# Offensive and Defensive Cybersecurity

**Heap Exploitation** 

21-22

# Heap Introduction

- What's the heap?
  - One or more memory pages used to store data(rw-)
- Why do we need it?
  - For dynamic memory allocation
  - O What about alloca, mmap, etc? Ok, but ...
- How do we manage it?
  - Through library functions

#### libc

- malloc allocate a chunk of memory
- calloc allocate and zero-out memory
- realloc change size of an allocation
- free free a chunk of memory

#### syscall

- mmap (allocate memory page)
- munmap (deallocate memory page)
- brk/sbrk (change the location of the program break)

#### The HEAP Allocators


- **ptmalloc** (glibc)
- dlmalloc (was in glibc)
- tcmalloc (chromium)
- jemalloc (FreeBSD, Firefox, Android)

splittings, fits, coalescing, segregations (free list, storage, non determinism)

# ptmalloc2 (aka the malloc of glibc)

- splittings (how to divide in chunk)
- **fits** (match requested size with )
- coalescing (how to merge chunks)
- **segregations** free list
- NO segregations storage
- deterministic


# **Memory Layout**



## Memory Allocation: malloc

- void\* malloc(size\_t size);
- Most known allocation primitive
- Requires allocation size(bytes)
- Returns a "void \*" pointer which points the allocated memory(buffer)
- This buffer is a part of struct called chunk


### Chunk





- PREV\_INUSE (P) This bit is set when previous chunk is allocated.
- IS\_MMAPPED (M) This bit is set when chunk is mmap'd.
- NON\_MAIN\_ARENA (N) This bit is set when this chunk belongs to a thread arena.

# Top Chunk


- Special chunk that occupies all the available memory space in the heap
- Every time a malloc is called it might be shrinked
- Once there's no more space on the heap, a brk(void \*) is called to allocate more pages to the heap and the top chunk is expanded








0x0000... Chunk 1 Chunk 2 Chunk 3 Top Chunk 0xFFFF...






Let's see it in memory!

# Memory Deallocation: free

- void free(void\* ptr);
- Most known deallocation primitive
- Requires a pointer to a memory buffer previously allocated with a function for memory allocation (e.g. malloc)
- Freed chunks could be consolidated with other freed chunks (also with the top chunks)
- If not they are inserted in lists called bins

#### Free Chunk



- PREV\_INUSE (P) This bit is set when previous chunk is allocated.
- IS\_MMAPPED (M) This bit is set when chunk is mmap'd.
- NON\_MAIN\_ARENA (N) This bit is set when this chunk belongs to a thread arena.

#### Bins

- Lists of freed chunks of a specific size
- Heads of the lists are located in the .bss of the libc (main\_arena)
- Lists can be single or double linked
- 4 types of bins:
  - Fast bins 8 Linked lists
  - Unsorted bin 1 Double linked list
  - Small bins 62 Double linked lists
  - Large bins 62 Double linked lists


## Bins

- t-cache
- Fast bin (0x20 to 0x90 bytes)
- Unsorted bin
- Small bin (< 512 bytes)</li>
- Large bin (>= 512 bytes)
- top-chunk

#### Fast Bins


- Optimized bins for tiny freed chunks
- Managed as LIFO linked lists (backward pointer not used)
- Better performance, less checks and operations
- Freed chunks are never consolidate with any other freed chunk
- Freed chunks in fast bins act as non freed chunks (P flag of next chunk is not set to 0)

### Fast Bins




Fast Bin Snapshot


## Fast Bins




# Fast Bins: free(0xCCD0) - Before




# Fast Bins: free(0xCCD0) - After




# Fast Bins: free(0xBBC0) - Before




# Fast Bins: free(0xBBC0) - After




# Fast Bins: free(0xAAB0) - Before




# Fast Bins: free(0xAAB0) - After



# Fast Bins: malloc(0x20) - Before



# Fast Bins: malloc(0x20) - After




Let's see it in memory!

### **Unsorted Bin**

- Any freed chunk with size >= 0xA0 ends up in the unsorted bin
- Managed as a double linked list
- When a chunk in the unsorted bin is not able to satisfy a malloc request (e.g., malloc(0x200) but the freed chunk has size 0x100), the chunk in the unsorted bin is moved to the proper small or large bin
- Unsorted bin is like a middle ground

# Bins (Unsorted, Small, Large )



Unsorted, Small and Large Bin Snapshot

Let's see it in memory!


# Vulnerability after Allocation

- Good old buffer overflow :D
- Overflows on:
  - Metadata and content of the next chunks (in memory)
  - Top chunk (House of force)
- Potential leaks if the buffer is not memset to 0 (calloc solves this problem)


# Vulnerability after Deallocation


- Pointer should be set to 0 after free, otherwise it may occur:
  - Leakage of the bins' pointers
  - Corruption of the bins' pointers
  - Multiple pointers to the same chunk in memory
  - Double free (Fastbin attack)


- Allocate twice the same chunk
- Allocate an almost arbitrary chunk













free(0xBBC0)







free(0xBBC0)




free(0xAAB0)




free(0xAAB0)




free(0xBBC0)



free(0xBBC0)




malloc(0x20)



# malloc(0x20)


0xBBC0 is returned by the malloc.

