

TLP:CLEAR

Hayabusa & Takajō

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For an Easier DFIR Life

Agenda

- 1) Problems with Windows Event Log Analysis
- 2) Solution: Yamato Security OSS Tools!
 - Hayabusa
 - Takajō



Problems with Windows Event Log Analysis

- **Tough** to read
- **Tough** to process
- **Tough** to filter quickly
- **Tough** to analyze quickly



Event logs are **E**vil



Solution: Yamato Security OSS Tools!

- Easy to read
- Easy to process
- Easy to filter quickly
- Easy to analyze quickly



HAYABUSA

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Takajō



Event log analysis made Easy

About Hayabusa (隼)

- Motivation: Get the most use out of Sigma rules and make Windows event log analysis as quick and easy as possible.
- Language: Rust (fast and memory safe!)
- Started development in 2021
- Contributors: 14
- Releases / Major updates: 44!!!
- Major update released almost monthly for 2.5 years!
- Downloads: 97,000+
- Hayabusa detection rules: ~200
- Sigma detection rules: 4000+


About Hayabusa (隼)



.evtx



Sigma



HAYABUSA

~~Tough~~ Easy to Filter Quickly!

Results saved in **CSV** for **easy analysis** with **Timeline Explorer**!

```
> hayabusa csv-timeline -d <evtx directory> -o result.csv
```

Timestamp	Computer	Channel	Event ID	Level	Record ...	Rule Title	Details
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sec	4624	info	124	Logon (Interactive) *Cr...	Type: 2 TgtUser: IEUser
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sec	4624	info	125	Logon (Interactive) *Cr...	Type: 2 TgtUser: IEUser
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sec	4648	info	123	Explicit Logon	TgtUser: IEUser SrcUser: W...
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sec	4672	info	126	Admin Logon	TgtUser: IEUser LID: 0x298
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sys	20001	info	367	New Non-USB PnP Device	DeviceID: UMB\UMB\1&841921D8
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sys	20001	info	369	New Non-USB PnP Device	DeviceID: SW\{EEAB7790-C514-
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sec	4616	low	129	Unauthorized System Tim...	PrevTime: 2013-10-23T16:23:5...
2013-10-23 12:2...	IE8Win7	Sys	20001	info	391	New Non-USB PnP Device	DeviceID: STORAGE\VOLUMESNAP

~~Tough~~ Easy to Process!

You can also output in **JSON(L)** for analysis **with JQ!**

```
> hayabusa json-timeline -d <evtx directory> -o result.json -L
```

```
{  
    "Timestamp": "2013-10-23 12:1  
    "Computer": "37L4247D28-05",  
    "Channel": "Sec",  
    "EventID": 4624,  
    "Level": "info",  
    "RecordID": 2,  
    "RuleTitle": "Logon (System) - Bo  
    "Details": {  
        "Type": 0,  
        "TgtUser": "SYSTEM",  
        "SrcComp": "-",  
        "SrcIP": "-",  
        "LID": "0x3e7"  
    }  
}
```

```
cat results.json | jq '.Timestamp | .[:10] ' -r | sort | uniq -c
```




```
1066 2021-12-12  
1093 2016-09-02  
1571 2021-04-22  
1750 2016-09-03  
2271 2016-08-19
```

This will give us the dates with the most events!

Hayabusa 2.16.0 is released today!!

- **Loads of new features and enhancements!**
- **15%~10x faster with Channel filtering!**
- **Splunk REST API exported log support!**
- **Initial support for Sigma Correlations!**
- **Easier to read/process output**

For an easier DFIR life with Takajo!



Hayabusa's
JSONL
results



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Takajo



./takajo --help

```
fukusuke@fukusukenoAir hayabusa-2.15.0-mac-arm % ./takajo -h
Version: 2.5.0 BSides Tokyo Release
Usage: takajo.exe <COMMAND>
```



