

Richard A. Easterlin

The economics of happiness

Most of us, I think it is safe to say, would like to be happier, would like, indeed, to hold the 'keys to happiness.' For centuries the contemplation of this desire was the exclusive preserve of philosophers and theologians, who speculated and offered prescriptions on 'the good life.' Only fairly recently has it come into the domain of social science – first in psychiatry, where depression had been the object of concern, and then, since around 1950, in the mainstream social sciences. The impetus for social science research in this area during the last half century has been the development of population surveys inquiring into people's feelings of well-being. A very simple survey question, for example, might ask a respondent, "In general,

how happy would you say you are – very happy, pretty happy, or not so happy?" Another question might be, "How satisfied are you with your life as a whole – very, somewhat, so-so, not very, or not at all?"

Over the years a substantial methodological literature has developed to consider the value of the answers to such questions. The professional consensus is that the responses, though not unproblematic, are meaningful and reasonably comparable among various groups of individuals. Although there are subtle differences between happiness and life satisfaction, I will treat them for the present purpose as interchangeable measures of overall feelings of well-being, that is, of *subjective* well-being. My focus will be on what we are learning from the survey data on the causes of subjective well-being, and, based on this, what we might do as individuals to improve it.

As I go along I shall discuss two prominent and contrasting theories of well-being, one from psychology, one from economics. In psychology, setpoint theory has gained increasing attention in the last decade or so. Each individual is thought to have a fixed setpoint of happiness or life satisfaction determined by genetics and personality; life events such as marriage or divorce, job loss, or serious injury or disease may temporarily

Richard A. Easterlin, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1978, is professor of economics at the University of Southern California. He is past president of the Population Association of America and of the Economic History Association. His writings include "Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American Experience" (1968), "Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare" (1980), and "Growth Triumphant: The 21st Century in Historical Perspective" (1996).

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deflect a person above or below this setpoint, but in time each individual will adjust to the new circumstances and return to the given setpoint. Psychologists call this adjustment process 'hedonic adaptation.' One setpoint theory writer states flatly that life circumstances have a negligible role to play in a theory of happiness. If this is correct, then there is little that you or I can do to improve our well-being, and public policies aimed at making people better off by improving their social and economic conditions are fruitless.

In contrast, economics places particular stress on the importance of life circumstances – particularly on one's income and employment situation – to well-being. The view that money makes you happier finds ringing endorsement in economic theory. The implication is that one can improve one's happiness by getting more money, and that public policy measures aimed at increasing the income of society as a whole will increase well-being.

I shall argue that the accumulating survey evidence indicates that neither of these theories is correct. Contrary to setpoint theory, life events such as marriage, divorce, and serious disability or disease do have lasting effects on happiness. Contrary to economic theory, more money does not make people happier. My discussion will be guided here by what people themselves say about what makes them happy.

In the early 1960s, social psychologist Hadley Cantril carried out an intensive worldwide survey in fourteen countries, rich and poor, capitalist and communist, asking open-ended questions about what people want out of life – what they would need for their lives to be completely happy. I would like to stress the open-ended nature of Cantril's survey.

There have been many surveys of people's values and goals, but almost all present the respondent with a list predetermined by the interviewer. Cantril, in contrast, let each respondent speak for him or herself.

Despite the enormous socioeconomic and cultural disparities among the countries, what people say in Cantril's survey is strikingly similar. In every country, material circumstances, especially material living conditions, are mentioned most often. Next are family concerns such as a happy family life. This is followed by concerns about one's personal or family health. After this, and about equal in importance, are matters related to one's work (e.g., having an interesting job) and to personal character (emotional stability, personal worth, self-discipline, etc.). Concerns about broad international or domestic issues, such as war, political or civil liberty, and social equality, are rarely mentioned.

Thus, it is the things that occupy most people's everyday lives, and are somewhat within their control, that are typically at the forefront of their personal concerns – especially making a living, marriage and family, and health. The universality of these concerns helps explain why comparisons of happiness among groups of individuals are meaningful: most people base their judgments of well-being on essentially the same considerations.

In what follows I shall discuss the evidence on the relation between happiness and the three circumstances people most often name as their sources of well-being – material living conditions, family circumstances, and health. I will focus throughout on average relationships. Needless to say, what is true on average is not necessarily true for each individual; but it is important to be clear on what is typical. I'll be reporting the re-

sults of survey data – some, but not all, from my own research – that show how life events affect well-being as people progress through the adult life cycle, from early adulthood through middle age to retirement.

