

Week 1 CTF Introduction and Forensics

Introduction to CTF

Capture The Flags, or CTFs, are a kind of computer security competition.

Teams of competitors (or just individuals) are pitted against each other in a test of computer security skill.

Very often CTFs are the beginning of one's cyber security career due to their team building nature and competitive aspect. In addition, there isn't a lot of commitment required beyond a weekend.

The screenshot shows the CTFtime website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links for CTFs, Upcoming, Archive, Calendar, Teams, FAQ, Contact us, About, Timezone (Asia/Shanghai), and Endorse. Below the navigation is a section titled "Team rating" with a table of 2021 results. The table includes columns for Place, Team, Country, and Rating. The top team is "perfect blue" with a rating of 811,668. To the right, there are sections for "Past events" (Securebug.se CTF Loki 2021, Lexington Informatics Tournament CTF 2021, Google Capture The Flag 2021) and "Upcoming events" (HTB Business CTF 2021, ImaginaryCTF 2021, UCTF 2021).

Figure: CTFs on the CTFtime website.

These contests run every month by various organizations and universities across the globe. These contests can be arranged in the 3 styles:

1. Jeopardy
2. Attack & Defense
3. Mixed Style

Most of the CTFs are online, while some of them (usually finals) are offline. The most famous CTF is the **DEF CON CTF**, which is held every August annually.

In our semester, every lab would have several CTF challenges in Jeopardy format. By the end of this semester, yet another AWD (Attack & Defense) CTF would be held.

Categories

In Jeopardy format CTFs, there are usually 5 categories:

- **Forensics**

Forensics is the art of recovering the digital trail left on a computer. There are plenty of methods to find data which is seemingly deleted, not stored, or worse, covertly recorded.

- **Cryptography**

Cryptography is the reason we can use banking apps, transmit sensitive information over the web, and in general protect our privacy. However, a large part of CTFs is breaking widely used encryption schemes which are improperly implemented. The math may seem daunting, but more often than not, a simple understanding of the underlying principles will allow you to find flaws and crack the code.

The word "cryptography" technically means the art of writing codes. When it comes to digital forensics, it's a method you can use to understand how data is constructed for your analysis.

- **Web Exploitation**

Websites all around the world are programmed using various programming languages. While there are specific vulnerabilities in each programming language that the developer should be aware of, there are issues fundamental to the internet that can show up regardless of the chosen language or framework.

These vulnerabilities often show up in CTFs as web security challenges where the user needs to exploit a bug to gain some kind of higher level privileges.

- **Reverse Engineering**

Reverse Engineering in a CTF is typically the process of taking a compiled (machine code, bytecode) program and converting it back into a more human readable format.

Very often the goal of a reverse engineering challenge is to understand the functionality of a given program such that you can identify deeper issues.

- **Binary Exploitation**

Binaries, or executables, are machine code for a computer to execute. For the most part, the binaries that you will face in CTFs are Linux ELF files or the occasional windows executable.

Binary Exploitation is a broad topic within Cyber Security which really comes down to finding a vulnerability in the program and exploiting it to gain control of a shell or modifying the program's functions.

Some other categories growing up in recent years, like IoT (Internet of Thing) and AI.

Forensics

An important part of Forensics is having the right tools, as well as being familiar with the following topics:

- File Formats
- EXIF data
- **Wireshark & PCAPs**
 - Wireshark traffic analysis
- Steganography
- *(Optional) Disk Imaging*

File Formats

File Extensions are not the sole way to identify the type of a file, files have certain leading bytes called *file signatures* which allow programs to parse the data in a consistent manner. Files can also contain additional "hidden" data called *metadata* which can be useful in finding out information about the context of a file's data.

File Signatures

File signatures (also known as File Magic Numbers) are bytes within a file used to identify the format of the file. Generally they're 2-4 bytes long, found at the beginning of a file.

What is it used for?

Files can sometimes come without an extension, or with incorrect ones. We use file signature analysis to identify the format (file type) of the file. Programs need to know the file type in order to open it properly.

How do you find the file signature?

You need to be able to look at the binary data that constitutes the file you're examining. To do this, you'll use a hexadecimal editor. Once you find the file signature, you can check it against file signature repositories [such as Gary Kessler's](#).

Example



The file above, when opened in a Hex Editor, begins with the bytes FFD8FFE0 00104A46 494600 or in ASCII \ÿþ JFIF where \x00 and \x10 lack symbols.

Searching in [Gary Kessler's](#) database shows that this file signature belongs to a **JPEG/JFIF graphics file**, exactly what we suspect.

Extensions vs Signature

File extension is used to uniquely describe a format of a particular file **whereas file signature is the header information that is present in each file.**


Some operating systems (Windows like) use file extension to bind with applications to open the file, while some other operating systems check file signature in the header to guess the file format (file command in Unix).

What about MIME?

A media type (also known as a Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions or MIME type) is **a standard that indicates the nature and format of a document, file, or assortment of bytes**. It is defined and standardized in IETF's RFC 6838.

