



HAYABUSA

[English] | [日本語]

Stable Version v2.5.1 GitHub Downloads 34k GitHub Stars 1.3k Contributors 14

Black Hat Arsenal Asia 2022 CODE BLUE Bluebox 2022 SECCON 2023 SANS DFIR Summit 2023

Maintenance Level Actively Developed rs report A+ codecov 82% Follow @SecurityYamato

About Hayabusa

Hayabusa is a **Windows event log fast forensics timeline generator** and **threat hunting tool** created by the [Yamato Security](#) group in Japan. Hayabusa means "peregrine falcon" in Japanese and was chosen as peregrine falcons are the fastest animal in the world, great at hunting and highly trainable. It is written in [Rust](#) and supports multi-threading in order to be as fast as possible. We have provided a [tool](#) to convert [Sigma](#) rules into Hayabusa rule format. The Sigma-compatible Hayabusa detection rules are written in YML in order to be as easily customizable and extensible as possible. Hayabusa can be run either on single running systems for live analysis, by gathering logs from single or multiple systems for offline analysis, or by running the [Hayabusa artifact](#) with [Velociraptor](#) for enterprise-wide threat hunting and incident response. The output will be consolidated into a single CSV timeline for easy analysis in [LibreOffice](#), [Timeline Explorer](#), [Elastic Stack](#), [Timesketch](#), etc...

Companion Projects

- [EnableWindowsLogSettings](#) - Documentation and scripts to properly enable Windows event logs.
- [Hayabusa Rules](#) - Detection rules for hayabusa.
- [Hayabusa Sample EVTXs](#) - Sample evtx files to use for testing hayabusa/sigma detection rules.
- [Takajo](#) - An analyzer for hayabusa results.
- [WELA \(Windows Event Log Analyzer\)](#) - An analyzer for Windows event logs written in PowerShell.

Table of Contents

- [About Hayabusa](#)

- Companion Projects
 - Table of Contents
 - Main Goals
 - Threat Hunting and Enterprise-wide DFIR
 - Fast Forensics Timeline Generation
- Screenshots
 - Startup
 - DFIR Timeline Terminal Output
 - Keyword Search Results
 - Detection Frequency Timeline (`-T` option)
 - Results Summary
 - HTML Results Summary (`-H` option)
 - DFIR Timeline Analysis in LibreOffice (`-M` Multiline Output)
 - DFIR Timeline Analysis in Timeline Explorer
 - Critical Alert Filtering and Computer Grouping in Timeline Explorer
 - Analysis with the Elastic Stack Dashboard
 - Analysis in Timesketch
- Importing and Analyzing Timeline Results
- Analyzing JSON-formatted results with JQ
- Features
- Downloads
- Git Cloning
- Advanced: Compiling From Source (Optional)
 - Updating Rust Packages
 - Cross-compiling 32-bit Windows Binaries
 - macOS Compiling Notes
 - Linux Compiling Notes
 - Cross-compiling Linux MUSL Binaries
- Running Hayabusa
 - Caution: Anti-Virus/EDR Warnings and Slow Runtimes
 - Windows
 - Linux
 - macOS
- Command List
 - Analysis Commands:
 - DFIR Timeline Commands:
 - General Commands:
- Command Usage
 - Analysis Commands
 - `logon-summary` command
 - `logon-summary` command example
 - `metrics` command
 - `metrics` command examples
 - `metrics` command config file
 - `pivot-keywords-list` command
 - `pivot-keywords-list` command example

- `pivot-keywords-list` config file
- `search` command
 - `search` command examples
 - `search` command config files
- DFIR Timeline Commands
 - `csv-timeline` command
 - `csv-timeline` command examples
 - Advanced - GeolP Log Enrichment
 - GeolP config file
 - Automatic updates of GeolP databases
 - `csv-timeline` command config files
 - `json-timeline` command
 - `json-timeline` command examples and config files
 - `level-tuning` command
 - `level-tuning` command examples
 - `level-tuning` config file
 - `list-profiles` command
 - `set-default-profile` command
 - `update-rules` command
 - `update-rules` command example
- Timeline Output
 - Output Profiles
 - 1. `minimal` profile output
 - 2. `standard` profile output
 - 3. `verbose` profile output
 - 4. `all-field-info` profile output
 - 5. `all-field-info-verbose` profile output
 - 6. `super-verbose` profile output
 - 7. `timesketch-minimal` profile output
 - 8. `timesketch-verbose` profile output
 - Profile Comparison
 - Profile Field Aliases
 - Level Abbreviations
 - MITRE ATT&CK Tactics Abbreviations
 - Channel Abbreviations
 - Other Abbreviations
 - Progress Bar
 - Color Output
 - Results Summary
 - Detection Frequency Timeline
- Hayabusa Rules
 - Sigma v.s. Hayabusa (Built-in Sigma Compatible) Rules
- Other Windows Event Log Analyzers and Related Resources
- Windows Logging Recommendations
- Sysmon Related Projects
- Community Documentation

- English
- Japanese
- Contribution
- Bug Submission
- License
- Twitter

Main Goals


Threat Hunting and Enterprise-wide DFIR

Hayabusa currently has over 3250 Sigma rules and around 150 Hayabusa built-in detection rules with more rules being added regularly. It can be used for enterprise-wide proactive threat hunting as well as DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response) for free with [Velociraptor's Hayabusa artifact](#). By combining these two open-source tools, you can essentially retroactively reproduce a SIEM when there is no SIEM setup in the environment. You can learn about how to do this by watching [Eric Capuano's Velociraptor walkthrough here](#).

Fast Forensics Timeline Generation


Windows event log analysis has traditionally been a very long and tedious process because Windows event logs are 1) in a data format that is hard to analyze and 2) the majority of data is noise and not useful for investigations. Hayabusa's goal is to extract out only useful data and present it in a concise as possible easy-to-read format that is usable not only by professionally trained analysts but any Windows system administrator. Hayabusa hopes to let analysts get 80% of their work done in 20% of the time when compared to traditional Windows event log analysis.

DFIR Timeline Creation



Screenshots

Startup



by Yamato Security

```
Analyzing event files: 574
Total file size: 148.0 MB

Loading detections rules. Please wait.

Excluded rules: 15
Noisy rules: 5 (Disabled)

Experimental rules: 1574 (61.58%)
Stable rules: 212 (8.29%)
Test rules: 770 (30.13%)

Hayabusa rules: 134
Sigma rules: 2422
Total enabled detection rules: 2556

316 / 574 [=====>-----] 55.05 % 8s
```

DFIR Timeline Terminal Output

```
2021-12-13 17:21:30.845 +09:00 || f503vuln.offsec.lan || Sec || 5145 || info || 1176260 || NetShare File Access || User: admmig | ShareName: \\*\C$ | SharePath: \??\C:\ | Path: Windows\System32\Drivers\etc | IP-Addr: 10.23.23.9 | LID: 0x8ca6e1d
2021-12-13 21:55:45.250 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sys || 7045 || info || 1467331 || Svc Installed || Svc: BT0BTO | Path: %COMSPEC% /Q /c e
cho cd ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\_output 2>^&1 > %TEMP%\execute.bat & %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TEMP%\execute.bat & del %TEMP%\execute.bat | Acct: Local
System | StartType: demand start
2021-12-13 21:55:45.250 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sys || 7045 || crit || 1467331 || smbexec.py Service Installation || Svc: BT0BTO | Path:
%COMSPEC% /Q /c echo cd ^> \\127.0.0.1\C$\_output 2>^&1 > %TEMP%\execute.bat & %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TEMP%\execute.bat & del %TEMP%\execute
.bat | Acct: LocalSystem | StartType: demand start
2021-12-13 21:55:45.250 +09:00 || - || - || - || low || Rare Service Installations || [condition] count() by ServiceName < 5 in timeframe [result]
count:1 ServiceName:BT0BTO timeframe:7d
2021-12-13 21:55:45.250 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4697 || info || 236864754 || Svc Installed || Svc: BT0BTO | Path: %COMSPEC% /Q /c
echo cd ^> \\127.0.0.1\$\_output 2>^&1 > %TEMP%\execute.bat & %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TEMP%\execute.bat & del %TEMP%\execute.bat | User: adm
mig | SvcAccount: LocalSystem | SvcType: 0x10 | SvcStartType: 3 | LID: 0x2cff42b44
2021-12-14 23:42:48.182 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4776 || info || 237294513 || NTLM Logon To Local Account || User: hack1 | Comp: a
ttacker | Status: 0x0
2021-12-14 23:42:48.182 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4624 || info || 237294514 || Logon (Type 3 Network) || User: hack1 | Comp: attack
er | IP-Addr: 10.23.123.11 | LID: 0x308fabbb0c
2021-12-14 23:42:48.182 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4624 || med || 237294514 || Pass the Hash Activity 2 || User: hack1 | Comp: atta
cker | IP-Addr: 10.23.123.11 | Proc: - | LID: 0x308fabbb0c
2021-12-14 23:42:48.690 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4776 || info || 237294516 || NTLM Logon To Local Account || User: hack1 | Comp:
| Status: 0x0
2021-12-14 23:42:48.690 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4624 || info || 237294517 || Logon (Type 3 Network) || User: hack1 | Comp: - | IP
-Addr: 10.23.123.11 | LID: 0x308fb82ad
2021-12-14 23:42:48.693 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 5140 || info || 237294519 || NetShare Access || User: hack1 | ShareName: \\*\IPC$
| SharePath: | IP-Addr: 10.23.123.11 | LID: 0x308fb82ad
2021-12-14 23:42:48.908 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4781 || high || 237294532 || Suspicious Computer Account Name Change CVE-2021-42
287 || OldTgtUser: compnay-88$ | NewTgtUser: rootdc1 | TgtSID: S-1-5-21-4230534742-2542757381-3142984815-1296 | User: hack1 | SID: S-1-5-2
1-4230534742-2542757381-3142984815-1234 | Domain: OFFSEC | TgtDomain: OFFSEC | PrivList: - | LID: 0x308fabbb0c
2021-12-14 23:42:48.908 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4781 || high || 237294532 || Suspicious Computer Account Name Change CVE-2021-42
287 || OldTgtUser: compnay-88$ | NewTgtUser: rootdc1 | TgtSID: S-1-5-21-4230534742-2542757381-3142984815-1296 | User: hack1 | SID: S-1-5-2
1-4230534742-2542757381-3142984815-1234 | Domain: OFFSEC | TgtDomain: OFFSEC | PrivList: - | LID: 0x308fabbb0c
2021-12-14 23:42:49.222 +09:00 || rootdc1.offsec.lan || Sec || 4768 || info || 237294534 || Kerberos TGT Requested || User: rootdc1 | Svc: krbtg
t | IP-Addr: ::ffff:10.23.123.11 | Status: 0x0 | PreAuthType: 2
```


