

Assignment 3

Submission

Team Members:

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
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Md Raihan Ahmed (u1374605)

Part A:


1. What is the machine user's name?



```
Command Prompt
C:\Users\victim1>whoami
victim-pc\victim1
C:\Users\victim1>
```


Ans: victim1

2. What time was the user's most recent login? Convert the time to UTC.



Ans: **21/11/2023 4:34:39 pm** (From Event ID:4624)

3. A TXT file was deleted. What is the SHA256 hash value of the zip file?



We went to the Recycle Bin and found a file named “**cmd_history.txt**”.

The SHA256 hash of this file is:

"990D093306FD2F8C480F84367BF66BB7FC9A5D67541C05DCA97111DA0A0BDEA2".

4. RID questions:

a. How many users have a RID of 1000 or above on the machine?

Using command: "Get-LocalUser | Select-Object SID"

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\victim1\topSecret\keep-it-secret> Get-LocalUser | Select-Object SID
SID
---
S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-500
S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-503
S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-501
S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-1003
S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-504
```

Answer: 1 (1003)

b. What is the account name for RID of 501?

Using command: "wmic useraccount get name, sid"

```
PS C:\Users\victim1\topSecret\keep-it-secret> wmic useraccount get name,sid
Name SID
Administrator S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-500
DefaultAccount S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-503
Guest S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-501
victim1 S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-1003
WDAGUtilityAccount S-1-5-21-271853984-2378250948-965456637-504
```


Answer: Guest

c. What is the account name for RID of 1003?

Using command: "wmic useraccount get name, sid"


Answer: victim1

5. User-specific questions:



Name	Date modified	Type	Size
Favicons-journal	5/12/2023 4:12 pm	File	0 KB
heavy_ad_intervention_opt_out	1/5/2023 3:08 pm	Data Base File	16 KB
heavy_ad_intervention_opt_out.db-journal	1/5/2023 3:08 pm	DB-JOURNAL File	0 KB
History	5/12/2023 4:25 pm	File	164 KB

For this, we copied the 'History' DB from
"C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default" and
opened it on SQLite Viewer.



id	url	title	visit_count
1	http://192.168.56.1...		1
2	http://normal-web....		1
3	http://not-that-nor...	Directory listing for /	1

- How many times did the user visit <http://not-that-normal.site>?
1
- How many times did the user visit <http://normal-web.site>:8000?
1
- How many times did the user visit <https://www.live.com>?
0

Part B:

1. What is the security incident?


The security incident is that on 2022-01-07 at 09:07:32 UTC, a Windows host was infected with “**OskiStealer C2**” malware.

We found a suspicious IP in Wireshark through packet analysis in an HTTP request created from 192.168.1.216 at the aforementioned time.

2022-01-07 09:07:32.212441 192.168.1.216 2.56.57.108 HTTP 539 POST /osk//6.jpg HTTP/1.1

```
\r\n
[Full request URI: http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg]
[HTTP request 1/9]
```


This requested suspicious URI was “<http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg>”. We looked up the IP on VirusTotal and saw that the IP is malicious.



We dumped the file from the pcap and submitted it to VirusTotal and got the result as Malicious.

MalwareBazaar Database

This page let you download the following malware sample: SHA256 c30ce79d7b5b0708dc03f1532fa89afd4efd732531cb557dc31fe63acd5bc1ce



2. What is the identity of the victim?

a. **Victim IP: 192.168.1.216**

Using filter (http) which requests <http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg>

```

> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.1.216, Dst: 2.56.57.108
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49738, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, A
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  > POST /osk//6.jpg HTTP/1.1\r\n
    Accept: text/html, application/xml;q=0.9, application/xhtml+xml, imag
    Accept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\r\n
    Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1, utf-8, utf-16, *,q=0.1\r\n
    Accept-Encoding: deflate, gzip, x-gzip, identity, *,q=0\r\n
    Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=1BEF0A57BE110FD467A\r\n
  > Content-Length: 25\r\n
    Host: 2.56.57.108\r\n
    Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
    Cache-Control: no-cache\r\n
    \r\n
    [Full request URI: http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg]
```

b. **MAC Address: ASUSTTekC 32:58:f9 (9c:5c:8e:32:58:f9)**

Using filter (arp)

```

- Address Resolution Protocol (ARP Probe)
  Hardware type: Ethernet (1)
  Protocol type: IPv4 (0x0800)
  Hardware size: 6
  Protocol size: 4
  Opcode: request (1)
  [Is probe: True]
  Sender MAC address: ASUSTekC_32:58:f9 (9c:5c:8e:32:58:f9)
  Sender IP address: 0.0.0.0
  Target MAC address: 00:00:00_00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00)
  Target IP address: 192.168.1.216
```

c. **Computer Name: DESKTOP-GXNYNO2**

Using filter (dhcp)

