

INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC SCHOOL

# **MODEL UNITED NATIONS**

2024



**GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1**  
**GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1**  
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# Introduction

## WELCOME LETTER FROM THE DIAS

Greetings, delegates!

It gives us immense pleasure to be serving as the Dais of General Assembly 1.

We're eagerly looking forward to the three fruitful days of the conference that we shall spend in committee together debating and discussing some of the most significant topics in the world today. To the veterans of MUN, we promise you a thrilling debate that you've never experienced before, and to the newcomers, we're excited to be a part of your maiden voyage ahead! Please know that we are here to guide and support you every step of the way.

This Background guide will never be enough for research, however, it will give you enough insight into the agenda. Also, embedded in this study guide, are a series of hints, at which direction your research should be heading. The Dais encourages you to research further about the agenda, foreign policies, and intricate details.

We hope that every delegate has a great time during the conference. A MUN is not only about battling out your foreign policy but also meeting new people, fostering friendships, learning new things, and having a time worth remembering.

We look forward to hosting each one of you and hope to nurture the diplomats in you!

Please feel free to contact us on WhatsApp (or email) if you have any queries or want to vibe (or both)! We'd be more than happy to help!

Warm Regards,

The Dias of General Assembly 1,

Agrima Sood, Ali Shariq, and Mohammed Mohana.



# Introduction

## COMMITTEE OVERVIEW

General Assembly 1, also known as the Disarmament and International Security Committee or DISEC, is one of the six main committees of the General Assembly. It holds discussions related to disarmament and international security matters, providing a space for each country to discuss their positions on such matters and to come up with solutions to better approach the issues.

GA1 has tackled various disarmament and security problems over the years. The committee concentrated on forming the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the early years of the UN. The committee was essential in the 1980s discussions that led to the intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. Its efforts have contributed to minimizing the threat of nuclear war, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting global peace and security. The committee has also focused on addressing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, including through the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. The General Assembly First Committee (DISEC) works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage. In the 21st century, the committee has addressed issues such as the arms trade, small arms and light weapons, and preventing an arms race in outer space.

### *The work of the committee falls under six main clusters:*

1. Addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and promoting their non-proliferation and disarmament.
2. Promoting the reduction of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, and encouraging transparency and confidence-building



# **Introduction**

## **COMMITTEE OVERVIEW**

measures.

3. Addressing the prevention of an arms race in outer space and promoting peaceful uses of outer space.

4. Supporting efforts to reduce military spending and redirect resources towards social and economic development.

5. Addressing the humanitarian impact of weapons, including their impact on civilians, and promoting their prohibition and elimination.

6. Promoting universal adherence to existing international disarmament and arms control agreements and encouraging further negotiations.



# **Introduction**

## **COMMITTEE STRUCTURE**

### **CHAIR**

A Chair is a person who is responsible for leading formal debate within the committee. The role of the Chair is to facilitate debate, to keep it moving, and to ensure that delegates follow the Rules of Procedure. Chairs also explain and clarify rules so that even first-timer delegates can feel comfortable participating. The Chair has complete control of the proceedings of the committee along with the Co-chair. Along with clarifying the rules and facilitating the flow of the committee sessions, the Chair also helps set the atmosphere of the simulation.

### **CO-CHAIR**

A Co-Chair is a person who is responsible for the logistics of the committee session as well as supporting the Chair and being ready to assume the responsibilities of the Chair. Co-chairs encourage direct discussions, announce decisions and ensure the observance of the Rules of Procedure. The Co-Chair also advises the delegations on the possible course of debate and suggests any motions which would be looked upon favourably.

### **PAGER**

As talking in a committee is strictly prohibited due to maintaining formal decorum, a pager's role is to ensure that messages written on paper notes get passed among delegates to communicate with each other. Alongside passing notes around, a pager also helps the dias with attendance and writing down committee topics such as caucuses or any challenge a delegate might bring up.