Keyword Search Results

```

2021-10-21T20:40:12.867822Z || FS03.offsec.lan || Sysmon || 1 || 82849 || Process Creation || CommandLine: mimikatz.exe | Company: gentilkiwi (Benjamin DELPY) | CurrentDirectory: C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64\ | Description: mimikatz for Windows | FileVersion: 2.2.0.0 | Hashes: SHA1=D241DF7B9D2EC0B8194751CD5CE153E27CC40FA4,MD5=A3CB3B02A683275F7E0A0F8A9A5C9E07,SHA256=31EB1DE7E840A342FD468E558E5AB627BCB4C542A8FE01AEC4D SBA01D539A0FC,IMPHASH=DBDEA7B557F0E6B5D9E18ABE9CE5220A | Image: C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe | IntegrityLevel: High | LogonGuid: 7CF65FC7-7ABF-616E-5FC6-F40100000000 | LogonId: 0x1f4c65f | OriginalFileName: mimikatz.exe | ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" | ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe | ParentProcessGuid: 7CF65FC7-886C-616E-B201-000000001200 | ParentProcessId: 2908 | ProcessGuid: 7CF65FC7-D02C-6171-1203-000000001200 | ProcessId: 2032 | Product: mimikatz | RuleName: technique_id=T1059,technique_name=Command-Line Interface | TerminalSessionId: 2 | User: OFFSEC\admmig | UtcTime: 2021-10-21 20:40:12.867 || ../hayabusa-sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0006-Credential Access/T1003-Credential dumping/ID10-Mimikatz LSASS process dump.evtx
2021-10-21T20:40:43.120486Z || FS03.offsec.lan || Sysmon || 1 || 82852 || Process Creation || CommandLine: cmd.exe | Company: Microsoft Corporation | CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\ | Description: Windows Command Processor | FileVersion: 6.3.9600.17415 (winblue_r4.141028-1500) | Hashes: SHA1=7C3D7281E1151FE4127923F4B4C3CD36438E1A12,MD5=F5AE03DE0AD60F5B17B82F2CD68402FE,SHA256=6F88FB88FFB0F1D5465C2826E5 B4F523598B1B8378377C8378FFEBBC171BAD18B,IMPHASH=77AED1ADAF24B344F08C8AD1432908C3 | Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe | IntegrityLevel: System | LogonGuid: 7CF65FC7-D04B-6171-A4DE-E60200000000 | LogonId: 0x2e6dea4 | OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe | ParentCommandLine: mimikatz.exe | ParentImage: C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe | ParentProcessGuid: 7CF65FC7-D02C-6171-1203-000000001200 | ParentProcessId: 2032 | ProcessGuid: 7CF65FC7-D04B-6171-1303-000000001200 | ProcessId: 5040 | Product: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System | RuleName: technique_id=T1059,technique_name=Command-Line Interface | TerminalSessionId: 2 | User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | UtcTime: 2021-10-21 20:40:43.120 || ../hayabusa-sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0006-Credential Access/T1003-Credential dumping/ID10-Mimikatz LSASS process dump.evtx
2021-10-21T20:40:43.136112Z || FS03.offsec.lan || Sysmon || 10 || 82853 || Process Access || CallTrace: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+909ba1C :Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+2d8e1C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+bcbda1C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+be7bd1C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+be6501C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+84f281C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+84d601C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+84b2b1C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe+c39a91C:\Windows\system32\KERNEL32.DLL+13d21C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+154f4 | GrantedAccess: 0x1010 | RuleName: - | SourceImage: C:\TOOLS\Mimikatzx64|mimikatz.exe | SourceProcessGUID: 7CF65FC7-D02C-6171-1203-000000001200 | SourceProcessId: 2032 | SourceThreadId: 4056 | TargetImage: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe | TargetProcessGUID: 7CF65FC7-6649-6165-0B00-000000001200 | TargetProcessId: 512 | UtcTime: 2021-10-21 20:40:43.136 || ../hayabusa-sample-evtx/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/TA0006-Credential Access/T1003-Credential dumping/ID10-Mimikatz LSASS process dump.evtx

```

Detection Frequency Timeline (-T option)



Results Summary

Results Summary:

Events with hits / Total events: 19,545 / 76,967 (Data reduction: 57,422 events (74.61%))

Total | Unique detections: 32,684 | 554
 Total | Unique critical detections: 46 (0.14%) | 18 (3.25%)
 Total | Unique high detections: 6,141 (18.79%) | 250 (45.13%)
 Total | Unique medium detections: 1,472 (4.50%) | 156 (28.16%)
 Total | Unique low detections: 6,771 (20.72%) | 76 (13.72%)
 Total | Unique informational detections: 18,254 (55.85%) | 54 (9.75%)

Dates with most total detections:

critical: 2019-07-19 (15), **high:** 2016-09-20 (3,656), **medium:** 2019-05-19 (165), **low:** 2016-09-20 (3,780), **informational:** 2016-08-19 (2,105)

Top 5 computers with most unique detections:

critical: MSEdgeWIN10 (6), IEWIN7 (3), FS03.offsec.lan (2), rootdc1.offsec.lan (2), srvdefender01.offsec.lan (2)
high: MSEdgeWIN10 (109), IEWIN7 (70), FS03.offsec.lan (31), fs03vuln.offsec.lan (27), IE10Win7 (23)
medium: MSEdgeWIN10 (62), IEWIN7 (38), FS03.offsec.lan (16), IE10Win7 (15), PC01.example.corp (14)
low: MSEdgeWIN10 (35), IEWIN7 (18), FS03.offsec.lan (16), fs03vuln.offsec.lan (13), IE10Win7 (11)
informational: MSEdgeWIN10 (18), IEWIN7 (17), fs01.offsec.lan (16), PC01.example.corp (13), IE8Win7 (12)

Top critical alerts:

Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage (10)
 Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation (6)
 Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account (6)
 Windows Defender Alert (4)
 WannaCry Ransomware (4)

Top high alerts:

Metasploit SMB Authentication (3,562)
 Malicious Svc Possibly Installed (271)
 Susp Svc Installed (257)
 PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services (253)
 Suspicious Service Installation Script (250)

Top medium alerts:

Potentially Malicious PwSh (235)
 Proc Injection (104)
 Reg Key Value Set_Sysmon Alert (103)
 Suspicious Remote Thread Target (93)
 Cscript Visual Basic Script Execution (60)

Top low alerts:

Logon Failure_Wrong Password (3,564)
 Susp CmdLine (Possible LOLBIN) (1,418)
 Non Interactive PowerShell (325)
 Rare Service Installations (321)
 Windows Processes Suspicious Parent Directory (282)

Top informational alerts:

Proc Exec (11,173)
 NetShare File Access (2,564)
 PwSh Scriptblock (789)
 PwSh Pipeline Exec (680)
 NetShare Access (433)

Explicit Logon (342)
 Svc Installed (331)
 New Non-USB PnP Device (268)
 Logon (Type 3 Network) (228)
 File Created (210)

Elapsed Time: 00:00:28.827

HTML Results Summary (**-H** option)

General Overview

- Start time: 2022/10/02 03:16
- Excluded rules: 12
- Noisy rules: 5 (Disabled)
- Experimental rules: 2036 (67.24%)
- Stable rules: 213 (7.03%)
- Test rules: 779 (25.73%)
- Hayabusa rules: 138
- Sigma rules: 2890
- Total enabled detection rules: 3028
- Elapsed Time: 00:00:23.844

Results Summary

- Saved alerts and events: 19,545
- Total events analyzed: 76,967
- Data reduction: 57,422 events (74.61%)
- Dates with most total detections:
 - critical: 2019-07-19 (15)
 - high: 2016-09-20 (3,656)
 - medium: 2019-05-19 (165)
 - low: 2016-09-20 (3,780)
 - informational: 2016-08-19 (2,105)

Computers with most unique critical detections:

- MSEDGEWIN10 (6)
- IEWIN7 (3)
- srvdefender01.offsec.lan (2)
- FS03.offsec.lan (2)
- rootdc1.offsec.lan (2)
- alice.insecurebank.local (1)
- IE10Win7 (1)
- DC1.insecurebank.local (1)
- win10-02.offsec.lan (1)
- fs01.offsec.lan (1)
- fs03vuln.offsec.lan (1)
- DESKTOP-PIU87N6 (1)

Computers with most unique high detections:

- MSEDGEWIN10 (112)
- IEWIN7 (72)

Top critical alerts:

- [Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage](#) (10)
- [Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation](#) (6)
- [Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account](#) (6)
- [Windows Defender Alert](#) (4)
- [WannaCry Ransomware](#) (4)
- [Dumpert Process Dumper](#) (3)
- [SystemNightmare Exploitation Script Execution](#) (2)
- [Mimikatz MemSSP Default Log File Creation](#) (2)
- [Suspicious LSASS Process Clone](#) (2)
- [TrustedPath UAC Bypass Pattern](#) (2)
- [SMB Relay Attack Tools](#) (1)
- [smbexec.py Service Installation](#) (1)
- [Malicious Named Pipe](#) (1)
- [CobaltStrike Service Installations in Registry](#) (1)
- [Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs DLL](#) (1)

Top high alerts:

- [Metasploit SMB Authentication](#) (3,562)
- [Malicious Svc Possibly Installed](#) (271)

DFIR Timeline Analysis in LibreOffice (–M Multiline Output)

