




# CS409 : Chalk and Talk

Davies-Meyer Construction for Compression Functions  
and Time-Space Tradeoff Attacks on Hash Functions


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# Davies-Meyer Construction for Compression Functions



# Why Compression Functions?



Take large chunks of data and break them down into smaller fixed-size chunks, allowing for storage efficiency and faster processing.



They are a key component in the construction Hash Functions to handle arbitrary length inputs by considering fixed length “bytes” of data.




Well-designed compression functions are used to add layers of security making it difficult to find collisions and generate specific hash outputs.



# The Merkle-Damgård Transform

- This is a scheme used to build **CRHFs** from collision-resistant Compression Functions
- A message of arbitrary length is broken into fixed length pieces and fed into a compression function along with the previous “chaining value”




# The Davies-Meyer Construction

The Davies-Meyer Construction for Compression Functions provides a mechanism to build a secure one-way hash function by leveraging the properties of block ciphers. The building block of the construction relies on the following :


- A Secure Block Cipher
- The XOR Operation

This relatively straightforward algorithm is used to generate compression and hash functions that showcase a high degree of security. It has been previously used in MD5, SHA-1 and the SHA-2 family highlighting its robustness and practical relevance.



# Building the Compression Function

$$H_i = E(H_{i-1}, M_i) \oplus H_{i-1}$$



# Security of the Construction...

- The security of the Davies-Meyer Construction relies on the security assumptions made for the Block Cipher, which essentially acts as a keyed PRP.
- We can treat the Block Cipher as a “Black Box” or a Random Oracle which can be queried for both Encryptions and Decryptions.

**Claim 1:** For a block cipher of message length  $m$ , a Random Oracle Model solving:

Given  $m$ -bit value  $H$ , find any pair  $(X, K)$   
s.t.  $E_K(X) \oplus X = H$   
has expected runtime of at least  $2^m$

**Claim 2:** Given hash value  $Y$ , finding any message  $M$  and initial value  $I$  such that  
 $H(I, M) = Y$   
requires  $2^{m-1}$  calls under ROM

**Preimage Resistance** ~ Infeasibility of inverting the PRP

**Collision Resistance** ~ Psuedorandomness of PRP and Uniqueness by XORing with  $X$

Helps Prove Preimage Resistance for DM



# Can We Do Better?

- The current scheme becomes less secure in the situation where multiple key signatures and their messages are available. This poses a practical threat to the security of the system

Messages :  $M^1 = M_1^1 \parallel M_2^1 \dots \parallel M_n^1$

$M^j = M_1^j \parallel M_2^j \dots \parallel M_n^j$

It is possible to find a new message  $M$  with  $\underline{H(I, M)} = H(I, M^i)$  in  $O\left(\frac{2^m}{n_j}\right)$

Finding match for  $E_x(I) \oplus I @ H_k(M^i)$   
 $M = X \parallel M_{k+1}^i \dots \parallel M_n^i$

Can we Prevent this  
Speedup?





# Modified Davies-Meyer

We must make the problems faced by the forger independent. We can do this by adding a running count! The system will end up requiring more encryptions because of this but it allows us to achieve the required degree of security.

Construction 2: Let  $E$  has  $k$ -bit Key,  $m$ -bit Message, assume  $\leq 2^t$  total blocks are signed

$M := M_1 || M_2 \dots M_n$  of length  $k-t$

$$H_0 = I$$

$$H_{i+1} = H_i \oplus E_{T+i || M_{i+1}}(H_i) \quad i \leq n$$

$$H(I, M) = (T+n, H_n)$$

# Practical Applications

- **MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm 5)** : used a construction similar to the Davies-Meyer
- **SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2)** : Also built around compression functions similar of DM with adjustments to enhance security
- **Whirlpool** : Explicitly designed using the Davies-Meyer scheme and used the Rijndael (AES) as the Block Cipher





# Time-Space Tradeoff Attacks on Hash Functions



# What are Hash Functions?

- A cryptographic tool that converts data input into a fixed-length, unique "hash" output.
- Designed to be fast, deterministic, and resistant to reverse-engineering, ensuring that finding two inputs with the same hash is nearly impossible.
- Used to secure data, authenticate messages, digitalize signatures and protect stored passwords.



