§ 1. Problem Formulation . - A busic Version.

This note focuses on determinitic Control in operation manufement problems.

The main reference is based on three propers. (i) Optimal Dynamic Priving of inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finise Horizons, by Ghillermo Gallego & Garrett van Rysin (ii). A mutti product Dynamic Priving problem and its applications to network yield management by the Same Authors.

(iii). Reaptimization and Self-Adjusting Prive Control for Natural Revenue management.

By Justin Speeking of the formulation, a common framework, the intensity control is adopted.

We will start by a more general and every model adopted in (1). The nodels in (1)(1)!) are basically some extensions.

&1.1. Demand.

usually, a firm operates in a market with imperfect competition i.e., the firm can influence demand by verying its price p. The market demand is dehoted by a function $\lambda(p)$.

Ther realized domand is tormulated as a Poisson process with intensity 2(p).

That the firm An important characteristic is used frequently, that is,
in a very short time interval. pay. St, the probability that there is
an arrival is St. 2CP) ! D(St) while no items are sold the published ity
is executibly 1. 2(P1St-O(St)

This is due to the characteristic of Poisson Process.

Remark 1. The derivation of Poisson alletribation. Consider the fine interval to broken into Small subintervals of length of

P(1,8+)= a St; sufficient small It, act most 1 success,

P(0, S+) = 1- 28+.

2: arrival rete. Arrival rate . time = Arrival3. when time is sufficiently Small . it turns to probability.

Q(0, 4+84) = P(0,+)(1-28+).

 $= \frac{P(0, +\delta t) - P(0, t)}{8t} = -\lambda P(0, t) = \frac{dP(0, t)}{dt} = -\lambda P(0, t)$

Solving OPE:

-) P(0,+) = (-e-)+. P(0,0)=1

P(0,+) = e-)+.

Similarly: P(n,++S+) = P(n;+)C(-) of+)+P(n-1;+) > of+

 $\frac{dP(n,t)}{dt} + \lambda P(n;t) = \lambda P(n-1,t).$

It's a recursive differential function. A technyw is adopted, we aim to find. most such that:

 $\mu(t) \cdot \left[\frac{dp(n;t)}{dt} + \lambda P(n;t) \right] = \frac{d}{dt} (\mu(t)P(n;t)).$

integrally factor (let) =) 2 hence the equation (\$) becomes.

allert. P(n;+)) = aext P(n-1,+)

 $= 1 \quad n=1 \quad 1 \quad \frac{d(e^{\lambda t}, P(1;t))}{dt} = \lambda e^{\lambda t}, P(0,t) = \lambda$

=) elt. P(1,t) = frdt = xt + C

p(1;0)=0 =) 0=0. here p(1;t)= \lambda f.e-\lambda t By industran Wehave : P(n;t) = (2+)" = 1+ .

31.2. feverue Rate.

As very important assumption on the context of revenue mangement por the demand model i.e. Lapo is one-to-one corresponded. is that DCPD has an inverse faution: p() Ofterent regularity constraints are made about PCN is different papers. the revenue rate is then: $rc\lambda = \lambda \cdot p(\lambda)$

& 1.3. Formulation: [context: One Firm. One product, n stock, decide price to morcinize revenue

- · Ns. the number of items sold up to time s., a country process.
- · 1. Stock.
 . N(.). regular demand funtion Jo We ≤n.

. Zero Salvaya volve.

Ju(n,0) = 0. Ju(0, +) =0. · Juan+) = IEu [fo psalvs].

J (n,+)= Sup Ju(n,+). Hence this problem is fait

1.4. Optimelity Conditions and Structural Results.

J+(n+) = Sup[XS+(p(N+J*(n-1,t-S+)+(1))+(1))+0(S+))]+0(S+)]. r() = 2p(). St 702. Interchanging limit and Supreme Needs regularly 35*(N,+) = Sup [r(X)-)(J*(n,+)-J*(N-1,+))].

1. We Out the assumption you refularity here, as we focus now on the model and fisic introduction of the later miniti Courtso (.

PAGE 4.

(a). Existence of unique solutions

As long as ACP) is regular demand function, then the solution exists and is unique.

(b) Monotonic Properties.

Iten,+) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both a oalt.

Nonth .. Stritty increasing in n and strictly decreasing int.

(c) Definal Solution of hop) = ac-de

7 (1,+)= (of (\(\frac{1}{2}(\dagger(\d

P* (n.+) = J* (n.+) - J* (n-1,+) + |

State Deterministic Control. 52-1 Formulation

Usually, the demand function wight not fet x(p)=ae dp. The dynamic programacy suffers the carse of directionality. For example. if either nort increases, to computational efforts might exploder. Then the deterministic problem is involved. It would create an upper bound for the optimal sevenue. A key difference from the stochastic control is that the demand rate is a deterministic."

