept Erasing by Neuron Pruning We also evaluate the erasing performance by pruning the identified concept neurons directly. By training the model to erased nudity using ESD, we then prune (set the value of neurons to zero) the top-1 concept neurons in each layer that exhibit the largest activation variance between the original and the erased models. As indicated in Table 6, this approach of directly pruning concept neurons (NP-ESD) enhances the effectiveness of concept erasure on both the test prompts and adversarial prompts (searched by UnlearnDiff). However, this method could compromise the quality of generating safe content, as evidenced by the increase in the fidelity (FID) score for COCO 30k prompts from 14.32 to 17.31. This effect might occur because the identified concept neurons are not solely associated with a single target concept. In contrast, our proposed technique, which involves pruning within the parameter space (P-ESD), achieves both a high rate of concept erasure and maintains a low fidelity score.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we present a new pruning strategy to address the robustness issue in existing concept erasing frameworks. Our method selectively prunes critical parameters related to the concepts targeted for removal. We empirically validate its superior performance over prior methods and explore why it improves the internal robustness of diffusion models. We hope our work can mitigate the risk associated with deploying diffusion models in the open world, where they may encounter adversarial prompts, and the robustness is critical.

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A Vulnerability of Concept Erasing

A.1 Concept Neuron Identification

The concept neurons are identified from the output of the SiLU() activation function following the last convolution layer within the UNet’s ResNet blocks, which comprise a total of 22 nonlinear layers. We use the original test prompts in experiment section to identify the concept neurons. Additional visualizations where neurons, though deactivated in the erased model but reactivated by adversarial prompts are shown in Fig. 8, Fig. 9, Fig. 10, and Fig. 11. In both the main text and supplementary materials, these neurons are visualized at an intermediate diffusion step of $t=30$.

A.2 Sensitivity Score Measurement

To measure the sensitivity score, the original test prompts and adversarial prompts are from the prompts used in the experiment section. Specifically, we choose test prompts that have been effectively using both ESD and P-ESD methods to include in our measurement. The adversarial prompts are generated through the UnlearnDiff method. In total, the dataset comprises 104 prompt pairs for nudity, 42 for style, and 39 for church. As depicted in Fig. 7, when attacked, under different diffusion steps, concept neurons always register higher sensitivity scores compared to non-concept neurons.

B Supplementary Experimental Setups

B.1 Pruning Setup

In the P-ESD method, we employ the AdamW optimizer, setting the learning rate for optimizing the soft mask at 0.1. The total training step is 250. For the P-AC method, we use the AdamW optimizer with a learning rate of 0.01. The total training step is 1000.

B.2 Attack Setup

We use two recently proposed attack methods: P4D [8] and UnlearnDiff [41]. For both methods, the prepended prompt perturbation is set as 5 tokens for erasing nudity, and 3 tokens for erasing style and object. For each prompt, we conduct 10 attacks on samples drawn from 10 timesteps, selected at intervals of 5 steps across 50 diffusion steps. The prepended prompt perturbations are optimized for 40 iterations with a Adam optimizer. The learning rate is 0.01 and weight decay is 0.1 at each step.




Fig. 7: Sensitivity score of concept and non-concept neurons when attacked under different time steps. The results are obtained from the concept-erased models for nudity, van gogh (style), and church (object).

Table 7: FID comparison on COCO-30k prompts between ESD and P-ESD when erasing objects. The original stable diffusion model’s FID score is 14.64.

| | tench | church | garbage truck | parachute |
|-------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| ESD | 13.72 | 16.07 | 17.75 | 16.21 |
| P-ESD | 13.23 | 16.72 | 14.09 | 15.31 |

Table 8: Hyper-parameter analysis.

| | $\eta=5$ | $\eta=10$ | $\eta=15$ |
|----------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Concept Erasing Rate (CER) | 0.59 | 0.86 | 0.89 |
| FID | 12.75 | 13.60 | 14.06 |

C Supplementary Experimental Results

C.1 FID Comparison for Erasing Objects

In Tab. 7, we present the fidelity (FID) scores for the COCO 30k prompts focusing on object erasure using ESD, and P-ESD methods. It is observed that P-ESD maintains a generation quality comparable to, or better than, the ESD method. The FID scores are calculated using *clean-fid*⁶.

C.2 Hyper-Parameter Analysis.

We analyze the impact of hyper-parameter η on the concept erasing rate under UnlearnDiff attack and generation quality (FID) on erasing nudity. As shown in Tab. 8 The default choice $\eta = 10$ provides a good trade-off. A larger $\eta (= 15)$ results in worse generation quality. A smaller $\eta (= 5)$ converges slower and shows less effective in erasing. When $\eta = 10$, the soft masks concentrate on 0 and 1, so we don’t need to heavily tune the threshold (η) and set it empirically at 0.5.

⁶ <https://github.com/GaParmar/clean-fid>

D Broader Impacts

This paper seeks to address the issue of diffusion models generating inappropriate content, including nudity and copyrighted artworks. However, our defense technique could inadvertently pave the way for the development of more sophisticated attack strategies, which are not expected.

E Limitations

The identification of concept neurons in our study uses a numerical criterion that evaluates the reduction in activation values from the original model to the erased model. A greater reduction in activation is interpreted as a higher correlation with the target concept intended for erasure, leading us to empirically select the top-5 neurons as concept neurons. However, it is important to acknowledge that this identification process may be sensitive to the selection of the erased model, and the optimal number of neurons to consider (denoted by k in the top- k selection) may differ across various erasure tasks and neural layers. Therefore, this criterion is only employed as an exploratory tool for global sensitivity analysis, aimed at illustrating the vulnerabilities of existing methods. We leave more accurate concept neuron identification methodologies for future works.

F Responsibility to Human Subjects

The prompts utilized to assess the efficacy of our methods in eliminating nudity might encompass descriptions that some may find sensitive, pertaining to the human body in a state of undress. We assure that the inclusion of such prompts is strictly for academic purposes, aimed at exploring strategies to prevent the model from producing potentially offensive content. We have taken careful measures to ensure that any images featuring nudity, used within the context of this research, are appropriately modified—either blurred or covered—to maintain decorum and adhere to publication standards.




Fig. 8: Visualization of concept neurons in the original stable diffusion (SD) and the edited SD by the ESD [10] method when erasing tench.




Fig. 9: Visualization of concept neurons in the original stable diffusion (SD) and the edited SD by the ESD [10] method when erasing church.




Fig. 10: Visualization of concept neurons in the original stable diffusion (SD) and the edited SD by the ESD [10] method when erasing Van Gogh.




Fig. 11: Visualization of concept neurons in the original stable diffusion (SD) and the edited SD by the ESD [10] method when erasing nudity.