A	C	D	E	G	H	I
Timestamp	Chann	Even	Lev	RuleTitle	RuleAuthor	Details
2019-08-05 18:39:	Sec	4624	med	Pass the Hash Activity 2	Dave Kennedy Jeff Warren (method) David Vassallo (rule)	Type: 9 TgtUser: IEUser SrcComp: - SrcIP: ::1 LID: 0x3B8f7e
2019-08-05 18:39:	Sec	4624	high	Successful Overpass the Hash Attempt	Roberto Rodriguez (source) Dominik Schaudel (rule)	Type: 9 TgtUser: IEUser SrcComp: - SrcIP: ::1 LID: 0x3B8f7e
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	info	Proc Exec	Zach Mathis	Cmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe "shell:::{769f9427-3cc6-4b62-be14-2a705115b7ab}" Proc: C:\Windows\explorer.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe LID: 0x29126 PID: 1052 PGUID: 747F3D96-F639-5D53-0000-001067DA2600
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	info	Proc Exec	Zach Mathis	Cmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe /factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b} -Embedding Proc: C:\Windows\explorer.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p LID: 0x29126 PID: 6000 PGUID: 747F3D96-F639-5D53-0000-001092EE2600
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	med	Explorer Process Tree Break	Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) Nasreddine Bencherhal (Nextron Systems) @gott_cyber	Cmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe /factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b} -Embedding Proc: C:\Windows\explorer.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p LID: 0x29126 PID: 6000 PGUID: 747F3D96-F639-5D53-0000-001092EE2600
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	info	Proc Exec	Zach Mathis	Cmd: "c:\windows\system32\wscript.exe" /E:vbs c:\windows\temp\icon.ico "powershell -exec bypass -c ""IEX ((System.Text.Encoding)Get-Content C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe).ToString()""" Proc: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe /factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b} -Embedding LID: 0x29126 PID: 8180 PGUID: 747F3D96-F639-5D53-0000-0010B0FC2600
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	med	Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level	frack113	Cmd: "c:\windows\system32\wscript.exe" /E:vbs c:\windows\temp\icon.ico "powershell -exec bypass -c ""IEX ((System.Text.Encoding)Get-Content C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe).ToString()""" Proc: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe /factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b} -Embedding LID: 0x29126 PID: 8180 PGUID: 747F3D96-F639-5D53-0000-0010B0FC2600
2019-08-14 20:53:	Sysmon	1	high	PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Keyword	Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)	Cmd: "c:\windows\system32\wscript.exe" /E:vbs c:\windows\temp\icon.ico "powershell -exec bypass -c ""IEX ((System.Text.Encoding)Get-Content C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe).ToString()""" Proc: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe User: MSEdgeWIN10IEUser ParentCmd: C:\Windows\explorer.exe /factory,{75dff2b7-6936-4c06-a8bb-676a7b00b24b} -Embedding LID: 0x29126 PID: 8180


DFIR Timeline Analysis in Timeline Explorer

Time	Computername	Eventid	Level	Alert	Details
2021-05-22 05:43:18.227 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4648	informational	Explicit Logon	Source User: FS01\$: Target User: admmig
2021-05-22 05:43:22.562 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4625	low	Logon Failure - Wrong Password	User: admmig@offsec.lan : Type: 8 : Wor
2021-05-22 05:43:49.345 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4625	low	Logon Failure - Wrong Password	User: admmig@offsec.lan : Type: 8 : Wor
2021-05-22 05:43:50.131 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4625	low	Logon Failure - Wrong Password	User: admmig@offsec.lan : Type: 8 : Wor
2021-05-22 05:43:50.607 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4625	low	Logon Failure - Wrong Password	User: admmig@offsec.lan : Type: 8 : Wor
2021-05-22 05:43:50.866 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4625	low	Logon Failure - Wrong Password	User: admmig@offsec.lan : Type: 8 : Wor
2021-05-23 06:56:57.685 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	1102	high	Security log was cleared	User: admmig
2021-05-23 06:57:11.842 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4688	high	Relevant Anti-Virus Event	
2021-05-23 06:57:11.842 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4688	critical	Mimikatz Use	
2021-05-26 22:02:27.149 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-05-26 22:02:27.155 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	5145	medium	DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe	
2021-05-26 22:02:27.155 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	5145	critical	CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation IPC Access	
2021-05-26 22:02:29.726 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-05-26 22:02:29.734 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	5145	medium	DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe	
2021-05-26 22:02:29.734 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	5145	critical	CVE-2021-1675 Print Spooler Exploitation IPC Access	
2021-05-26 22:02:34.373 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-05-26 22:02:34.375 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	5145	medium	DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe	
2021-05-26 22:02:34.379 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-05-26 22:02:34.380 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-05-27 05:24:46.570 +09:00	rootdc1.offsec.lan	4768	medium	Possible AS-REP Roasting	Possible AS-REP Roasting
2021-05-27 05:24:46.570 +09:00	rootdc1.offsec.lan	4768	informational	Kerberos TGT was requested	User: admin-test : Service: krbtgt : IP
2021-06-01 23:06:34.542 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4720	medium	Local user account created	User: WADGUtilityAccount : SID:S-1-5-21-1081258321-3780
2021-06-01 23:08:21.225 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4720	medium	Local user account created	User: elie : SID:S-1-5-21-1081258321-3780
2021-06-03 21:17:56.988 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	1102	high	Security log was cleared	User: admmig
2021-06-03 21:18:12.941 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4672	informational	Admin Logon	User: admmig : LogonID: 0x322e5b7
2021-06-03 21:18:12.942 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4624	informational	Logon Type 3 - Network	User: admmig : Workstation: - : IP Addr
2021-06-04 03:34:12.672 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	4104	high	Windows Firewall Profile Disabled	
2021-06-04 04:17:44.873 +09:00	fs01.offsec.lan	1102	high	Security log was cleared	User: admmig

Critical Alert Filtering and Computer Grouping in Timeline Explorer

Computername ▾					
Line	Tag	Time	Eventid	Level	Alert
▼ =	■	2021-05-26 22:02:27.155 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	= critical	
▶ Computername: 01566s-win16-ir.threebeesco.com (Count: 1)					
▶ Computername: alice.insecurebank.local (Count: 3)					
▶	△	2021-05-26 22:02:29.726 +09:00	mssql01.offsec.lan	(Count: 18)	
5540	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.026 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5539	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.026 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5538	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.026 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5537	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.026 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5536	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.025 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5535	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.025 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5534	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.025 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5533	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.025 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5532	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.025 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5531	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.024 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5530	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.024 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5529	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.024 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5528	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.023 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5527	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.023 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5526	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.023 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5525	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.023 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5524	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.022 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
5523	■	2019-03-26 06:28:45.022 +09:00	5136	critical	Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right
▶ Computername: DESKTOP-PIU87N6 (Count: 1)					

Analysis with the Elastic Stack Dashboard



Top 10 Alerts							Top 10 Critical Alerts							Top 10 High Alerts						
Top values of RuleTitle		info	Count	low	Count	high	Count	medium	Count	critical	Count	Top values of RuleTitle		Count of records	Top values of RuleTitle		Count of records			
Network Share File Access		2,564	-	-	-	-	-	Mimikatz Use		33	-	Malicious Service Possibly Inst...		271	Suspicious Service Installed		257			
Process Created		1,447	-	-	-	-	-	Powershell Add-DomainObjectAcl...		22	-	System Log File Cleared		97	Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage		94			
PwSh Scriptblock Log		1,024	-	-	-	-	-	Active Directory Replication from ...		6	-	Suspicious Remote Thread Crea...		93	EfsPotato Named Pipe		6			
PwSh Pipeline Execution		680	-	-	-	-	-	WannaCry Ransomware		4	-	Accessing WinAPI in PowerShe...		71	CobaltStrike Service Installations		3			
Network Share Access		433	-	-	-	-	-	DNS Server Error Failed Loading t...		3	-	Relevant Anti-Virus Event		66	Image Loaded_Sysmon Alert		3			
Other		2,058	223	831	594	41	108	Dumpert Process Dumper		3	-	Security Log Cleared		60	Process Created_Sysmon Alert		3			
Logon Failure - Wrong Password		-	3,564	-	-	-	-	LSASS Access from Non System ...		3	-	Disabling Windows Event Audit...		42	Process Start From Suspicious Folder		-			
Suspicious Cmd Line_Possible_LOLBIN ...		-	1,418	-	-	-	-	Other		27	-	Malicious PowerShell Keywords		30	Other		562			
Process Access		-	154	-	-	-	-				-									
Image Loaded_Sysmon Alert		-	108	-	-	-	-				-									
Process Start From Suspicious Folder		-	39	-	-	-	-				-									

Hayabusa Discover (16622 documents)

Time	Computer	EventID	Level	MitreAttack	RuleTitle	Details
> 2022-02-19 17:35:16.328 +00:00	DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR	7	info	Persis Evas Pr ivEsc	Windows Spooler Service Suspicious Binary Load	-
> 2022-02-19 17:35:16.301 +00:00	DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR	11	info	-	File Created	Path: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\4\Test.dll Process: C:\Users\win10\Desktop\SpoolPool-main\SpoolPool.exe PID: 1232 PUUID: 0BDAA6306-2A54-6211-0B01-000000001000
> 2022-02-19 17:35:16.301 +00:00	DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR	11	medium	-	Rename Common File to DLL	-
> 2022-02-19 17:35:16.207 +00:00	DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR	1	info	-	Process Created	Cmd: "C:\Users\win10\Desktop\SpoolPool-main\SpoolPool.exe" -d11 C:\ProgramData\Test.dll Process: C:\Users\win10\Desktop\SpoolPool-main\SpoolPool.exe User: DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR\win10 Parent Cmd: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -noexit -command Set-Location -LiteralPath C:\Users\win10\Desktop\SpoolPool-main L ID: 0x277ef PID: 1232 PUUID: 0BDAA6306-2A54-6211-0B01-000000001000
> 2022-02-19 17:35:16.207 +00:00	DESKTOP-TTEQ6PR	1	low	Exec	Process Start From Suspicious Folder	-
> 2022-02-16 19:37:20.934 +00:00	01566s-win16-ir.t hreebeesco.com	5145	info	Collect	Network Share File Access	User: samir Share Name: *\C\$ Share Path: \?\C:\ Path: Users\PSECURITY IP Addr: 172.16.66.36 LID: 0x567758

Analysis in Timesketch

2019-05-08T02:10:43	<input type="checkbox"/> Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account	User: Administrator ObjSvr: DS ObjName: %{c6faf700-bfe4-452a-a766-424f84c29583} OpType: Object Access HID: 0x0 LID: 0x40c6511	4662	DC1.insecurebank.local	Sec	T1003.006
2019-05-08T02:10:43	<input type="checkbox"/> Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account	User: Administrator ObjSvr: DS ObjName: %{c6faf700-bfe4-452a-a766-424f84c29583} OpType: Object Access HID: 0x0 LID: 0x40c6511	4662	DC1.insecurebank.local	Sec	T1003.006
2019-05-08T02:10:43	<input type="checkbox"/> Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account	User: Administrator ObjSvr: DS ObjName: %{c6faf700-bfe4-452a-a766-424f84c29583} OpType: Object Access HID: 0x0 LID: 0x40c6511	4662	DC1.insecurebank.local	Sec	T1003.006
4 days						
2019-05-12T12:52:43	<input type="checkbox"/> Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation	Svc: WinPwnage Path: %COMSPEC% /c ping -n 1 127.0.0.1 >nul && echo 'WinPwnage' > \\.\pipe\WinPwnagePipe Acct: LocalSystem StartType: demand start	7045	IEWIN7	Sys	T1134.001 : T1134.002
39 days						
2019-06-21T07:35:37	<input type="checkbox"/> Dumpert Process Dumper	Path: C:\Windows\Temp\dumpert.dmp Process: C:\Users\administrator\Desktop\x64\O utfleck-Dumpert.exe PID: 3572 PGUID: ECAD0485-88C9-5D0C-0000-0010348C1D00	11	alice.insecurebank.local	Sysmon	T1003.001

Importing and Analyzing Timeline Results

You can learn how to analyze CSV timelines in Excel and Timeline Explorer [here](#).