This type is identified in HTTP packets and **DO NOT** stipulate the real file format. For example, a MIME type `image/jpg` means the transferred data **LIKELY** to be a JPEG image, but user can post a `plain text` or `anything` in real body.

Example



The file signature is `GIF89a\xc8\x00` while the file extension is `.jpg`, with the MIME type `image/jpg` during HTTP transmission.

The given file is a GIF image instead of JPEG file.

Metadata

Metadata is data about data. Different types of files have different metadata. The metadata on a photo could include dates, camera information, GPS location, comments, etc. For music, it could include the title, author, track number and album.

What kind of file metadata is useful?

Potentially, any file metadata you can find could be useful.

How do I find it?

One of our favorite tools is exiftool, which displays metadata for an input file, including:

- File size
- Dimensions (width and height)
- File type
- Programs used to create (e.g. Photoshop)
- OS used to create (e.g. Apple)

Run command line: `exiftool(-k).exe [filename]` and you should see something like this:

```
Command Prompt - "exiftool(-k).exe" C7qraXD.png
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\Downloads\exiftool-9.98>"exiftool(-k).exe" C7qraXD.png
ExifTool Version Number      : 9.98
File Name                   : C7qraXD.png
Directory                   :
File Size                   : 1014 kB
File Modification Date/Time : 2014:07:04 12:40:58-04:00
File Access Date/Time       : 2015:07:11 21:38:58-04:00
File Creation Date/Time    : 2015:07:11 21:38:58-04:00
File Permissions            : rW-rW-rW-
File Type                   : PNG
File Type Extension         : png
MIME Type                   : image/png
Image Width                 : 1920
Image Height                : 1080
Bit Depth                   : 8
Color Type                  : RGB with Alpha
Compression                 : Deflate/Inflate
Filter                      : Adaptive
Interlace                   : Noninterlaced
Pixels Per Unit X          : 2835
Pixels Per Unit Y          : 2835
Pixel Units                 : meters
Profile Name                : Photoshop ICC profile
Profile CMM Type            : appl
Profile Version              : 2.1.0
Profile Class                : Display Device Profile
Color Space Data             : RGB
Profile Connection Space     : XYZ
Profile Date Time            : 2014:06:08 20:13:16
Profile File Signature       : acsp
Primary Platform              : Apple Computer Inc.
CMM Flags                   : Not Embedded, Independent
Device Manufacturer          :
Device Model                 :
Device Attributes            : Reflective, Glossy, Positive, Color
Rendering Intent              : Media-Relative Colorimetric
Connection Space Illuminant   : 0.9642 1 0.82491
Profile Creator               : appl
Profile ID                   : 0
Profile Description           : Display
Profile Description ML (hr-HR) : LCD u boji
Profile Description ML (ko-KR) : 모니터 LCD
Profile Description ML (nb-NO) : Farge-LCD
Profile Description ML (hu-HU) : Színes LCD
Profile Description ML (cs-CZ) : Barevný LCD
Profile Description ML (da-DK) : LCD-farveskærm
Profile Description ML (uk-UA) : Монітор з кольоровим дисплеєм
Profile Description ML (it-IT) : LCD colori
```

Example

Let's take a look at File A's metadata with exiftool:

File type

```
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\Downloads\exiftool-9.98>"exiftool(-k).exe" fileA
ExifTool Version Number      : 9.98
File Name                   : fileA
Directory                   :
File Size                    : 3.2 MB
File Modification Date/Time : 2015:07:06 21:39:36-04:00
File Access Date/Time       : 2015:07:11 21:37:58-04:00
File Creation Date/Time    : 2015:07:11 21:37:58-04:00
File Permissions            : rW-rW-rW-
File Type                   : JPEG
File Type Extension         : jpg
MIME Type                   : image/jpeg
Exif Byte Order              : Little-endian (Intel, II)
Compression                 : JPEG (old-style)
```