- . Stock X a continuous amount .
- . finite time too.
- · P(s) prie.
- . Acp(s)) demand rate.

 $J^{0}(x,t) = \max_{S \in X(S)} \int_{S}^{t} r(\lambda(S)) ds$ Subject to: $\int_{0}^{t} \lambda(S) dS \in X$

PAGE 5.

One Formula directly distinguishes deterministic control with stochasticontal is.

En St leds vs. It lesseds.

Stochastic determinitie.

- · Given price policy u, the total demand is still unknown and its random.
- · Given prive palay par the total densend is deterministic Stapessods.

\$ 2.2. Optimal Solution of the deterministic problem

"run-ont" rate. $\lambda^{\circ} = \chi / t$

under such rade, all the stock can be sold.

Let it 6 organix r(i)(s)) => it represents the moviment of the revenue function.

PROPOSITION 2. Theoptimul solution to the determination problem is $\lambda(s) = \lambda^p = \min\{\lambda^*, A^o\}$. $0 \in S \subseteq I$. $P(s) = P^p = \max\{P^*, P^o\}$.

Jocx, +) = t min (rt, ro).

Proof Steach: Ox if it = in optimal solution

Since it maximize rex) pointwise

B & if No > N° . i.e., Not > x. the r() is increasing

in Co, xJ, optimal $A = \frac{x}{t} = \lambda^{\circ}$

(-lene) (s) = min { Xa, Xo}

Forexample red) if the recent of ma

- 3) Price PCN is a inverse function of $\lambda(p)$.
- 3. 3) (x+1= +. wm {r*, rol 3)? why?

PAGE 6.

\$2.3. Upper Bound.

Theorem Z. If $\lambda(p)$ is a regular domain function, then for all osnotro andostero, wehne.

J (n,+) = JD(n,+)

Proof Sketch: Step 1: Eulfor Asds] = n.

Step 2: Juan. +, M) = Eulftircher-whiles Juan, +1.

Step 3 Jacontino = St man redisor-mais ds + nu = John

Expertation = Maximizing the integrand inside pointwise.

Step 4 Strong durlity inf JD (n.t., u) = JD (n.t)

=).] (n,+) E] (n,+)

\$ 2.4 Hoursties.

Determinitie control suggests a fixed price heuristic. If we let pre-masspo, pt. for the entire horizon under the tochartic demand how the performer's?

femark:

Note that, in bout section, we show that the deterministic Control leads town upper bound. Here, the optical-fixed-privily policy is only a feasible control under the stochasth demand setting and hence any houristic definitely is smeller than I+ (1,+). But, we are Januar upe deterministic control on a median to explore the property of such heuristics

As the determination (outs) suggests a fixed pris. then it is better to find a better fixed price. For example, the one marinizing p Elimin (n. Marp)+1). Intuitively, the best noteles the uncertainty.

Theorem 3.
$$\frac{J^{OPP}}{J^*(n,+)} \gg \frac{J^{FP}(n,+)}{J^*(n,+)} \approx 1 - \frac{1}{2 J_{min(n)} x^{OFF}}$$
.

Proof Skatch.

· Fired prive; DECNXCPI+-(NXCPI+-1)+].

* At 71, run out policy is optimal po

it run out then. In would be sold out inexpectation of

The arrival rate of the poisson process -s 1/4

Hona E[N/1916] = N [la standard designation. 62 = n.

$$- FP_{(n,t)} = n p^{v} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 \sqrt{n}} \right) = r^{0} t \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 \sqrt{n}} \right)$$

· N+ < n, pt is sptimul

then. the rote is No E[Marph] = Not.

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{(n+1)}} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} (\lambda_{+} + \frac{1}{\sqrt{(n-1)^{2}} - (n-1)^{2}}) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{(n+1)^{2}}}\right) =$$

• $T^*(n,+) \leq \overline{J}^*(n,+)$ $\frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F^{p}(n,t)}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F^{p}(n,t)} \geq \frac{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F^{p}(n,t)}{\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F^{p}(n,t)} = 0.$

$$\lambda^{*}+>n, \quad \frac{J^{\mathsf{FP}}(n,+)}{J^{\mathsf{D}}(n,+)} \geq \frac{n\,\mathsf{P}^{\circ}(1-\frac{1}{2\sqrt{n}})}{n\cdot\mathsf{P}^{\circ}} = 1-\frac{1}{2\sqrt{n}}$$

$$\lambda^{*}+$$

· proof is completed.