# Agenda

## AGENDA 1: THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

With the rapid rise of robotics and AI, the question of how weapons that integrate automation, known as Autonomous Weapon Systems, should be regulated becomes increasingly important. Although there is no single agreed-upon definition of Autonomous Weapon Systems, they generally refer to weapon systems that, when activated, can operate without further human intervention. Regulations on autonomous weapon systems are being developed by various countries and organizations. This agenda is centered around how Autonomous Weapon Systems should be regulated, along with their ethical, legal, and political implications. It also covers diplomatic and public awareness and the ongoing struggle for international regulation.

Given below is a small timeline of the evolution of autonomous weapons systems.

1943	First mass-produced autonomous weapon, known as FIDO, was developed for use in the US Navy.
2012	The US Department of Defense released its original policy on Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Weapons.
2019	The 11 Guiding Principles on Lethal Autonomous Weapons were created and adopted.
2023 (October)	The UN Secretary-General calls for negotiations on a legally binding instrument to set prohibitions on Autonomous Weapons.
2023 (November)	GA1 approves a resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

### SUBTOPICS (KEY ISSUES THAT DELEGATES CAN DEBATE ON DURING MODERATED CAUCUS)

*1) Ethical implications of deploying autonomous weapons in armed conflicts*





# Agenda

The ethical implications of autonomous weapons can be discussed from different perspectives. One of the main arguments against the use of such weapons is the violation of human dignity. Do machines that can independently select targets and attack them without human intervention undermine the value of human life?

Accountability is another ethical concern. The use of autonomous weapons raises the possibility of accidental or intentional harm to innocent civilians, and it may not always be clear who is responsible for such actions.

Autonomous weapons also raise the question of whether such weapons can comply with international law. The principles of international humanitarian law require that the use of force must be proportional, discriminate, and avoid unnecessary suffering. The use of autonomous lethal weapons challenges these principles, as machines cannot judge the proportionality of a given attack or the civilian nature of a target.

## ***2) Advancement of a potential arms race***

Autonomous weapons operate with greater speed and precision than conventional weapons. Arms racing and the undermining of global peace and security becomes a risk when qualitatively new technologies promising clear military advantages seem close at hand. Countries like China, Russia, and the United States of America are already investing heavily in robotic and artificial intelligence technologies with the aim of exploiting their military potential. Competition between these rivals to gain an advantage over each other in autonomous technology and its military capabilities already meets the definition of an arms race and has the potential to escalate.

This competition has no absolute end goal: merely the relative goal of staying ahead of other competitors. Should one of these states, or another technologically advanced state, develop and deploy autonomous weapon systems in the field, it is very likely that others would follow suit. The ensuing race can be expected to be highly destabilizing and dangerous.





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## ***3) Risks associated with autonomous weapons***

There are a number of risks associated with the use of autonomous weapons. Autonomous weapons are dangerously unpredictable in their behavior. Complex interactions between machine learning-based algorithms and a dynamic operational context make it extremely difficult to predict the behavior of these weapons in real world settings. Moreover, the weapons systems are unpredictable by design; they're programmed to behave unpredictably in order to remain one step ahead of enemy systems.

Autonomous weapons are also extremely scalable. This means that the level of harm you can do using autonomous weapons depends solely on the quantity of autonomous weapons in your arsenal, not on the number of people you have available to operate the weapons. A swarm of autonomous weapons, small or large, requires only a single individual to activate it, and then its component weapons would fire themselves. This goes on to show that autonomous weapons have the potential to become weapons of mass destruction.

## ***4) Level of human control required in deployment and operations of autonomous weapons***

Meaningful human control is at the core of regulatory and ethical debates on autonomous weapon systems. There are varying perspectives on this topic. Humans, not computers and their algorithms should ultimately remain in control of, and thus morally responsible for, relevant decisions about lethal autonomous weapons. Many researchers argue that higher levels of autonomy of systems can and should be combined with human control and responsibility.

