

New Keynesian Model

1-33 (HW3)

Outline

- ▶ Gali Chapter 2 (skipped)
 - ▶ Perfect competition, flexible prices and wages: monetary policy has effects only on nominal variables.
 - ▶ Even money in the utility, the resulting non-neutrality is quantitatively small and empirically little relevant.
- ▶ The Baseline New Keynesian Model
- ▶ Early Critiques of the NK Model
- ▶ Medium-Scale NK Models
 - ▶ Credible Disinflation
 - ▶ Sticky Inflation and Responses
- ▶ Recent Critiques and Tests of the New Keynesian Model
 - ▶ The Minnesota Critique
 - ▶ The Cochrane Critique: Taylor Rule and Indeterminacy
 - ▶ The New Keynesian Phillips Curve in the Data.

垄断竞争
价格粘性

Roadmap

- ▶ The textbook New Keynesian model includes:
 - ▶ Monopolistic Competition, product differentiation
 - ▶ Nominal Rigidity, staggered price setting (Calvo (1983))

The Three Blocks

Three "blocks" to the model and the three equations. (IS-LM?)

- ▶ Households and IS curve
- ▶ Firms and the Phillips curve
- ▶ Monetary authority and a monetary policy rule to close the model.

Investment - Saving $\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} E_t \left\{ \hat{i}_t - \pi_{t+1}^{\hat{n}} - r_t^{\hat{n}} \right\} + E_t \{ \tilde{y}_{t+1} \}$

Inflation - Output $\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1} \} \quad \lambda = \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}$

Nominal Interest Rate $\hat{i}_t = \phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t + v_t \quad K = \lambda(\sigma + \psi)$

$\theta \uparrow, \lambda \downarrow, K \downarrow$.

Phillips 曲线变平坦。

Households

$$\max_{C_t, N_t, B_t} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left(\frac{C_t^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right) Z_t$$

↑ Labor

需求冲击

$$s.t. \quad C_t + Q_t \frac{B_t}{P_t} = \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + \frac{W_t}{P_t} N_t + \frac{\Pi_t}{P_t}$$

利润分红

FOCs:

$$\lambda_t = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma}$$

$$\lambda_t w_t = Z_t N_t^\varphi$$

变量: $Q_t = 1/R_t = \beta E_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}$

where $w_t = W_t/P_t$

Consumption Varieties

混合消費束

- ▶ C_t is the choice of the composite consumption bundle
- ▶ Structure of monopolistic competition follows Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Different varieties of goods

CES Aggregation:

$$C_t = \left[\int_0^1 C_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

ϵ : 可替代性

- ▶ ϵ is the price elasticity of demand for variety j

Maximization of C_t

$$\max_{c_t(j)} \left[\int_0^1 C_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

最大化消费

$$s.t. \quad X_t = \int_0^1 P_t(j)C_t(j) dj \quad \text{预算约束}$$

FOC: 总支出 = 消费 预算约束.

$$\{C_t(j)\} : \quad C_t(j)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} C_t^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}} = \xi_t P_t(j)$$

求出 $C_t(j)$ 需求方程

$$C_t = \left[\int_0^1 C_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} dj \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

Solution

$$\ln C_t(i) - \ln C_t(j) = -\varepsilon \ln P_t(i) + \varepsilon \ln P_t(j)$$

$$\frac{C_t(i)}{C_t(j)} = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t(j)}\right)^{-\varepsilon} \quad \ln \frac{C_t(i)}{C_t(j)} = -\varepsilon \ln \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t(j)}$$

$$C_t(j) = C_t(i) \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t(j)}\right)^{\varepsilon} \quad -\varepsilon \downarrow$$

plug into

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= \int_0^1 P_t(j) C_t(j) dj = \int_0^1 P_t(j) C_t(i) \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t(j)}\right)^{\varepsilon} dj \\ &= C_t(i) P_t(i)^{\varepsilon} \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\varepsilon} dj \end{aligned}$$

get

$$C_t(i) = P_t(i)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\varepsilon} dj}$$

Solution

$$C_t(i) = P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj}$$

plug into definition of C_t

$$\begin{aligned} C_t &= \left[\int_0^1 C_t(i)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \\ &= \left[\int_0^1 \left(P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} di \right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \\ &= \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj} \left(\int_0^1 P_t(i)^{1-\epsilon} di \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \\ &= \frac{X_t}{\left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}} \quad \text{对的吗} \end{aligned}$$

of which the last equation comes from that i and j are inter-changeable in the last step.