Commands:

help	print comprehensive or per-cmd help
automagic	automatically executes as many commands as possible and output results to a new folder
extract-scriptblocks	extract and reassemble PowerShell EID 4104 script block logs
list-domains	create a list of unique domains to be used with vt-domain-lookup
list-hashes	create a list of process hashes to be used with vt-hash-lookup
list-ip-addresses	create a list of unique target and/or source IP addresses to be used with vt-ip-lookup
list-undetected-evtx	create a list of undetected evtx files
list-unused-rules	create a list of unused sigma rules
split-csv-timeline	split up a large CSV file into smaller ones based on the computer name
split-json-timeline	split up a large JSONL timeline into smaller ones based on the computer name
stack-cmdlines	stack executed command lines
stack-computers	stack computers
stack-dns	stack DNS queries and responses
stack-ip-addresses	stack the target IP addresses (TgtIP field) or source IP addresses (SrcIP field)
stack-logons	stack logons by target user, target computer, source IP address and source computer
stack-processes	stack executed processes
stack-services	stack service names and paths from System 7040 and Security 4697 events
stack-tasks	stack new scheduled tasks from Security 4698 events and parse out XML task content
stack-users	stack target users (TgtUser field) or source users (SrcUser field)
sysmon-process-tree	output the process tree of a certain process
timeline-logon	create a CSV timeline of logon events
timeline-partition-diagnostic	create a CSV timeline of partition diagnostic events
timeline-suspicious-processes	create a CSV timeline of suspicious processes
timeline-tasks	create a CSV timeline of scheduled tasks
ttp-summary	summarize tactics and techniques found in each computer
ttp-visualize	extract TTPs and create a JSON file to visualize in MITRE ATT&CK Navigator
ttp-visualize-sigma	extract TTPs from Sigma and create a JSON file to visualize in MITRE ATT&CK Navigator
vt-domain-lookup	look up a list of domains on VirusTotal

Easy to process **Quickly**!

Just one easy command to automate everything!

```
> takajo automagic –d <Hayabusa JSONL result file directory> -o case
```

All processed by Takajo's automagic!

```
PS C:\tmp\takajo-2.4.0-win> .\takajo automagic -t ./timeline.jsonl -q
Started the automagic command

Automatically executes as many commands as possible and output results to a new folder.

File: ./timeline.jsonl (45.27 MB)
Counting total lines. Please wait.
Total lines: 34,940

Scanning the Hayabusa timeline. Please wait.

100%|██████████| 34940/34940 [ 3.0s < 0.0s,  61.55k/sec]
```

Command	Results	Saved Files
extract-scriptblocks	PowerShell logs: 108	case-1/scriptblock-logs/Summary.csv (19.92 kB) case-1/scriptblock-logs/*.txt
list-domains	Domains: 0	case-1/ListDomains.txt (0 Bytes)
list-domains(detailed)	Domains: 2	case-1/ListDomainsDetailed.txt (16 Bytes)
list-hashes	MD5: 1,038 SHA1: 976 SHA256: 978 Import: 1,038	case-1/ListHashes-MD5.txt (4.88 kB) case-1/ListHashes-SHA1.txt (5.66 kB) case-1/ListHashes-SHA256.txt (9.02 kB) case-1/ListHashes-ImportHashes.txt (4.28 kB)
list-ip-addresses	IP addresses: 0	case-1/ListIP-Addresses.txt (0 Bytes)
stack-cmdlines	Unique cmdlines: 1,411	case-1/StackCmdlines.csv (814.13 kB)
stack-computers	Unique computers: 54	case-1/StackTargetComputers.csv (49.51 kB)
stack-computers	Unique computers: 3,571	case-1/StackSourceComputers.csv (383.32 kB)

Logon Timeline!

Timestamp	Ch	Even	Event	LogoffTime	ElapsedTime	FailureReason	TargetComputer	TargetUser	AdminLog	SourceC
2016-08-18 23:47:04.676 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:47:04.676 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon	2016-08-18 23:47:20.053 +09:00	0d 0h 0m 15s 377ms		IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:47:36.671 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-18 23:47:36.671 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-18 23:47:38.430 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:47:38.430 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon	2016-08-18 23:48:31.289 +09:00	0d 0h 0m 52s 859ms		IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:47:38.430 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:47:38.430 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon	2016-08-18 23:48:31.289 +09:00	0d 0h 0m 52s 859ms		IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:49:38.281 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-18 23:49:38.281 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-18 23:49:40.000 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:49:40.000 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon	2016-08-19 00:28:28.043 +09:00	0d 0h 38m 48s 43ms		IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:49:40.000 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-18 23:49:40.000 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon	2016-08-19 00:28:28.043 +09:00	0d 0h 38m 48s 43ms		IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-19 00:29:27.609 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-19 00:29:27.609 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-19 00:29:29.859 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-19 00:29:29.859 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-19 00:29:29.859 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser	Yes	127.0.0.1
2016-08-19 00:29:29.859 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	IEUser		127.0.0.1
2016-08-19 03:46:19.937 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-08-19 03:46:19.937 +09:00	Sec	4624	Successful Logon				IE10Win7	SYSTEM	-	
2016-09-20 01:50:06.477 +09:00	Sec	4625	Failed Logon				Unknown - UNKNOWN USER	DESKTOP-M5SN04R	JcDfcZTc	6hgtnMvI
2016-09-20 01:50:06.477 +09:00	Sec	4625	Failed Logon				Unknown - UNKNOWN USFR	DESKTOP-M5SN04R	JcDfcZTc	6hgtnMvI


PowerShell Execution Timeline!