Image description

```
Image Description          : 78 68 103 103 78 106 85 103 78 122 107 103 77
106 65 103 78 68 81 103 78 106 85 103 78 106 69 103 78 109 77 103 78 106 85 103
78 122 73 103 77 122 73 103 77 122 65 103 77 122 69 103 77 109 77 103 77 71 81 1
03 77 71 69 103 78 68 107 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 99 103 78 106 69 103 78 122 7
7 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78
109 73 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 99 103 77 109 77 103 77 106 65 1
03 78 106 103 103 78 109 89 103 78 122 99 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 81 103 78 122
85 103 78 106 77 103 78 106 103 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 85 103 78 122 103 103
78 106 69 103 78 106 77 103 78 122 81 103 78 109 77 103 78 122 107 103 77 106 65
103 78 106 69 103 78 122 73 103 78 106 85 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 99 103 78 10
6 85 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 99 103 78 106 85 103 78 122 81 103 78 122 81 103 7
8 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 99 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 89 103 78 109 89
103 78 122 73 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 81 103 78 109 77 103 78 122 107 103 77 10
6 65 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 99 103
78 122 77 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 69 103 78 122 8
1 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 99 103 78 106 85 103 90 84 73 103 79 68 65 103 79 84
107 103 78 122 73 103 78 106 85 103 77 106 65 103 90 84 73 103 79 68 65 103 79 8
7 77 103 78 106 73 103 78 109 89 103 78 122 73 103 78 122 73 103 78 109 89 103 7
8 122 99 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 99 103 90 84 73 103 79 68 65 10
3 79 87 81 103 77 50 89 103 77 106 65 103 78 68 107 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 73
103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 81 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 89 103 78 10
6 89 103 77 106 65 103 78 122 99 103 78 109 89 103 78 122 85 103 78 109 77 103 7
8 106 81 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 77 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 73 103 78 106 85
103 77 106 65 103 78 122 81 103 78 109 89 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 73 103 78 106
85 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 69 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 77 103 78 109 89 103 78
122 81 103 77 109 77 103 77 106 65 103 78 109 89 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 1
03 78 106 85 103 78 122 73 103 78 122 99 103 78 106 107 103 78 122 77 103 78 106
85 103 77 106 65 103 78 68 107 103 90 84 73 103 79 68 65 103 79 84 107 103 78 1
06 81 103 77 106 65 103 78 106 89 103 78 106 85 103 78 106 85 103 78 109 77 103
77 106 65 103 78 106 107 103 78 106 89 103 78 106 89 103 78 122 107 103 77 106 6
5 103 78 106 99 103 78 109 89 103 78 106 107 103 78 109 85 103 78 106 99 103 77
106 65 103 78 106 69 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 85 103 78 106 69 103 78 106 81 10
3 77 106 65 103 78 122 99 103 78 106 107 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 103 77 106
65 103 78 122 81 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 107 103 78 122 77 103 90 84 73 103 7
9 68 65 103 89 84 89 103 77 71 81 103 77 71 69 103 77 109 81 103 77 109 81 103 7
7 106 65 103 78 68 99 103 78 106 107 103 78 122 73 103 78 109 77 103 78 68 107 1
03 78 109 85 103 78 84 99 103 78 106 103 103 78 106 107 103 78 122 81 103 78 106
85 103 77 71 81 103 77 71 69 61 226 128 157 61
```

Make and camera info

```
Make : samsung
Camera Model Name : SM-G900U
Orientation : Horizontal (normal)
X Resolution : 72
Y Resolution : 72
Resolution Unit : inches
Software : G900UURU1B0C4
Modify Date : 2015:06:09 11:56:51
YCbCr Positioning : Centered
Exposure Time : 1/346
F Number : 2.2
Exposure Program : Program AE
ISO : 40
Exif Version : 0220
Date/Time Original : 2015:06:09 11:56:51
Create Date : 2015:06:09 11:56:51
Components Configuration : V, Cb, Cr, -
Shutter Speed Value : 1/345
Aperture Value : 2.2
Brightness Value : 7.19
Exposure Compensation : 0
Max Aperture Value : 2.2
Metering Mode : Center-weighted average
Light Source : Unknown
Flash : No Flash
Focal Length : 4.8 mm
Sub Sec Time : 745
Sub Sec Time Original : 745
Sub Sec Time Digitized : 745
Flashpix Version : 0100
Color Space : sRGB
Exif Image Width : 5312
Exif Image Height : 2988
Interoperability Index : R98 - DCF basic file (sRGB)
Interoperability Version : 0100
Sensing Method : One-chip color area
Scene Type : Directly photographed
Exposure Mode : Auto
White Balance : Auto
Focal Length In 35mm Format : 31 mm
Scene Capture Type : Standard
Image Unique ID : F16QLHF01SB
```

GPS Latitude/Longitude

```

GPS Version ID          : 2.2.0.0
GPS Latitude Ref       : North
GPS Longitude Ref      : West
Thumbnail Offset        : 4138
Thumbnail Length        : 8319
Image Width             : 5312
Image Height            : 2988
Encoding Process        : Baseline DCT, Huffman coding
Bits Per Sample         : 8
Color Components         : 3
Y Cb Cr Sub Sampling   : YCbCr4:2:0 (2 2)
Aperture                : 2.2
GPS Latitude             : 38 deg 52' 52.52" N
GPS Longitude            : 77 deg 1' 47.92" W
GPS Position             : 38 deg 52' 52.52" N, 77 deg 1' 47.92" W
Image Size               : 5312x2988
Megapixels              : 15.9
Scale Factor To 35 mm Equivalent: 6.5
Shutter Speed            : 1/346
Create Date              : 2015:06:09 11:56:51.745
Date/Time Original       : 2015:06:09 11:56:51.745
Modify Date              : 2015:06:09 11:56:51.745
Thumbnail Image          : (Binary data 8319 bytes, use -b option to extract)
Circle Of Confusion      : 0.005 mm
Field Of View             : 60.3 deg
Focal Length              : 4.8 mm (35 mm equivalent: 31.0 mm)
Hyperfocal Distance       : 2.25 m
Light Value               : 12.0
-- press any key --

