

Introduction to Bayesian Inference


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September 30, 2017

see more themes in

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Why are you interested in Bayesianism?

Things Ecologist say...

- small sample sizes: exact inference
- missing data: easy to impute
- integrate other information
- derived quantities
- complex, hierarchical process models

multiple sources of variation (space,time)
"honest" epistemology

Theoretical

- conditional on the observed data
 - probabilistic statements
 - evidential
 - coherence, decision making
 - good frequentist properties
- shrinkage, decision-theory
- model selection

- what is probability (basing inference on something that doesn't exist!!!)?
- objective basis for science?
- misalignment: probability theory and human psychology
- bias (to prior)¹
- language dependence

¹Bayesian would claim that, if a prior exists, it would be irrational to believe in anything other than the posterior.

Neo Bayesian Revival (>1992)

Gelfand and Smith 1992 - Sampled based approximations of Bayesian posteriors
2

Revival (~1920s -)

Subjective Bayesian, Decision Theory

- Ramsey (1926)
- De Finetti (1937)
- Savage (1954)
- (Wald, 1939, 1954)

Hypothesis Testing, Logical/Objective Bayesism

- Jeffreys (1939)
- Jaynes (2003)

Hierarchical Bayesian

- Good (1953,65)

Relationship to Compact Coding Theory

- Rissanen (1978), Wallace (1968)

Prediction

Frequentist "lethal blow"³

Rallied against use of prior probabilities in statistical inference

- Ronald A. Fisher (1925,1935,...)

Maximum likelihood, significance testing, ANOVA, sufficiency, randomized experiments

- Jerzy Neyman & Egon Pearson (1933)

Hypothesis testing, confidence intervals

Falsificationism

- Karl Popper (1959,1963)

³S. Zabell 1989

Frequentism

Fisher's p-value

- continuous index of evidence **against** a hypothesis H
- **NEVER** prove a hypothesis H , only disprove

Neyman-Pearson α and β

- long-run error rates of Type-I and Type-II
- **bound** Type-I at $\alpha \leq 0.05$ and hopefully maximize power $(1 - \beta)$ with high n and most powerful tests
- never confirm a hypothesis: only **act** so as to "not be wrong too often"

Bayesians

Model probabilities

probabilistic confirmation of hypotheses

- $p(H_k|Y)$ what is the probability of Hypothesis H_k given the data?

Bayes Factors

evidence in favour of one hypothesis over another

- $BF = \frac{p(Y|H_1)}{p(Y|H_2)}$

find hypothesis that is more likely to be true

from late 1700's to ~1920's: Method of Inverse Probability, the bread and butter of applied analyses

- Thomas Bayes (1778)
- Laplace (1774)

Bayes Theorem

conditional probability

$$\underbrace{p(\theta|Y)}_{\text{posterior}} = \frac{\underbrace{p(\theta)}_{\text{prior}} \underbrace{\mathcal{L}(Y|\theta)}_{\text{likelihood}}}{\underbrace{f(Y)}_{\text{marginal likelihood}}} \quad (1)$$

- **Prior:** distribution of θ (before the data)
- **Likelihood:** joint probability density of the data (given θ)
- **Posterior:** distribution of θ (given the θ)
- $f(Y) \equiv$ marginal likelihood $\int f(Y|\theta)p(\theta)d\theta$

... or more commonly,

$$p(\theta|Y) \propto f(Y|\theta)p(\theta)$$

where...


$p(\theta) \equiv$ prior information (before the data) (2)

$f(Y|\theta) \equiv$ likelihood (information from the data)

$p(\theta|Y) \equiv$ distribution of θ after the data

~~$f(Y)$ marginal likelihood~~ (often ignore)

- posterior is a mixture of information in **prior** and **likelihood**



Prior

Likelihood

Posterior

Mixture of information

- $\mathcal{L}(Y|\theta)$: Likelihood, specified by model. Similar between Bayesian and non-Bayesian analyses⁴
- $p(\theta)$... where do they come from?

How to specify priors (HUGE topic)

- a previous posterior distribution
- elicitation from experts, previous studies
- Priors as degrees-of-beliefs: **Subjectivist/personalist** Bayesians}
- Default prior and reference priors: **Objective/logical** Bayesians
- adhoc

⁴Frequentists reserve the term likelihood for a function of θ for fixed y , whereas Bayesians consider "joint probability density of the data" given θ .

- Probabilistic statements about abstract quantity (θ) (*only* Bayesians can do)
- Posterior probability necessarily depends on a *prior*

“to make an Omelette, you must crack a few eggs” (Savage)

The joy of Posterior Inference

can make statements like...

- what is the probability that $\theta > 0$?
- what is the most probable value of θ ? (**MAP**)
- what is the expected value of θ ? (**posterior mean**)
- what is a *high probability region* of θ (**Q% credibility interval**)

Example 1:

- men's height, $n=20$ observations.


