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THE POSSIBILITY OF A STRUCTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY: THE CASE OF REVERSAL THEORY

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The aim of this paper is to discuss an approach to psychology which those of us who have been adopting have found helpful to think of as "structural phenomenology." Structural phenomenology can be defined as "*the search for pattern and structure in the way in which experience is interpreted.*" It should be emphasized from the outset that although our interest is in structure, it is not in structure in the *content* of experience in the sense of perceptual Gestalts; rather our interest is in structure in the *form* of experience itself, in its nature and quality, and the way in which this nature and quality change over time. To use Husserl's distinction, our concern is more with noesis than it is with noema.

In order to exemplify this approach reference will be made to "the theory of psychological reversals" (originally proposed by Smith and Apter, 1975) which is concerned principally with the experience of *motivation*. It can be defined as a theory of the different ways in which the individual interprets various aspects of his own motivational experience, and the way in which he switches between these different types of interpretation.

This theory was developed initially on the basis of careful self-observation in everyday life, over an extended period, by the authors of



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the theory. 'Self-observation' means, here, observation not only of one's own behavior, but more particularly of one's mental states in relation to that behavior. This constitutes in a certain sense a kind of ethology, since careful and detailed observation is made of the phenomena of interest, as they occur *in their natural settings*. The difference of this kind of ethology from classical zoological ethology is of course that one is observing one's own conscious experience, and its relationship to one's own behavior, rather than observing the overt behavior of some other organism. (Ironically, on etymological grounds the term 'ethology' would have been better applied to the observation of one's own mental states than to the subject matter which it usually depicts, since the word is derived from the Greek *ethos* which means 'spirit').

From an early stage of the development of the theory its authors regularly compared their self-observations in order to identify common patterns in their experience of motivation as it occurred in everyday situations. So more or less from the beginning, the existence of the structures dealt with by the theory had this kind of minimal intersubjective validity. Such consensual validity was soon extended by self-reports from colleagues and others, and by information derived from patients in the course of clinical interviews.

Once the theory had become adequately articulated, it became possible to derive hypotheses for experimental testing. A number of such experiments have now been carried out (Apter, 1976; Murgatroyd et al, 1978; Fontana, 1978; Aris, 1978) and the results so far have been generally consistent with the predictions of the theory. Other experimental studies are currently in progress.

Although this second step of experimental testing is undoubtedly important in order to legitimize the ideas of reversal theory within psychology, and will undoubtedly play a part in the development and elaboration of the theory, there is a sense in which the basic ideas of the theory can be more directly demonstrated. This is because, as has been indicated, the structures with which the theory deals are directly discernible from an examination of experience—provided attention can be suitably drawn to them. This statement may seem paradoxical, and yet the fact is that mental phenomena which are in some sense particularly obvious are often those which are among the easiest to overlook: one may spend several hours watching a film and yet not notice the screen on which the film is projected; one may spend one's waking life looking through a pair of spectacles and yet remain totally unaware of them, except when putting them on or taking them off. Indeed, Husserl's

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method of ‘bracketing pre-suppositions’ can be seen as a way of attempting to break through those factors which prevent us seeing the obvious in order to get at the characteristics of prereflective experience. There is an analogy in much of this with Gestalt psychology. The types of patterns, or Gestalts, which occur in perception are undeniable once they have been pointed out; each of us can recognize them clearly in our own experience. And yet they still needed to be pointed out and described in a systematic way.

Furthermore, one suspects that the impact of the Gestalt school was due more to their delightful and convincing visual demonstrations than it was to the experimental work which they carried out. The latter may have helped to legitimize and extend their ideas, but the persuasiveness of their attack on the presuppositions of stimulus-response psychology came with the former. In a similar vein, if reversal theory is to seem at all convincing we suspect that this will at least initially be through people’s recognition in their own experience of the motivational structure to which the theory draws attention. Unfortunately this cannot be demonstrated at will in the way in which the Gestaltists could demonstrate their principles, because motivation cannot be so easily manipulated as perception for demonstration purposes. And the structures are a little more difficult to discern because they are structures *of* experience rather than structures *within* experience; or to put it another way, they are about the *way* in which experience is interpreted rather than with perceived objects and events *within* experience. But it is still possible for people to look out for the structures identified by the theory in the course of self-observation in everyday life.