You can learn how to import CSV files into Elastic Stack [here](#).

You can learn how to import CSV files into Timesketch [here](#).

Analyzing JSON-formatted results with JQ

You can learn how to analyze JSON-formatted results with `jq` [here](#).

Features

- Cross-platform support: Windows, Linux, macOS.
- Developed in Rust to be memory safe and faster than a hayabusa falcon!
- Multi-thread support delivering up to a 5x speed improvement.
- Creates a single easy-to-analyze CSV timeline for forensic investigations and incident response.
- Threat hunting based on IoC signatures written in easy to read/create/edit YML based hayabusa rules.
- Sigma rule support to convert sigma rules to hayabusa rules.
- Currently it supports the most sigma rules compared to other similar tools and even supports count rules and new aggregators such as `|equalsfield` and `|endswithfield`.

- Event ID metrics. (Useful for getting a picture of what types of events there are and for tuning your log settings.)
- Rule tuning configuration by excluding unneeded or noisy rules.
- MITRE ATT&CK mapping of tactics.
- Rule level tuning.
- Create a list of unique pivot keywords to quickly identify abnormal users, hostnames, processes, etc... as well as correlate events.
- Output all fields for more thorough investigations.
- Successful and failed logon summary.
- Enterprise-wide threat hunting and DFIR on all endpoints with [Velociraptor](#).
- Output to CSV, JSON/JSONL and HTML Summary Reports.
- Daily Sigma rule updates.
- Support for JSON-formatted log input.
- Log field normalization. (Converting multiple fields with different naming conventions into the same field name.)
- Log enrichment by adding GeolP (ASN, city, country) information to IP addresses.
- Search all events for keywords or regular expressions.

Downloads

Please download the latest stable version of Hayabusa with compiled binaries or compile the source code from the [Releases](#) page.

Git Cloning

You can `git clone` the repository with the following command and compile binary from source code:

Warning: The main branch of the repository is for development purposes so you may be able to access new features not yet officially released, however, there may be bugs so consider it unstable.

```
git clone https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa.git --recursive
```

Note: If you forget to use `--recursive` option, the `rules` folder, which is managed as a git submodule, will not be cloned.

You can sync the `rules` folder and get latest Hayabusa rules with `git pull --recurse-submodules` or use the following command:

```
hayabusa.exe update-rules
```

If the update fails, you may need to rename the `rules` folder and try again.

Caution: When updating, rules and config files in the `rules` folder are replaced with the latest rules and config files in the [hayabusa-rules](#) repository. Any changes you make to existing files will be overwritten, so we recommend that you make backups of any files that you edit before updating. If you are performing level tuning with `level-tuning`, please re-tune your rule files after each update. If you add **new** rules inside of the `rules` folder, they will **not** be overwritten or deleted when updating.

Advanced: Compiling From Source (Optional)

If you have Rust installed, you can compile from source with the following command:

Note: To compile, you usually need the latest version of Rust.

```
cargo build --release
```

You can download the latest unstable version from the main branch or the latest stable version from the [Releases](#) page.

Be sure to periodically update Rust with:

```
rustup update stable
```

The compiled binary will be outputted in the `./target/release` folder.

Updating Rust Packages

You can update to the latest Rust crates before compiling:

```
cargo update
```

Please let us know if anything breaks after you update.

Cross-compiling 32-bit Windows Binaries

You can create 32-bit binaries on 64-bit Windows systems with the following:

```
rustup install stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc
rustup target add i686-pc-windows-msvc
rustup run stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc cargo build --release
```

Warning: Be sure to run `rustup install stable-i686-pc-windows-msvc` whenever there is a new stable version of Rust as `rustup update stable` will not update the compiler for

cross compiling and you may receive build errors.

macOS Compiling Notes

If you receive compile errors about openssl, you will need to install [Homebrew](#) and then install the following packages:

```
brew install pkg-config  
brew install openssl
```

Linux Compiling Notes

If you receive compile errors about openssl, you will need to install the following package.

Ubuntu-based distros:

```
sudo apt install libssl-dev
```

Fedora-based distros:

```
sudo yum install openssl-devel
```

Cross-compiling Linux MUSL Binaries

On a Linux OS, first install the target.

```
rustup install stable-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl  
rustup target add x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
```

Compile with:

```
cargo build --release --target=x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
```

Warning: Be sure to run `rustup install stable-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` whenever there is a new stable version of Rust as `rustup update stable` will not update the compiler for cross compiling and you may receive build errors.

The MUSL binary will be created in the `./target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/` directory. MUSL binaries are about 15% slower than the GNU binaries, however, they are more portable across different versions and distributions of linux.

Running Hayabusa

Caution: Anti-Virus/EDR Warnings and Slow Runtimes

You may receive an alert from anti-virus or EDR products when trying to run hayabusa or even just when downloading the `.yml` rules as there will be keywords like `mimikatz` and suspicious PowerShell commands in the detection signature. These are false positives so will need to configure exclusions in your security products to allow hayabusa to run. If you are worried about malware or supply chain attacks, please check the hayabusa source code and compile the binaries yourself.

You may experience slow runtime especially on the first run after a reboot due to the real-time protection of Windows Defender. You can avoid this by temporarily turning real-time protection off or adding an exclusion to the hayabusa runtime directory. (Please take into consideration the security risks before doing these.)

Windows

In a Command/PowerShell Prompt or Windows Terminal, just run the appropriate 32-bit or 64-bit Windows binary.

Linux

You first need to make the binary executable.

```
chmod +x ./hayabusa
```

Then run it from the Hayabusa root directory:

```
./hayabusa
```

macOS


From Terminal or iTerm2, you first need to make the binary executable.

```
chmod +x ./hayabusa
```

Then, try to run it from the Hayabusa root directory:

```
./hayabusa
```

On the latest version of macOS, you may receive the following security error when you try to run it:




Click "Cancel" and then from System Preferences, open "Security & Privacy" and from the General tab, click "Allow Anyway".

The screenshot shows the 'Security & Privacy' settings in macOS. The 'General' tab is selected. A message at the top states 'A login password has been set for this user' with a 'Change Password...' button. Below it, under 'Require password', there are two options: 'immediately' (selected) and 'after sleep or screen saver begins'. There is also a checkbox for 'Show a message when the screen is locked' which is unchecked. Under 'Allow apps downloaded from:', the 'App Store and identified developers' option is selected. A note says "'hayabusa-1.1.0-mac-intel' was blocked from use because it is not from an identified developer." An 'Allow Anyway' button is available. At the bottom, there is a lock icon with the text 'Click the lock to make changes.', an 'Advanced...' button, and a help icon.

After that, try to run it again.

A terminal window is shown with the command `./hayabusa` entered. The window has a light gray background and a dark gray border.

The following warning will pop up, so please click "Open".



You should now be able to run hayabusa.

Command List

Analysis Commands:

- `logon-summary`: Print a summary of logon events.
- `metrics`: Print metrics of the number and percentage of events based on Event ID.
- `pivot-keywords-list`: Print a list of suspicious keywords to pivot on.
- `search`: Search all events by keyword(s) or regular expressions

DFIR Timeline Commands:

- `csv-timeline`: Save the timeline in CSV format.
- `json-timeline`: Save the timeline in JSON/JSONL format.
- `level-tuning`: Custom tune the alerts' `level`.
- `list-profiles`: List the available output profiles.
- `set-default-profile`: Change the default profile.
- `update-rules`: Sync the rules to the latest rules in the [hayabusa-rules](#) GitHub repository.

General Commands:

- **help**: Print this message or the help of the given subcommand(s)
- **list-contributors**: Print the list of contributors

Command Usage

Analysis Commands

logon-summary command

You can use the **logon-summary** command to output logon information summary (logon usernames and successful and failed logon count). You can display the logon information for one evtx file with **-f** or multiple evtx files with the **-d** option.

```
Usage: logon-summary <INPUT> [OPTIONS]
```

Input:

-d, --directory <DIR>	Directory of multiple .evtx files
-f, --file <FILE>	File path to one .evtx file
-l, --live-analysis folder	Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs
-J, --JSON-input	Scan JSON formatted logs instead of .evtx (.json or .jsonl)

Output:

-o, --output <FILE>	Save the Logon summary in CSV format (ex: logon-summary.csv)
----------------------------------	--

Display Settings:

--no-color	Disable color output
-q, --quiet	Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
-v, --verbose	Output verbose information

General Options:

-C, --clobber	Overwrite results files
-Q, --quiet-errors	Quiet errors mode: do not save error logs
-c, --rules-config <DIR>	Specify custom rule config directory (default: ./rules/config)
--target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT>	Specify additional file extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evtx2)
-t, --threads <NUMBER>	Number of threads (default: optimal number for performance)

logon-summary command example

- Print logon summary: **hayabusa.exe logon-summary -f Security.evtx**
- Save logon summary results: **hayabusa.exe logon-summary -d ../logs -o logon-summary.csv**

metrics command

You can use the **metrics** command to print out the total number and percentage of Event IDs separated by Channels.

```
Usage: metrics <INPUT> [OPTIONS]

Input:
  -d, --directory <DIR>  Directory of multiple .evtx files
  -f, --file <FILE>        File path to one .evtx file
  -l, --live-analysis     Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs
  folder
  -J, --JSON-input        Scan JSON formatted logs instead of .evtx (.json
  or .jsonl)

Output:
  -o, --output <FILE>    Save the Metrics in CSV format (ex: metrics.csv)

Display Settings:
  --no-color   Disable color output
  -q, --quiet    Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
  -v, --verbose   Output verbose information

General Options:
  -C, --clobber           Overwrite results files
  -Q, --quiet-errors      Quiet errors mode: do not save
  error logs
  -c, --rules-config <DIR>  Specify custom rule config
  directory (default: ./rules/config)
  --target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT>  Specify additional file
  extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evtx2)
  -t, --threads <NUMBER>    Number of threads (default:
  optimal number for performance)
```

metrics command examples

- Print Event ID metrics from a single file: `hayabusa.exe metrics -f Security.evtx`
- Print Event ID metrics from a directory: `hayabusa.exe metrics -d ../logs`
- Save results to a CSV file: `hayabusa.exe metrics -f metrics.csv`

metrics command config file

The channel, event IDs and titles of the events are defined in `rules/config/channel_eid_info.txt`.