Solution

From

$$C_t = \frac{X_t}{\left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}}$$

combining with definition

$$X_t = P_t C_t$$

we know that

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

Back again into our previous equation

$$\begin{aligned} C_t(i) &= P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj} = P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{P_t^{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{P_t} = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t \end{aligned}$$

Producers

- Demand for variety i

$$\begin{aligned} C_t(i) &= P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj} = P_t(i)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{P_t^{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} \frac{X_t}{P_t} = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} C_t \end{aligned}$$

constant Return to Scale

- Produce variety CRS with labor

Supply $Y_t(i) = A_t N_t(i)$

- Output must equal consumption for each variety:

Demand $Y_t(i) = C_t(i)$

Producers: Factor demand

- ▶ Firms demands labor to minimize cost subject to production constraint

$$\mathcal{L} : w_t N_t(i) + \phi_t (Y_t(i) - A_t N_t(i))$$

$$\min_{N_t(i)} w_t N_t(i) + \phi_t (Y_t(i) - A_t N_t(i))$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial N_t(i)} = w_t - \phi_t A_t = 0 \Rightarrow \phi_t = \frac{w_t}{A_t}.$$

- ▶ ϕ_t is real marginal cost, w is the real wage

$$\{ \phi_t(i) \} : \quad \phi_t = mc_t = w_t / A_t$$

real marginal cost is the same for all firms.

Producers: Calvo Assumption

firm 由静态到动态

- ▶ Calvo (1983) pricing assumption: Each firm resets price each period with iid probability $1 - \theta$.
- ▶ By LLN, fraction that reset is $1 - \theta$ and fraction constant is θ .
 - ▶ Average price duration follows geometric distribution with mean duration $\frac{1}{1-\theta}$.
- ▶ Is the world Calvo?
 - ▶ Literally, no.
 - ▶ But it could be a decent approximation
- ▶ Literature on "menu cost" models where there is an inaction region due to fixed cost of changing price.
 - ▶ Initial literature: Much more flexible than Calvo.
 - ▶ Recent literature: To match micro-pricing facts, need large and infrequent firm-level MC shocks, which looks close to Calvo.

Producers: the pricing decision

- ▶ Firms that adjust prices choose $P_t(i), Y_t(i), N_t(i)$ to maximize expected discounted profits and demand.
- ▶ Firms takes into account the possibility they will have to keep this price in the future. (Different with simple RBC)
- ▶ For those who re-optimize [there are other terms in firms' objective function omitted here for they are not related to $P_t(i)$]:

消費

$$\max_{P_t(i)} E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \beta^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t} \left[\frac{P_t(i)}{P_{t+s}} Y_{t+s}(i) - \phi_{t+s} Y_{t+s}(i) \right]$$

$$s.t. \quad C_t(i) = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_t$$

$$Y_{t+s}(i) = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon}$$

$$and \quad C_t(i) = Y_t(i) \quad and \quad C_t = Y_t$$

$$\mathcal{L} = E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \beta^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t} \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_{t+s}} - \psi_{t+s} \right) \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{\epsilon} Y_{t+s}$$

Optimal Price re-setting

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p_{t+1}} = E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t+s} Y_{t+s} \left((1-\epsilon) \left(\frac{1}{P_{t+s}}\right)^{1-\epsilon} P_{t+s}^{-\epsilon} - \right. \\ \left. + \phi_{t+s} \epsilon \frac{P_{t+s}^{-\epsilon} - 1}{(P_{t+s})^{1-\epsilon}} \right) = 0$$

Solve it, we get:

\Rightarrow

$$\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1} P_{t+s} \phi_{t+s}$$

- If $\theta = 0$, no stickiness and this collapse to flex price model.

$$P_t^* = (1 + \mu) \phi_t P_t, \quad \mu = \frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}$$

- If $\theta > 0$, then the optimal reset price is a markup over a weighted average of expected future marginal costs:

这叫什么
权重

$$P_t^* = (1 + \mu) \frac{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} P_{t+s} \phi_{t+s}}{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1}}$$

re-define $\Lambda_{t,t+s} = \beta^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t}$ is the stochastic discount factor

