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# USING GENETIC ALGORITHMS TO DEVELOP STRATEGIES FOR THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA\*

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The Prisoner's Dilemma, a simple two-person game invented by Merrill Flood & Melvin Dresher in the 1950s, has been studied extensively in Game Theory, Economics, and Political Science because it can be seen as an idealized model for real-world phenomena such as arms races (Axelrod 1984). In this paper, I describe a GA to search for strategies to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the fitness of a strategy is its average score in playing 100 games with itself and with every other member of the population. Each strategy remembers the three previous turns with a given player, by using a population of 20 strategies, fitness-proportional selection, single-point crossover with  $P_c=0.7$ , and mutation with  $P_m=0.001$ .

*JEL Classifications:* C63, C72

*Keywords:* GA, Crossover, Mutation and Fitness-proportional.

## 1. Introduction

The Prisoner's Dilemma, can be formulated as follows: Two individuals (call them Mr. X and Mr. Y) are arrested for committing a crime together and are held in separate cells, with no communication possible between them. Mr. X is offered the following deal: If he confesses and agrees to testify against Mr. Y, he will receive a suspended sentence with probation, and Mr. Y will be put away for 5 years. However, if at the same time Mr. Y confesses and agrees to testify against Mr. X, his testimony will be discredited, and each will receive 4 years for pleading guilty. Mr. X is told that Mr. Y is being offered precisely the same deal. Both Mr. X and Mr. Y know that if neither testifies against the other they can be convicted only on a lesser charge for which they will each get 2 years in jail. Should Mr. X "defect" against Mr. Y and hope for the suspended sentence, risking, a 4-year sentence if Mr. Y defects? Or should he "cooperate" with Mr. Y (even though they cannot communicate), in the hope that he will also cooperate so each will get only 2 years, thereby risking a defection by Mr. Y that will send him away for 5 years?

The game can be described more abstractly. Each player independently decides which move to make— i.e., whether to cooperate or defect. A "game" consists of each player's making a decision (a "move"). The possible results of a single game are summarized in a payoff matrix like the one shown in table 1.1. Here the goal is to get as many points (as opposed to as few years in prison) as possible. (In table 1.1, the payoff in each case can be interpreted as 5 minus the number of years in prison.) If both players cooperate, each

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gets 3 points. If player A defects and player B cooperates, then player A gets 5 points and player B gets 0 points, and vice versa if the situation is reversed. If both players defect, each gets 1 point. What is the best strategy to use in order to maximize one's own payoff? If you suspect that your opponent is going to cooperate, then you should surely defect. If you suspect that your opponent is going to defect, then you should defect too. No matter what the other player does, it is always better to defect. The *dilemma* is that if both players defect each gets a worse score than if they cooperate. If the game is *iterated* (that is, if the two players play several games in a row), both players always defecting will lead to a much lower total payoff than the players would get if they cooperated.

**Table 1.** The Payoff Matrix

		Player A	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player B	Cooperate	3, 3	0, 5
	Defect	5, 0	1, 1

Assume a rational player is faced with playing a single game (known as one-shot) of the Prisoner's Dilemma described above and that the player is trying to maximize their reward. If the player thinks his/her opponent will cooperate, the player will defect to receive a reward of 5 as opposed to cooperation, which would have earned him/her only 3 points. However if the player thinks his/her opponent will defect, the rational choice is to also defect and receive 1 point rather than cooperate and receive the sucker's payoff of 0 points. Therefore the rational decision is to always defect.

But assuming the other player is also rational he/she will come to the same conclusion as the first player. Thus both players will always defect; earning rewards of 1 point rather than the 3 points that mutual cooperation could have yielded. Therein lays the dilemma. In game theory the Prisoner's Dilemma can be viewed as a two players, non zero-sum and simultaneous game. Game theory has proved that always defecting is the dominant strategy for this game (the *Nash Equilibrium*). This holds true as long as the payoffs follow the relationship  $T > R > P > S$ , and the gain from mutual cooperation is greater than the average score for defecting and cooperating,  $R > (S + T)/2$ . While this game may seem simple it can be applied to a multitude of real world scenarios. Problems ranging from businesses interacting in a market, personal relationships, super power negotiations and the trench warfare "live and let live" system of World War I have all been studied using some form of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

## 2. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is an interesting variant of the above game in which two players play repeated games of the Prisoner's Dilemma against each other. In

the above discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma the dominant mutual defection strategy relies on the fact that it is a one-shot game, with no future. The key to the IPD is that the two players may play each other again; this allows the players to develop strategies based on previous game interactions. Therefore a player's move now may affect how his/her opponent behaves in the future and thus affect the player's future payoffs. This removes the single dominant strategy of mutual defection as players use more complex strategies dependant on game histories in order to maximize the payoffs they receive. In fact, under the correct circumstances mutual cooperation can emerge. The length of the IPD (i.e. the number of repetitions of the Prisoner's Dilemma played) must not be known to either player, if it was the last iteration would become a one-shot play of the Prisoner's Dilemma and as the players know they would not play each other again, both players would defect. Thus the second to last game would be a one-shot game (not influencing any future) and incur mutual defection, and so on till all games are one-shot plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

This paper is concerned with modeling the IPD described above and devising strategies to play it. The fundamental Prisoner's Dilemma will be used without alteration. This assumes a player may interact with many others but is assumed to be interacting with them one at a time. The players will have a memory of the previous three games only (memory-3 IPD).