This can be done in two ways: first, a “tracking” condition, according to which the system should be able to respond to both the relevant moral reasons of the humans designing and deploying the system and the relevant facts in the environment in which the system operates; second, a “tracing” condition, according to which the system should be designed in such a way as to grant the possibility to always trace back the outcome of its operations to at least one human along the chain of design



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and operation. But, finding the right balance between technological advancements in warfare and ensuring human oversight and accountability remains a significant challenge in regulating the deployment and operations of autonomous weapons.

## FOCUS QUESTIONS

- What ethical guidelines should govern the deployment of autonomous weapons in armed conflict or military operations?
- How can meaningful human control be defined and ensured in the development and deployment of these systems?
- What legal frameworks and international conventions should be established or adapted to regulate the use of autonomous weapons?
- What are the potential risks associated with the use of autonomous weapons, and how can these risks be identified and mitigated?
- What safety measures or fail-safes should be in place to prevent unintended consequences or malfunctions?
- How can transparency be ensured in the development, testing, and deployment of autonomous weapons systems?
- What mechanisms are needed to hold individuals, organizations, or states accountable for the actions and consequences of autonomous weapons?
- What measures can be implemented to prevent the escalation of conflicts due to the use of autonomous weapons?
- How can nations collaborate to establish shared regulations and guidelines for the responsible use of these technologies?



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## AGENDA 2: PREVENTING THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE.

Considering the rapid rise of technology, preventing the militarization of space becomes increasingly important to maintain international peace and global stability, protect valuable space assets, and avoid an arms race. The militarization of space typically refers to the use of space for military purposes, such as surveillance and communication. This agenda is centered around how the Militarization of Space can be prevented and covering the potential threats posed by it; also delving into current international treaties and the effectiveness of these treaties.

Given below is a small timeline of the militarization of space.

1943	First mass-produced autonomous weapon, known as FIDO, was developed for use in the US Navy.
2012	The US Department of Defense released its original policy on Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Weapons.
2019	The 11 Guiding Principles on Lethal Autonomous Weapons were created and adopted.
2023 (October)	The UN Secretary-General calls for negotiations on a legally binding instrument to set prohibitions on Autonomous Weapons.
2023 (November)	GA1 approves a resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

## SUBTOPICS (KEY ISSUES THAT DELEGATES CAN DEBATE ON DURING MODERATED CAUCUS)

### *1) Development, deployment and regulation of space weapons*

Any weapons (whether land-, sea-, or air-based) able to damage a satellite or interfere with its functioning. These weapons are called anti-satellite (or ASAT)



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Weapons that interfere with a satellite's ground stations or ground-based communications receivers are typically not considered ASAT weapons. Any space-based weapons intended to attack targets in space or on the ground. These weapons include space-based ballistic missile defense interceptors and ground-attack weapons.

There is an urgent need for a discussion on the future military uses of space for several reasons. First, the technology for developing and deploying weapons systems in space is already available in major space faring nations. Second, conflicts are beginning to arise over space-based assets, both for economic and security reasons. Thirdly, there are few legal restrictions on the use of space weapons. Finally, a number of political and military leaders in some major powers have expressed their support for the deployment of space weapons.

## ***2) Risks posed by space debris resulting from military activities in space***

Space debris is any human-made object in orbit that no longer serves a useful purpose. It includes defunct satellites, discarded equipment and rocket stages, and fragments from the breakup of satellites and rocket stages. Space debris is a concern because—due to its very high speed in orbit—even relatively small pieces can damage or destroy satellites in a collision. Since debris at high altitudes can stay in orbit for decades or longer, it accumulates as more is produced. As the amount grows, the risk of collisions with satellites also grows. If the amount of debris at some altitudes becomes sufficiently large, it could be difficult to use those regions for satellites.