Example:

```
Channel,EventID,EventTitle
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational,1,Process Creation.
```

```
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational,2,File Creation Timestamp Changed.  
(Possible Timestamping)  
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational,3,Network Connection.  
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational,4,Sysmon Service State Changed.
```

pivot-keywords-list command

You can use the `pivot-keywords-list` command to create a list of unique pivot keywords to quickly identify abnormal users, hostnames, processes, etc... as well as correlate events.

Important: by default, hayabusa will return results from all events (informational and higher) so we highly recommend combining the `pivot-keywords-list` command with the `-m`, `--min-level` option. For example, start off with only creating keywords from `critical` alerts with `-m critical` and then continue with `-m high`, `-m medium`, etc... There will most likely be common keywords in your results that will match on many normal events, so after manually checking the results and creating a list of unique keywords in a single file, you can then create a narrowed down timeline of suspicious activity with a command like `grep -f keywords.txt timeline.csv`.

```
Usage: pivot-keywords-list <INPUT> [OPTIONS]
```

Input:

```
-d, --directory <DIR> Directory of multiple .evtx files  
-f, --file <FILE> File path to one .evtx file  
-l, --live-analysis Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs  
folder  
-J, --JSON-input Scan JSON formatted logs instead of .evtx (.json  
or .jsonl)
```

Output:

```
-o, --output <FILENAMES-BASE> Save pivot words to separate files (ex:  
PivotKeywords)
```

Display Settings:

```
--no-color Disable color output  
-q, --quiet Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner  
-v, --verbose Output verbose information
```

Filtering:

```
-E, --EID-filter Scan only common EIDs for faster speed  
(./rules/config/target_event_IDs.txt)  
-D, --enable-deprecated-rules Enable rules with status of deprecated  
-n, --enable-noisy-rules Enable rules set to noisy  
(./rules/config/noisy_rules.txt)  
-u, --enable-unsupported-rules Enable rules with status of unsupported  
-e, --exact-level <LEVEL> Scan for only specific levels  
(informational, low, medium, high, critical)  
--exclude-status <STATUS> Ignore rules according to status (ex:  
experimental) (ex: stable,test)  
-m, --min-level <LEVEL> Minimum level for rules (default:  
informational)
```

```
--timeline-end <DATE>           End time of the event logs to load (ex:  

"2022-02-22 23:59:59 +09:00")  

--timeline-start <DATE>         Start time of the event logs to load  

(ex: "2020-02-22 00:00:00 +09:00")  

General Options:  

-Q, --quiet-errors             Quiet errors mode: do not save  

error logs  

-c, --rules-config <DIR>       Specify custom rule config  

directory (default: ./rules/config)  

--target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT> Specify additional file  

extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evttx2)  

-t, --threads <NUMBER>         Number of threads (default:  

optimal number for performance)
```

pivot-keywords-list command example

- Create a list of pivot keywords from critical alerts and save the results. (Results will be saved to **keywords-Ip Addresses.txt**, **keywords-Users.txt**, etc...):

```
hayabusa.exe pivot-keywords-list -d ..\logs -m critical -o keywords
```

pivot-keywords-list config file

You can customize what keywords you want to search for by editing **./rules/config/pivot_keywords.txt**. [This page](#) is the default setting.

The format is **KeywordName.FieldName**. For example, when creating the list of **Users**, hayabusa will list up all the values in the **SubjectUserName**, **TargetUserName** and **User** fields.

search command

The **search** command will let you keyword search on all events. (Not just Hayabusa detection results.) This is useful to determine if there is any evidence in events that are not detected by Hayabusa.

```
Usage: hayabusa.exe search <INPUT> <--keywords "<KEYWORDS>" OR --regex "<REGEX>" [OPTIONS]
```

Display Settings:

--no-color	Disable color output
-q, --quiet	Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
-v, --verbose	Output verbose information

Input:

-d, --directory <DIR>	Directory of multiple .evtx files
-f, --file <FILE>	File path to one .evtx file
-l, --live-analysis	Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs folder

Filtering:

-F, --filter <FILTER>	Filter by specific field(s)
-i, --ignore-case	Ignore case
-k, --keywords <KEYWORDS>	Search by keyword(s)
-r, --regex <REGEX>	Search by regular expression

Output:

-M, --multiline	Output event field information in multiple rows
-o, --output <FILE>	Save the search results in CSV format (ex: search.csv)

General Options:

-C, --clobber	Overwrite results files
-Q, --quiet-errors	Quiet errors mode: do not save error logs
-c, --rules-config <DIR>	Specify custom rule config directory (default: ./rules/config)
--target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT>	Specify additional file extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evttx2)
-t, --threads <NUMBER>	Number of threads (default: optimal number for performance)

search command examples

- Search the `../hayabusa-sample-evtx` directory for the keyword `mimikatz`:

```
hayabusa.exe search -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -k "mimikatz"
```

Note: The keyword will match if `mimikatz` is found anywhere in the data. It is not an exact match.

- Search the `../hayabusa-sample-evtx` directory for the keywords `mimikatz` or `kali`:

```
hayabusa.exe search -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -k "mimikatz" -k "kali"
```

- Search the `../hayabusa-sample-evtx` directory for the keyword `mimikatz` and ignore case:

```
hayabusa.exe search -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -k "mimikatz" -i
```

- Search the `../hayabusa-sample-evtx` directory for IP addresses using regular expressions:

```
hayabusa.exe search -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -r "(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}"
```

- Search the `../hayabusa-sample-evtx` directory and show all events where the `WorkstationName` field is `kali`:

```
hayabusa.exe search -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx -r ".*" -F
WorkstationName:"kali"
```

Note: `.*` is the regular expression to match on every event.

search command config files

`./rules/config/channel_abbreviations.txt`: Mappings of channel names and their abbreviations.

DFIR Timeline Commands

csv-timeline command

The `csv-timeline` command will create a forensics timeline of events in CSV format.

Usage: `csv-timeline <INPUT> [OPTIONS]`

Input:

<code>-d, --directory <DIR></code>	Directory of multiple .evtx files
<code>-f, --file <FILE></code>	File path to one .evtx file
<code>-l, --live-analysis folder</code>	Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs
<code>-J, --JSON-input</code>	Scan JSON formatted logs instead of .evtx (.json or .jsonl)

Output:

<code>-G, --GeoIP <MAXMIND-DB-DIR></code>	Add GeoIP (ASN, city, country) info to IP addresses
<code>-H, --HTML-report <FILE> report (ex: results.html)</code>	Save Results Summary details to an HTML
<code>-M, --multiline rows</code>	Output event field information in multiple
<code>-o, --output <FILE> results.csv</code>	Save the timeline in CSV format (ex:
<code>-p, --profile <PROFILE></code>	Specify output profile

Display Settings:

<code>--no-color</code>	Disable color output
<code>-N, --no-summary</code>	Do not display Results Summary (slightly faster speed)
<code>-q, --quiet</code>	Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
<code>-v, --verbose</code>	Output verbose information
<code>-T, --visualize-timeline</code>	Output event frequency timeline (terminal needs to support unicode)

Filtering:

<code>-E, --EID-filter</code>	Scan only common EIDs for faster speed
-------------------------------	--

```
(./rules/config/target_event_IDs.txt)
  -D, --enable-deprecated-rules  Enable rules with status of deprecated
  -n, --enable-noisy-rules       Enable rules set to noisy
(./rules/config/noisy_rules.txt)
  -u, --enable-unsupported-rules  Enable rules with status of unsupported
  -e, --exact-level <LEVEL>      Scan for only specific levels
(informational, low, medium, high, critical)
  --exclude-status <STATUS>    Ignore rules according to status (ex:
experimental) (ex: stable,test)
  -m, --min-level <LEVEL>      Minimum level for rules (default:
informational)
  --timeline-end <DATE>        End time of the event logs to load (ex:
"2022-02-22 23:59:59 +09:00")
  --timeline-start <DATE>      Start time of the event logs to load
(ex: "2020-02-22 00:00:00 +09:00")
```

General Options:

-C, --clobber	Overwrite results files
-Q, --quiet-errors	Quiet errors mode: do not save
error logs	
-r, --rules <DIR/FILE>	Specify a custom rule directory
or file (default: ./rules)	
-c, --rules-config <DIR>	Specify custom rule config
directory (default: ./rules/config)	
--target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT>	Specify additional file extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evttx2)
-t, --threads <NUMBER>	Number of threads (default: optimal number for performance)

Time Format:

--European-time	Output timestamp in European time format (ex: 22-02-2022 22:00:00.123 +02:00)
--ISO-8601	Output timestamp in ISO-8601 format (ex: 2022-02-22T10:10:10.1234567Z) (Always UTC)
--RFC-2822	Output timestamp in RFC 2822 format (ex: Fri, 22 Feb 2022 22:00:00 -0600)
--RFC-3339	Output timestamp in RFC 3339 format (ex: 2022-02-22 22:00:00.123456-06:00)
--US-military-time	Output timestamp in US military time format (ex: 02-22-2022 22:00:00.123 -06:00)
--US-time	Output timestamp in US time format (ex: 02-22-2022 10:00:00.123 PM -06:00)
-U, --UTC	Output time in UTC format (default: local time)

csv-timeline command examples

- Run hayabusa against one Windows event log file with default **standard** profile:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -f eventlog.evtx
```

- Run hayabusa against the sample-evtx directory with multiple Windows event log files with the verbose profile:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -p verbose
```

- Export to a single CSV file for further analysis with LibreOffice, Timeline Explorer, Elastic Stack, etc... and include all field information (Warning: your file output size will become much larger with the **super-verbose** profile!):

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -o results.csv -p super-verbose
```

- Enable the EID (Event ID) filter:

Note: Enabling the EID filter will speed up the analysis by about 10-15% in our tests but there is a possibility of missing alerts.

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -E -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -o results.csv
```

- Only run hayabusa rules (the default is to run all the rules in **-r .\rules**):

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa -o results.csv
```

- Only run hayabusa rules for logs that are enabled by default on Windows:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\builtin -o results.csv
```

- Only run hayabusa rules for sysmon logs:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\sysmon -o results.csv
```

- Only run sigma rules:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\sigma -o results.csv
```

- Enable deprecated rules (those with `status` marked as `deprecated`) and noisy rules (those whose rule ID is listed in `.\rules\config\noisy_rules.txt`):

Note: Recently, deprecated rules are now located in a separate directory in the sigma repository so are not included by default anymore in Hayabusa. Therefore, you probably have no need to enable deprecated rules.