Price Dynamics with Calvo

- ▶ Assume symmetric model, so fraction $1 - \theta$ of firms adjust to P_t^* and fraction θ keep $P_{t-1}(i)$

$$\begin{aligned} P_t &= \left[\int_0^1 P_t(i)^{1-\epsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= \left[\theta \int_0^1 P_{t-1}(i)^{1-\epsilon} di + (1 - \theta) \int_0^1 (P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= \left[\theta \left[\int_0^1 P_{t-1}(i)^{1-\epsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1-\epsilon}{1-\epsilon}} + (1 - \theta) \int_0^1 (P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \\ &= [\theta P_{t-1}^{1-\epsilon} + (1 - \theta)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon}]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}} \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Price index P_t is geometric average of P_{t-1} and P_t^* .
- ▶ Recursive formulation is part of why Calvo is so tractable.

Inflation Dynamics with Calvo

- ▶ Divide by P_{t-1} to get inflation between $t - 1$ and t , Π_t

$$\text{[JPK]} \quad \Pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \left[\theta + (1 - \theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

- ▶ Calvo pricing implies a partial adjustment mechanism:
 - ▶ If $P_t^* = P_{t-1}$, $\Pi_t = 1$
 - ▶ If $P_t^* > P_{t-1}$, $\Pi_t > 1$ and $P_t \neq P_{t-1}$.

Completing the Model

- ▶ Aggregate output is

$$\begin{aligned}N_t &= \int_0^1 N_t(i) di \\N_t &= \int_0^1 \frac{Y_t(i)}{A_t} di = \frac{Y_t}{A_t} \int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di \\Y_t &= A_t N_t \frac{1}{\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di}\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Term in fraction is loss in output due to misallocation caused by price dispersion.
- ▶ Creates welfare costs of inflation, but it is second order and drops out of log-linearization.

A slightly detour: The labor wedge

- ▶ Because of CRS, nominal marginal cost is:

$$MC_t = \frac{W_t}{Y_t(i)/N_t(i)} = \frac{W_t}{A_t}$$

实际边际成本 $mct = \frac{MC_t}{P_t}$

- ▶ The labor wedge
 - ▶ Note that for firm with markup $\mu_t(i)$,

$$1 + \mu_t(i) = \frac{P_t(i)/P_t}{mct}$$

- ▶ In flexible price equilibrium, $P_t(i)/P_t = 1$ so

$$1 + \mu_t(i) = 1/mct = \frac{Y_t/N_t}{W_t/P_t} = \frac{MPL_t}{MRS_t}$$

Monetary Policy Rule

We will later introduce central bank policy rule directly in log-linearized form

New Keynesian Model Equilibrium

Definition

A symmetric equilibrium is an allocation $\{C_{t+s}, N_{t+s}, Y_{t+s}\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ and set of prices $\{P_{t+s}^*, P_{t+s}, W_{t+s}, Q_{t+s}\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ along with exogenous processes $\{A_{t+s}, Z_{t+s}, v_{t+s}\}_{s=0}^{\infty}$ such that:

1. *Households optimize: Euler, labor-leisure, (money demand in background as the central bank chooses Q_{t+s} , putting B_{t+s} in background as well.)*
2. *Firm optimize: Price index follows dynamic Calvo formulation; Intermediate reset prices are chosen optimally given nominal marginal cost: $MC_t = \frac{W_t}{Y_t(i)/N_t(i)} = \frac{W_t}{A_t}$.*
3. *Central bank follows interest rate rule with shock v_t .*
4. *Labor and goods (and bond) markets clear.*

Log Linearization Strategy

(sticky price)

IVK output - flexible price output.

$$\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n$$

- ▶ Phillips curve should be function of output gap, so want to write whole model as functions of output gap.
- ▶ Strategy:
 1. Log-linearize Model around zero-inflation steady state.
(IS-PC-MP)
 2. Log-linearize Flexible Price Equilibrium.
 3. Difference to get equilibrium in terms of output gap.