The destruction of satellites by ASAT weapons can produce tremendous amounts of orbital debris. ASAT weapons could therefore significantly increase the cost of using space, and could hinder using regions of space that today are widely used for a range of purposes. Beyond that, the sudden loss of a satellite due to debris during a crisis could remove important capabilities, or could lead to dangerous reactions and the escalation of the crisis, especially if the adversary was known to have an ASAT capability.



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## ***3) Preventing an arms race in outer space***

The overwhelming majority of UN member states are concerned that the weaponization of outer space will lead to an arms race and insist that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race, emphasizing that this treaty would not limit space access, but would prevent such limitations. Outer space is becoming a contest for supremacy, drawing on space-based communications and intelligence assets, and the early development of anti-satellite weaponry. Big businesses are already pursuing space commerce more aggressively, with visions of space colonies and large scale resource extraction. But the continued, unchecked proliferation of ASATs could close off space entirely—and help induce a major arms race.

## **FOCUS QUESTIONS**

- What governance structures and regulatory frameworks are needed to prevent the escalation of conflicts in space?
- How can existing international treaties like the Outer Space Treaty be updated to address contemporary challenges?
- What strategies can be adopted to address the growing issue of space debris resulting from military activities in space?
- How can the environmental impact of militarization in space be minimized?
- How can diplomatic channels be utilized to resolve disputes related to military activities in space?
- What ethical considerations should guide nations in their pursuit of military activities in space?
- How can developing nations be included in discussions about space militarization to ensure equitable access and participation?
- What steps should be taken to secure and protect satellites from potential attacks or interference in a militarized space environment?



# Resources & References

## LIST OF RECOMMENDED READINGS

- <https://diginomica.com/autonomous-weapons-systems-cautionary-use-case-evaluating-ai-risks#:~:text=These%20robots%20are%20designed%20for,and%20compliance%20with%20international%20law.>
- <https://www.amacad.org/publication/ethics-morality-robotic-warfare-assessing-debate-over-autonomous-weapons>
- <https://dronewars.net/2023/05/09/the-arms-race-towards-autonomous-weapons-industry-acknowledge-concerns/>
- <https://autonomousweapons.org/the-risks/>
- <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2018.00015/full#:~:text=We%20identify%20two%20general%20necessary,the%20system%20and%20the%20relevant>
- <https://science.howstuffworks.com/space-war2.htm>
- <https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/intro-to-space-weapons.pdf>
- [https://www.esa.int/Enabling\\_Support/Operations/Space\\_debris\\_assessing\\_the\\_risk](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Operations/Space_debris_assessing_the_risk)
- <https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5448-outer-space>

## ONLINE RESOURCES

- <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/09/i-weapons-are-third-revolution-warfare/620013/>
- <https://academic.oup.com/book/33540/chapter-abstract/287905547?redirectedFrom=fulltext>
- <https://opiniojuris.org/2020/12/18/meaningful-human-control-over-autonomous-weapon-systems-an-international-criminal-law-account/>
- <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43154-020-00024-3>



# Resources & References

- [https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1540361/1/Vol1No1\\_19-32\\_Marshall\\_et\\_al\\_article.pdf](https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1540361/1/Vol1No1_19-32_Marshall_et_al_article.pdf)
- <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/10006-cerl-conference-summary-report-weaponization>
- <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep32146.4.pdf>
- <https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/archive/visit-our-museum-archive/naval-undersea-museum/collections/torpedoes/mark-24/history-of-the-mark-24-torpedo.html>
- <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/14/review-2023-us-policy-autonomy-weapons-systems>
- <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=726163>
- <https://assembly.coe.int/LifeRay/JUR/Pdf/TextesProvisoires/2022/20221116-LawsApprehension-EN.pdf>
- <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/multilateralism-a-principle-of-action-for-france/alliance-for-multilateralism/article/11-principles-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-laws>
- <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3731.doc.htm>
- <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141922>
- <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/103729.htm#:~:text=On%20October%204%2C%201957%2C%20the,accomplish%20this%20scientific%20advancement%20first>
- <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html>
- [https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES\\_34\\_68E.pdf](https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_34_68E.pdf)
- [https://www.ops-alaska.com/IOSL/V7P2/2014\\_PPWTreaty\\_EN.pdf](https://www.ops-alaska.com/IOSL/V7P2/2014_PPWTreaty_EN.pdf)

## CONTACT INFORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE





# Resources & References

In case of any queries and doubts, delegates are free to send a mail to the official email address of GA1.

