Exercise 3

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Notes for Week 5 readinds

Theories of International Relations (I selected optional readings)

1. Abbott and Snidal (2010)

   International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized for being ineffective. When evaluating IO performance, however, scholars and practitioners frequently focus on traditional modes of governance, such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, when they observe poor performance, they frequently recommend that those same activities be strengthened. They argue that we should consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate, including, more and more, reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities, in order to better understand and improve IO performance. They provide the Transnational Bew Governance model to fill this gap.

2. Bauer and Ege (2016)

   This paper advances a theoretical conceptualization of the bureaucratic autonomy of international secretariats and proposes an empirical yardstick for measuring it. The proposed concept of bureaucratic autonomy focuses on administrative structures and provides an indicator-based approximation for the bureaucratic capacities of international organizations in order to systematically reveal variation in intra-organizational potential for autonomous bureaucratic behavior. An empirical examination of 15 international secretariats is used to discuss the concept's utility and limitations.

3. Bayerlein, Kaplaner, Knill, and Steinebach (2020)

   Is there a significant difference between the issues on which an IO's decision-making body agrees and the issues on which the organization's administrative body deals in

practice? Or are the administration and the member states singing (to) the same song? To answer these questions, this article investigates agenda congruence in three single-purpose organizations using quantitative text analysis methods. The exploratory empirical analysis reveals that both change dynamics and agenda congruence vary significantly across organizations. According to the findings, agenda congruence decreases with delegated authority and the extent to which the administration tries to identify relevant policy issues from within the administration. Because the findings are consistent with dominant theoretical accounts, both the concept and the measurement are regarded as promising additions to the study of IOs and international public administrations.

4. Abbott and Snidal (1998)

States rely on formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both routine interactions and more dramatic events, such as international conflicts. However, current international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article investigates the functions of IOs and the properties that allow them to perform those functions in order to answer the question of why states use formal organizations. The authors examine power and distributive issues, as well as the role of IOs in creating norms and understanding, beginning with a rational-institutionalist perspective that sees IOs as enabling states to achieve their goals.Centralization and independence are identified as key characteristics of formal organizations, and their significance is demonstrated through a variety of examples. As community representatives, IOs help states create and implement community values, as well as enforce international commitments.

5. Chapman and Reiter (2004)

This paper focuses on the rally round effect. A principal agent model is used to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force are approved by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president grows significantly.

Regression analysis is used to examine rallies held during all militarized interstate conflicts from 1945 to 2001. Even after controlling for a variety of variables, the results show that UN Security Council support significantly increases the rally behind the president (by as much as 9 points in presidential approval). This finding holds true across most model specifications. Other actions by the UN or regional security organizations have little impact on rallies, making this effect unique among international institutions. These findings shed new light on how international organizations can influence state foreign policies through public opinion.

Psychological Approach to IR (I selected optional readings)

6. Daugirdas (2014)

In order to deflect threats to IOs' reputations – and to retain their efficacy, this essay claims that IOs and their member states will take steps to prevent and rectify violations of international law. Many states, international organizations (IOs), and academics have expressed skepticism about the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. This article will explain why those Articles can still have a significant practical impact. In doing so, this article fills a critical gap in the IO literature and offers a theoretical explanation for why IOs comply with international law.

7. Tallberg and Zürn (2019)

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the empirical study of legitimacy and legitimation in global governance. It considers when, how, and why international organizations (IOs) gain, maintain, and lose legitimacy in global politics. They define legitimacy as the belief that an IO's authority is being exercised appropriately, and legitimation and delegitimation as processes of justification and contestation aimed at shaping such beliefs. They then discuss the sources of variation in legitimation processes and beliefs, with a particular emphasis on the authority, procedures, and performances of IOs.

8. Dellmuth and Tallberg (2021)

This is the first systematic and comparative study of the effects of elite communication on citizen perceptions of international organizations' legitimacy (IOs). It puts these hypotheses to the test by conducting a population-based survey experiment with nearly 10,000 people from three countries in relation to five IOs. According to the evidence, communication by national governments and civil society organizations has a greater impact on perceptions of legitimacy than communication by IOs themselves.

9. Edwards (2009)

The public's perceptions of international economic organizations (IEOs) such as the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO) have received little attention. I contrast five lines of argument using a multi-country survey of developing countries, focusing on economic judgments, skills, gender, and ideology, as well as measures of involvement with the organizations themselves. Individual respondents have negative economic views if they have negative economic views. More educated respondents are more likely to view IEOs negatively. Women are more likely than men to be positive about IEOs. National levels of participation in IEOs have an impact on public perceptions of IEOs.

10. Kreps (2010)

What effect does public opinion in member countries have on alliance cohesion? This article examines public opinion data for countries that are participating in Afghanistan operations. It concludes that, despite the war's unpopularity, leaders have largely defied public opinion by not reducing or withdrawing troops from NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. As demonstrated in the article, operating through a formal institution such as NATO creates systemic incentives for long-term international cooperation. As a result, elite consensus protects leaders from electoral repercussions and provides states' commitments to Afghanistan with "stickiness" that defies negative public opinion.

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