```

Timestamps

Timestamps are data that indicate the time of certain events (MAC): - Modification – when a file was modified - Access – when a file or entries were read or accessed - Creation – when files or entries were created

Types of timestamps

- Modified
- Accessed
- Created
- Date Changed (MFT)
- Filename Date Created (MFT)
- Filename Date Modified (MFT)
- Filename Date Accessed (MFT)
- INDX Entry Date Created
- INDX Entry Date Modified
- INDX Entry Date Accessed
- INDX Entry Date Changed

Why do we care?

Certain events such as creating, moving, copying, opening, editing, etc. might affect the MAC times. If the MAC timestamps can be attained, a timeline of events could be created.

Timeline Patterns

There are plenty more patterns than the ones introduced below, but these are the basics you should start with to get a good understanding of how it works, and to complete this challenge.

Pattern: Run steghide Tool on File

If the steghide tool was used to hide information in a file,

**M= Date Changed (MFT) = INDX Entry Date Modified = INDX Entry Date
Changed > A, C**



Pattern: File Renamed

If a file was renamed,

Date Changed (MFT) ≠ INDX Entry Date Changed and Date Changed (MFT) > M, A, C



Pattern: File Copied Within Drive

If a file was copied within a drive,

A = C > Date Changed (MFT), Filename Date Changed (MFT)
Copy's Filename Date Modified (MFT) = Orig's Filename Date Modified (MFT)
Copy's Filename Date Changed (MFT) = Orig's Date Changed (MFT)



Pattern: File Copied from Different Drive

If a file was copied from a completely different drive,

Accessed = Created > Modified

This is because the file must be newly created & accessed when copying the data over, but the last time it was modified was from before this time.



Pattern: File Opened with Paint, No Save


If the steghide tool was used to hide information in a file,

Filename Date Changed (MFT) > M, A, C



Examples

We know that the BMP files fileA and fileD are the same, but that the JPEG files fileB and fileC are different somehow. So how can we find out what went on with these files?



By using time stamp information from the file system, we can learn that the BMP fileD was the original file, with fileA being a copy of the original. Afterward, fileB was created by modifying fileB, and fileC was created by modifying fileA in a different way.

Follow along as we demonstrate.

We'll start by analyzing images in AccessData FTK Imager, where there's a Properties window that shows you some information about the file or folder you've selected.

Properties	
Name	fileA
File Class	Regular File
File Size	3,364,945
Physical Size	3,366,912
Start Cluster	1,069
Date Accessed	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Date Created	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Date Modified	7/7/2015 1:39:36 AM
Encrypted	False
Compressed	False
Actual File	True
Start Sector	8,584
Alternate Data Stream Count	1
DOS Attributes	

Properties

NTFS Information	
MFT Record Number	37 (37888)
Date Changed (MFT)	7/8/2015 1:38:57 AM
Resident	False
Offline	False
Sparse	False
Temporary	False
Owner SID	S-1-5-21-2769241069-209125157:
Group SID	S-1-5-21-2769241069-209125157:
Filename Date Created (MFT)	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Filename Date Modified (MFT)	7/7/2015 1:39:36 AM
Filename Date Accessed (MFT)	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Filename Date Changed (MFT)	7/8/2015 1:06:11 AM
Filename File Size (MFT)	3,364,945
Filename Physical Size (MFT)	3,366,912

Properties

NTFS Access Control Entry (1)	
ACE Type	Allow Access
SID	S-1-1-0
Name	Everyone
Access Mask	001f01ff
Execute File	True
Read Data	True
Write Data	True

Properties

NTFS Information	
MFT Record Number	37 (37888)
Date Changed (MFT)	7/8/2015 1:38:57 AM
Resident	False
Offline	False
Sparse	False
Temporary	False
Owner SID	S-1-5-21-2769241069-209125157:
Group SID	S-1-5-21-2769241069-209125157:
Filename Date Created (MFT)	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Filename Date Modified (MFT)	7/7/2015 1:39:36 AM
Filename Date Accessed (MFT)	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Filename Date Changed (MFT)	7/8/2015 1:06:11 AM
Filename File Size (MFT)	3,364,945
Filename Physical Size (MFT)	3,366,912

Properties

NTFS Access Control Entry (1)	
ACE Type	Allow Access
SID	S-1-1-0
Name	Everyone
Access Mask	001f01ff
Execute File	True
Read Data	True
Write Data	True

Properties

DOS Attributes	
Name	fileA
File Class	Regular File
File Size	3,364,945
Physical Size	3,366,912
Start Cluster	1,069
Date Accessed	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM
Date Created	7/8/2015 12:50:43 AM



Date Created	7/7/2015 12:30:43 AM
Date Modified	7/7/2015 1:39:36 AM
Encrypted	False
Compressed	False
Actual File	True
Start Sector	8,584
Alternate Data Stream Co	1
□ DOS Attributes	

Here are the extracted MAC times for fileA, fileB, fileC and fileD: Note, AccessData FTK Imager assumes that the file times on the drive are in UTC (Universal Coordinated Time). I subtracted four hours, since the USB was set up in Eastern Standard Time. This isn't necessary, but it helps me understand the times a bit better.