- $y_i \sim \mathcal{N}(175, 10^2)$

```
y <- c(183.46, 182.32, 178.31, 181.36, 165.12, 185.68, 170.47,  
178.11, 174.86, 182.03, 180.09, 172.88, 177.94, 177.26, 182.58,  
171, 173.74, 177.78, 180.02, 163.05)
```

- estimate $\theta = [\mu, \sigma^2]$: mean population height and variance
- priors: $p(\mu) = \mathcal{N}(0, 90^2)$, $p(\sigma^2) = \mathcal{IG}(0.1, 0.1)$
- specify a likelihood: $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{y}|\mu, \sigma^2) = \prod_i^n \mathcal{N}(y_i; \mu, \sigma^2)$


now run a Gibbs sampler to approximate the posterior $p(\mu, \sigma^2|\mathbf{y}) \dots$

- IS a probability distribution




- easy to interpret

- IS a probability distribution




- Posterior mode: most probable value
- Posterior mean $\mathbb{E}[\theta] = \int p(\theta|Y)\theta d\theta$: expected value

- IS a probability distribution



- Posterior mode: most probable value
- Posterior mean $\mathbb{E}[\theta] = \int p(\theta|Y)\theta d\theta$: expected value
- 95%CI of θ

- IS a probability distribution




- Posterior mode: most probable value
- Posterior mean $\mathbb{E}[\theta] = \int p(\theta|Y)\theta d\theta$: expected value
- What is the probability that $\theta > X$? Area of $p(\theta|Y) > X$

Bayesian vs. frequentist estimates: compare posteriors to maximum-likelihood method

method of maximum likelihood

- Choose θ such that we *maximize* the likelihood (\mathcal{L}) of seeing y
- **interpretation** "It would be very (un)likely to see the data that I saw, if the value of θ were X "
- Most common method among Frequentists (single model estimation)
- $\hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}}$ is **NOT** the "most probability value of θ "
- **optimality**: unbiased, efficient ⁵

⁵but see shrinkage estimators for high-dimensional problems



- frequentist point estimates: `glm(y~1)`

MLE	se	95CI-low	95CI-hi
172.3	1.48	169.4	175.17

- compare to (approximate)⁶ Posterior descriptive statistics

$E[\theta]$	SD	95CI-low	95CI-hi
172.21	1.51	169.21	175.16

nearly the same

Example 2:


- survival [0 = died, 1 = survived], $n = 30$ observations.
- $s_i \sim \text{Bern}(0.9)$


`s <-`

`c(1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1)`


- estimate $\theta = [\phi]$: mean population survival
- priors: $p(\phi) = \text{Beta}(1, 1)$
- specify a likelihood: $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{s}|\phi, n_s) = \prod_s^n \text{Bern}(s_i; \phi, n_s)$

now run a Gibbs sampler to approximate the posterior $p(\phi|\mathbf{s})$






What if you have a “cost function” $g(\phi)$? e.g., cost of conservation action conditional on the estimated values of ϕ ?



Posterior inference: cost functions



$$\mathbb{E}[\text{COST}] = \int_0^1 g(\phi) p(\phi|s) d\phi$$


- full cost including all uncertainty in ϕ

How do Bayesian posterior estimates compared to more-familiar (frequentist) point-estimates based on maximum likelihood?

method of maximum likelihood

- Most common method among Frequentists (single model estimation)
- "It would be very (un)likely to have seen the data that I saw, if the value of θ were X"
- Choose θ : that which *maximize's* the likelihood of seeing y
- $\hat{\theta}_{MLE}$ is **NOT** the "most probability value of θ "
- optimality properties: unbiased, efficient ⁷

⁷but see shrinkage estimators for high-dimensional problems



- frequentist point estimates: `glm(y~1)`

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Posterior Estimation vs Maximum Likelihood Estimation

for n getting **LARGE**, and for **WEAK** priors

- Posterior Mode $\theta_{\text{MAP}} \rightarrow \hat{\theta}_{\text{MLE}}$
- Posterior Confidence Intervals \rightarrow Confidence Intervals


for **low** n and/or for **STRONG** priors

- shrinkage: $\theta \rightarrow$ Prior expectation.
- Posterior mean $\bar{\theta}$ is “biased” towards the priors


role of priors (from an estimation perspective)

- Priors retard/accelerate rate of convergence of $\bar{\theta} \rightarrow$ truth
- At low samples-sizes, “sensible” priors induce *shrinkage* and have better estimation properties than MLEs
- **Key POINTS**: you must be a master of prior distributions.