Structural Phenomenology

Since the two words which go to make up the phrase ‘structural phenomenology’ can each be construed in a variety of different ways, something should be said about the meaning which each is intended to convey here. It should be clear already that neither word is being used in its strictest sense, since in this case the phrase ‘structural phenomenology’ would be self-contradictory. Thus the word ‘structural’ as it is used today in the social sciences (rather than in early introspective psychology) means that the set of phenomena being studied are being interpreted as if together they constituted a language. In these terms understanding a phenomenon means understanding its *relationship* to other members of an identifiable set of phenomena; its meaning inheres



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in its relationships. Phenomenology in its strictest Husserlian sense, on the other hand, is about understanding the 'essences' of phenomena—intuiting them directly and discovering what they are *in themselves*. An essence may of course itself have a structure of some kind, but uncovering this is not the same as understanding it in relation to some larger structure of which it may be only a part. (It is also possible to search for essential relationships among essences, but again the relationship should be intuited directly rather than understood in relation to other relationships.) From these strict points of view, then, understanding has to be either structural or phenomenological, and it would make little sense to talk of a 'structural phenomenology'.

However, both of these terms can also be used in a broader sense, and in this broader sense there need be no contradiction between them. The word 'structural' can be used broadly to mean a search for structure of *any* kind, not just structure on the linguistic analogy. Any kind of structure which underlies a complicated set of events can count, linguistic structure being a special case. This is for example the way in which Piaget (1971) uses the term; and when used in this way structuralism becomes coterminous with cybernetics and system theory. 'Phenomenological' in its broader sense implies a primary concern with experience rather than behavior, and phenomenological psychology then becomes the study of the way in which the individual himself understands what he is doing, why he is doing it, and how he feels about it. This is of course the sense in which the term is generally used today in the English-speaking world, and in this sense phenomenological psychology (or psychiatry) includes the otherwise disparate approaches of such figures as Carl Rogers, Fritz Heider, George Kelly and Rom Harré. When the terms 'structural' and 'phenomenology' are used in these broader senses, 'structural phenomenology' then means the search for structure underlying the complexity of experience. Rather than being a self-contradiction, the phrase denotes a meaningful and distinctive area of study.

Although when the terms are used in this way the contradiction between them is removed, an inner tension still remains. Historically, the thrust of phenomenology and of structuralism has been in very different directions, and something of this remains even when the terms are used broadly. Husserl's phenomenology led, especially through the work of Heidegger and Sartre, into existentialism, with its emphasis on free-will and its notion that every person is ultimately in conscious control of his own destiny. For Sartre, indeed, consciousness and freedom were essentially the same thing. Structuralism, on the other hand has tended to



be deterministic and has emphasized the way in which individuals express cultural structures which are outside their control and of which they may even be unaware. This has been put dramatically by Lévi-Strauss in relation to myths when he argues that "myths think themselves out in men and without men's knowledge" (Lévi-Strauss, 1964). Structuralism therefore merges in one direction into the determinism of psychoanalysis. Indeed it has been argued that Lévi-Strauss's structuralism is merely "a hygienically de-libidinized version of Freudianism" (Badcock, 1975, p. 109). In a rather different direction, as already noted, structuralism merges into cybernetics with its overriding mechanistic philosophy, and structuralism therefore tends to be deterministic in this sense too. It is of course possible to avoid conflict between the philosophies of structuralism and phenomenology by supposing for example that certain structures constitute a rigid framework within which free choice is possible. Thus it would be possible to assume that the syntax of language unconsciously determines the way in which one says things, but not necessarily the things which one chooses to say. Nevertheless some element of tension remains if one attempts to practice structural phenomenology; in developing reversal theory we have tried to harness this tension in a creative way.

Reversal Theory and Meta-Motivational States

In relation to the experience of motivation, reversal theory is concerned not so much with the contents of this experience—the goals, routes to goals, and the sensations and emotions that relate to motivation—as with the way in which these are interpreted by the individual. Our self-observation leads us to the conclusion that motivation is interpreted by means of pairs of what we call '*meta-motivational*' states. Each of these pairs is *disjunctive* in the sense that *either* one or the other is operative at a given moment. For each pair, one or the other is operative at all times during conscious waking life, but reversal from one to the other is also always possible.