File Name	Date Accessed	Date Created	Date Modified	Date Changed (MFT)	Filename Date Created (MFT)	Filename Date Modified (MFT)	Filename Date Accessed (MFT)	Filename Date Changed (MFT)
fileA	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:06:11 PM
fileB	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM
fileC	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM
fileD	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:55:52 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM
INDEX Entry Date Created	INDEX Entry Date Modified	INDEX Entry Date Accessed	INDEX Entry Date Changed					
7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM					
7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM					
7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM					
7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:55:52 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM					

Highlight timestamps that are the same, if timestamps are off by a few seconds, they should be counted as the same. This lets you see a clear difference between different timestamps. Then, highlight oldest to newest to help put them in order.

1. fileA A,C > M: fileA was copied from another drive @ [7/7/15 8:50PM]

File Name	Date Accessed	Date Created	Date Modified	Date Changed [MFT]	Filename Date Created [MFT]	Filename Date Modified [MFT]	Filename Date Accessed [MFT]	Filename Date Changed [MFT]
fileA	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:39:36 PM
fileB	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM
fileC	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM
fileD	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:45:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:56 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:57 PM

INDEX Entry Date Created	INDEX Entry Date Modified	INDEX Entry Date Accessed	INDEX Entry Date Changed
7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM
7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM
7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM
7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:45:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:45:05 PM

2. fileA Filename Date Changed (MFT) > M, A, C: **fileA opened in program (Paint?) @ [7/7/15 9:06PM]**

File Name	Date Accessed	Date Created	Date Modified	Date Changed (MFT)	Filename	Date Created	Filename Date Modified (MFT)	Filename Date Accessed (MFT)	Filename Date Changed (MFT)
fileA	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:06:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:06:11 PM
fileB	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM
fileC	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM
fileD	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:55:53 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM
INDX Entry Date Created	INDX Entry Date Modified	INDX Entry Date Accessed	INDX Entry Date Changed						
7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM						
7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM						
7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM						
7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:55:52 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:55:53 PM						

3. fileB is PNG, looks like fileA, M = A = C: **fileB created from fileA in program @ [7/7/15 9:10PM]**

4. fileC is BMP, looks like fileA, M = A = C: **fileC created from fileA in program @ [7/7/15 9:20PM]**

9. fileD M = Date Changed (MFT) = INDX Entry Date Modified = INDX
 Entry Date Changed > A, C: **fileD modified w/ Steghide @ [7/7/15 9:55PM]**

Steghide usage could indicate hidden information inside fileD

File Name	Date Accessed	Date Created	Date Modified	Date Changed (MFT)	Filename Date Created (MFT)	Filename Date Modified (MFT)	Filename Date Accessed (MFT)	Filename Date Changed (MFT)
fileA	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:06:11 PM
fileB	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM
fileC	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM
fileD	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM
INDX Entry Date Created	INDX Entry Date Modified	INDX Entry Date Accessed	INDX Entry Date Changed					
7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/6/2015 09:39:36 PM	7/7/2015 08:50:43 PM	7/7/2015 09:38:57 PM					
7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:13 PM	7/7/2015 09:10:11 PM	7/7/2015 09:32:14 PM					
7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:45 PM	7/7/2015 09:20:44 PM	7/7/2015 09:35:05 PM					
7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM	7/7/2015 09:44:54 PM					

Identify timestamp patterns.


- [7/7/15 8:50PM] fileA was copied onto the USB
- [7/7/15 9:06PM] fileA was opened with a program (Paint?)
- [7/7/15 9:10PM] fileA was saved in the program as fileB
- [7/7/15 9:20PM] fileB was saved in the program as fileC
- [7/7/15 9:32PM] fileB was renamed to **fileB**
- [7/7/15 9:35PM] fileC was renamed to **fileC**
- [7/7/15 9:38PM] fileA was renamed to **fileA**
- [7/7/15 9:44PM] **fileA** was copied within the USB drive & renamed **fileD**
- [7/7/15 9:55PM] Steghide was run on **fileD**

Wireshark

[Wireshark](#) is a network protocol analyzer which is often used in CTF challenges to look at recorded network traffic. Wireshark uses a filetype called PCAP to record traffic. PCAPs are often distributed in CTF challenges to provide recorded traffic history.

Interface

Upon opening Wireshark, you are greeted with the option to open a PCAP or begin capturing network traffic on your device.