Most of the generalizations in the social science literature on subjective well-being are based not on life-cycle but on point-of-time studies. As shall be seen below in regard to money and happiness, point-of-time relationships are not always replicated over the life course. Even in those studies that do try to follow the same individuals over time, the period covered is rarely more than a year or two; hardly ever are data representative of the national population as a whole available for as long as five or ten years. The life-cycle approach that I use here employs the demographers' technique of birth-cohort analysis and covers a much longer segment of the life course. Although the same individuals are not interviewed in each successive year, we do have a nationally representative random sample of the same *group* of individuals – of those born in a given decade. The special advantage of this approach is that we can follow birth cohorts in American data on happiness for almost thirty years.

Let me start with health. The critical issue is whether significant changes in health have a lasting effect on happiness. One might suppose, on the one hand, that a serious accident or major disease would permanently reduce one's happiness. On the other hand, people may bounce back from such occurrences, especially if helped by medications and health devices such as wheelchairs, and by a support network of friends and relatives.

Indeed, the psychologists' setpoint theory sees people as adapting fully and

returning to the level of happiness that they had before the adverse turn in health. The seminal article, repeatedly cited in the psychological literature as evidence of complete adaptation, is a 1978 study of twenty-nine paraplegics and quadriplegics by psychologist Philip Brickman and his collaborators. The study's principal conclusion is that the accident victims, when compared with twenty-two people who were comparable in all respects except that they had not experienced serious disability, "did not appear nearly as unhappy as might have been expected." As a careful reading of this statement makes clear, the study does not actually assert that there was complete adaptation. Indeed, the statistical finding is that the accident victims were significantly less happy than the comparison group.

There have been a number of studies since, some continuing to claim complete adaptation, others contradicting it. To my knowledge the most comprehensive investigation is a 1990 American inquiry that compares the life satisfaction of large national samples of disabled and nondisabled persons. The conclusion is that the life satisfaction of those with disabilities is, on average, significantly lower than that of those who report no disabilities. Even more telling is the finding that when persons with disabilities are classified in several different ways – according to the severity of the disability, to whether the respondent suffers from one or multiple conditions, to what extent the respondent is limited in daily activities, and to whether close contacts are thought to perceive the respondent as disabled – life satisfaction is lower for those with more serious problems on every single one of these dimensions.

It is highly unlikely that these systematic differences in life satisfaction arise because those with worse problems sim-

ply haven't had enough time to adapt. The more straightforward conclusion is that, on average, an adverse change in health permanently reduces happiness, and the worse the change in health, the greater the reduction in happiness. The results do not mean that no adaptation to disability occurs. But the evidence does suggest that even with adaptation, there is, on average, a lasting negative effect of poor health on happiness.

Let me turn from this point-in-time evidence to some relating to the life cycle. As we all know, among adults real health problems increase as people age. But what do people *say* about their health? If people adapted completely to adverse changes in health, as setpoint theory asserts, then there should be no change in self-reported health over the life course because people would continuously adjust to worsening health. Is it true that self-reported health doesn't change?

The answer is no; self-reported health declines throughout the life course. If one follows Americans born in the decade of the 1950s over the twenty-eight-year segment of the life span for which data are available, one finds a clear and statistically significant downtrend in their average self-reported health. This downtrend in self-reported health as people get older is also true of people born in earlier decades as far back as reliable data go.

This finding assesses adaptation in terms of self-reported health – not life satisfaction, as in the disability analysis. However, it is not the case that people with worsening health do not feel unhappy about it: they say that they are less satisfied with their health and that they are less happy generally. At a point in time among adults of all ages, reported happiness is always less, on average, the poorer the state of self-reported

health. This can be due in part to a loss of income, but more importantly to non-pecuniary effects such as limits on one's usual activities. It seems clear from comprehensive survey evidence that, contrary to the psychologists' setpoint theory, adverse health changes have a lasting negative effect on happiness, and that there is less than complete adaptation to deteriorating health.

Let me now turn to the effects of marriage and marital dissolution. One might suppose that establishing close and intimate relationships of the sort marriage embodies would typically make the partners in such relationships happier and more satisfied with life in general. Some of the initial pleasure of a new union would be expected to wear off in time; similarly, people who have lost a partner through death, separation, or divorce would be expected to adjust somewhat to single status. But, on average, the close relationships embodied in marriage would be expected to have a lasting positive effect on one's happiness, and the loss of such relationships, a permanently negative effect. (I am using 'marriage' here as a proxy for the formation of unions. These days marriage is sometimes preceded by a period of cohabitation, and the real union consequently takes place some time prior to marriage.)