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx --enable-noisy-rules --enable-deprecated-rules -o results.csv
```

- Only run rules to analyze logons and output in the UTC timezone:

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -r .\rules\hayabusa\builtin\Security\LogonLogoff\Logon -U -o results.csv
```

- Run on a live Windows machine (requires Administrator privileges) and only detect alerts (potentially malicious behavior):

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -l -m low
```

- Print verbose information (useful for determining which files take long to process, parsing errors, etc...):

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d .\hayabusa-sample-evtx -v
```

- Verbose output example:

```
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/sample1.evtx"
1 / 509 [>-----]
0.20 % 1s
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/sample2.evtx"
2 / 509 [=-----]
0.39 % 1s
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/sample3.evtx"
3 / 509 [==>-----]
0.59 % 1s
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/sample4.evtx"
4 / 509 [====>-----]
0.79 % 1s
Checking target evtx FilePath: "./hayabusa-sample-evtx/sample5.evtx"
5 / 509 [=====>-----]
0.98 % 1s
```

- Output to a CSV format compatible to import into [Timesketch](#):

```
hayabusa.exe csv-timeline -d ../hayabusa-sample-evtx --RFC-3339 -o timesketch-import.csv -p timesketch -U
```

- Quiet error mode: By default, hayabusa will save error messages to error log files. If you do not want to save error messages, please add [-Q](#).

Advanced - GeolIP Log Enrichment

You can add GeolIP (ASN organization, city and country) information to SrcIP (source IP) fields and TgtIP (target IP) fields with the free GeoLite2 geolocation data.

Steps:

1. First sign up for a MaxMind account [here](#).
 2. Download the three [.mmdb](#) files from the [download page](#) and save them to a directory. The filenames should be called [GeoLite2-ASN.mmdb](#), [GeoLite2-City.mmdb](#) and [GeoLite2-Country.mmdb](#).
 3. When running the [csv-timeline](#) or [json-timeline](#) commands, add the [-G](#) option followed by the directory with the MaxMind databases.
- When [csv-timeline](#) is used, the following 6 columns will be additionally outputted: [SrcASN](#), [SrcCity](#), [SrcCountry](#), [TgtASN](#), [TgtCity](#), [TgtCountry](#).
 - When [json-timeline](#) is used, the same [SrcASN](#), [SrcCity](#), [SrcCountry](#), [TgtASN](#), [TgtCity](#), [TgtCountry](#) fields will be added to the [Details](#) object, but only if they contain information.
 - When [SrcIP](#) or [TgtIP](#) is localhost ([127.0.0.1](#), [::1](#), etc...), [SrcASN](#) or [TgtASN](#) will be outputted as [Local](#).
 - When [SrcIP](#) or [TgtIP](#) is a private IP address ([10.0.0.0/8](#), [fe80::/10](#), etc...), [SrcASN](#) or [TgtASN](#) will be outputted as [Private](#).

GeolIP config file

The field names that contain source and target IP addresses that get looked up in the GeolIP databases are defined in [rules/config/geoip_field_mapping.yaml](#). You can add to this list if necessary. There is also a filter section in this file that determines what events to extract IP address information from.

Automatic updates of GeolIP databases

MaxMind GeolIP databases are updated every 2 weeks. You can install the MaxMind [geoipupdate](#) tool [here](#) in order to automatically update these databases.

Steps on macOS:

1. [brew install geoipupdate](#)
2. Edit [/usr/local/etc/GeoIP.conf](#): Put in your [AccountID](#) and [LicenseKey](#) you create after logging into the MaxMind website. Make sure the [EditionIDs](#) line says [EditionIDs GeoLite2-](#)

ASN GeoLite2-City GeoLite2-Country.

3. Run `geoipupdate`.
4. Add `-G /usr/local/var/GeoIP` when you want to add GeolP information.

Steps on Windows:

1. Download the latest Windows binary (Ex: `geoipupdate_4.10.0_windows_amd64.zip`) from the [Releases](#) page.
2. Edit `\ProgramData\MaxMind\GeoIPUpdate\GeoIP.conf`: Put in your `AccountID` and `LicenseKey` you create after logging into the MaxMind website. Make sure the `EditionIDs` line says `EditionIDs GeoLite2-ASN GeoLite2-City GeoLite2-Country`.
3. Run the `geoipupdate` executable.

csv-timeline command config files

`./rules/config/channel_abbreviations.txt`: Mappings of channel names and their abbreviations.

`./rules/config/default_details.txt`: The configuration file for what default field information (`%Details%` field) should be outputted if no `details:` line is specified in a rule. This is based on provider name and event IDs.

`./rules/config/eventkey_alias.txt`: This file has the mappings of short name aliases for fields and their original longer field names.

Example:

```
InstanceId,Event.UserData.UMDFHostDeviceArrivalBegin.InstanceId  
IntegrityLevel,Event.EventData.IntegrityLevel  
IpAddress,Event.EventData.IpAddress
```

If a field is not defined here, Hayabusa will automatically check under `Event.EventData` for the field.

`./rules/config/exclude_rules.txt`: This file has a list of rule IDs that will be excluded from use. Usually this is because one rule has replaced another or the rule cannot be used in the first place. Like firewalls and IDSEs, any signature-based tool will require some tuning to fit your environment so you may need to permanently or temporarily exclude certain rules. You can add a rule ID (Example: `4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fcfa6`) to `./rules/config/exclude_rules.txt` in order to ignore any rule that you do not need or cannot be used.

`./rules/config/noisy_rules.txt`: This file a list of rule IDs that are disabled by default but can be enabled by enabling noisy rules with the `-n`, `--enable-noisy-rules` option. These rules are usually noisy by nature or due to false positives.

`./rules/config/target_event_IDs.txt`: Only the event IDs specified in this file will be scanned if the EID filter is enabled. By default, Hayabusa will scan all events, but if you want to improve performance, please use the `-E`, `--EID-filter` option. This usually results in a 10~25% speed improvement.

json-timeline command

The `json-timeline` command will create a forensics timeline of events in JSON or JSONL format. Outputting to JSONL will be faster and smaller file size than JSON so is good if you are going to just import the results into another tool like Elastic Stack. JSON is better if you are going to manually analyze the results with a text editor. CSV output is good for importing smaller timelines (usually less than 2GB) into tools like LibreOffice or Timeline Explorer. JSON is best for more detailed analysis of data (including large results files) with tools like `jq` as the `Details` fields are separated for easier analysis. (In the CSV output, all of the event log fields are in one big `Details` column making sorting of data, etc... more difficult.)

```
Usage: json-timeline <INPUT> [OPTIONS]
```

Input:

<code>-d, --directory <DIR></code>	Directory of multiple .evtx files
<code>-f, --file <FILE></code>	File path to one .evtx file
<code>-l, --live-analysis folder</code>	Analyze the local C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs
<code>-J, --JSON-input</code>	Scan JSON formatted logs instead of .evtx (.json or .jsonl)

Output:

<code>-G, --GeoIP <MAXMIND-DB-DIR></code>	Add GeoIP (ASN, city, country) info to IP addresses
<code>-H, --HTML-report <FILE></code>	Save Results Summary details to an HTML report (ex: results.html)
<code>-L, --JSONL-output</code>	Save the timeline in JSONL format (ex: -L
<code>-o results.jsonl</code>	
<code>-o, --output <FILE></code>	Save the timeline in JSON format (ex: results.json)
<code>-p, --profile <PROFILE></code>	Specify output profile

Display Settings:

<code>--no-color</code>	Disable color output
<code>-N, --no-summary</code>	Do not display Results Summary (slightly faster speed)
<code>-q, --quiet</code>	Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
<code>-v, --verbose</code>	Output verbose information
<code>-T, --visualize-timeline</code>	Output event frequency timeline (terminal needs to support unicode)

Filtering:

<code>-E, --EID-filter</code>	Scan only common EIDs for faster speed (./rules/config/target_event_IDs.txt)
<code>-D, --enable-deprecated-rules</code>	Enable rules with status of deprecated
<code>-n, --enable-noisy-rules</code>	Enable rules set to noisy (./rules/config/noisy_rules.txt)
<code>-u, --enable-unsupported-rules</code>	Enable rules with status of unsupported
<code>-e, --exact-level <LEVEL></code>	Scan for only specific levels (informational, low, medium, high, critical)
<code>--exclude-status <STATUS></code>	Ignore rules according to status (ex: experimental) (ex: stable,test)
<code>-m, --min-level <LEVEL></code>	Minimum level for rules (default: informational)
<code>--timeline-end <DATE></code>	End time of the event logs to load (ex:

```
"2022-02-22 23:59:59 +09:00")
    --timeline-start <DATE>      Start time of the event logs to load
(ex: "2020-02-22 00:00:00 +09:00")

General Options:
  -C, --clobber                      Overwrite results files
  -Q, --quiet-errors                  Quiet errors mode: do not save
error logs
  -r, --rules <DIR/FILE>            Specify a custom rule directory
or file (default: ./rules)
  -c, --rules-config <DIR>          Specify custom rule config
directory (default: ./rules/config)
  --target-file-ext <EVTX_FILE_EXT> Specify additional file
extensions (ex: evtx_data) (ex: evtx1,evttx2)
  -t, --threads <NUMBER>           Number of threads (default:
optimal number for performance)

Time Format:
  --European-time        Output timestamp in European time format (ex:
22-02-2022 22:00:00.123 +02:00)
  --ISO-8601             Output timestamp in ISO-8601 format (ex: 2022-
02-22T10:10:10.1234567Z) (Always UTC)
  --RFC-2822              Output timestamp in RFC 2822 format (ex: Fri, 22
Feb 2022 22:00:00 -0600)
  --RFC-3339              Output timestamp in RFC 3339 format (ex: 2022-
02-22 22:00:00.123456-06:00)
  --US-military-time      Output timestamp in US military time format (ex:
02-22-2022 22:00:00.123 -06:00)
  --US-time                Output timestamp in US time format (ex: 02-22-
2022 10:00:00.123 PM -06:00)
  -U, --UTC                 Output time in UTC format (default: local time)
```

json-timeline command examples and config files

The options and config files for `json-timeline` are the same as `csv-timeline` but one extra option `-L`, `--JSONL-output` for outputting to JSONL format.