Log Linearization: supply block

$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \frac{N_t^\varphi}{C_t^{-\sigma}}$$

$$Y_t = A_t N_t \frac{1}{\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di}$$

$$\Pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \left[\theta + (1-\theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

$$P_t^* = (1+\mu) \frac{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} P_{t+s} \phi_{t+s}}{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1}}$$

Labor-leisure:

$$\hat{w}_t - \hat{p}_t = \varphi \hat{n}_t + \sigma \hat{c}_t$$

Production function: [one term missing here, see appendix slides]

$$\hat{y}_t = \hat{a}_t + \hat{n}_t$$

Log Linearization: Inflation and Reset Prices

Details in appendix slides

- ▶ Key trick: Zero inflation steady state
- ▶ The price index can be log-linearized to get

$$\hat{p}_t = \theta \hat{p}_{t-1} + (1 - \theta) \hat{p}_t^* \quad \leftarrow$$
$$\hat{\pi}_t = (1 - \theta)(\hat{p}_t^* - \hat{p}_{t-1})$$
$$P_t = [\theta P_{t-1}^{1-\theta} + (1-\theta) P_t^{*1-\theta}]^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$$

Log Linearization: Phillips Curve

- We will get an expectation-augmented Phillips curve [see appendix slides for details]:

加原成本变动更少的那部分进入 $\hat{\pi}_t$.

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \lambda \hat{\phi}_t + \beta E_t \{ \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \}$$

where

$$\lambda = \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta} \quad \theta \uparrow, \uparrow \downarrow$$

- Inflation is equal to expected future inflation plus the deviation of marginal cost from its steady state level.
- Iterating forward

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \lambda E_t \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \hat{\phi}_{t+s} \right\} = \lambda E_t \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \hat{m}c_{t+s} \right\}$$

- Inflation is the present discounted value of future marginal cost/markup deviations from steady state.

Log Linearization: Real Marginal Costs

Real marginal cost:

$\hat{mct} = \hat{w}_t - \hat{p}_t - \hat{a}_t$

\nwarrow mct 的百分比变动而非 MC_t 的百分比变动

Combine labor-leisure, production function, and $\hat{c}_t = \hat{y}_t$:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{w}_t - \hat{p}_t &= \varphi \hat{a}_t + \sigma \hat{c}_t \\ &= \varphi (\hat{y}_t - \hat{a}_t) + \sigma \hat{a}_t \quad \hat{w}_t - \hat{p}_t = (\sigma + \varphi) \hat{y}_t - \varphi \hat{a}_t \\ \text{Consequently } &= (\sigma + \varphi) \hat{y}_t - \varphi \hat{a}_t\end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{mct} = (\sigma + \varphi) \hat{y}_t - (1 + \varphi) \hat{a}_t$$

Log Linearization: Flexible Price Equilibrium

$$Y_t^n = A_t N_t^n$$

$$\frac{W_t^n}{P_t^n} = \frac{A_t}{1 + \mu}$$

$$\frac{W_t^n}{P_t^n} = \frac{(N_t^n)^\varphi}{(C_t^n)^{-\sigma}}$$

$$Y_t^n = C_t^n$$

$$\frac{A_t}{1 + \mu} = \frac{(N_t^n)^\varphi}{(C_t^n)^{-\sigma}}$$

$$A_t = (1 + \mu) \left(\frac{Y_t^n}{A_t} \right)^\varphi \cdot Y_t^n$$

$$A_t^{1+\varphi} = (1 + \mu) (Y_t^n)^{\sigma + \varphi}$$

$$A_t^{1+\varphi} = (1 + \mu) (Y_t^n)^{\sigma + \varphi}$$

$$(\sigma + \varphi) \hat{y}_t^n = (1 + \varphi) \hat{a}_t$$

Combine to get:

Real Marginal Costs in Terms of Output Gap

$$\tilde{y}_t = \hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n = \frac{\hat{y}_t - y}{y} - \frac{\hat{y}_t^n - y}{y} = \frac{\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n}{y}.$$

► Combine:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{m}c_t &= (\sigma + \varphi)\hat{y}_t - (1 + \varphi)\hat{a}_t & \hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n \\ (\sigma + \varphi)\hat{y}_t^n &= (1 + \varphi)\hat{a}_t & NK\text{条件下} - \text{flexible price}\end{aligned}$$

to write real marginal costs in terms of output gap \tilde{y}_t :

$$\hat{m}c_t = (\sigma + \varphi)(\hat{y}_t - \hat{y}_t^n) = (\sigma + \varphi)\tilde{y}_t$$

- Real marginal costs go up (and markups go down) when the output gap is high.
- del. (*) {
- To produce more than under flex prices, markup must be lower.
 - Marginal costs high because need to hire more workers, bidding up real wage.
 - Stronger when Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution and labor supply elasticity are low.

