

# Problem set 4

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1. The point estimates are presented in the following table:

	$MC_H(p)$	$MC_L(p)$	$MC_S(p)$
intercept	-120.92	-94.04	3.01
slope	1.06	1.02	0.98

Use the delta method to calculate standard errors:

$$Var(\mu_H) = Var(\gamma_H) + Var(\delta_H)(\frac{\alpha}{\beta})^2 + (\frac{\delta_H}{\beta})^2 Var(\alpha) + (\frac{\alpha\delta_H}{\beta^2})^2 Var(\beta)$$


$$SE(\mu_H) = \sqrt{Var(\mu_H)} \approx 22.440$$

$$Var(\nu_H) = 4Var(\delta_H)$$

$$SE(\nu_H) = \sqrt{Var(\nu_H)} \approx 0.037$$

2. Plotting  $D(p)$ ,  $AIC_H(p)$ ,  $MC_H(p)$  and data points in the same figure: Since the marginal cost curve is downward sloping, this figure features adverse selection, where customers with the highest willingness to pay also have the highest expected costs.

Efficient point: Demand curve intersects with the MC curve.



Competitive equilibrium point: Demand curve intersects with  $AIC_H$  curve, which we denote as point A.

In the competitive market there would be underprovision of the high coverage plan because of adverse selection.

DWL: The area to the right of vertical line going through point A and between the demand and  $MC_H$  lines.

3. The  $MC_H$  curve lies above the  $MC_L$  curve, but they are very close. If we fail to reject the null hypothesis of  $MC_H \neq MC_L$ , it implies there is moral hazard. If we reject the null hypothesis, we couldn't conclude that there is no moral hazard. We need to directly compare  $MC_H$  and  $MC_S$ .
4. Leave out  $MC_L(p)$  and plot  $MC_S(p)$ . The  $MC_S$  curve is above the  $MC_H$  curve and they are quite far away depending on the point estimates. If we fail to reject that  $MC_H \neq MC_S$ , there exists moral hazard. If we reject it, it implies there is no moral hazard.