The pair to which most attention has been devoted so far in developing the theory is one whose two members have been labelled 'telic' and 'paratelic' respectively. The telic state is defined as a state in which the individual sees himself to be pursuing an essential goal. (The word telic is derived from the Greek 'telos' meaning 'goal' or 'end'.) The paratelic state, in contrast, is defined as a state in which the individual does not see himself to be pursuing an essential goal. (The word paratelic is obtained



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by adding ‘para’ from the Greek word meaning ‘alongside’ to ‘telic’.) There may still be a goal in the paratelic state but, if there is one, it is not seen as being essential; rather, it can be changed or even dropped without it being felt (at that time) that important consequences would ensue. It should be emphasized that in saying that in the telic state the goals are essential, the definition of ‘essential’ is phenomenological rather than biological or social: ‘essential’ means what the individual himself, rather than some external observer, sees as being essential.

The telic state of mind, then, is a serious one, the paratelic state being more light-hearted and even playful. In the former the activity is seen as having some significance beyond itself; in the latter it is carried out for its own sake. In the former the orientation tends to be towards the future, in the latter it is more towards the “here and now,” and the enjoyment of the ongoing activity or experience in itself. In short, if the individual would prefer his activity to be already successfully completed, he may be said to be in the telic state; if he would prefer to be in the course of performing the activity, he may be said to be in the paratelic state.

A student working towards an examination, a surgeon carrying out an operation, a juryman trying to make up his mind during a court case, an applicant attending an interview for a job, or a pilot during take-off, would all be likely to be in a telic state of mind. In contrast, the same student dancing at a ‘disco’, or the surgeon having a drink in his local pub, or the juryman watching television, or the applicant going for a swim, or the pilot playing golf, would all be likely to be in the paratelic state. (More detailed examples and descriptions of experience in each state will be found in Apter, in press.)

One can never be certain, however, which meta-motivational state someone is in from the behavior they are performing at the time in question. Thus a particular student may be in a telic state at the ‘disco’ if he has some serious goal (perhaps his self-esteem depends on impressing his girl-friend, for example) whereas he may be in a paratelic state during a particular examination if the outcome or even the completion of the examination is of little importance for him. Furthermore, a person may move from one way of interpreting his motivation to another during the course of the same activity—the student may switch between states during the course of an evening at the ‘disco’, and might even fluctuate between the two in the course of the same dance. For reasons such as these, then, such states of mind cannot be defined through overt behavior, but must always be defined phenomenologically.

Self-observation further discloses, we believe, that the telic and paratelic states tend to be associated with a number of features over and



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above those which have been indicated so far. One of these concerns arousal. In the telic state of mind arousal is felt as unpleasant and tends to be avoided as far as possible, whereas in the paratelic state of mind the opposite is the case and arousal is felt as pleasant and sought. The greater the arousal, the less it appears to be enjoyed in the telic state—telic high arousal is what is described by such words as ‘anxiety’ or ‘fear’ or ‘stress’. In contrast, in the paratelic state the greater the arousal the more it appears to be enjoyed—in this case the feeling of high arousal is described by such words as ‘excitement’ or ‘exhilaration’ or even ‘euphoria’. So if a goal is felt to be essential, then the arousal associated with its non-attainment will be experienced as unpleasant and the pursuit of the goal is at the same time an attempt to reduce the arousal. If, however, the orientation is towards the behavior and associated experiences, then the greater the intensity of these experiences, including intensity of felt arousal, the greater the pleasure which will be obtained.

Since this arousal-interpretation feature of the two states is logically independent of the telic-paratelic dimension, this aspect of the experience of motivation can be said to constitute another dimension and involve another pair of meta-motivational states. We have labelled this pair ‘arousal-avoidance’ and ‘arousal-seeking’. It is then possible to say that arousal-avoidance tends to be linked to the telic state and arousal-seeking to the paratelic state. If the pursuit of a goal is exciting then one must suspect that it is the pursuit itself which is the most salient part of the experience; if the pursuit is accompanied by anxiety then it is likely that the goal is felt to have overriding importance and to be of crucial significance to the individual, beyond itself. Naturally, the pursuit of a given goal may be felt in each of these ways at different times.