level-tuning command

The `level-tuning` command will let you tune the alert levels for rules, either raising or decreasing the risk level according to your environment.

```
Usage: level-tuning [OPTIONS]

Display Settings:
  --no-color  Disable color output
  -q, --quiet   Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner

General Options:
  -f, --file <FILE>  Tune alert levels (default:
./rules/config/level_tuning.txt)
```

level-tuning command examples

- Normal usage: `hayabusa.exe level-tuning`
- Tune rule alert levels based on your custom config file: `hayabusa.exe level-tuning -f my_level_tuning.txt`

level-tuning config file

Hayabusa and Sigma rule authors will determine the risk level of the alert when writing their rules. However, the actual risk level may differ according to the environment. You can tune the risk level of the rules by adding them to `./rules/config/level_tuning.txt` and executing `hayabusa.exe level-tuning` which will update the `level` line in the rule file. Please note that the rule file will be updated directly.

Warning: Anytime you run `update-rules`, the original alert level will overwrite any settings you have changed, so you will need to run the `level-tuning` command after every time you run `update-rules` if you want to change the levels.

`./rules/config/level_tuning.txt` sample line:

```
id,new_level
00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000,informational # sample level tuning
line
```

In this case, the risk level of the rule with an `id` of `00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000` in the rules directory will have its `level` rewritten to `informational`. The possible levels to set are `critical`, `high`, `medium`, `low` and `informational`.

list-profiles command

```
Usage: list-profiles [OPTIONS]

Display Settings:
  --no-color  Disable color output
  -q, --quiet    Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
```

set-default-profile command

```
Usage: set-default-profile [OPTIONS]

Display Settings:
  --no-color  Disable color output
  -q, --quiet    Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
```

```
General Options:  
  -p, --profile <PROFILE>  Specify output profile
```

update-rules command

The **update-rules** command will sync the **rules** folder with the [Hayabusa rules github repository](#), updating the rules and config files.

```
Usage: update-rules [OPTIONS]
```

Display Settings:

```
  --no-color  Disable color output  
  -q, --quiet    Quiet mode: do not display the launch banner
```

General Options:

```
  -r, --rules <DIR/FILE>  Specify a custom rule directory or file  
(default: ./rules)
```

update-rules command example

You will normally just execute this: **hayabusa.exe update-rules**

Timeline Output

Output Profiles

Hayabusa has 5 pre-defined output profiles to use in **config/profiles.yaml**:

1. **minimal**
2. **standard** (default)
3. **verbose**
4. **all-field-info**
5. **all-field-info-verbose**
6. **super-verbose**
7. **timesketch-minimal**
8. **timesketch-verbose**

You can easily customize or add your own profiles by editing this file. You can also easily change the default profile with **set-default-profile --profile <profile>**. Use the **list-profiles** command to show the available profiles and their field information.

1. **minimal** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %RecordID%, %RuleTitle%,  
%Details%
```

2. **standard** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %RecordID%, %RuleTitle%,
%Details%, %ExtraFieldInfo%
```

3. **verbose** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %MitreTactics%,
%MitreTags%, %OtherTags%, %RecordID%, %RuleTitle%, %Details%, %ExtraFieldInfo%,
%RuleFile%, %EvtxFile%
```

4. **all-field-info** profile output

Instead of outputting the minimal **details** information, all field information in the **EventData** and **UserData** sections will be outputted along with their original field names.

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %RecordID%, %RuleTitle%,
%AllFieldInfo%, %RuleFile%, %EvtxFile%
```

5. **all-field-info-verbose** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %MitreTactics%,
%MitreTags%, %OtherTags%, %RecordID%, %RuleTitle%, %AllFieldInfo%, %RuleFile%,
%EvtxFile%
```

6. **super-verbose** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%, %RuleTitle%,
%RuleAuthor%, %RuleModifiedDate%, %Status%, %RecordID%, %Details%,
%ExtraFieldInfo%, %MitreTactics%, %MitreTags%, %OtherTags%, %Provider%,
%RuleCreationDate%, %RuleFile%, %EvtxFile%
```

7. **timesketch-minimal** profile output

Output to a format compatible with importing into [Timesketch](#).

```
%Timestamp%, hayabusa, %RuleTitle%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%,
%MitreTactics%, %MitreTags%, %OtherTags%, %RecordID%, %Details%, %RuleFile%,
%EvtxFile%
```

8. **timesketch-verbose** profile output

```
%Timestamp%, hayabusa, %RuleTitle%, %Computer%, %Channel%, %EventID%, %Level%,
%MitreTactics%, %MitreTags%, %OtherTags%, %RecordID%, %Details%,
%ExtraFieldInfo%, %RuleFile%, %EvtxFile%
```

Profile Comparison

The following benchmarks were conducted on a 2018 Lenovo P51 (Xeon 4 Core CPU / 64GB RAM) with 3GB of evtx data and 3891 rules enabled. (2023/06/01)

Profile	Processing Time	Output Filesize	Filesize Increase
---------	-----------------	-----------------	-------------------

Profile	Processing Time	Output Filesize	Filesize Increase
minimal	8 minutes 50 seconds	770 MB	-30%
standard (default)	9 minutes 00 seconds	1.1 GB	None
verbose	9 minutes 10 seconds	1.3 GB	+20%
all-field-info	9 minutes 3 seconds	1.2 GB	+10%
all-field-info-verbose	9 minutes 10 seconds	1.3 GB	+20%
super-verbose	9 minutes 12 seconds	1.5 GB	+35%

Profile Field Aliases

Alias name	Hayabusa output information
%Timestamp%	Default is <code>YYYY-MM-DD HH:mm:ss.sss +hh:mm</code> format. <code><Event><System><TimeCreated SystemTime></code> field in the event log. The default timezone will be the local timezone but you can change the timezone to UTC with the <code>--UTC</code> option.
%Computer%	The <code><Event><System><Computer></code> field.
%Channel%	The name of log. <code><Event><System><Channel></code> field.
%EventID%	The <code><Event><System><EventID></code> field.
%Level%	The <code>level</code> field in the YML detection rule. (<code>informational, low, medium, high, critical</code>)
%MitreTactics%	MITRE ATT&CK <code>tactics</code> (Ex: Initial Access, Lateral Movement, etc...).
%MitreTags%	MITRE ATT&CK Group ID, Technique ID and Software ID.
%OtherTags%	Any keyword in the <code>tags</code> field in a YML detection rule which is not included in <code>MitreTactics</code> or <code>MitreTags</code> .
%RecordID%	The Event Record ID from <code><Event><System><EventRecordID></code> field.
%RuleTitle%	The <code>title</code> field in the YML detection rule.

Alias name	Hayabusa output information
%Details%	The <code>details</code> field in the YML detection rule, however, only hayabusa rules have this field. This field gives extra information about the alert or event and can extract useful data from the fields in event logs. For example, usernames, command line information, process information, etc... When a placeholder points to a field that does not exist or there is an incorrect alias mapping, it will be outputted as <code>n/a</code> (not available). If the <code>details</code> field is not specified (i.e. sigma rules), default <code>details</code> messages to extract fields defined in <code>./rules/config/default_details.txt</code> will be outputted. You can add more default <code>details</code> messages by adding the <code>Provider Name</code> , <code>EventID</code> and <code>details</code> message you want to output in <code>default_details.txt</code> . When no <code>details</code> field is defined in a rule nor in <code>default_details.txt</code> , all fields will be outputted to the <code>details</code> column.
%ExtraFieldInfo%	Print the field information that was not outputted in %Details%.
%AllFieldInfo%	All field information.
%RuleFile%	The filename of the detection rule that generated the alert or event.
%EvtxFile%	The evtx filename that caused the alert or event.
%RuleAuthor%	The <code>author</code> field in the YML detection rule.
%RuleCreationDate%	The <code>date</code> field in the YML detection rule.
%RuleModifiedDate%	The <code>modified</code> field in the YML detection rule.
%Status%	The <code>status</code> field in the YML detection rule.
%RuleID%	The <code>id</code> field in the YML detection rule.
%Provider%	The <code>Name</code> attribute in <code><Event><System><Provider></code> field.
%RenderedMessage%	The <code><Event><RenderingInfo><Message></code> field in WEC forwarded logs.

You can use these aliases in your output profiles, as well as define other `event key` aliases to output other fields.

Level Abbreviations

In order to save space, we use the following abbreviations when displaying the alert `level`.

- `crit`: `critical`
- `high`: `high`
- `med` : `medium`
- `low` : `low`
- `info`: `informational`

MITRE ATT&CK Tactics Abbreviations

In order to save space, we use the following abbreviations when displaying MITRE ATT&CK tactic tags. You can freely edit these abbreviations in the `./config/mitre_tactics.txt` configuration file.

- `Recon` : Reconnaissance
- `ResDev` : Resource Development
- `InitAccess` : Initial Access
- `Exec` : Execution
- `Persis` : Persistence
- `PrivEsc` : Privilege Escalation
- `Evas` : Defense Evasion
- `CredAccess` : Credential Access
- `Disc` : Discovery
- `LatMov` : Lateral Movement
- `Collect` : Collection
- `C2` : Command and Control
- `Exfil` : Exfiltration
- `Impact` : Impact

Channel Abbreviations

In order to save space, we use the following abbreviations when displaying Channel. You can freely edit these abbreviations in the `./rules/config/channel_abbreviations.txt` configuration file.