# Properties of Hash Functions

For a hash function to be considered cryptographically secure:

- Deterministic: The same input will always produce the same hash output.
- Preimage Resistance: For  $H$ , infeasible to find any message  $M$  such that  $H(M) = H$ .
- Second Preimage Resistance: Given a message  $M1$  with hash  $H(M1)$ , it should be infeasible to find another message  $M2$  such that  $H(M1) = H(M2)$ .
- Collision Resistance: It should be infeasible to have different messages  $M1$  and  $M2$  that hash to the same value  $H(M1) = H(M2)$ .
- Fast Computation: Hashing the input should be computationally efficient and fast.



# Secure Hash Algorithm (256-bit)

SHA-256 is a hash algorithm which takes an input of any size and generates a 256-bit (32-byte) fixed-length output, typically represented as a 64-character hexadecimal number.

Steps of the SHA-256 algorithm:

- Padding to create 512-bit chunks.
- Initialization of output with the hash constants.
- Iteratively processing through the chunks, using a series of mathematical operations involving bitwise operations, modular additions, and logical functions.
- The final output is the 256-bit hash value.



# Hash Function Attacks

- Hash functions, while designed to be secure, are susceptible to a range of attacks aimed at exploiting weaknesses in their properties.
- The primary goal of attackers is to find a way to reverse the hash (retrieve the original input) or create identical hashes from different inputs to undermine the function's integrity.
- There are various types of attacks: Brute-Force Attacks, Birthday Attacks, Time-Space Tradeoff Attacks etc.



# Time-Space Tradeoff

- The time-space tradeoff is a concept where computation time is conserved at the expense of memory or storage (or vice versa).
- In cryptography, this principle allows storage of precomputed information to reduce the computational time needed in a task (e.g. attacks).
- The tradeoff is typically between the space needed to store large tables of precomputed values (e.g., hashes) and the time saved by avoiding on-the-fly calculations during an attack i.e. Storing vs Calculating.



# Principle of Tradeoff Attacks


- Tradeoff attacks are based on balancing memory storage with computational time to efficiently find hash collisions or preimages.
- By precomputing and storing values (often as tables of hashes), attackers can reduce the time required to find a hash match.
- Main types: Rainbow Table attacks and Distinguished Point attacks.
- These attacks are effective mainly against unsalted hash functions, which produce identical hashes for the same input across different instances.



# Rainbow Table Attack


- Uses precomputed tables of hash chains to efficiently find hash collisions or reverse hashes back to their original input values.
- Use less computer processing time and more storage than a brute-force attack.

- **Hash Chain Generation:** Store only the starting and ending points of chains generated by repeatedly applying a hash function and a reduction function.
- **Reduction Function:** The reduction function maps hashes back to potential inputs (eg. potential passwords), allowing for the creation of a sequence of hashes.
- **Searching with Rainbow Tables:** When an attacker targets a specific hash, they check it against the endpoints in the table and simulate a chain starting from that hash to see if it matches any stored endpoints.



# Distinguished Point Attack

- DP attacks store only special, identifiable points within each chain as markers.
- These points, called "**distinguished points**", are chosen based on a characteristic that makes them easy to recognize, such as a specific number of leading zeros in their binary representation.
- Thus, the computed Hash Chains are variable in length, stopping only when a hash reaches a distinguished point. They use similar reduction functions as RT Attacks.
- Each round of hashing and reducing produces a new hash, which is checked for the distinguished point criterion (matching with a DP in the table).



# Mitigating Tradeoff Attacks

- **Salting Hashes:** Adding unique salts to each input ensures even identical passwords create distinct hashes, preventing precomputed attacks like Rainbow Tables by making tables for every salt combination impractical.
- **Using HMACs:** HMACs use a secret key with the hash, creating key-dependent hashes that attackers cannot replicate without the key, adding strong protection against brute-force and precomputed attacks.







Thank You!