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve

- ▶ Plug back into the Phillips curve $\hat{\pi}_t = \lambda \hat{m}c_t + \beta E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\}$:

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\}$$

where $\kappa = \lambda(\sigma + \varphi)$.  Phillips curve slope

- ▶ This is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve: an expectations augmented Phillips curve written in terms of the output gap.
- ▶ Solving forward,

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \tilde{y}_{t+s}$$

- ▶ Inflation is an increasing function of future output gaps.

Log Linearization: Demand

$$\frac{I}{P_t} = \beta E_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}$$

$$Q_t = 1/R_t = \beta E_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}}$$

$$Y_t = C_t$$

$$-\hat{r}_t = +(\hat{\pi}_{t+1} - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}) - \sigma (\hat{q} - E_t \hat{C}_{t+1}) - (\hat{i}_t - E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}) = \dots$$

$$\sigma(\hat{q} - E_t \hat{C}_{t+1}) + (\hat{i}_t - E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\}) - \hat{z}_t - E_t \hat{z}_{t+1}). \quad \hat{c}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(\dots)$$

- ▶ Log-linearize Euler around zero-inflation.

$$\hat{c}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(\hat{i}_t - E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{z}_t - E_t \hat{z}_{t+1})) + E_t \{\hat{c}_{t+1}\}$$

- ▶ Combine with market clearing and use :

$$\hat{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(\hat{i}_t - E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\} - (\hat{z}_t - E_t \hat{z}_{t+1})) + E_t \{\hat{y}_{t+1}\}$$

- ▶ This is the dynamic IS curve. It relates output to future expectations of output and the real interest rate.

The Natural Rate of Interest

- ▶ Define the natural rate of interest \hat{r}_t^n as the real interest rate that would prevail when output is equal to its flexible level (natural level of output):

$$\hat{y}_t^n = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(\hat{r}_t^n - (\hat{z}_t - E_t z_{t+1})) + E_t\{\hat{y}_{t+1}\}$$

- ▶ Recall $\hat{y}_t^n = (\frac{1+\varphi}{\sigma+\varphi})\hat{a}_t$ so:

$$\hat{r}_t^n = \sigma\left(\frac{1+\varphi}{\sigma+\varphi}\right)E_t\{\hat{a}_{t+1} - \hat{a}_t\} + \underbrace{(\hat{z}_t - E_t z_{t+1})}_{\text{demand shock}}$$

- ▶ If a_t follows an AR(1) and grows today, it will be expected to decline between today and tomorrow due to mean reversion.
- ▶ So positive tech shock causes real interest rate to fall by standard RBC logic.

IS Curve in Terms of the Output Gap

$$\hat{r}_t = \hat{i}_t - E_t^2 [\hat{\pi}_{t+1}].$$

$$\hat{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} (\hat{i}_t - \underbrace{E_t \{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\}}_{\text{natural}} - (\hat{z}_t - E_t z_{t+1})) + E_t \{\hat{y}_{t+1}\} \quad (1)$$

$$\hat{y}_t^n = -\frac{1}{\sigma} (\hat{r}_t^n - (\hat{z}_t - E_t z_{t+1})) + E_t \{\hat{y}_{t+1}^n\} \quad (2)$$

(1)-(2):

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} E_t \left\{ \hat{i}_t - \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{r}_t^n \right\} + E_t \{\tilde{y}_{t+1}\}$$

Iterating forward, the current output gap depends negatively on the gap between the real interest rate and the natural rate of interest:

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} E_t \left\{ \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\hat{r}_{t+s} - \hat{r}_{t+s}^n) \right\}$$

The Three Equation Model

In sum, the NK model boils down to three equations:

$$\tilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma} E_t \left\{ \hat{i}_t - \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{r}_t^n \right\} + E_t \{ \tilde{y}_{t+1} \}$$

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta E_t \{ \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \}$$

$$\hat{i}_t = \phi_\pi \hat{\pi}_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t + v_t$$

with three unknowns: \hat{i}_t , \tilde{y}_t , and $\hat{\pi}_t$ and an exogenous driving process for the natural rate:


$$\hat{r}_t^n = \sigma \left(\frac{1 + \varphi}{\sigma + \varphi} \right) E_t \{ \hat{a}_{t+1} - \hat{a}_t \} + (\hat{z}_t - E_t \hat{z}_{t+1})$$