Since most emotions involve arousal it will further be noticed that in the arousal-avoidance state emotions of all kinds tend to be felt as unpleasant and in the arousal-seeking state they tend to be felt as pleasant. Furthermore, honest self-observation has led us to the view that emotions which are supposed to be unpleasant can take on an ‘as if’ form and be felt as pleasant in the arousal-seeking state. We call these emotions '*parapathic*' emotions. They include therefore such ‘unpleasant’ emotions as anger, fear, disgust and even grief. If they lose this ‘as if’ quality, of course, there will be a switch to the arousal-avoidance state in which, once more, they will be felt as unpleasant. An obvious way of illustrating such emotions is by referring to the emotions which one feels in following a work of fiction, be it in the form of a novel or a play or a film. Here one is able to go through the whole gamut of emotions, including such emotions as disgust and grief and anger, and enjoy them



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all thoroughly; at the same time one realises that the emotions one feels have a special, slightly unreal, quality.

In the language of structuralism we could say that a pair of meta-motivational states such as the telic and paratelic states or the arousal-avoidance and arousal-seeking states, constitute a *binary opposition*. If we put this in the language of cybernetics we could say that two such states constitute a *bistable system*—like a light switch with its two stable states of ‘on’ and ‘off’. Actually, a more precise cybernetic analogy would be with a computer with two alternative programs between which it switches in processing a body of data.

If the alternative stable states can be seen as being opposite to each other in some respect, as we believe is the case with meta-motivational states, then a switch from one to the other can meaningfully be called a *reversal*. It is because of the central place which switches of this kind have in the theory of motivation which we are developing, that we have called it ‘reversal theory’. Much of the theory deals with the factors which induce such reversals and the effects in experiential and behavioral terms of being in one state rather than its opposite in different situations. It also attempts to identify typical sequences of reversals in the course of everyday experience. The bias which individuals may have in favor of one meta-motivational state rather than the other in a pair is also being studied in terms of the theory.

Using the term ‘reversal’ is likely to put psychologists in mind of perceptual reversals such as the Necker cube reversal or figure-ground reversals. In fact there is a certain kind of formal similarity between telic-paratelic reversals and figure-ground reversals. If we think of the figure as being the focus of interest, then in the telic state the figure is the goal, with the behavior needed to achieve that goal being of subsidiary importance and therefore in this sense part of the ground; in the paratelic state, the behavior, or the feelings, sensations and emotions connected with the behavior, can in the same sense be seen as the figure, while the goal (if there is one) can be seen as part of the ground. To put this in another way, in the telic state the goal is fixed and the activity required to achieve it is relatively flexible; in the paratelic state the activity is fixed, and the goal is relatively arbitrary. And just as figure-ground reversal occurs in relation to a given perceptual situation the objective features of which do not themselves change, so meta-motivational reversals can occur in the way just described, during the course of a particular activity; and this may not be obvious from objective features of this activity. For example, during a serious meeting in which it is important to achieve



certain ends, irrespective of the means used, one may nevertheless switch occasionally into a mode in which one finds oneself enjoying the use of one's argumentative skills, and the social interaction involved, the outcome momentarily slipping into the background. Or in playing golf, especially if one is playing badly and self-esteem is threatened, one may shift into a state in which the outcome is everything, and the enjoyment of the skill, sensations and other pleasures that go with the game becomes of secondary importance. This does not mean that the goal is totally lost sight of in the meeting when one is enjoying the interaction, or that the pleasant feelings associated with playing golf disappear when the game is being played in the telic state; what it does mean is that the orientation of one's experience is toward the interaction in itself in the former case and toward the threat to self-esteem in the latter.

It should now be clearer why such states as the telic and paratelic states have been described as 'meta-motivational'. This is because they are defined at a level which is higher than that of any particular goals or particular activities. They denote something *about* the phenomenological nature of the goals and activities, whatever these goals and activities happen to be. That is, the interpretation of the experience of motivation is different in each state—even if the goals and activities are otherwise identical. The telic and paratelic states therefore in no way represent a classification of different goals and activities; and although some goals may be more likely to be pursued in one state rather than the other for a given person, a wide range of different goals may be pursued, or activities performed, in each state at different times by that person. In a similar way, the arousal-seeking and arousal-avoidance states denote something *about* the way in which arousal is interpreted, and in principle any level of arousal can occur in either state: these states therefore denote something *about* this aspect of the experience of motivation.