Capture

...using this filter: Enter a capture filter ... All interfaces shown

Wi-Fi: en0	
p2p0	
awdl0	
Thunderbolt Bridge: bridge0	
utun0	
Thunderbolt 1: en1	
utun1	

Learn

[User's Guide](#) · [Wiki](#) · [Questions and Answers](#) · [Mailing Lists](#)

You are running Wireshark 2.4.4 (v2.4.4-0-g90a7be1).




The network traffic displayed initially shows the packets in order of which they were captured. You can filter packets by protocol, source IP address, destination IP address, length, etc.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	70	Standard query 0x82f1 A google.com
2	0.020666	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	86	Standard query response 0x82f1 A goog
3	0.023651	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	70	Standard query 0x0d1c AAAA google.com
4	0.044001	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	98	Standard query response 0x0d1c AAAA g
5	0.049059	192.168.198.128	172.217.9.14	TCP	66	50311 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0
6	0.086465	192.168.198.128	172.217.9.14	TCP	54	50311 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=1644
7	0.086817	192.168.198.128	172.217.9.14	HTTP	236	GET / HTTP/1.1
8	0.136338	192.168.198.128	172.217.9.14	TCP	54	50311 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=183 Ack=541
9	0.164267	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	71	Standard query 0x268a A youtube.com
10	0.173835	192.168.198.128	172.217.9.14	TCP	54	50311 → 80 [ACK] Seq=184 Ack=542 Win=
11	0.187468	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	87	Standard query response 0x268a A you
12	0.187662	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	71	Standard query 0x273a AAAA youtube.co
13	0.204877	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	71	Standard query 0x273a AAAA youtube.co
14	0.210129	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	99	Standard query response 0x273a AAAA y
15	0.220185	192.168.198.128	216.58.194.110	TCP	66	50312 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0
16	0.224502	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	99	Standard query response 0x273a AAAA y
17	0.257009	192.168.198.128	216.58.194.110	TCP	54	50312 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=1644
18	0.257176	192.168.198.128	216.58.194.110	HTTP	237	GET / HTTP/1.1
19	0.317275	192.168.198.128	216.58.194.110	TCP	54	50312 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=184 Ack=213
20	0.332746	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	72	Standard query 0xedf2 A facebook.com
21	0.352428	8.8.8.8	192.168.198.128	DNS	88	Standard query response 0xedf2 A face
22	0.352612	192.168.198.128	8.8.8.8	DNS	77	Standard query 0xedf2 AAAA facebook.c

▶ Frame 1: 70 bytes on wire (560 bits), 70 bytes captured (560 bits)
 ▶ Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_f8:4e:70 (00:0c:29:f8:4e:70), Dst: Vmware_ec:fa:7e (00:50:56:ec:fa:7e)
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.198.128, Dst: 8.8.8.8
 ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 63874, Dst Port: 53
 ▶ Domain Name System (query)



In order to apply filters, simply enter the constraining factor, for example 'http', in the display filter bar.



Filters can be chained together using '&&' notation. In order to filter by IP, ensure a double equals '==' is used.

pcap.pcap

http & ip.dst ==172.217.14.163

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
163	7.233156	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	238	GET / HTTP/1.1
228	15.671532	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
237	15.829230	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	238	GET / HTTP/1.1
246	15.999055	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
263	16.576285	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
284	16.903072	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
302	18.963202	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
320	19.415508	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
329	19.603719	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
365	20.600719	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
402	22.271232	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
674	32.783651	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
719	33.596332	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
755	34.515410	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
866	41.317575	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
939	45.796633	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	238	GET / HTTP/1.1
948	45.965842	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
975	46.541799	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
1099	50.925898	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	239	GET / HTTP/1.1
1144	54.705568	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	235	GET / HTTP/1.1
1184	56.356255	192.168.198.128	172.217.14.163	HTTP	238	GET / HTTP/1.1

Frame 163: 238 bytes on wire (1904 bits), 238 bytes captured (1904 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_f8:4e:70 (00:0c:29:f8:4e:70), Dst: Vmware_ec:fa:7e (00:50:56:ec:fa:7e)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.198.128, Dst: 172.217.14.163

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50327, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 184

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

 ▶ GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n

 Host: google.co.jp\r\n

 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.112

 Accept: */*\r\n

 \r\n

[Full request URI: http://google.co.jp/]

 [HTTP request 1/1]

Text Item (text), 16 bytes

Packets: 1601 · Displayed: 28 (1.7%) · Load time: 0:0.44 · Profile: Default

The most pertinent part of a packet is its data payload and protocol information.

pcap.pcap

http & ip.dst ==172.217.14.163

Frame 163: 238 bytes on wire (1904 bits), 238 bytes captured (1904 bits)

Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_f8:4e:70 (00:0c:29:f8:4e:70), Dst: Vmware_ec:fa:7e (00:50:56:ec:fa:7e)

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.198.128, Dst: 172.217.14.163

Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 50327, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 184

 Source Port: 50327

 Destination Port: 80

 [Stream index: 16]

 [TCP Segment Len: 184]