The psychologists' setpoint theory would argue, however, that adaptation to marriage and marital dissolution is complete. Indeed, there is a recent empirical study of the German population claiming to support this conclusion. This study holds that around the time of marriage, happiness increases briefly during what is proverbially called the honeymoon period, but that after one year it returns to the level that prevailed more than one year before marriage.

Meanwhile, widowhood takes a somewhat longer time – eight years – for complete adaptation to occur. (Separation and divorce were not included in the study.)

American data, however, suggest that the formation and dissolution of unions produce enduring effects, thus contradicting the results of the German study. As the proportion of married Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine increases, the average happiness of those who marry is consistently higher than that of the unmarried, and quite constant.

If these young Americans were simply experiencing a temporary increase in well-being when they married, their average happiness should peak at ages eighteen to nineteen, when all or almost all of those married are in the honeymoon period. Thereafter, average happiness should progressively decline as it returns to the setpoint level for an ever-larger proportion of those married. But in fact, throughout the first decade of marriage the happiness of young married persons remains constant at a higher level than that of their unmarried counterparts.

The American results also contradict the argument that the higher happiness of the married group stems from a selection effect – that those getting married are happier to start with. If they are happier to start with, then the life satisfaction of the combined group of married and unmarried people would not increase as more and more people marry. But the happiness of the group as a whole, married and unmarried, does indeed increase as the proportion of married people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine rises.

The survey evidence continues to suggest that there are lasting effects associated with marital status beyond the early

adult years. The happiness of married people remains significantly greater than that of the unmarried throughout the life cycle. People who remarry are just as happy as those still in their first marriage; and even after thirty-five years of marriage, the happiness of those still in their first marriage continues to be significantly greater than that of their unmarried counterparts.

Results consistent with these are reported by American sociologist Linda Waite and her collaborators in a nationally representative study that follows five thousand married Americans over a five-year period. At the end of the period, the happiness of those still married is virtually unchanged, while the happiness of those who separated, or divorced and did not remarry, is significantly lower. Remarriage reverses the effect of divorce – those who divorced and then remarried experience about the same level of happiness as those who stayed married. The lesson is clear: on average, marriage brings greater happiness, marital dissolution, less.

Evidence of people's desires for a 'happy marriage' also contradicts the notion that people adapt completely to their marital circumstances. Six in ten people cite a happy marriage as a factor when asked about their conception of the good life. More remarkable is how women over forty-five who have never married answer this question. Among these women more than four in ten cite a happy marriage as part of the good life as far as they personally are concerned. Perhaps some have adapted, and doubtless some never wanted to marry in the first place – but a sizable proportion of these women who have been single their entire lives has not fully adjusted to the possibility of never marrying.

These are substantial reasons, I believe, for concluding that adaptation

with regard to marital status is less than complete, that the formation of unions has a lasting positive effect on happiness, and that dissolution has a permanently negative effect. If the psychologists' setpoint model is correct that life circumstances are of negligible importance to long-run happiness, then it is hard to see how one can reconcile it with the bulk of population survey evidence on either marriage or health.

Let me briefly mention two other pieces of survey evidence that are difficult to square with the setpoint model. First, throughout the life cycle, blacks in the United States are, on average, consistently less happy than whites. One would be hard put, I believe, to argue that this difference is due simply to different setpoints given by genetics and personality, and that differences in the life circumstances of the two races are of little importance. Second, beyond age sixty the life-cycle excess of female over male happiness is reversed. Clearly, this cannot be explained by genetic and personality factors; rather an important life event – the much higher incidence of widowed women than widowed men – is chiefly responsible.

I'd like to turn now to the source of happiness that is mentioned most often by people – one's material living level, or standard of living. Does more money make people happier? To judge from survey responses, most people certainly think so, although there is a limit. When asked how much more money they would need to be completely happy, people typically name a figure greater than their current income by about 20 percent. Indeed, if happiness and income are compared at any point in time, those with more income are, on average, happier than those with less.

But what happens to happiness as income goes up over the life cycle – does

happiness go up too? The answer is no; on average there is no change. Consider, for example, Americans born in the 1940s. Between the years 1972 and 2000, as their average age increased from about twenty-six to fifty-four years, their average income per person – adjusted for the change in the price of goods and services – more than doubled, increasing by 116 percent. Yet their reported happiness in the year 2000 was no different from that of twenty-eight years earlier. They had a lot more money and a considerably higher standard of living at the later date, but these did not make them feel any happier.