Calibration Parameters


- ▶ $\beta = 0.99$
- ▶ $\alpha = 0.33$ (Back to more general case). $\sigma = 1$ (Log utility),
 $\phi = 5$ (Frisch elasticity of labor supply: 0.2)
- ▶ $\epsilon = 9$ (Steady state markup: 12.5 percent)
- ▶ $\theta = 0.75$ (Average price duration: four quarters)
- ▶ $\phi_\pi = 1.5, \phi_y = 0.125.$
- ▶ $\rho_v = 0.5, \rho_z = 0.5, \rho_a = 0.9$

Impulse Response: Monetary Shock


$M \uparrow$



Impulse Response: Discount Rate Shock



Impulse Response: Tech Shock



Limitation of "Simple" NK Models

- ▶ "Simple" New Keynesian models like the one we have studied have limitations.
 - ▶ For starters, no capital!
 - ▶ No inflation persistence.
 - ▶ No wage stickiness (which makes marginal costs sticky and prices stickier).
 - ▶ Little amplification of Calvo friction (price level has adjusted once the time most firms have reset price).
- ▶ Big literature adding many features back into basic NK model.

Medium-Scale NK Models

- ▶ "State of the Art" for NK literature (absent financial frictions) is "Medium-Scale" models of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
- ▶ Goal: Quantitative parameterized model that can be used for
 -
 - ▶ Forecasting
 - ▶ But also, structural model so can be used for shock decompositions, policy experiments, and other counterfactuals.
- ▶ Consequently, add features to RBC to fit data, add features to NK to fully fit data.
 - ▶ Then use GMM or Bayesian methods to fit model to match VAR impulse responses in simulated data.
- ▶ Parameterized models do a remarkably good job
 - ▶ As good at forecasting over 1-2 years as VAR
 - ▶ Allow for shock decompositions and counterfactuals
 - ▶ Used at many central banks

Medium-Scale NK Models: Smets and Wouters

- ▶ Example: Smets and Wouters (2007) has
 - ▶ Calvo pricing and inflation indexation
 - ▶ Calvo wages
 - ▶ Capital and investment adjustment costs
 - ▶ Habit formation in consumption
 - ▶ Variable capital utilization
 - ▶ Fixed costs in production
 - ▶ Strategic complementarity in price setting
- ▶ And seven shocks:
 - ▶ TFP
 - ▶ Risk premium shock
 - ▶ Investment technology shocks
 - ▶ Wage markup shocks
 - ▶ Price markup shocks
 - ▶ Government spending shock
 - ▶ Monetary policy shock
- ▶ When people say "New Keynesian" they mean these models

Does the NKPC Hold in the Data?

- ▶ NK Phillips Curve is at the center of the NK model
- ▶ Final critique: Does it hold in the data?

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa \tilde{y}_t + \beta E_t\{\hat{\pi}_{t+1}\}$$

- ▶ How do we measure inflation expectations?
- ▶ How do we measure "natural rate of output" and output gap?
- ▶ One approach: Are markups countercyclical?

APPENDIX

Connecting inflation with the optimal reset price

We need to log-linearize the following equation connecting the current price index with the lagged price index and the optimal reset price.

$$\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \left[\theta + (1 - \theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$
$$\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon} = \theta + (1 - \theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\epsilon}$$

Take the total derivative around the steady state:

$$(1 - \epsilon) \left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\epsilon} (dp_t - dp_{t-1}) = (1 - \theta)(1 - \epsilon) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\epsilon} (dp_t^* - dp_{t-1})$$

since we are at the steady state, the term in blue equals one.

$$p\hat{p}_t - p\hat{p}_{t-1} = (1 - \theta)(p\hat{p}_t^* - p\hat{p}_{t-1})$$

Connecting inflation with the optimal reset price

$$\hat{pp_t} - \hat{pp_{t-1}} = (1 - \theta)(\hat{pp_t^*} - \hat{pp_{t-1}})$$

in which we use the definition of $\hat{x}_t = \frac{x_t - x}{x} = \frac{dx_t}{x}$. x is the steady state value for a certain variable.

Then we get

$$\hat{\pi_t} = (1 - \theta)(\hat{p_t^*} - \hat{p_{t-1}})$$

Appendix: price dispersion in production

We need to log-linearize the following term

$$Y_t = A_t N_t \frac{1}{\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di}$$

we write in the following form:

$$\hat{y}_t = \hat{a}_t + \hat{n}_t - \hat{d}_t$$

of which d_t corresponds to the price dispersion term.