### 3. Genetic Algorithms

Genetic Algorithms are search algorithms based on the mechanics of natural selection and natural genetics. John Holland at the University of Michigan originally developed them. They usually work by beginning with an initial population of random solutions to a given problem. The success of these solutions is then evaluated according to a specially designed fitness function. A form of 'natural selection' is then performed whereby solutions with higher fitness scores have a greater probability of being selected. The selected solutions are then 'mated' using genetic operators such as crossover and mutation. The children produced from this mating go on to form the next generation. The theory is that as fitter genetic material is propagated from generation to generation the solutions will converge towards an optimal solution. This research utilizes Genetic Algorithms to develop successful strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma.

A simple GA works on the basis of the following steps:

- **Step 1.**  
Start with a randomly generated population of  $n$   $l$ -bit chromosomes (Candidate solution to a problem).
- **Step 2.**  
Calculate the fitness  $f(x)$  of each chromosome  $x$  in the population.
- **Step 3.**

Repeat the following steps until  $n$  offspring have been created:

- Select a pair of parent chromosomes from the current population, the probability of selection being an increasing function of fitness. Selection is done “with replacement” meaning that, the same chromosome can be selected more than once to become a parent.
- With probability  $P_c$  (the “crossover probability”), crossover the pair at a randomly chosen point to form two offspring. If no crossover takes place, form two offspring that are exact copies of their respective parents. (*Note:* crossover may be in “single point” or “multi-point” version of the GA.)
- Mutate the two offspring at each locus with probability  $P_m$  (the mutation probability or mutation rate), and place the resulting chromosomes in the new population. (*Note:* if  $n$  is odd, one new population member can be described at random.)

- **Step 4.**

Replace the current population with the new population.

- **Step 5.**

Go to step 2.

#### 4. Experimental Setup

Genetic Algorithms provide the means by which strategies for the Prisoner's Dilemma are developed in this paper. As this is the principal objective of the research, naturally the genetic algorithm used is one of the systems major components. The other system components have been designed to suit the Genetic Algorithm. As such, in describing the genetic algorithms implementation most of the other components will also be described. What follows is a description of how a genetic algorithm was implemented to evolve strategies to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

##### 4.1. Figuring out Strategies

The first issue is figuring out how to encode a strategy as a string. Suppose the memory of each player is one previous game. There are four possibilities for the previous game:

- |         |      |
|---------|------|
| Case 1: | $CC$ |
| Case 2: | $CD$ |
| Case 3: | $DC$ |
| Case 4: | $DD$ |

Where  $C$  denotes “cooperate” and  $D$  denotes “defect”. Case I is when both players cooperated in the previous game, case II is when player A cooperated and player B defected, and so on.

A strategy is simply a rule that specifies an action in each of these cases.

$CC\ CC\ CC$  (Case 1),  
 $CC\ CC\ CD$  (Case 2),  
 $CC\ CC\ DC$  (Case 3),  
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $i$   
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $\dots\ \dots\ \dots\ \dots$   
 $DD\ DD\ DC$  (Case 63)  
 $DD\ DD\ DD$  (Case 64)

The history in table 2 is stated in the order Your first move, Opponents first Move, Your second move, Opponents second Move, Your third move, Opponents third Move. The move column indicates what move to play for the given history. Table 2 also shows how the TFT strategy is encoded using this scheme. The resulting TFT chromosome is:

This is actually stored as a Bit-Set in computer memory as follow:



objects in some form of IPD. The Game object was implemented to play a game of IPD for a specified number of rounds between two players. This object simply keeps track of two Prisoner's scores and game histories while asking them for new moves until the rounds limit is met. The tournament object uses this class to organize a round robin IPD tournament, akin to Axelrod's [1] computer tournaments. In such a tournament an array of Prisoner's is supplied as the population and every Prisoner plays an IPD Game against every other Prisoner and themselves. Each player's payoff after these interactions have completed is deemed to be the player's fitness score.