Cognitive Synergy

The relationship between pairs of meta-motivational states appears always to be a *disjunctive* one—the two states are mutually exclusive so that only one or the other can be operative at a given time. Now it might seem that to say that two ways of interpreting experience are mutually exclusive would imply that their relationship is necessarily disjunctive, and logically this must of course be the case. Psychologically, however, there are some situations in which opposite interpretations may be attributed simultaneously to the same phenomenon, and when this



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occurs we may say that the relationship between the different interpretations is *conjunctive* rather than disjunctive. Indeed, it is difficult to go far in any structural-phenomenological investigation without coming across instances of such conjuctions, and they appear to connect up with meta-motivational disjunctions in an interesting way.

The most salient property of such conjunctions is brought out by the term which is used to refer to them in reversal theory: they are called ‘synergies’ or, more strictly, ‘cognitive synergies’. The term ‘synergy’ (from the Greek word *ergos* meaning ‘work’ and *syn* meaning ‘together’) implies that two different factors work together in such a way as to produce an effect over and above that which could have been produced by either one alone or by both independently. In medicine, for example, the term is used to describe what happens when two drugs which are administered simultaneously to a patient have effects which could not have been brought about by either of them acting on their own. Cognitive synergies then are different—indeed mutually-exclusive—interpretations which are both assigned to the same identity (e.g., object or person or event), and which between them produce a phenomenological effect which could not have been produced by either interpretation alone.

The effect which a synergy has depends on whether the telic or paratelic state is prevailing at the time. In the telic state the effect seems to be a kind of discomfort expressed in such words as ‘dissonance’ or ‘ambiguity’ or ‘incongruity’. In the paratelic state the effect seems to be a kind of ‘magic’ or ‘fascination’, the exact quality of which depends on the nature of the conjunction. As a consequence, cognitive synergies appear to be avoided in the telic state but sought out and even specially constructed in the paratelic state.

Examples of synergies in the telic state hardly need to be detailed, since the social psychological literature on attitude change abounds with them—as does the writings of social anthropologists like Mary Douglas (1966) and Edmund Leach (1976). It is of more interest here to look at some examples of the kinds of synergy which occur in the paratelic state. There are a number of categories of which the following three are among the more obvious.

One prevalent type of synergy is represented by all kinds of make-believe. A given object or event may have a set of real characteristics, but in imagination a number of these characteristics might have opposite characteristics substituted for them. These opposite characteristics may be suggested in some way by the real object, but nevertheless remain mutually-exclusive, and both the real and imaginary characteristics are

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simultaneously part of the individual's understanding of the object. A child's model car, for example, suggests a real car, and some of the characteristics of the toy and the imaginary car which it suggests remain the same: the overall shape, the colour, the presence of four wheels, and so on. Certain of the characteristics, however, are opposite: thus the toy is small, the real car which it suggests is large. The 'toyness' of the model car derives in part from this conjunction of opposites: if the model was seen as a small strangely shaped lump of plastic which did not represent anything, then there would be no synergy. If it was a real car, then again there would, at least in this respect, not be a synergy. The fascination comes from its both being and not-being a small lump of plastic, or, to put it the other way round, its both being and not-being a car. There is a tension between these two meanings which children (and adults) appear to find fascinating. And although a real car may provide pleasures of various kinds, one suspects that it only rarely provides adults with the intense delight they experienced as children with toy cars. However, to enjoy such synergies one needs to be in a paratelic state of mind.

Any object of art which is representational is also a make-believe synergy in this sense: at the most general level it both is and is not what it appears to be, and many of the characteristics of the object will be opposite to the characteristics of that which is depicted. A statue may be hard and rigid, the living body represented by it soft and flexible; a painting may be flat, small and motionless but the scene it depicts three-dimensional, spacious and moving. The statue is seen as both marble and living flesh, the painting as both paint-and-canvas and, let us say, a mountain-with-a-lake. The 'magic' comes with the trick of such artworks which suggest something which they are not, while at the same time clearly remaining what they are.

In make-believe synergies, then, a whole set of mutually-exclusive characteristics may be brought together in such a way that each pair of such characteristics may be part of the experience, and part of the meaning assigned to the object or event. And all these separate synergies are subsumed by an overriding synergy between 'reality' and 'imagination'.