**[galiasmun2024@gmail.com](mailto:galiasmun2024@gmail.com)**

The individual contact information of the dias is also available.

**Chair, Agrima Sood**

Whatsapp Number: 0567171398

**Co-Chair, Ali Shariq**

Whatsapp Number: 0566608110

**Pager, Mohammed Mohana**

Whatsapp Number: 0547372343



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## SAMPLE POSITION PAPER

*Delegation from*

The Federal Republic of  
Germany

*Represented by*

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The Position Paper for the Disarmament and International Security Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the United Nations (UN) General Assembly First Committee that has been responsible for maintaining international peace and security since 1945. Germany is a crucial member as it participates in initiatives on disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control. The topics discussed are 'Militarization of Outer Space and the Possibility of a Space Arms Race' and 'Gun Control Policies: Effective or a Hindrance'.

### **I. Militarization of Outer Space and the Possibility of a Space Arms Race**

Due to dramatic technological and scientific advancements in the past decades, nations have been interested in exploring outer space and retaining superiority over other countries through outer space militarization. After the lengthy competition between USSR and the US for paramount space exploration that started in 1957, the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test being first executed by Russia, other countries have been building and developing more advanced technologies. Thus, due to its calamitous consequences, the UN placed numerous treaties, conventions, and agreements to cease any arms race or militarization in space. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was established by the General Assembly in 1959 to govern the exploration and usage of space for the benefit of all humankind: peace, security, and development.

Germany is firmly devoted to terminating the arms race and establishing peace and security in outer space. To accomplish that, Germany has ratified The Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Launch Registration Convention to ensure concord. Forbye, Germany actively contributed to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (GGE PAROS). Germany is wholly supportive of a resumption of the substantive endeavours of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. It persists in actively contributing to the discussions and negotiations under the PAROS working group in multiple fora within the UN system.

Germany is open to initiatives to substantially advance arms control policy concerning menaces to space systems. During the forum of the draft resolutions on outer space in the First Committee (DISEC) on 29 October 2019, Germany was concerned about the increasing development of various counter-space capabilities. Germany then abstained due to the inadequate response to the long-term objective, ambiguities, and shortcomings which could raise the risk of conflict in space. Furthermore, a German representative stated, "Germany emphasizes that a future framework for arms control concerning outer space should involve comprehensive, practical, and verifiable legally binding instruments designed to eventually cover all relevant threats [...]." Thus, there ought to be more than the current normative framework for outer space.

Further, Germany voted against the draft resolution L.58/Rev.1 because it was inadequate and restricted. Germany is seeking an approach that principally excludes the militarization of outer space, which is flawless, sufficient, and time-independent.

Germany calls for the continuation and strengthening of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 to prohibit placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and for all nations to ratify and adhere to the treaty. The UN should create a space confidence-building



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measures (CBMs) mechanism to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to a space arms race, which would involve transparency through sharing information on space-related activities and developing a code of conduct for the peaceful use of outer space.

Establishing a joint international space research and development program would be open to participation by all nations and would promote collaboration and cooperation between developed and non-developed countries that require aid in exploring and using outer space. Lastly, promoting international cooperation for the peaceful use of outer space, including developing technologies for space exploration, satellite-based services, and space debris management.