Buffer 1: 0xBBC0



# malloc(0x20)


Buffer 1: 0xBBC0



# malloc(0x20)


0xAAB0 is returned by the malloc.

- Buffer 1: 0xBBC0
- Buffer 2: 0xAAB0




### write Buffer 1

- Buffer 1: 0xBBC0
- Buffer 2: 0xAAB0



### write Buffer 1


- Buffer 1: 0xBBC0
- Buffer 2: 0xAAB0




malloc(0x20)

- Buffer 1: 0xBBC0
- Buffer 2: 0xAAB0

# Fast Bin Attack: malloc(0x20) - After






# malloc(0x20)

0xBBC0 is returned by the malloc.

- Buffer 1: 0xBBC0
- Buffer 2: 0xAAB0
- Buffer 3: 0xBBC0

#### Notes

- The arbitrary chunk will be returned if:
  - The memory is mapped (otherwise SEG FAULT)
  - The size of the fake chunk matches with the bin size
- The first 4 bits of the size are not considered
- No requirements on the alignment of the chunk



# Load another Library (libc-2.xx.so)

- env LD\_PRELOAD
  - LD\_PRELOAD=./libc-2.23.so ./binary
- ld.so
  - ./ld-2.23.so --library-path ./lib ./binary
  - o lib contains libc.so.6
- patchelf (<a href="https://github.com/Nix0S/patchelf">https://github.com/Nix0S/patchelf</a>)
  - o patchelf --set-interpreter ./ld-2.23.so --replace-needed libc.so.6 ./libc-2.23.so ./binary
- YOLO (Do not use this!)
  - Replace system library
- Docker/Virtual Machine


# Poison Null Byte

Allocate two chunks that overlap

# Poison Null Byte

```
char *buf = malloc(128);
int read_length = read(0, buf, 128);
buf[read_length] = 0;
```

# Poison Null Byte



**B2** 

Α

Initial Setup

Free(B)

Overflow into B. Sizes goes from 0x208 to 0x200. prev\_size is not update


Allocate two chunks into old B. First not a fastbin

Free(B1)


Free(C) trigger the merge with the previous chunk

the next allocation will overlap with B2

# Chunk




# Null Byte




# Poison Null Byte "FIX"

# Poison Null Byte "FIX"

# fake prev\_size



# Poison Null Byte Fixed



A B1 B2 C

A B1 B2 C

A B1 + C B2

A B2

Initial Setup (B chunk needs to contain fake prev\_size)

Free(B)

Overflow into B. Sizes goes from 0x208 to 0x200. prev\_size is not update


Allocate two chunks into old B. First not a fastbin


Free(B1)

Free(C) trigger the merge with the previous chunk


the next allocation will overlap with B2

- Cache for chunk size < 0x500</li>
- LIFO
- New Attack Vector
- Need to bypass it for attacks on other bins
- You can exploit T-Cache for better HEAP Manipulation
- 64 bins
- 7 chunks per bin as cache




















# T-Cache Poison


Allocate an arbitrary chunk


### T-Cache (need at least 2 elements in the list)















# malloc(0x20)

Chunk1: 0xAAD0

Chunk2: **0xarbitrary** 





### T-Cache Key > glibc 2.29

#### glibc 2.34

```
tcache_key = random_bits ();
tcache_key = (tcache_key << 32) | random_bits ();
e->key = tcache_key;

glibc 2.29 - 2.33
e->key = tcache;
```

#### free

```
if (__glibc_unlikely (e->key == tcache)){
/* very likely a problem make extra checks*/
}
```

### T-Cache PTR Protection

```
glibc >= 2.32
```

```
#define PROTECT_PTR (pos, ptr) \
   ((__typeof (ptr)) ((((size_t) pos) >> 12) ^ ((size_t) ptr)))
```

#### Best documentation is source code.


```
Size of previous chunk, if unallocated (P clear)
  Size of chunk, in bytes
User data starts here...
         (malloc_usable_size() bytes)
         (size of chunk, but used for application data)
  Size of next chunk, in bytes
```

### Best documentation is <del>source code</del>. binary code

Ubuntu Backports - glibc 2.27

```
@@ -2942,6 +2951,7 @@ tcache_get (size_t tc_idx)
   assert (tcache->entries[tc_idx] > 0);
   tcache->entries[tc_idx] = e->next;
   --(tcache->counts[tc_idx]);
+ e->key = NULL;
   return (void *) e;
}
```

## Algorithm



### Useful Links / Reading Material

- https://github.com/shellphish/how2heap
- https://sploitfun.wordpress.com/2015/02/10/understa nding-glibc-malloc/
- https://heap-exploitation.dhavalkapil.com
- https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/ presentation/heelan (Automatic Heap Manipulation)