```
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (Request)
  Message type: Boot Request (1)
  Hardware type: Ethernet (0x01)
  Hardware address length: 6
  Hops: 0
  Transaction ID: 0x6144ca1c
  Seconds elapsed: 0
  ▶ Bootp flags: 0x0000 (Unicast)
  Client IP address: 0.0.0.0
  Your (client) IP address: 0.0.0.0
  Next server IP address: 0.0.0.0
  Relay agent IP address: 0.0.0.0
  Client MAC address: ASUSTekC_32:58:f9 (9c:5c:8e:32:58:f9)
  Client hardware address padding: 00000000000000000000
  Server host name not given
  Boot file name not given
  Magic cookie: DHCP
  ▶ Option: (53) DHCP Message Type (Request)
  ▶ Option: (61) Client identifier
  ▶ Option: (50) Requested IP Address (192.168.1.216)
  ▶ Option: (12) Host Name
    Length: 15
    Host Name: DESKTOP-GXMYNO2
```

d. **Username: SPOONWATCH**


Using filter (nbns)

```
NetBIOS Name Service
  Transaction ID: 0x9e17
  ▶ Flags: 0x2900, Opcode: Registration, Recursion desired
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 0
  Authority RRs: 0
  Additional RRs: 1
  ▶ Queries
  ▶ Additional records
    ▶ SPOONWATCH<00>: type NB, class IN
      Name: SPOONWATCH<00> (Workstation/Redirector)
      Type: NB (32)
      Class: IN (1)
      Time to live: 3 days, 11 hours, 20 minutes
      Data length: 6
      ▶ Name flags: 0xe000, Name type, ONT: Unknown (H-node, group)
      Addr: 192.168.1.216
```


3. What is the evidence of attack (i.e., that the machine has been attacked)?

Following the steps in Question 1, we saw that the victim requested URI [“http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg”](http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg).

We looked up the IP in VirusTotal and saw that the IP is malicious.



We downloaded the file and submitted it to VirusTotal and got the result as Malicious.



ABUSE|^{ch}

abuse_ch

OskiStealer C2:
<http://2.56.57.108/osk//6.jpg>

Part C:

1. Please identify the Windows Major Version (e.g., XP, Vista, Windows 8, etc.), bit version (32-bit or 64-bit), and the image date/time (please use UTC).

```
(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw windows.info.Info
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
Variable Value
Kernel Base 0xf80155406000
DTB 0x1aa000
Symbols file:///home/kali/volatility3/volatility3/symbols/windows/ntkrnlmp.pdb/769C521E4833ECF72E21F02BF33691A5-1.json.xz
Is64Bit True
IsPAE False
layer_name 0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer 1 FileLayer
KdVersionBlock 0xf80156015368
Major/Minor 15.19041
MachineType 34404
KeNumberProcessors 4
SystemTime 2023-05-01 23:16:58
NtSystemRoot C:\Windows
NtProductType NtProductWinNt
NtMajorVersion 10
NtMinorVersion 0
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0
PE Machine 34404
PE TimeDateStamp Tue Oct 11 07:04:26 1977
```

Windows Version: Windows 10
Bit Version: 64 because 64 Bit is True
Image date/time: 2023-05-01 23:16:58

2. What is the name of the computer?

```
(kali@kali)~[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw windows.registry.printkey --key "ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName"
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
Last Write Time Hive Offset Type Key Name Data Volatile
- 0xd08de1464000 Key ?\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName - -
2023-05-01 21:07:57.000000 0xd08de1489000 REG_SZ \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName "mnmsrvc" False
2023-05-01 21:07:57.000000 0xd08de1489000 REG_SZ \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName "VICTIM-PC" False
- 0xd08de1497000 Key ?\ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName - -
```

Computer Name: **VICTIM-PC**

3. What is the name of the malicious process?

The malicious process appears to be **conhost.exe** which is started by **cmd.exe**, which is in turn initiated by **MSID942.tmp** from an abnormal location.

```
(kali@kali)~[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw -o ~/Downloads/dump windows.dumpfiles --pid 1912
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
Cache FileObject FileName Result
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8dd8e4f0 ntdll.dll file.0xbe8dd8e4f0.0xbe8dd8e69bc0.ImageSectionObject.ntdll.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8de0a5d7c0 MSID942.tmp file.0xbe8de0a5d7c0.0xbe8dd89fdb90.ImageSectionObject.MSID942.tmp.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8ddafc33e0 kernelBase.dll file.0xbe8ddafc33e0.0xbe8ddab074a0.ImageSectionObject.kernelBase.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8de069e3e0 wsock32.dll file.0xbe8de069e3e0.0xbe8de0815dc0.ImageSectionObject.wsock32.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8de06a3200 mssock.dll file.0xbe8de06a3200.0xbe8ddfc4cc10.ImageSectionObject.mssock.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8de02cc9f0 apphelp.dll file.0xbe8de02cc9f0.0xbe8ddfee88b0.ImageSectionObject.apphelp.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8ddafc4830 rpcrt4.dll file.0xbe8ddafc4830.0xbe8ddab07960.ImageSectionObject.rpcrt4.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8dde08d6a0 sechost.dll file.0xbe8dde08d6a0.0xbe8ddab04740.ImageSectionObject.sechost.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8ddafc3890 kernel32.dll file.0xbe8ddafc3890.0xbe8ddab05bd0.ImageSectionObject.kernel32.dll.img
ImageSectionObject 0xbe8ddafc3a20 ws2_32.dll file.0xbe8ddafc3a20.0xbe8ddab06840.ImageSectionObject.ws2_32.dll.img
```

MSID942.tmp has a PID of 1912 and runs **cmd.exe**, which calls **conhost.exe**.