### 4.3. Fitness Scaling

The fitness scores calculated above will serve to determine which players go on to reproduce and which players 'die off'. However these 'raw' fitness values present some problems. The initial populations are likely to have a small number of very high scoring individuals in a population of ordinary colleagues. If using fitness proportional selection, these high scorers will take over the population rapidly and cause the population to converge on one strategy. This strategy will be a mixture of the high scorers' strategies, however as the population did not get time to develop these strategies may be sub-optimal, and the population will have converged prematurely. In the later generations of evolution the individuals should have begun to converge on a strategy. Thus they will all share very similar chromosomes and the population's average fitness will likely be very close to the population's best fitness. In this situation average members and above average members will have a similar probability of reproduction. In this situation the natural selection process has ended and the algorithm is merely performing a random search among the strategies.

It is useful to scale the 'raw' fitness scores to help avoid the above situations. This algorithm uses linear scaling as described by Goldberg, Linear scaling produces a linear relationship between raw fitness,  $f$ , and scaled fitness,  $f'$ , as follows:

$$f' = af + b \quad (1)$$


Coefficients  $a$  and  $b$  may be calculated as follows:

$$a = (c - 1) * \frac{f_{avg}}{f_{max} - f_{avg}} \quad (2)$$

$$b = f_{avg} * \frac{(f_{avg} - (c * f_{avg}))}{f_{max} - f_{avg}} \quad (3)$$


Where  $c$  is the number of times the fittest individual should be allowed to reproduce. A value of 2 was found to produce accurate scaling in this method. The effect of this fitness scaling is shown in the *fig. 1*.





**Fig. 1.** Linear Fitness Scaling

This scaling works fine for most situations, however in the later stages of evolution when there are relatively few ‘low’ scoring strategies problems may arise. The average and best scoring strategies have very close raw fitness and extreme scaling is required to separate them. Applying this scaling to the few low scorers may result in them becoming negative. [Fig. 2]



**Fig. 2.** Linear Fitness Scaling Negative Values

This can be overcome by adjusting the scaling coefficients to scale the weak strategies to zero and scale the other strategies as much as is possible. In the case of negative scaled fitness values the coefficients may be calculated as follows:

$$a = \frac{f_{avg}}{f_{avg} - f_{min}} \quad (4)$$

$$b = -f_{min} * \left( \frac{f_{avg}}{f_{avg} - f_{min}} \right) \quad (5)$$


This scaling helps prevent the early dominance of high scorers, while later on distinguishes between mediocre and above average strategies. It is implemented in the

Genetic object and applied to all raw fitness scores (i.e. the IPD payoffs) before performing genetic algorithm selection.

#### 4.4. *Reproduction*

Having selected two strategies from the population the Genetic Algorithm proceeds to mate these two *parents* and produce their two *children*. This reproduction is a mirror of sexual reproduction in which the genetic material of the parents is combined to produce the children. In this research reproduction allows exploration of the search space and provides a means of reaching new and hopefully better strategies. Reproduction is accomplished using two simple yet effective genetic operators—crossover and mutation.

Crossover is an artificial implementation of the exchange of genetic information that occurs in real-life reproduction. This algorithm, breaking both the parent chromosomes at the same randomly chosen point and then rejoining the parts, can implement it. [Fig. 3]



**Fig. 3.** Crossover

This crossover action, when applied to strategies selected proportional to their fitness, constructs new ideas from high scoring building blocks. The genetic algorithm implemented in this research performs crossover a large percentage of the time, however occasionally (5% of the time by default) crossover will not be performed and simple natural selection will occur. In nature small mutations of the genetic material exchanged during reproduction occurs a very small percentage of the time. However if these *mutations* produce an advantageous result they will be propagated throughout the population by means of natural selection. The possibility of small mutations occurring was included in this system. A very small percentage of the time (0.1% of the time by

default) a bit copied between the parent and the child will be flipped, representing a mutation. These mutations provide a means of exploration to the search.

#### **4.5. *Replacement***

The genetic algorithm is run across the population until it has produced enough children to build a new generation. The children then replace all of the original population. More complicated replacement techniques such as fit-weak and child parent replaced were researched but they were unsuitable for the round robin tournament nature of the system.

#### **4.6. *Search Termination***


The only termination criteria implemented is a limit to the maximum number of generations that will run; the user may set this. Other termination criteria were investigated, for example detecting when a population has converged and strategies are receiving equal payoffs, however these criteria resulted in many false positives and it was decided better to allow the user to judge when the algorithm had reached the end of useful evolution.

### **5. Conclusion**

GA often found strategies that scored substantially higher than any other algorithm. But it would be wrong to conclude that the GA discovered strategies that are “better” than any human designed strategy. The performance of a strategy depends very much on its environment- that is, on the strategies with which it is playing. Here the environment was fixed- that did not change over the course of a run. Therefore it may conclude that the above-mentioned environment is static (Unchanged).

### Appendix:

The following flowchart describes the completed genetic algorithm of the Prisoner's Dilemma Problem.



**Fig. 4.** Flow Chart of Prisoner's Dilemma Problem

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