 Sequence number: 1 (relative sequence number)

 [Next sequence number: 185 (relative sequence number)]

 Acknowledgment number: 1 (relative ack number)

 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)

 Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK)

 Window size value: 64240

 [Calculated window size: 16445440]

 [Window size scaling factor: 256]

 Checksum: 0x4378 [unverified]

 [Checksum Status: Unverified]

 Urgent pointer: 0

 ▶ [SEQ/ACK analysis]

 TCP payload (184 bytes)

Hypertext Transfer Protocol

 ▶ GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n

[Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]

 [GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n]

 [Severity level: Chat]

 [Group: Sequence]

 Request Method: GET

 Request URI: /

 Request Version: HTTP/1.1

 Host: google.co.jp\r\n

 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_8) AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/12.0.742.112

 Accept: */*\r\n

 \r\n

[Full request URI: http://google.co.jp/]

 [HTTP request 1/1]

Request number (http.request_number)

Packets: 1601 · Displayed: 28 (1.7%) · Load time: 0:0.44 · Profile: Default

Decrypting SSL Traffic

By default, Wireshark cannot decrypt SSL traffic on your device unless you grant it specific certificates.

High Level SSL Handshake Overview


In order for a network session to be encrypted properly, the client and server must share a common secret for which they can use to encrypt and decrypt data without someone in the middle being able to guess. The SSL Handshake loosely follows this format:

1. The client sends a list of available cipher suites it can use along with a random set of bytes referred to as `client_random`
2. The server sends back the cipher suite that will be used, such as `TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA`, along with a random set of bytes referred to as `server_random`
3. The client generates a pre-master secret, encrypts it, then sends it to the server.
4. The server and client then generate a common master secret using the selected cipher suite
5. The client and server begin communicating using this common secret

Decryption Requirements

There are several ways to be able to decrypt traffic.


- If you have the client and server random values *and* the pre-master secret, the master secret can be generated and used to decrypt the traffic
- If you have the master secret, traffic can be decrypted easily
- If the cipher-suite uses RSA, you can factor n in the key in order to break the encryption on the encrypted pre-master secret and generate the master secret with the client and server randoms




Steganography

Steganography is the practice of hiding data in plain sight. Steganography is often embedded in images or audio.

You could send a picture of a cat to a friend and hide text inside. Looking at the image, there's nothing to make anyone think there's a message hidden inside it.




You could also hide a second image inside the first.



Steganography Detection

So we can hide text and an image, how do we find out if there is hidden data?




FileA and FileD appear the same, but they're different. Also, FileD was modified after it was copied, so it's possible there might be steganography in it.

FileB and FileC don't appear to have been modified after being created. That doesn't rule out the possibility that there's steganography in them, but you're more likely to find it in fileD. This brings up two questions:

1. Can we determine that there is steganography in fileD?
2. If there is, what was hidden in it?

LSB Steganography

Files are made of bytes. Each byte is composed of eight bits.



Changing the least-significant bit (LSB) doesn't change the value very much.

$$10101100_2 = 172_{10}$$

changing the LSB from '0' to '1':

$$10101101_2 = 173_{10}$$

So we can modify the LSB without changing the file noticeably. By doing so, we can hide a message inside.

LSB Steganography in Images

LSB Steganography or *Least Significant Bit* Steganography is a method of Steganography where data is recorded in the lowest bit of a byte.

Say an image has a pixel with an RGB value of (255, 255, 255), the bits of those RGB values will look like

1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

By modifying the lowest, or least significant, bit, we can use the 1 bit space across every RGB value for every pixel to construct a message.

1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

The reason Steganography is hard to detect by sight is because a 1 bit difference in color is insignificant as seen below.

COLOR 1

FFFFFE

COLOR 2

FFFFFF

Example

Let's say we have an image, and part of it contains the following binary:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101100 00110100 01101101
01100101

And let's say we want to hide the character y inside.

First, we need to convert the hidden message to binary.

y = 01111001

Now we take each bit from the hidden message and replace the LSB of the corresponding byte with it.

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101100 00110100 01101101
01100101

01111001

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101100 00110100 01101101
01100101

01111001

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101100 00110100 01101101
01100101

01111001

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101101 00110100 01101101
01100101

01111001

NOTE: The 0 had to be changed to a 1 here

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101101 001101000 01101101
01100101

01111001

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101101 00110100 01101100
01100101

01111001

And again:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101101 00110100 01101100
01100101

01111001

And once more:

00110010 01100011 01101111 01101111 01101101 00110100 01101100
01100101

↑

01111001

Completed Steganography:
Seemingly normal message with hidden message inside

Decoding LSB steganography is exactly the same as encoding, but in reverse. For each byte, grab the LSB and add it to your decoded message. Once you've gone through each byte, convert all the LSBs you grabbed into text or a file. (You can use your file signature knowledge here!)

What other types of steganography are there?