Posteriors and Sample Size



Posteriors and Prior information



Posteriors and Prior information



Most Biologists are reluctant Bayesians

- **Frequentist** vs. **Bayesian**: often desire that point estimates are identical between posteriors and MLEs
- **but**, only for: i) weak priors, and ii) large-samples sizes
- key point: **Be a Master of Priors!**

Subjective Personalist Bayesians

Probabilities are your “degree of belief”

- priors: prior beliefs
- posteriors: bring your beliefs into alignment with posterior
- **decision making**

Objective Logical Bayesians

Probabilities are continuous extension of Aristotean logic, deductive

- Probabilities capture “degree of truth”
- Priors: non-informative, set by **default** (Jeffrey’s Priors, reference priors, language-invariant priors)

e.g., $p(\phi) = \text{Beta}(0.5, 0.5)$ (Jeffrey’s Prior)

- Elicit priors from previous studies (posterior becomes new prior)

Instrumentalist

priors useful for good estimation properties

- shrinkage, efficiency

Frequentist

Principal principle: "probabilities ($p(\text{Event})$) should align with long-run frequencies of Event"

- probabilities do not exist in reality

Other

- Quantum mechanics
- Propensities (Karl Popper)

Probability Distributions in JAGS/BUGS

- you must express your prior information **probabilitistically**

Know the distributions and their parameters (JAGS Manual)


Name	Usage	Density	Lower	Upper
Beta	<code>dbeta(a,b)</code> $a > 0, b > 0$	$\frac{x^{a-1}(1-x)^{b-1}}{\beta(a,b)}$	0	1
Chi-square	<code>dchisqr(k)</code> $k > 0$	$\frac{x^{\frac{k}{2}-1} \exp(-x/2)}{2^{\frac{k}{2}} \Gamma(\frac{k}{2})}$	0	
Double exponential	<code>ddexp(mu,tau)</code> $\tau > 0$	$\tau \exp(-\tau x - \mu)/2$		
Exponential	<code>dexp(lambda)</code> $\lambda > 0$	$\lambda \exp(-\lambda x)$	0	
F	<code>df(n,m)</code> $n > 0, m > 0$	$\frac{\Gamma(\frac{n+m}{2})}{\Gamma(\frac{n}{2})\Gamma(\frac{m}{2})} \left(\frac{n}{m}\right)^{\frac{n}{2}} x^{\frac{n}{2}-1} \left\{1 + \frac{nx}{m}\right\}^{-\frac{(n+m)}{2}}$	0	
Gamma	<code>dgamma(r, lambda)</code> $\lambda > 0, r > 0$	$\frac{\lambda^r x^{r-1} \exp(-\lambda x)}{\Gamma(r)}$	0	
Generalized gamma	<code>dgen.gamma(r, lambda, b)</code> $\lambda > 0, b > 0, r > 0$	$\frac{b\lambda^{br} x^{br-1} \exp\{-(\lambda x)^b\}}{\Gamma(r)}$	0	
Logistic	<code>dlogis(mu, tau)</code> $\tau > 0$	$\frac{\tau \exp\{(x - \mu)\tau\}}{[1 + \exp\{(x - \mu)\tau\}]^2}$		
Log-normal	<code>dlnorm(mu,tau)</code> $\tau > 0$	$\left(\frac{\tau}{2\pi}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} x^{-1} \exp\left\{-\tau(\log(x) - \mu)^2/2\right\}$	0	
Noncentral Chi-squre	<code>dnchisqr(k, delta)</code> $k > 0, \delta \geq 0$	$\sum_{r=0}^{\infty} \frac{\exp(-\frac{\delta}{2}) (\frac{\delta}{2})^r}{r!} \frac{x^{(k/2+r-1)} \exp(-\frac{x}{2})}{2^{(k/2+r)} \Gamma(\frac{k}{2}+r)}$	0	
Normal	<code>dnorm(mu,tau)</code> $\tau > 0$	$\left(\frac{\tau}{2\pi}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \exp\{-\tau(x - \mu)^2/2\}$		
Pareto	<code>dpar(alpha, c)</code> $\alpha > 0, c > 0$	$\alpha c^\alpha x^{-(\alpha+1)}$	c	

Intuiting Probability Distributions

- easy to learn in R

e.g., $r \sim \text{Beta}(a, b)$

```
r <- rbeta(10000, 0.5, 0.5)
```



Posteriors

often no 'analytical' solution to $(\theta|Y)$

Solution: Sampling

- it is a Probability Distribution!!!
- find a way to sample from posterior
- with enough samples: $\text{mean}(\text{samples}) = \text{Posterior Expectation}$

assuming $\theta_j \sim p(\theta|y)$ for $j = 1, \dots, J$

Expected Value	$= \int \theta p(\theta y) d\theta$	$\approx \frac{1}{J} \sum_j^J \theta_j$
Standard Error(θ)	$= SE(\theta)$	$\approx SD(\theta_j)$
Probability $\theta > 0$	$= \int \mathbb{I}[\theta > 0] p(\theta y) d\theta$	$\approx \frac{1}{J} \sum_j^J \mathbb{I}[\theta_j > 0]$

