

# 胡新全

✉ huxinquan@163.sufe.edu.cn · ☎ (+86) 151-7147-8221 · 🌐 <https://xinquanhu.github.io/>

## 教育背景

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上海财经大学, 经济学院

2018.09 – 至今

西方经济学, 硕博连读, 导师: 姚澜教授

华中科技大学, 经济学院

2014.09 – 2018.06

经济统计学, 经济学学士

## 研究领域

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行为经济学, 实验经济学, 微观经济学, 机制设计

## 论文发表

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Xinquan Hu, Jun Zhang (2024). Characterization of Top Trading Cycles with single-dipped preferences. *Economics Letters*, 241, 111822. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111822>

## 工作论文

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- Two-stage Chinese College Admission (with Lan Yao and Jun Zhang), 2024.
  - **Abstract:** The Chinese college admission system employs a unique two-stage admission process where students are initially assigned to colleges and subsequently to majors. Notably, if a student is assigned to a college in the first stage but fails to be assigned to a major within that college in the second stage, she cannot reapply to other colleges (within the same tier), which introduces the potential for strategic behavior. In particular, students are compelled to accept an option called *major transfer* in their preference tables, which distorts their reported preferences and leads to undesirable assignments. This paper analyzes the deficiencies of the two-stage process by contrasting it with a modification that combines the two stages into one. Our arguments find support in laboratory experiments.
- Cognitive ability in matching with strategic uncertainty: An experimental study (with Lan Yao), 2024. Revise and resubmit, *China Economic Review*
  - **Abstract:** Strategyproof mechanisms have become the predominant choice for educational institutions. However, both laboratory experiments and empirical evidence highlight the persistent occurrence of strategic misreporting, leading to adverse consequences. This underscores the need to examine the reporting strategies of students, particularly those with varying cognitive abilities, across different decision environments. We present an experimental comprehension test of reporting strategies using computerized opponents to precisely control the levels of strategic uncertainty. The results reveal that removing strategic uncertainty does not significantly affect truth-telling rates. However, subjects with median cognitive ability are more truthful under strategic uncertainty, especially when information is incomplete. Ad-

ditionally, providing information about priorities has a negative and significant impact on truth-telling rates. The findings of this research demonstrate that constructing a simplified market environment using computerized agents and providing relevant feedback to students can effectively enhance their understanding of the matching mechanism and nudge them to make optimal strategy choices.

## 课题项目

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- 参与国家自然科学基金重大项目课题 (2024-2028 年), 决策和博弈理论与经济政策, 项目号 72394394
- 参与国家自然科学基金面上项目 (2023-2026 年), 改善协调困境的机制设计: 理论与实验研究, 项目号 72273077

## 学术报告

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第五届“中国行为与实验经济学论坛”, 武汉大学	2023.06
Xiamen University International Workshop on Experimental Economics, 厦门大学	2022.12

## 助研经历

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项目研究助理	2021.09 – 2022.06
• 为项目“Public Discourse and Socially Responsible Market Behavior”(Björn Bartling, Vanessa Valero, Roberto A. Weber and Lan Yao) 提供助研工作并被首页致谢, 该论文被 American Economic Review 条件接收	

## 助教经历

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Advanced Microeconomics, 博士生课程	2022 秋季学期
Advanced Microeconomic II, 博士生课程	2021、2022 春季学期
Microeconomics, 研究生课程	2020 秋季学期
Econometrics, 本科生课程	2020 秋季学期

## 奖励荣誉

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2022/2021/2020 年上海财经大学博士研究生二等学业奖学金

2019 年上海财经大学招商银行奖学金, 硕士研究生一等学业奖学金

2018 年华中科技大学校三好学生 (前 2%), 优秀毕业生, 国家励志奖学金 (两次, 前 5%)

2017 年美国大学生数学建模竞赛 (MCM/ICM) Meritorious Winner(一等奖)

## 技能

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- 计算机技能: *Python, R, Stata, Matlab*
- 经济学实验技能: *z-Tree, oTree*