Steganography is hard for the defense side, because there's practically an infinite number of ways it could be carried out. Here are a few examples:

- LSB steganography: different bits, different bit combinations
- Encode in every certain number of bytes
- Use a password
- Hide in different places
- Use encryption on top of steganography

Blind Watermark

Blind watermark is a kind of technique to embed one picture or string to another image. Just like the regular watermark, but the blind watermark cannot be detected by using human eyes. The transformed image is indistinguishable from the original one.

Furthermore, blind watermark should be able to bypass different types of processing of image. For example, rotating the picture should not break the blind watermark. Some modern researches are focusing on the strong transform of the image, such as film the image from another screen.

Example

encode:

original image



watermark

PYTHON

```
python encode.py --image ori.png --watermark watermark.png --result res.png
```

result



decode:

```
python decode.py --original ori.png --image res.png --result extract.png
```

watermark



Hex Editor

A hexadecimal (hex) editor (also called a binary file editor or byte editor) is a computer program you can use to manipulate the fundamental binary data that constitutes a computer file. The name "hex" comes from "hexadecimal," a standard numerical format for representing binary data. A typical computer file occupies multiple areas on the platter(s) of a disk drive, whose contents are combined to form the file. Hex editors that are designed to parse and edit sector data from

the physical segments of floppy or hard disks are sometimes called sector editors or disk editors. A hex editor is used to see or edit the raw, exact contents of a file. Hex editors may be used to correct data corrupted by a system or application. A [list of editors](#) can be found on the forensics Wiki. You can download one and install it on your system.

Example

Open fileA.jpg in a hex editor. (Most Hex editors have either a “File > Open” option or a simple drag and drop.)



When you open fileA.jpg in your hex editor, you should see something similar to this:

Offset(h)	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F
00000000	FF	D8	FF	E1	30	A6	45	78	69	66	00	00	49	49	2A	00
00000010	08	00	00	00	0F	00	00	01	04	00	01	00	00	00	C0	14
00000020	00	00	01	01	04	00	01	00	00	00	AC	0B	00	00	03	01
00000030	03	00	01	00	00	00	06	00	00	00	0E	01	02	00	9E	0B
00000040	00	00	C2	00	00	00	0F	01	02	00	08	00	00	00	60	0C
00000050	00	00	10	01	02	00	09	00	00	00	68	0C	00	00	12	01
00000060	03	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	1A	01	05	00	01	00
00000070	00	00	72	0C	00	00	1B	01	05	00	01	00	00	00	7A	0C
00000080	00	00	28	01	03	00	01	00	00	00	02	00	00	00	31	01
00000090	02	00	0E	00	00	00	82	0C	00	00	32	01	02	00	14	00

Your hex editor should also have a "go to" or "find" feature so you can jump to a specific byte.

Exercise

Every lab we will have 2 or 3 challenges about the topics this week. But in case the difficulty of the challenge, only the first 2 challenges are required. But if you want to fight CTF so hard, you can try the third one. Solving the third one would give you extra points for this lab and some prizes as well.

For finishing the challenges, you may click this site: [COMPASS CTF Platform](#) and find the category cs315. Other challenges are for CTF team members, but you also can finish them freely. After uploading the flag on the platform, you also need to upload a writeup to blackboard system to grade.

The `writeup` is a file to describe how you solve the challenges and you need also post flag in it. **The writeup would use to grade** and in case you forget to submit the writeup, during the argue procedure, we would check the submission in platform.

Example writeup

(5 pt) Congratulations!

Now in order to check whether you are a robot, you need to submit this flag to show that you are a real human!

`flag{w3lcom3_t0_cs315_c0urs3!!!}`

The flag you submit should be `flag{w3lcom3_t0_cs315_c0urs3!!!}`, and the example writeup probably be:

`writeup.md`

I am a human so I copied the flag and submit it.

Here is the flag:

`flag{w3lcom3_t0_cs315_c0urs3!!!}`

(5 pt) What is so called stream?

The network is so bad that I can't even send TCP stream through Internet. Wondering if I can use "UDP streams"...

[capture.pcap](#)

Try to find `flag` in this file, the flag format is: `picoCTF{***}`

Hint1: Wireshark may be useful.

(5 pt) HTTPS with secret sauce

Solved the network problem yesterday, but I found some guy was sniffing my network traffic. I need to be careful to protect my flag. Decide to use HTTPS to submit my flag to `web01`.



By the way, upload my `super☆secret☆file` to network disk.

[capture.pcapng](#)

[pre-master secret.txt](#)

Try to find `f1ag` in this file, the flag format is: `flag{y2***}`

(BONUS 5 pt) Bytes through network

That hacker still got my flag! Fine, I'm going to send my file byte by byte. Besides, combined with my knowledge of **programming, encryption, and stenography** I'm going to fight the final round. WE ARE IN THE ENDGAME NOW.

[capture.pcapng](#)

Try to find `f1ag` in this file, the flag format is: `flag{***}`

This challenge is extremely hard. The winner will get a badge for solving this.