Appendix: Log Linearization

- ▶ Taylor Expansion of $f(x)$ around x^*

$$f(x) = f(x^*) + \frac{f'(x^*)}{1!}(x - x^*) + \frac{f''(x^*)}{2!}(x - x^*)^2 + \dots$$

- ▶ For a sufficiently smooth function, the higher order derivatives will be small.

$$f(x) = f(x^*) + f'(x^*)(x - x^*)$$

- ▶ Log Linearization: log it first, Taylor expand it then.

Appendix: Log Linearization

- ▶ Example

$$y_t = A_t k_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$$

- ▶ Take logs:

$$\ln y_t = \ln A_t + \alpha \ln k_t + (1 - \alpha) \ln N_t$$

- ▶ Do the Taylor expansion around the steady state values:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln y^* + \frac{1}{y^*} (y_t - y^*) &= \ln A^* + \frac{1}{A^*} (A_t - A^*) + \\ &\quad \alpha \ln k^* + \alpha \frac{1}{k^*} (k_t - k^*) + \\ &\quad (1 - \alpha) \ln N^* + (1 - \alpha) \frac{1}{N^*} (N_t - N^*) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ With hat indicating percentage deviation from the steady state values, we get

$$\hat{y}_t = \hat{A}_t + \alpha \hat{k}_t + (1 - \alpha) \hat{N}_t$$

Appendix: price dispersion in production

We expand the exponential function around the steady state where $P_t(i) = P_t$.

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{1-\epsilon} &= \exp\left[(1-\epsilon)(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)\right] \\ &= 1 + (1-\epsilon)(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t) + \frac{(1-\epsilon)^2}{2}(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2 \end{aligned}$$

Since we have $\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{1-\epsilon} di = 1$. A second order linear approximation will lead to:

$$E_i\{p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t\} = \frac{\epsilon - 1}{2} E_t\{(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2\}$$

$$\left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} = 1 - \epsilon(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t) + \frac{\epsilon^2}{2}(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2$$

Combine the above two equations:

$$\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di = 1 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} E_t\{(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2\}$$

Appendix: price dispersion in production

$$\begin{aligned}\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} di &= 1 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} E_t \{(p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2\} \\ &\approx 1 + \frac{\epsilon}{2} var_i \{p_t(i)\}\end{aligned}$$

The second line comes from:

$$\int_0^1 (p_t(i) - \hat{p}_t)^2 di \approx \int_0^1 (p_t(i) - E_i\{\hat{p}_t\})^2 di \equiv var_i \{p_t(i)\}$$

so

$$d_t = \log \left[\int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} di \right] \approx \frac{\epsilon}{2} var_i \{p_t(i)\}$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

We know

$$P_t^* = (1 + \mu) \frac{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} P_{t+s} \phi_{t+s}}{E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \theta^s \Lambda_{t,t+s} Y_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1}}$$

Rewrite the denominator and numerator:

$$X_{1,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} m c_t P_t^\epsilon Y_t + \beta \theta E_t X_{1,t+1}$$

$$X_{2,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} P_t^{\epsilon-1} Y_t + \beta \theta E_t X_{2,t+1}$$

Define

$$x_{1,t} = \frac{X_{1,t}}{P_t^\epsilon}$$

$$x_{2,t} = \frac{X_{2,t}}{P_t^{\epsilon-1}}$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

$$x_{1,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} m c_t Y_t + \beta \theta E_t \frac{X_{1,t+1}}{P_{t+1}^\epsilon} \left(\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right)^\epsilon$$

$$x_{2,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} Y_t + \beta \theta E_t \frac{X_{2,t+1}}{P_{t+1}^{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right)^{\epsilon-1}$$

In short,

$$x_{1,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} m c_t Y_t + \beta \theta E_t x_{1,t+1} (1 + \pi_{t+1})^\epsilon \quad (3)$$

$$x_{2,t} = Z_t C_t^{-\sigma} Y_t + \beta \theta E_t x_{2,t+1} (1 + \pi_{t+1})^{\epsilon-1} \quad (4)$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