### **II. Gun Control Policies: Effective or a Hindrance**

One of the fundamental human rights is the right to life. This is one of the cornerstones of basic rights that should be guaranteed to any human being. However, this right is usurped by one of the world's prevalent issues: gun control. Even the international community has signed many treaties, such as the UN firearms protocol, the UN small arms programme of action, the UN Register of Conventional weapons, and the UN arms trade treaty. Despite all these measures, the availability of guns and their threat are still at large. This is quite evident by the recent statistic that shows 250,000 people died due to firearms worldwide.

Germany considers that firearm ownership, not a right but a privilege. Thus, Germany firmly believes that strict gun control policies effectively reduce gun crime and protect citizens' safety. This is evident by Germany's gun control laws that require all firearms to be registered; individuals must pass background checks and attend a firearms safety course. The effects of these strict laws are shown as Germany has one of the lowest numbers of deaths by firearms worldwide. Moreover, just from 1998-2018, Germany saw an almost 50% drop in deaths caused by gun violence. Despite this decrease in gun violence, Germany is one of the largest exporters of firearms. However, the government is enacting and has stated plans for measures to restrict firearm exports. This will reduce firearm exports to other nations, reducing firearm casualties in other nations. Furthermore, Germany has signed and ratified many UN and other international firearm treaties, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, UN Firearms Protocol, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and development, and other EU treaties relating to firearms. Additionally, Germany has provided funds to other UN member states to aid in implementing UNPoA. It would enable other nations as well to reduce deaths by gun violence.

One solution is to increase funding for background checks and mental health evaluations for gun ownership. This will reduce the risk of firearms landing in the hands of mentally unstable individuals. Additionally, implementing an international buyback program for illegal firearms can help decrease the number of illicit firearms in circulation and increase penalties for unlawful possession.

Moreover, this can be coupled with measures such as restricting the sale of certain types of ammunition and increasing international cooperation to combat the illegal trade of firearms. Hence, implementing stricter regulations such as the import and export of weapons, developing technology to trace firearms and pinpoint their origin, and mandating an age limit and gun safety education programs before purchasing a firearm will result in awareness of the dangers posed by



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## SAMPLE POSITION PAPER

*Delegation from*

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The Position Paper for the Disarmament and International Security Committee

the mishandling of weapons. Following all these measures being integrated successfully will lead to a reduction in gun violence across the world.

In conclusion, the Federal Republic of Germany strongly believes that strict gun control policies can reduce gun crime and protect citizens' safety through the initiatives mentioned.

**References:**

**I. Militarization of Outer Space and the Possibility of a Space Arms Race:**

<https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/2020/02/preventing-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-and-political-game-play-at-the-united-nations/>

<https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2011&context=ncilj>

<https://unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-a-guide-to-the-discussions-in-the-cd-en-451.pdf>

<https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/>

<https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html>

**II. Gun Control Policies: Effective or a Hindrance:**

<https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-executions/international-standards>

<https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/gun-deaths-by-country>

[https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compareyears/69/total\\_number\\_of\\_gun\\_deaths](https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compareyears/69/total_number_of_gun_deaths)

<https://www.iamexpat.de/expat-info/german-expat-news/germany-poised-introduce-new-law-aimed-limiting-arms-exports>

<https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/germany>





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## SAMPLE RESOLUTION PAPER

AUSMUN/2023/GA1

**General Assembly First Committee** (Disarmament and International Security)

Main submitters: Russian Federation, Japan

Sponsors: Germany, Iran, Iceland

Signatories: Palestine, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Bulgaria, Egypt, Nigeria, Iraq, Sweden, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Luxembourg, Hungary, Kuwait, Tunisia, Pakistan, France, Cuba, Poland, Colombia, South Africa, India, Bangladesh, Yemen, Turkey, Paraguay, Switzerland, New Zealand, Central Africa, United Arab Emirates, Bulgaria

Agenda: "Gun Control Policies: Effective or a Hindrance"