Sampling Algorithms


MCMC; Gibbs Sampling; Metropolis-Hastings; Slice-Sampling; Importance Sampling; "Conjugate Priors";

Approximate the joint-posterior distribution"


example: estimate mean and variance of θ

$$\theta_{\text{true}} = 3.44; \text{Var}(\theta)_{\text{true}} = 4.89$$


10 samples from $N(\mu=3.44, \sigma=4.89)$




30 samples



100 samples



3000 samples



break-down joint posterior into (simpler) conditional distributions

- difficult: sampling $P(\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, \sigma^2 | Y)$
- easy: sampling $P(\beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, | \sigma^2, Y)$ then $P(\sigma^2 | \beta_0, \beta_1, \beta_2, Y)$ then repeat

approximates the joint posterior

algorithm

- initialize: $\beta_0^{(0)}, \beta_1^{(0)}, \beta_2^{(0)}, \sigma^{2(0)}$

$$\begin{aligned}\{\beta_0^{(1)}, \beta_1^{(1)}, \beta_2^{(1)}\} &\sim P(\beta | \sigma^{2(0)}, Y) \\ \sigma^{2(1)} &\sim P(\sigma^2 | \beta_0^{(1)}, \beta_1^{(1)}, \beta_2^{(1)}, Y) \\ \{\beta_0^{(2)}, \beta_1^{(2)}, \beta_2^{(2)}\} &\sim P(\beta | \sigma^{2(1)}, Y) \\ \sigma^{2(2)} &\sim P(\sigma^2 | \beta_0^{(2)}, \beta_1^{(2)}, \beta_2^{(2)}, Y)\end{aligned}\tag{3}$$

- repeat 1000's or 1000000 's times

Previously, Bayesian analysis demanded custom-coding MCMC algorithms

WinBUGS & OpenBUGS & JAGS


automatically use appropriate sampling techniques; so we don't have to worry

BUT you must: Monitor the MCMC!


- give reasonable **initial values**
- ensure **convergence**: no trend; independent chains give same answer
- ensure adequate **mixing**: independent samples

MCMC: Good mixing


Trace of μ




Density of μ



Trace of σ




Density of σ




MCMC: Poor convergence


Trace of beta1




Density of beta1




Trace of beta2




Density of beta2




Trace of intercept



Density of intercept



Trace of sigma



Density of sigma



MCMC parameters in JAGS

- **n.chains**: num. of MCMC chains; more is better
- **n.adapt**: discard first samples; let algorithm 'adapt'
- **n.burn**: discard extra samples; allow algorithm to reach stationary distribution
- **n.iter**: total number of sample; more is better
- **thin**: take every k^{th} iteration for a sample; decorrelates one sample from the next; higher is better
- **total samples**: number of samples to approximate your Posterior; target at least 2000 to 5000

- run longer chains
- ensure long enough adaption phase
- misspecified priors
- bad initial values?

Time to open up R and JAGS

- go to website: colugos.blogspot.com

'JAGS: Just Another Gibbs Sampler'

Uses BUGS-like syntax (similar to OpenBUGS, WinBUGS)

- `rjags` Package: R friendly JAGS interface
- easy easy **easy** Bayesian *estimation*
- not so easy for *model selection*

Don't worry about 'samplers': JAGS does the hard work

- specify **likelihood** (how the data arose) and the **priors**

example model: height of 20 Australian `y <- c(183.46, 182.32, 178.31, 181.36, 165.12, 185.68, 170.47, 178.11, 174.86, 182.03, 180.09, 172.88, 177.94, 177.26, 182.58, 171, 173.74, 177.78, 180.02, 163.05)`

- lets estimate the mean height (μ) and the dispersion (sigma)

JAGS we estimate the 'precision' (τ): $\tau = \frac{1}{\sigma^2}$




Figure: Prof Mike Jordan lecture notes

- open up R and rjags
- download and open the R file:

Jags model syntax: specify priors and likelihood

```
model.txt<-'model{
  # Normal priors on mean height
  mu0 <- 100
  sigma0 <- 35
  tau0 <- pow(sigma0,-2)
  mu ~ dnorm(mu0,tau0) T(0,) # truncated normal
  # Gamma prior on precision
  alpha0 <- 0.1
  beta0 <- 0.1
  tau ~ dgamma(alpha0,beta0)
  # Likelihood: how the data arose
  for(i in 1:length(y)){
    y[i] ~ dnorm(mu,tau) T(0,) # truncated normal
  }
  sigma <- pow(tau,-0.5)
}'
```