```
5092 svchost.exe C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k WbioSvcG
1912 MSID942.tmp "C:\Windows\Installer\MSID942.tmp"
564 cmd.exe cmd
4444 conhost.exe \??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0x4
5460 SystemSettings
```

Details of each of these processes:

```
(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw windows.pslist --pid 4444
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
PID PPID ImageFileName Offset(V) Threads Handles SessionId Wow64 CreateTime ExitTime File output
4444 564 conhost.exe 0xbe8ddad61300 4 - 1 False 2023-05-01 23:16:26.000000 N/A Disabled

(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw windows.pslist --pid 564
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
PID PPID ImageFileName Offset(V) Threads Handles SessionId Wow64 CreateTime ExitTime File output
564 1912 cmd.exe 0xbe8dde506080 2 - 1 True 2023-05-01 23:16:26.000000 N/A Disabled

(kali@kali)-[~/volatility3]
$ python vol.py -f ~/Downloads/phymem.raw windows.pslist --pid 1912
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
PDB scanning finished
PID PPID ImageFileName Offset(V) Threads Handles SessionId Wow64 CreateTime ExitTime File output
1912 5972 MSID942.tmp 0xbe8ddac972c0 1 - 1 True 2023-05-01 23:16:26.000000 N/A Disabled
```

4. What is the SHA1 checksum of the program supporting the malicious process?

The SHA1 hash of the malicious program [MSID942.tmp] is:
d87f57e9b41cce328455a86e92d0f1773aceb55f

```
MD5 7642b2813017d2a98f3a14520ab3a84c
SHA-1 d87f57e9b41cce328455a86e92d0f1773aceb55f
SHA-256 2610cd8557d56f679f493a23995a1577379fead9792e44a4884756821e609b66
Vhash 074046150d051z
Authenthash bccae5418d40b30c58240896c07d84418c47233fd15afe626f202fc44e510ee7
Rich PE header hash a7016ce5cb15a8644d2a00d0e692d936
SSDEEP 384:lsHzMid7I08ebwH64Ni7ggLgpl7wLdfusq3:lsH5ZIZpHbgApiMLfjq3
TLSH T18A738E421FF80439E1B3B756ABE253895207C5DED7A574F52C5CA492E30E60AB30F26
File type Win32 EXE executable windows win32 pe peexe
Magic PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
TrID Win32 Executable (generic) (35.7%) | Windows Icons Library (generic) (16.3%) | OS/2 Executable (generic) (16.1%) | Generic Win/DOS Executable (15.8%) | DOS Executable Generic (15.8%)
DetectItEasy PE32 | Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++ (12.20.9044) [C] | Linker: Microsoft Linker (6.00.8047) | Tool: Visual Studio (6.0)
File size 72.00 KB (73728 bytes)
```

Which is malicious:

45

172

Community Score

45 security vendors and 2 sandboxes flagged this file as malicious

ReanalyzeSimilarMore

2610cd8557d56f679f493a23995a1577379fead9792e44a4884756821e609b66

Size72.00 KB

Last Analysis Date3 days ago

EXE

ob.exe

peexechecks-user-inputidle

DETECTION

DETAILS

RELATIONS

BEHAVIOR

COMMUNITY5

Join the VT Community and enjoy additional community insights and crowdsourced detections, plus an API key to automate checks.

Popular threat label

trojan.cryptz/marte

Threat categories

trojanhacktool

Family labels

cryptzmarteswroot

Security vendors' analysis

Do you want to automate checks?

ALYac	Trojan.CryptZ.Marte.1.Gen	AntiY-AVL	Trojan/Win32.Rozena.ed
Arcabit	Trojan.CryptZ.Marte.1.Gen	Avast	Win32:SwPatch [Wrm]
AVG	Win32:SwPatch [Wrm]	Avira (no cloud)	TR/Patched.Gen2
BitDefender	Trojan.CryptZ.Marte.1.Gen	BitDefenderTheta	Gen:NN.ZexaF.36608.eq0@aOfw6Dki
Bkav Pro	W32.AIDetectMalware	ClamAV	Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7
CrowdStrike Falcon	Win/malicious_confidence_90% (D)	Cylance	Unsafe
Cynet	Malicious (score: 99)	DeepInstinct	MALICIOUS
DrWeb	BackDoor.Meterpreter.259	Elastic	Windows.Trojan.Metasploit
Emsisoft	Trojan.CryptZ.Marte.1.Gen (B)	eScan	Trojan.CryptZ.Marte.1.Gen