The General Assembly,

*Alarmed by* the increasing gun violence across the world,

*Bearing in mind* every citizen has the right to their safety, security and self defense and that their right to live is their most important right,

*Recognizing* the need for effective gun control policies in order to prevent tragedies and mass shootings,

*Concerned* that illicit trafficking and diversion of arms and related material of all types undermine the rule of law and human rights, and has the potential to undermine the respect for international humanitarian law, can impede the provision of humanitarian assistance and have wide ranging negative humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences,

*Emphasizing* the need for proper implementation of measures to curb arms trafficking,

*Noting with deep concern* that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world continue to pose threats to international peace and security, cause significant loss of life,

*Emphasizing* the need for international cooperation on this issue,

1. *Recommends* for the establishment of rules and regulations internationally over the eligibility for obtaining firearm licenses of all kinds;
  - a. These include a thorough testing process which includes;
    - i. Background checks including mental health evaluations;
    - ii. Must be over the age of Twenty-One;
    - iii. Physical tests to make sure the person is capable of being responsible;



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## SAMPLE RESOLUTION PAPER

- b. These tests must be done every two years to renew one's license;
  - c. Must have a rational reason or motive to own the firearm;
    - i. hunting;
    - ii. sport shooting;
    - iii. collection;
    - iv. tradition;
  - d. Only one firearm is allowed for each license;
- 2. *Further recommends* alternative government initiatives such as buyback programs for illicit firearms;
- 3. *Condemns* the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons;
  - a. Small arms refer to weapons designed for individual use, and light weapons are designed for use by several people serving as a crew;
- 4. *Calls for* mandatory gun safety education programmes for any who would like to wield a firearm;
  - a. This teaches the responsibilities and consequences of using a firearm;
  - b. Both physically and psychologically prepares citizens for the usage of a firearm;
  - c. Furthermore, raises awareness by showing gun violence related statistics;
- 5. *Encourages* the use of lengthier punishments against transgressors of gun laws;
  - a. Illegal gun ownership will entail a sentence of at least 5 years;
  - b. Crimes committed with a firearm will entail a sentence of 7 years;
  - c. Gun related homicides will result in 30 years in prison;
- 6. *Emphasizing* the creation and maintenance of a National Firearms Registry for each nation;



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## SAMPLE RESOLUTION PAPER

- a. Every citizen with ownership of a firearm must officially register it with the government;
  - b. Any illicit ownership of firearms will face harsh punishment;
- 7. *Requests* the researching and implementing of smart gun technology;
  - a. Includes features such as;
    - i. Biometric recognition;
    - ii. Personalized locks;
    - iii. Gps tracking;
  - b. This will help reduce:
    - i. the number of accidental shootings;
    - ii. theft-related gun violence;
    - iii. unauthorized use of firearms;
    - iv. reduce illicit firearm trafficking;
- 8. *Authorizing* the implementing of stricter regulations on the legal import and export of firearms;
  - a. Working with trusted manufacturers that use high quality materials to prevent accidental malfunctions;
  - b. Limiting a country's amount of firearm importing and exporting based on the impact of the limitation on the national economy;
    - i. Special exceptions such as countries being at war will be considered;
- 9. *Requests* the prevention of 3d printed firearms;
  - a. Regulating the sale and distribution of 3D printers capable of printing firearms;
  - b. Enforcing laws that prohibit the production and possession of 3D printed guns;
  - c. Tracking and removing illegal files used for printing firearms from the internet;
  - d. Implementing background checks and licensing requirements for those who own or operate 3D printers;
  - e. Incorporating technology such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) or fingerprint recognition to ensure that only authorized users can access 3D printers;





# Appendices

## SAMPLE RESOLUTION PAPER

10. *Solemnly affirms* modifications to the following treaties;

a. The UN Arms Trade Treaty;

- i. Ammunition needs to appear included in the Arms Trade Treaty;
- ii. The recording of weapons should be under a central authority;

b. The UN Firearm Protocol;