We use $Y_t = C_t$ and take total derivative of (3):

$$x_1 \hat{x_{1,t}} = (1 - \sigma) Z Y^{-\sigma} m c Y \hat{Y}_t + Z Y^{1-\sigma} m c m \hat{c}_t + Y^{1-\sigma} m c Z \hat{Z}_t \quad (5)$$

$$+ \epsilon \beta \theta (1 + \pi)^{\epsilon-1} x_1 (1 + \pi) E_t \hat{\pi_{t+1}} + \beta \theta (1 + \pi)^\epsilon x_1 E_t \hat{x_{1,t+1}} \quad (6)$$

of which the percentage deviation of inflation is different from variables like y .

$$\begin{aligned} \log(1 + \pi_{t+1}) - \log(1 + \pi) &= \log\left(1 + \frac{1 + \pi_{t+1} - (1 + \pi)}{1 + \pi}\right) \\ &\approx \frac{\pi_{t+1} - \pi}{1 + \pi} = \hat{\pi_{t+1}} \end{aligned}$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

We simplify (5-6) at zero inflation steady state $Z = 1$.

$$\begin{aligned}x_1 \hat{x_{1,t}} &= (1 - \sigma) Y^{-\sigma} m c Y \hat{Y}_t + Y^{1-\sigma} m c \hat{m} c_t + Y^{1-\sigma} m c \hat{Z}_t \\&\quad + \epsilon \beta \theta x_1 E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\hat{}} + \beta \theta x_1 E_t x_{1,t+1}^{\hat{}}\end{aligned}$$

and evaluate equation (3) at the steady state we get

$$x_1 = \frac{Y^{1-\sigma} m c}{1 - \beta \theta}$$

plug into the previous equation,

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{x_{1,t}} &= (1 - \sigma)(1 - \beta \theta) \hat{Y}_t + (1 - \beta \theta) \hat{m} c_t + (1 - \beta \theta) \hat{Z}_t \\&\quad + \epsilon \beta \theta E_t \pi_{t+1}^{\hat{}} + \beta \theta E_t x_{1,t+1}^{\hat{}}\end{aligned}$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{x_{1,t}} &= (1 - \sigma)(1 - \beta\theta)\hat{Y}_t + (1 - \beta\theta)\hat{m}c_t + (1 - \beta\theta)\hat{Z}_t \\ &\quad + \epsilon\beta\theta E_t\pi_{t+1} + \beta\theta E_tx_{1,t+1}\end{aligned}$$

Following similar steps, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{x_{2,t}} &= (1 - \sigma)(1 - \beta\theta)\hat{Y}_t + (1 - \beta\theta)\hat{Z}_t \\ &\quad + (\epsilon - 1)\beta\theta E_t\pi_{t+1} + \beta\theta E_tx_{2,t+1}\end{aligned}$$

Take the difference of the two equations

$$\hat{x_{1,t}} - \hat{x_{2,t}} = (1 - \beta\theta)\hat{m}c_t + \beta\theta E_t\pi_{t+1} + \beta\theta E_t[\hat{x_{1,t+1}} - \hat{x_{2,t+1}}] \quad (7)$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

We have the following from definition of $x_{1,t}, x_{2,t}$:

$$\frac{X_{1,t}}{X_{2,t}} = P_t \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}}$$

Thus, we have

$$P_t^* = (1 + \mu) P_t \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}}$$

$$P_t^*/P_{t-1} = (1 + \mu) P_t/P_{t-1} \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}}$$

$$1 + \pi_t^* = (1 + \mu)(1 + \pi_t) \frac{x_{1,t}}{x_{2,t}}$$

$$\hat{\pi}_t^* = \hat{\pi}_t + \hat{x_{1,t}} - \hat{x_{2,t}}$$

We got the following equation in the main slides

$$\hat{\pi}_t = (1 - \theta)(\hat{p}_t^* - \hat{p}_{t-1}) = (1 - \theta)\hat{\pi}_t^*$$

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

We now have

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\pi}_t^* &= \hat{\pi}_t + \hat{x}_{1,t} - \hat{x}_{2,t} \\ \hat{\pi}_t &= (1 - \theta)\hat{\pi}_t^*\end{aligned}$$

we get

$$\frac{\theta}{1 - \theta}\hat{\pi}_t = \hat{x}_{1,t} - \hat{x}_{2,t}$$

Plug back into equation (7), we get

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta}\hat{m}c_t + \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1}$$

FINALLY DONE.

Appendix: Linearization of the optimal price setting

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