Creation Time	Computer Name	Script ID	Script Name	Records	Level	Alerts
2019-09-09 22:35:08.655 +09:00	MSEdgeWIN10	37f6d110-cfdf-4118-8748-17638e258531	no-path	1/1	med	"Suspicious FromBase64String Usage Or Archive - Ps Script", "Potentially Malicious PwSh"
2019-09-09 22:35:09.315 +09:00	MSEdgeWIN10	c7ca7056-b317-4fff-b796-05d8ef896dcd	no-path	1/1	high	"Suspicious PowerShell Get Current User", "PowerShell Credential Prompt", "Manipulation of User Computer or Group Security Principals Across AD", "Potentially Malicious PwSh"
2020-06-30 23:24:08.254 +09:00	MSEdgeWIN10	27f08bda-c330-419f-b83b-eb5c0f699930	C:\Users\Public\lsass_wer_ps.ps1	1/1	high	"PowerShell Get-Process LSASS in ScriptBlock", "Malicious PowerShell Keywords", "Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process", "WinAPI Function Calls Via PowerShell Scripts", "Use Remove-Item To Delete File", "Potentially Malicious PwSh"
2020-08-26 14:09:28.845 +09:00	DESKTOP-RIPCLIP	fdd51159-9602-40cb-839d-c31039ebbc3a	no-path	1/1	high	"Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets - ScriptBlock", "Powershell Token Obfuscation - Powershell"

Suspicious Process Timeline!

Timestamp	Computer	Type	Level	Rule	Cmdline
2019-05-20 02:32:00.482 +09:00	DC1.inse...	Sysmon 1	high	Proc Exec (Sysmon Alert)	attrib +h nbtscan.exe
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Rundll32 Execution Without DLL File	rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApp
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Rundll32 Execution Without DLL File	rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApp
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApp
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApp
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml
2019-05-22 00:32:57.286 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Mshtml DLL RunHTMLApplication Abuse	rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApp
2019-05-22 00:32:57.867 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Remotely Hosted HTA File Executed Via Mshta...	"C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" https://hotele
2019-05-22 00:32:57.867 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Remotely Hosted HTA File Executed Via Mshta...	"C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" https://hotele
2019-05-22 00:32:57.867 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning ...	"C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" https://hotele
2019-05-22 00:32:57.867 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Windows Shell/Scripting Processes Spawning ...	"C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe" https://hotele
2019-05-22 00:32:59.769 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Ta...	"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /Create /sc
2019-05-22 00:33:59.769 +09:00	IEWIN7	Sysmon 1	high	Suspicious Command Patterns In Scheduled Ta...	"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /Create /sc

MITRE ATT&CK Heatmap Visualizations



Various stack analysis to identify outliers and abnormalities.

	Count	TgtUser	TgtComp	LogonType	SrcIP	SrcComp
1	40	takahashi	fs03vuln.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.123.11	-
2	19	tanaka	rootdc1.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
3	14	sato	fs03vuln.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
4	12	suzuki	fs02.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
5	13	ito	mssql01.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
6	12	watanabe	srvdefender01.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.123.11	-
7	11	yamamoto	rootdc1.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
8	10	shimizu	FS03.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.42.38	-
9	10	hayashi	fs01.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.23.9	-
10	10	saito	srvdefender01.offsec.lan	3 - NETWORK	10.23.42.22	-
11	1	qfasodiab	01566s-win16-ir.threebeesco.com	3 - NETWORK	172.16.66.142	04246W-WIN10

Why is there only 1 logon for this user, from this IP/hostname, etc... ?

.\\StackLogons.csv [Row 10/11, Col 1/6]

Features of Takajo's automagic!

Automagic will output many useful results:

- Listing up domains, IP addresses, hashes
- VirusTotal lookups
- Stacking tasks, users, services, etc...
- Logon timeline
- Suspicious process timeline
- Scheduled tasks timeline
- PowerShell timeline
- PowerShell script extraction and reassembly
- MITRE ATT&CK TTP visualizations
- and more!



Thank you for listening!

大和セキュリティ