- i. Adopting this protocol universally and implementing all provisions;
- ii. Including enforcement mechanisms;
- iii. Modifying the protocols to track the movement of firearms and to identify their origin;
- iv. Criminalizing the illicit trade of firearm;



# Appendices

## RULES OF PROCEDURES CHEAT SHEET

### POINTS & MOTIONS

- ***Point of Information:*** Ask a question to the committee or chair.
- ***Point of Order:*** Raise to address a rules violation.
- ***Point of Parliamentary Inquiry:*** Seek clarification on rules or procedures.
- ***Point of Personal Privilege:*** Used to address matters affecting a delegate personally, such as discomfort, technical issues, or other urgent concerns.
- ***Motion to Set the Agenda:*** A proposal made by a delegate to determine the order in which topics or issues will be discussed during the committee sessions.
- ***Motion to Open the General Speakers' List (GSL):*** It proposes to allow delegates to add their names to the speakers' list, indicating their desire to speak on a topic. Once approved, the GSL provides an orderly way for delegates to express their views during the discussion.
- ***Motion for a Moderated Caucus:*** Proposal to initiate a focused and time-limited discussion, allowing delegates to speak in an organized manner on a specific topic within the committee.
- ***Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus:*** Proposes a period of informal discussion without a chairperson, allowing delegates to collaborate freely on specific topics.
- ***Motion to Move into Voting Procedure:*** Proposal to transition from discussion or debate to the formal voting phase, signaling the conclusion of discussions and the initiation of the decision-making process.
- ***Motion to Recess:*** A motion to recess is a parliamentary procedure seeking a temporary break or pause in a session.
- ***Motion to Adjourn the Meeting:*** Propose to end the session.



# Appendices

## RULES OF PROCEDURES CHEAT SHEET

### SPEAKING TIME

- **Standard Speech:** Usually 1-2 minutes.
- **Moderated Caucus Speech:** Short, focused speech during a moderated caucus.
- **Unmoderated Caucus:** No speaking time limit; used for informal discussion.

### VOTING

- **Voice Vote:** Chair asks for approval; delegates respond verbally.
- **Division of the House:** Delegates physically stand for or against a motion.
- **Roll Call Vote:** Individual vote by each delegation.

### RESOLUTIONS

- Resolution is the finalized and officially adopted document.
- Draft Resolution is a preliminary version that is subject to refinement and approval before it becomes a resolution.
- **Sponsor:** Delegates responsible for a draft resolution.
- **Signatory:** Delegates supporting a draft resolution.

### AMENDMENTS

- **Friendly Amendment:** Accepted by the sponsors without a vote.
- **Unfriendly Amendment:** Requires a majority vote to pass.

### GENERAL ETIQUETTE



# Appendices

## RULES OF PROCEDURES CHEAT SHEET

- **Addressing Others:** Always use formal titles ("Delegate of Country X"), and refrain from using personal pronouns.
- **Respectful Language:** Maintain professionalism and courtesy.
- **Cell Phones:** Keep them on silent; use discreetly during unmoderated caucuses.
- **Position Papers:** Submit before the conference for preparation.

## CODE OF CONDUCT

- **Respect:** Treat all delegates and chairs with respect.
- **Inclusivity:** Encourage diverse perspectives and participation.
- **Professionalism:** Uphold the integrity of the committee.

## ADDITIONAL TIPS

- **Research:** Be well-prepared on your country and the agenda items.
- **Collaboration:** Work with others to build consensus.
- **Listening:** Actively listen to other delegates' perspectives.



# **Conclusion**

**THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1. WE WISH  
YOU A PRODUCTIVE AND REWARDING MUN EXPERIENCE!**

INTERNATIONAL ACADEMIC SCHOOL

# **MODEL UNITED NATIONS**

2024



**GOOD LUCK!**

**GOOD LUCK!**

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