Consider, further, two subgroups of persons born in the 1940s – those with at least some college education and those with only a secondary education or less. At any given age, the more educated subgroup is happier than the less educated. This is consistent with the point-of-time relation between happiness and income just mentioned – the more educated being, on average, more affluent and happier.

But what happens over the life course to the two educational groups? As one might expect, the income of the more educated increases more than that of the less educated. If happiness were moving in accordance with the income of each group, then the happiness of both groups should increase, with that of the more educated increasing more, and the difference between the two groups widening. In fact, over the life course happiness remains constant for both educational groups, and the happiness differential is unchanged. Although those fortunate enough to start out with higher income and education remain, on average, happier than those of lower socioeconomic status, there is no evidence that happiness increases with income growth for either group.

These results – both point-of-time and life cycle – hold as well for people born in the 1950s, 1930s, and 1920s. Although the point-of-time result seemingly confirms the economists' assumption that more money makes you happier, the life cycle result contradicts it.

Why this paradoxical pattern? A simple thought experiment brings out the basic reason. Imagine your income increases substantially while everyone else's stays the same – would you feel better off? The answer most people give is yes. But now, let's turn the example around. Think about a situation in which your real income stays the same but everyone else's increases substantially – then how would you feel? Most people say that they would feel less well-off, even though their real level of living hasn't, in fact, changed at all.

This thought experiment demonstrates that, as far as material things are concerned, one's satisfaction with life depends not simply on one's objective condition, but also on a comparison between one's objective condition and a subjective (or 'internalized') living level norm – and this norm is significantly affected by the average living level of the people around us. Over time, as everyone's income increases, so too do the internal norms by which we are making our judgments about happiness. The increase in internal norms is greater for those with higher income because over the life cycle we increasingly compare ourselves against those with whom we come in closest contact, and contacts are more and more limited to those of similar income. The increase over time in one's internal living level norm, however, undercuts the effect of increased actual income on well-being.

The subversive effect of rising internal norms also explains why most people think that over the life course more

money will make them happier when, in fact, it doesn't. What actually happens, of course, is that when their own income increases, so too does everyone else's. This means the internal living level norms used to evaluate happiness also increase, offsetting the effect of growth in their actual income, and so their happiness stays the same. Here, at last, we seemingly have a validation of the psychologists' model: in the material goods domain there does appear to be complete hedonic adaptation.

The survey evidence indicates that over the life cycle, family and health circumstances typically have lasting effects on happiness, but that more money does not. What do these empirical results imply for the possibility of increasing one's happiness?

Each of us has only a fixed amount of time available for family life, health activities, and work. Do we distribute our time in the way that maximizes our happiness? The answer, I believe, is no, for a reason that has already been suggested: we decide how to use our time based on the false belief that more money will make us happier. Because of this 'money illusion,' we allocate an excessive amount of time to monetary goals, and shortchange nonpecuniary ends such as family life and health.

As evidence of the perverse effect of the money illusion, let me cite a survey reported by sociologist Norval Glenn. In this survey Americans were asked about the likelihood of their taking a more rewarding job that would take away family time, because it would require both more hours at the office and more time on the road. Choosing from four response options, not one of the twelve hundred respondents said it was "very unlikely" that he or she would take the job, and only about one in three said it

was “somewhat unlikely.” The large majority of respondents said it was either “very likely” or “somewhat likely” – each of these categories accounting for about one-third of the respondents. Most Americans, it seems, would readily sacrifice family life for what they think will be greater rewards from their working life – not knowing that these prospective rewards are likely illusory.

Some may feel that I have given too little attention here to the genetic and personality determinants of happiness. This is so, but there is a reason. There is nothing one can do, at least at present, about one’s genes – and very little that most of us can do about our personalities (except, perhaps, to consult a psychologist). But all of us have the potential for managing our lives more efficiently to achieve greater happiness.

In my discussion of life events, I have focused on the three – money, family, and health – that people cite most often as important for their happiness. I have tried to summarize here what social surveys have to say about these principal sources of personal happiness. Could we make our lives happier? The tentative answer, based on the evidence at hand, I suggest, is this. Most people could increase their happiness by devoting less time to making money, and more time to nonpecuniary goals such as family life and health.