- `App` : Application
- `AppLocker` : Microsoft-Windows-AppLocker/*
- `BitsCli` : Microsoft-Windows-Bits-Client/Operational
- `CodeInteg` : Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational
- `Defender` : Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational
- `DHCP-Svr` : Microsoft-Windows-DHCP-Server/Operational
- `DNS-Svr` : DNS Server
- `DvrFmwk` : Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode/Operational
- `Exchange` : MSExchange Management
- `Firewall` : Microsoft-Windows-Windows Firewall With Advanced Security/Firewall
- `KeyMgtSvc` : Key Management Service
- `LDAP-Cli` : Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client/Debug
- `NTLM` : Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational
- `OpenSSH` : OpenSSH/Operational
- `PrintAdm` : Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Admin
- `PrintOp` : Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational
- `PwSh` : Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
- `PwShClassic` : Windows PowerShell
- `RDP-Client` : Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RDPCClient/Operational
- `Sec` : Security
- `SecMitig` : Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations/*
- `SmbCliSec` : Microsoft-Windows-SmbClient/Security
- `SvcBusCli` : Microsoft-ServiceBus-Client
- `Sys` : System

- **Sysmon** : Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
- **TaskSch** : Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational
- **WinRM** : Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational
- **WMI** : Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational

Other Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in rules in order to make the output as concise as possible:

- **Acct** -> Account
- **Addr** -> Address
- **Auth** -> Authentication
- **Cli** -> Client
- **Chan** -> Channel
- **Cmd** -> Command
- **Cnt** -> Count
- **Comp** -> Computer
- **Conn** -> Connection/Connected
- **Creds** -> Credentials
- **Crit** -> Critical
- **Disconn** -> Disconnection/Disconnected
- **Dir** -> Directory
- **Drv** -> Driver
- **Dst** -> Destination
- **EID** -> Event ID
- **Err** -> Error
- **Exec** -> Execution
- **FW** -> Firewall
- **Grp** -> Group
- **Img** -> Image
- **Inj** -> Injection
- **Krb** -> Kerberos
- **LID** -> Logon ID
- **Med** -> Medium
- **Net** -> Network
- **Obj** -> Object
- **Op** -> Operational/Operation
- **Proto** -> Protocol
- **PW** -> Password
- **Reconn** -> Reconnection
- **Req** -> Request
- **Rsp** -> Response
- **Sess** -> Session
- **Sig** -> Signature
- **Susp** -> Suspicious
- **Src** -> Source
- **Svc** -> Service

- **Svr** -> Server
- **Temp** -> Temporary
- **Term** -> Termination/Terminated
- **Tkt** -> Ticket
- **Tgt** -> Target
- **Unkwn** -> Unknown
- **Usr** -> User
- **Perm** -> Permanent
- **Pkg** -> Package
- **Priv** -> Privilege
- **Proc** -> Process
- **PID** -> Process ID
- **PGUID** -> Process GUID (Global Unique ID)
- **Ver** -> Version

Progress Bar

The progress bar will only work with multiple evtx files. It will display in real time the number and percent of evtx files that it has finished analyzing.

Color Output

The alerts will be outputted in color based on the alert **level**. You can change the default colors in the config file at **./config/level_color.txt** in the format of **level, (RGB 6-digit ColorHex)**. If you want to disable color output, you can use **--no-color** option.

Results Summary

Total events, the number of events with hits, data reduction metrics, total and unique detections, dates with the most detections, top computers with detections and top alerts are displayed after every scan.

Detection Frequency Timeline

If you add the **-T, --visualize-timeline** option, the Event Frequency Timeline feature displays a sparkline frequency timeline of detected events. Note: There needs to be more than 5 events. Also, the characters will not render correctly on the default Command Prompt or PowerShell Prompt, so please use a terminal like Windows Terminal, iTerm2, etc...

Hayabusa Rules

Hayabusa detection rules are written in a sigma-like YML format and are located in the **rules** folder. The rules are hosted at <https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules> so please send any issues and pull requests for rules there instead of the main Hayabusa repository.

Please read [the hayabusa-rules repository README](#) to understand about the rule format and how to create rules.

All of the rules from the hayabusa-rules repository should be placed in the [rules](#) folder. [informational](#) level rules are considered [events](#), while anything with a [level](#) of [low](#) and higher are considered [alerts](#).

The hayabusa rule directory structure is separated into 2 directories:

- [builtin](#): logs that can be generated by Windows built-in functionality.
- [sysmon](#): logs that are generated by [sysmon](#).

Rules are further separated into directories by log type (Example: Security, System, etc...) and are named in the following format:

Please check out the current rules to use as a template in creating new ones or for checking the detection logic.

Sigma v.s. Hayabusa (Built-in Sigma Compatible) Rules

Hayabusa supports Sigma rules natively with a single exception of handling the [logsource](#) fields internally. In order to reduce false positives, , Sigma rules should be run through our convertor explained [here](#). This will add the proper [Channel](#) and [EventID](#), and perform field mapping for certain categories like [process_creation](#).

Almost all Hayabusa rules are compatible with the Sigma format so you can use them just like Sigma rules to convert to other SIEM formats. Hayabusa rules are designed solely for Windows event log analysis and have the following benefits:

1. An extra [details](#) field to display additional information taken from only the useful fields in the log.
2. They are all tested against sample logs and are known to work.
3. Extra aggregators not found in sigma, such as [|equalsfield](#) and [|endswithfield](#).

To our knowledge, hayabusa provides the greatest native support for sigma rules out of any open source Windows event log analysis tool.

Other Windows Event Log Analyzers and Related Resources

- [AllthingsTimesketch](#) - A NodeRED workflow that imports Plaso and Hayabusa results into Timesketch.
- [APT-Hunter](#) - Attack detection tool written in Python.
- [Awesome Event IDs](#) - Collection of Event ID resources useful for Digital Forensics and Incident Response
- [Chainsaw](#) - Another sigma-based attack detection tool written in Rust.
- [DeepBlueCLI](#) - Attack detection tool written in Powershell by [Eric Conrad](#).
- [Epagneul](#) - Graph visualization for Windows event logs.
- [EventList](#) - Map security baseline event IDs to MITRE ATT&CK by [Miriam Wiesner](#).
- [Mapping MITRE ATT&CK with Window Event Log IDs](#) - by [Michel de CREVOISIER](#)
- [EvtxECmd](#) - Evtx parser by [Eric Zimmerman](#).
- [EVTXtract](#) - Recover EVTX log files from unallocated space and memory images.
- [EvtxToElk](#) - Python tool to send Evtx data to Elastic Stack.
- [EVTX ATTACK Samples](#) - EVTX attack sample event log files by [SBousseaden](#).

- [EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack](#) - EVTX attack sample event log files mapped to ATT&CK by [Michel de CREVOISIER](#)
- [EVTX parser](#) - the Rust evtx library we use written by [@OBenamram](#).
- [Grafiki](#) - Sysmon and PowerShell log visualizer.
- [LogonTracer](#) - A graphical interface to visualize logons to detect lateral movement by [JPCERTCC](#).
- [NSA Windows Event Monitoring Guidance](#) - NSA's guide on what to monitor for.
- [RustyBlue](#) - Rust port of DeepBlueCLI by Yamato Security.
- [Sigma](#) - Community based generic SIEM rules.
- [SOF-ELK](#) - A pre-packaged VM with Elastic Stack to import data for DFIR analysis by [Phil Hagen](#)
- [so-import-evtx](#) - Import evtx files into Security Onion.
- [SysmonTools](#) - Configuration and off-line log visualization tool for Sysmon.
- [Timeline Explorer](#) - The best CSV timeline analyzer by [Eric Zimmerman](#).
- [Windows Event Log Analysis - Analyst Reference](#) - by Forward Defense's Steve Anson.
- [WELA \(Windows Event Log Analyzer\)](#) - The swiff-army knife for Windows event logs by [Yamato Security](#)
- [Zircolite](#) - Sigma-based attack detection tool written in Python.

Windows Logging Recommendations

In order to properly detect malicious activity on Windows machines, you will need to improve the default log settings. We have created a separate project to document what log settings need to be enabled as well as scripts to automatically enable the proper settings at <https://github.com/Yamato-Security/EnableWindowsLogSettings>.

We also recommend the following sites for guidance:

- [JSCU-NL \(Joint SIGHT Cyber Unit Netherlands\) Logging Essentials](#)
- [ACSC \(Australian Cyber Security Centre\) Logging and Forwarding Guide](#)
- [Malware Archaeology Cheat Sheets](#)

Sysmon Related Projects

To create the most forensic evidence and detect with the highest accuracy, you need to install sysmon. We recommend the following sites and config files:

- [TrustedSec Sysmon Community Guide](#)
- [Sysmon Modular](#)
- [SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon Config](#)
- [SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon Config fork by Neo23x0](#)
- [SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon Config fork by ion-storm](#)

Community Documentation

English

- 2023/03/21 [Find Threats in Event Logs with Hayabusa](#) by [Eric Capuano](#)

- 2023/03/14 [Rust Performance Guide for Hayabusa Developers](#) by Fukusuke Takahashi
- 2022/06/19 [Velociraptor Walkthrough and Hayabusa Integration](#) by [Eric Capuano](#)
- 2022/01/24 [Graphing Hayabusa results in neo4j](#) by Matthew Seyer ([@forensic_matt](#))

Japanese

- 2022/03/14 [Rust Performance Guide for Hayabusa Developers](#) by Fukusuke Takahashi
- 2022/01/22 [Visualizing Hayabusa results in Elastic Stack](#) by [@kzzzo2](#)
- 2021/12/31 [Intro to Hayabusa](#) by itiB ([@itiB_S144](#))
- 2021/12/27 [Hayabusa internals](#) by Kazuminn ([@k47_um1n](#))

Contribution

We would love any form of contribution. Pull requests, rule creation and sample evtx logs are the best but feature requests, notifying us of bugs, etc... are also very welcome.

At the least, if you like our tool then please give us a star on GitHub and show your support!

Bug Submission

Please submit any bugs you find [here](#). This project is currently actively maintained and we are happy to fix any bugs reported.

If you find any issues (false positives, bugs, etc...) with Hayabusa rules, please report them to the hayabusa-rules GitHub issues page [here](#).

If you find any issues (false positives, bugs, etc...) with Sigma rules, please report them to the upstream SigmaHQ GitHub issues page [here](#).

License

Hayabusa is released under [GPLv3](#) and all rules are released under the [Detection Rule License \(DRL\) 1.1](#).

Hayabusa uses GeoLite2 data created by MaxMind, available from <https://www.maxmind.com>.

Twitter

You can receive the latest news about Hayabusa, rule updates, other Yamato Security tools, etc... by following us on Twitter at [@SecurityYamato](#).