

# POLICE OFFICER ASSIGNMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME

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# Introduction

- ◀ This paper studies the impact of Chicago's seniority-based mechanism for allocating police officers to districts.
- ◀ Experienced officers self select into safer districts. They also deter violent crime and use less force.
- ◀ Key contribution: the first to examine the economic implications of police officer assignment mechanisms empirically.
- ◀ Model: officer preferences + crime production function.
- ◀ Counterfactual: offer subsidies to incentivize officers to choose less desirable districts.

# Findings

- ◀ Model: increasing the share of more experienced officers in a district reduces violent crime, while having a negligible impact on property crime.
- ◀ Counterfactual: equalizing tenure across districts leads to a sizable decline in the aggregate violent crime rate while having little impact on property crime. There is a substantial reduction of violent crime in the highest crime districts.

# Discussion

- ◀ This paper solves the endogeneity issue very cleverly: exploiting the rigid structure of police 4+2 shift schedule and using the simulated IV.
- ◀ Is it sensible to assume that the police officers are risk-neutral? Does it make sense to assume linear additively separable utility function? Partial identification good enough?