'Sacredness' represents a second kind of synergy. Here the two overriding categories are not 'reality' and 'imagination', but 'natural' and 'supernatural'. Of course if one does not believe in the supernatural, then such synergies become make-believe ones again; but if one does believe, then the quality of the synergy is clearly different. For example, the sacramental wine and wafer used in the Mass in Christian worship are seen by worshippers as being both real wine and real wafer in the natural



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world, but at a supernatural level are seen as the body and blood of Christ. Similarly, holy relics in Christianity and other religions are understood as being both of this world and in some sense part of some other world that goes beyond this one. The same applies in many religions, and Christianity in its origins, in relation to religious leaders who are construed as being simultaneously man and god. In secular culture, the nearest one comes to experiencing ‘sacredness’ synergies is probably in relation to special days, like Christmas, which are both part of the calendar and to this extent part of real time, but also in some way outside the calendar in a special time of their own; this synergy then provides some of the ‘magic’ that is felt even by non-Christians, in relation to Christmas. (The way in which these ‘sacredness’ synergies arise, and are experienced in, the telic and paratelic states is discussed further in Apter and Smith, 1977a.)

A third type of synergy is that which is involved in humor. The difference between humor synergies and make-believe synergies is complicated and subtle, and we cannot elaborate on all the various aspects here. But the key difference can perhaps be brought out by saying that whereas a make-believe synergy involves the conjunction of ‘reality’ and ‘imagination’, humor involves the conjunction of ‘reality’ and ‘appearance’. In make-believe the imaginary characteristics, although they may be suggested by some of the real characteristics, nevertheless require an act of imagination on the part of the perceiver. In humor, the imaginary characteristics purport to be the real ones and the perceiver has to ‘see through them’: instead of adding something to produce a synergy, the individual has to strip something away. So the purported reality turns out to be only an appearance, the real and apparent characteristics then combining into a single conjunction of these opposite interpretations. Thus a man dressed as a woman appears to be a woman, but turns out to be a man; in this respect he purports to be something he is not. Similarly, Charlie Chaplin’s tramp purports to be a dandy and Peanuts to be an adult; in both these cases the appearance belies the reality. In verbal humor a statement appears to say one thing but in actuality says something quite different. By contrast, a toy car at no stage appears to be a real car or purports to be what it is not. In short, a make-believe synergy is in some sense invented, whereas a humor synergy is discovered. There is much more to humor than this, but this is enough at least to indicate that synergy is one of the factors involved, and that the synergy is of a distinctive kind. As with make-believe synergies, the enjoyment of humor takes place in the paratelic state, and part of the function of a



humorous situation is to induce and maintain this state. (The way in which this occurs is explained in Apter and Smith, 1977b.)

It will now be appreciated that synergies typically have a two-level structure: at the most general level they involve opposite dimensions of interpretation being brought to bear on the same identity—like the dimensions of real and imaginary or the dimensions of natural and supernatural. At a more concrete level a particular synergy will involve a number of particular opposites being combined—like large and small, male and female, strong and weak, stationary and moving, rich and poor.

Conclusion

It has now been shown, albeit briefly, how structures may be discerned in the way in which experience is interpreted. The identification of such disjunctive and conjunctive structures as those which have been discussed here has made it possible to give a new ("reversal theory") interpretation to a variety of psychological processes, including those involved in religion (Apter and Smith, 1977a), humor (Apter and Smith, 1977b, Apter, in press, a) sexual behavior (Apter and Smith 1978a, 1978b, 1979a), and negativism (Apter and Smith, 1976). It has also been found possible to use the insights gained in the practical setting of a child guidance clinic (Smith and Apter, 1978, Apter and Smith, 1979b).

More significantly, perhaps, the theory of reversals calls into question some general assumptions which appear to underlie most of present-day psychology. In particular it questions the notion of homeostasis which underlies most theories of motivation, and suggests that this should be replaced, or extended, by the notion of bistability; and it challenges the idea that man always seeks to avoid ambiguity and inconsistency and suggests instead that man often takes great delight in the complexities of contradiction.

The point of discussing reversal theory here has principally been to demonstrate the viability of a structural phenomenological approach by showing how it can work out in practice, and to provide something of the distinctive flavor of the approach. What has not been possible in the space of a single paper has been to give any extended descriptive examples of the experience of different meta-motivational states, to discuss any of the many epistemological issues which are raised, or to address in any detail the question of the way in which this approach might



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resemble or differ from other approaches which have been variously labelled 'phenomenological'. It is, however, intended to deal with these matters in later publications.

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